


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INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY

OF

Philosophy, Psychology,
Psychical Research, Religion,
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VOLUME XXVI

JANUARY 1986

NUMBER 1

DEDICATION

*This 101st issue of the Darshana International
is most respectfully dedicated to*

Dr. Yaqub Masih Ph.D., D Litt.

Eminent Philosopher, Psychologist and Educationist, Retired University Professor of Philosophy, Magadh University, Ex-Pro. Vice-Chancellor, Ranchi University, Retired Chairman Bihar University Service Commission, Visiting Professor to Hungry. Visiting Professor to Shanti-niketan, President AkhilBharatiya Darshan Parishad (1986), Author of more than 18 books on Philosophy, Psychology and Religion, who has devoted his life time in serving the cause of Philosophy since he came in teaching Profession. We wish him a long and active life to serve Philosophy by his scholarly contributions.

Anurag Atreya
Managing Editor

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DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

An International Quarterly
OF
Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical
Research, Religion, Mysticism
& Sociology

VOLUME XXVI

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DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

COMPLETES TWENTY FIVE YEARS

Darshana International, after completing twenty five Years of its existence, is now entering in its twenty sixth year with this number. I am happy that the Journal has completed gracefully one quarter of a century serving the cause of Philosophy its and allied disciplines, and attracted the attention of scholars all over the world. It is all due to God's Grace, kindness of learned scholars who have contributed to this journal, Members of the Editorial Board who have been instrumental to a large extent in procuring scholarly articles for it on account of their great influence in the fields which it covers; Readers and Subscribers from India and abroad who have devoted their energies for its survival. The members of the Editorial Board have actively contributed much to help the Journal in continuing philosophical activities which has attracted the attention of scholars all over the globe. This journal now occupies a prominent place in the philosophical map of the world. We express sincerely our most heart felt and sincere thanks to our Contributors, Members of the Editorial Board and to the Subscribers who deserve our appreciation for the continued interest in its appearance. *Darshana International* has achieved an enviable status in the realm of philosophical journals of the world.

We owe to Late Sri Kowtha Suryanarayan Roy founder of Swadharma Swaarajya Sangha, and his grandson who were kind enough to associate with the activities of the *Darshana International*. Mr B V. S S Mani, the Hony Managing Director of the Swadharma Swaarajya Sangha Madras is enabling us to send *Darshana International* as gift to several institutions in India. We are grateful to Mr. Mani for his generous help in propagating indirectly the cause of the Journal *Darshana International*. Mr. Mani has been a great source of inspiration as well as spirit to encourage its publication. His continuous help to promote the publication of this Philosophical Journal for so many

years is his magnanimity. Our further plans to remove the difficulties and obstacles have not yet been overcome due to high cost of production. We feel really sorry for not having been able to maintain the desired standard and quality of publication as we wished. We hope in near future we shall try to improve the quality of its publication, if our resources come to our rescue.

Darshana International has maintained its standard in publishing scholarly articles from the pens of eminent scholars and has attracted more and more readers. This is the only journal in the world which is being published by any individual member of teaching community and we admire and appreciate his perseverance in getting this untiring work to continue.

Darshana Printers and its staff under the guidance of Sri Suresh Kumar Agrawal is holding the responsibility for continuing its standard and appearance in the domain of philosophy.

Our General Editor Dr. J. P. Atreya, was invited to several International Conferences, but availed three opportunities: He went to St. Louis (U.S.A.) to attend the First World Congress of the International Philosophers for the Prevention of Nuclear Omnicide (IFPNO) in May 1966. He also visited Sofia (Bulgaria) in the same month where he attended and participated in the Second World Bulgaristic Congress on the invitation of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and renewed his old acquaintances in Bulgaria which he visited thrice (1973, 1981, 1983) and met Bulgarian President, many Bulgarian and International Scholars. In July he went to Ankara (Turkey) to attend an International Seminar on Human Rights under the joint collaboration of UNESCO and Philosophical Society of Turkey.

We wish all our Readers, Contributors, Members of the Editorial Board and well wishers.

A VERY HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR

ANURAG ATREYA

Managing Editor



Editorial

Chance, Choice and God

The position which I shall advocate in this paper might be labeled "Process Neoplatonism." It may be described as a modern version of Neoplatonism with major emendations in favor of Peirce and Whitehead. In the final analysis it is a Neoplatonic position since it follows a Neoplatonic epistemology in its main structure and since the notion of God that we finally present goes far beyond any notion of God found in either Peirce or Whitehead.

I take it to be the case that a philosophical enterprise is always an enterprise in logic. Metaphysics goes beyond science, but it never goes beyond logic. It goes beyond science not by denying any clearly established scientific facts, but by projecting the implications of those facts beyond the limits which science *qua* science is able to go. Metaphysics necessarily involves speculation, the use of the imagination to project facts beyond the realm in which they are known to apply. It is an extrapolation of a variety of themes, scientific and otherwise, into some sort of a balanced overall picture of the nature of the whole situation — exactly what the scientist *qua* scientist cannot do and should not do unless he is willing to admit that he is temporarily shedding his scientific white coat and putting on the garb of a philosopher. As a form of speculation its results are always tentative and debatable and should always be recognized as such. They should never be allowed to have the degree of certainty ascribable to scientific facts. Its inherent speculative character, however, does not make it a trivial pursuit. Quite to the contrary, it is one of the most necessary and most important human activities since it is in response to one of the most persistent and most significant human needs, the need to see the whole picture.

Another way to set forth the difference between science and metaphysics is to say that science is the effort to speak with as great

a certainty as is possible about what we can see and control to some extent, whereas metaphysics is the attempt to make some kind of comment about those forces that are beyond our vision and control. The Platonists of various centuries stand out from other metaphysicians in that they are also willing to claim that these invisible forces, or laws, or principles are both structurally and causally prior to the processes we can observe. Whether this is a necessary logical projection or an act of faith is a matter of opinion, but it would be accurate to say that the Platonic has not prevailed either in modern science or modern philosophy even though we find strong intimations of it in such widely divergent recent philosophers as the early Russell, Santayana, Peirce, Whitehead, and John Findlay.

I do not know at what point in man's intellectual development he began to wonder about the nature of the deeper forces beyond the natural world as we observe it, but in my opinion it is at this point that he became human. Animals may worry about forces, but I seriously doubt if they wonder about forces behind forces. Apparently a great number of human beings do not do so either because they are too busy or too lazy or too afraid to do so. But those who have wondered about the forces behind the forces, have provided us with some answers. We will now consider two of them briefly.

Perhaps the earliest most persistent answer was that the gods are behind every force we find in nature. In most of the ancient mythologies we find an effort to identify the various actions in the physical world and in human life with the choice of some deity. In Greek mythology, for example, Zeus, the father of the gods, presided over all the lesser gods who represented the division of the government of all forces operating in the natural world. The picture of the world that Homer gives us in the *Illiad* is one in which the forces at work in nature and in the life of men are really determined by the whim and fancy of the gods. The choices that men think they make are not really their own, but are actually the products of the choices the gods have made for them. Somewhat similar ideas are also found in Egyptian, Nordic, Hindu, and various Asian mythologies and the notion is also found in most primitive cultures.

Another answer that also developed in Greece was the idea of chance. Chance is the denial that any choice whatsoever, either by the gods or by man, is the real cause of the way things happen. Things just happen when a sufficient set of conditions occur to make them happen and nothing in particular is responsible for making a decision to make them happen. According to this view, everything that happens is a random occurrence. Everything that there is a product of chance.

The classic Greek example of this view is found in the ontology and cosmology of Leucippus and Democritus who saw the world as

ultimately composed of very small and very hard invisible bodies, that are indivisible or uncuttable because of their hardness and smallness. The bodies come together in a purely random way, governed only by their own weight and tendency to fall downward to form purely accidental combinations of themselves resulting in the larger bodies that we see. Their views were accepted by the Epicureans and also in a modified and modernized form by the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century materialist philosophers and they are still to be found in revised versions in contemporary physics and psychology.

The idea of human choices making much difference in what happens in life and in the history of the world arose sometime in the history of man after the wane of power of the ancient mythologies, and it is essentially what religion is all about. The net result of religion is to encourage human beings to make the decisions that they should make in order to insure their own future well being and also the future well being of their world. If the gods are really making all the decisions or if everything that happens is the product of chance, religion is a waste of time and its presumed results are illusory. Along with religion comes judgment, namely, holding man responsible for the decisions he makes, a theme quite preponderant in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and especially the latter two, but one that is also found in decreasing lesser degrees in the Chinese and Japanese native religions and in Hinduism, and Buddhism. The idea that we do have the ability to make significant decisions for which we are to be held personally responsible before our fellowmen and God is a basic assumption in the teachings of Jesus. The evolution of Christianity in Western Europe and the Americas shows signs of an increasing awareness of the crucial importance of the implications of that teaching. In this context, for example, even the issue of acid rain would be a matter of religious concern.

CHANCE

If I were to pretend to assume the role of a contemporary metaphysician and attempt to construct a contemporary world view I would insist that all the three concepts we have mentioned, chance, choice and God, should be included in it. I am convinced that chance is an important factor in human life and that it figures to some extent into virtually everything that happens. I do not think that the idea of "pure chance" makes any sense whatsoever. Nothing in the world happens without something preceding it, with the possible exception, perhaps, of God's first act of creation. Everything that we know to happen happens because there were a number of previous events that occurred before that event that were sufficient to make it happen. What appears to be a random event may not be as random as it might appear to be. A comet does not just occur in

the sky just because it appears to do so to us. It has a history behind it and there is a reason why it is located at the particular spot in the heavens at any given time. By a chance occurrence we do not mean one which has no cause or no history or no significance, but rather one whose actual occurrence is not a necessity. It is more than one whose causes, history, and significance are unknown to us at the time it happens, or even at a later time. It is rather an event whose actual occurrence in history would have been *inherently* unknowable by anyone, including God, at any time before it happened. It is both unknowable and unpredictable because the combination of events sufficient to make it happen are not determinable, and hence, not knowable until the time they occur. There is no reason to call an event a chance event if it is predictable or has the potential for being known. Distinction should be made between those events that are both predictable and necessary in their occurrence, but have some important chance factors involved in the time or place or manner of their occurrence, as would be the case in most events that occur, and those events whose actual occurrence is not a necessity. A chance event is an event that did not have to happen. When it does happen it does have a history of its own thereafter, and it then has its own significance in relation to other events that have happened and are still occurring. Its causes are then determinable and knowable. A chance event, then, is an event whose potential for happening may be said to lie in the nature of the events preceding it, but whose actuality as a historical entity is not a necessity that could have been foreseen or predicted by anyone.

We would further speculate that there are, then, essentially two types of events that occur in the history of all things, incidents and accidents. The difference between the two is mainly that incidents are predictable and knowable to some extent before they happen whereas accidents are not predictable as future events at all. Examples of an incident would be the coming of a comet or the birth of a baby while examples of an accident would be a specific meteorite striking the earth or an automobile wreck. Most everything that happens can be labeled an incident with only a small per cent, possibly as low as one per-cent, being able to be labeled an accident. The history of the world is the story of how incidents have mixed with other incidents and occasionally with accidents to make things be the way they actually are. In some cases accidents have been quite significant in shaping the future course of events; but, even so, it would not be fair to say that the course of history is governed by chance events.

The resulting view of nature I am able to have, with some help from Peirce, Whitehead, and Hartshorne, is that of a collection of billions and billions of events, or little processes taking place in the

world all at the same time. They include everything that is happening in the world at any one time, from a conference of world leaders in Geneva to a cat waiting to pounce upon a small animal in the grass. They include all the biological processes taking place in all the living things in the world at this time—all the motions of all the heavenly bodies, all the actions of nations and groups of individuals, all the functions of each of the two billion cells in my body, all the grains of sand on all the beaches, all the snowflakes, and every blade of grass, in short, every single individual thing there now is in the universe. Each one of these things is more of a process than it is a thing. Even though each one has its own unique individual form, as Aristotle would have it, it still maintains that form while undergoing internal changes in the nature of its consistency and external changes in the significance of its relation to other things or events. Everything that is, with the possible exception of God, is historical and only historical, which means that it has some beginning, an actual mid-point, and a necessary terminus of its existence as a thing. No one of these things/events/processes in the universe is only a thing-in-itself or self sufficient, since its very life and function is also involved in the life and function of certain, but not all, other things. New things or processes begin as such when certain events combine to produce a new event, when old events cease to be significant as events and yield their force and meaning to the formation of a new event.

As we have suggested earlier, most of these events may be labeled as incidents. They happen in a rather routine way and are the normal results of the numerous forces that come to play upon each other in the operation of the world. This is what we mean by the operation of the laws of nature, namely, that most things are likely to happen according to rules. Acorns are capable of producing oak trees, given a sufficient set of circumstances including proper temperature and moisture and sufficient surrounding nutrients. Everything that happens, however, has some chance factor involved in the way that it happens and especially in the time at which it happens, with the chance factor being a greater factor in some incidents than it is in others. Not every acorn survives to become an oak tree. Most of them are eaten by animals or simply left alone to rot. In short, the real world is made up of both billions and billions of relatively routine incidents mixed with a number of accidents that also shape the formation of new incidents. Although all incidents have some element of chance involved in them, they may not be said to be determined by those chance factors. Accidents really do happen and they are real accidents and not just pseudo accidents. After they happen, their happening is explainable in terms of the various events that compose them, very much in the same way that we can

see what combination of events caused an automobile accident to occur, but even so, no real reason for the necessity of the accident can be given and the accident itself has no necessary significance in relation to the way incidents occur.

CHOICE

To say that anything is able to make a choice is to say that it has been given a limited number of options within which it may make a selection. All living things, including trees and every cell in my body have some power of choice, but some things have more options than others. Birds have more choice than beavers or bears and humans have a much wider range of choices than birds. Although some philosophers and psychologists have questioned whether or not the choices humans make are real choices, suggesting that they really are determined by subconscious psychological and physical needs, I am convinced this is the case only when we do not deliberately exercise our power of reason. Even a bird pecking on the ground shows some discrimination concerning what he pecks and I see evidence of some active decision making in the behavior of most animals, including man. To the degree that I am able to think about the issue before me and to conceptualize the alternatives that are possible in my dealing with it, to that degree is my choice free.

Religion. All religion is based upon the presupposition that we can make some choices that will make some difference about the state of affairs in the future. Most of us are actually far more influential, for better or for worse, on the lives of other people than we want to admit that we are. Almost everyone has someone who is looking to that person for guidance in some respect. We influence the future of fellow human beings either positively or negatively when we design buildings or automobiles or plan curricula or prepare a meal. There are numerous domains in which we can quite obviously make choices that would lead to the betterment of mankind and this alone should be sufficient to give us a positive outlook on life and a meaning for our existence. Our potential religious sentiments come to play upon our reason when we begin to wonder about the long range significance of the choices we make in life, when we ask whether or not the various choices that we can make throughout our life have any really lasting significance. The philosophical or logical answer is that we can never know for sure, since it is quite possible that some future accident can wipe out years or even centuries of achievements. The religious answer, however, is that it is best to leave all such matters up to the will of God, and that it is somewhat impertinent of us to be a capitalist in spiritual affairs, demanding assurances of spiritual capital gains on our moral and religious investments.

I am convinced that my life has been affected by a very large number of events over which I have had no control and about which my choices can make no difference. I did not choose my genetic structure, nor that of my children, nor my fundamental station in life. I cannot choose to be taller than I am nor to live longer than my body will allow. I am also convinced that my life has also been affected by certain accidents that have occurred along the way—that in a minor way I am also the product of chance. Yet there are also some parts of my life and history that are the results of my own choices. I did choose the college and various graduate schools that I have attended. I did choose to get married to the particular person that I married when I did not have to. I did choose to have children and to live in the particular state that I live in when I could have remained in the employment that I had in another state. I do choose to own certain brands of automobiles, eat certain kinds of foods and to drink or not to drink certain liquids. I believe all of these are real choices that I make and that all of them and many others that I have made and still will make a real difference in my future and in the future of all the people who are in any under my influence.

GOD

If I did not believe in the reality of God, I could be reasonably content with only chance and choice as explanatory factors for the various incidents and accidents in the world, and more particularly, for the way they do operate in my own life. My belief in God, however, causes me to have all sorts of *philosophical* problems that I would not otherwise have. I will now mention some of them.

God's Existence. First of all, there is the concept "God itself." The word has many meanings and a wide variety of connotations both philosophical and religious within a wide range of cultural traditions, but essentially it is the idea that there is some sort of ultimate form of being or reality that is causally responsible for the universe and its structure. To believe in God is to believe that He "is" in some sense, namely that He does exist in the way that the ultimate force/cause/being/principle/thing/person exists. Such an existence is not the same sort of existence that I have or the same sort of existence that most everything we know in the world has. His basic existence, for example, could not be "fraught with temporality" as is the case of our existence and that of virtually everything we can see or know. It must be a higher form of existence, or existence on a much higher level the level of existence of most ordinary things. Why not say, as the Neoplatonists do, that there are levels of existence, that some things exist more than other things exist, and that a thing may exist in a rich and full way in one context and at the same time only in a weak and feeble way in another context?

To say that God exists is to say that he has a reality that is greater than the reality of other things that exist. It is logically necessary for Him to have this sort of existence in order to be an ultimate being. We might even speculate that He exists more on His own level than He does on our level. Any effort to explain His existence only in terms of my existence would be to trivialize the necessary status of His existence.

We might further distinguish between a philosophical belief in God and a religious belief in God. The former necessarily entails both a metaphysics and an epistemology within which God's being is a possibility and it also forces one to have some opinion as to how such an ultimate being might be related to all the various processes within the universe. The latter deals mainly with the necessary qualities or attributes one believes the deity to have, qualities such as love, justice, goodness, power, etc. and is more of an axiological judgment. A philosophical belief in God is, in the final analysis, an enterprise in logic, whereas a religious belief in God is in large measure based upon sentiments arising out of personal experience.

As a Process Platonist I have little trouble with a philosophical belief in God's "existence". When I look at a gasoline engine I see on one level a machine that is working. I know that particular engine has a history that theoretically could be known. I can decide what it is good for and approximately how long it will last. When I reflect upon how it works, however, I reason that it must function because some clever fellow figured out the way to manipulate certain physical forces in such a manner that the energy released in a controlled explosion inside the engine is directed to cause a shaft to rotate. I believe that these laws exist in some sense, but perhaps not in the sense that the engine does. I also believe that their status of existence is higher than the status of existence of the engine; that fundamentally, processes work according to principles that are behind it, and not the other way around. The engine exists because of the principles and not the principles because of the engine. I further reason that the laws that apply in the case of the engine are not only for the engine alone, but apply on a much wider scale; that they are part of the general laws of the way the universe works. These laws, I think, allow all sorts of events to occur in the universe, most of which are incidents, the necessary merger of a series of events with another series of events, with some chance factors being involved in their merger; but some of them are accidents, events whose actual occurrence were neither necessary nor predicable, and thus inherently unknowable in advance. My philosophical belief in God comes from a further inferential leap I am able to make from the fact of existence of laws in the universe to some higher factor beyond them able to account for their existence and harmonious

interfunctioning. Especially when I consider the nature of the operation of some things that are much more sophisticated than gasoline engines, things like a blade of grass, or the eye of an insect, or the interfunctioning of the various parts and systems in my body, I conclude that there are numerous higher and lower principles involved in the processes involved in their being and function. I am unable to stop, as many philosophers and scientist do, with only a universe operated by myriads of principles. My own *logical* need forces me to infer that there must be some prior organizing and stabilizing element that transcends all of these principles; that there must be a factor above all principles that is itself not just a principle, but something much more than one. And if there is such an element or entity, it must be much more profound in its own nature than any of the principles involved in the operation of the universe and it must "exist" in some higher sense than the way a principle exists.

God and the World. The existence of God has never been a very exciting problem or issue for me. With Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, I accept the idea as a logical necessity and the necessary foundation of a well developed metaphysical system. A much more troubling problem for me has been how I can fit both my philosophical and religious belief in God into a universe filled with billions and billions of incidents and some accidents, incidents which appear at face value to be operating on their own without the necessity of an overall director. A basic question that is often posed is whether God is to be conceived of as a constituent of the universe, as a process among the processes, or as St. Augustine would have it, as an entity who in some way exists beyond or outside of the world. Actually, I am not satisfied with either image as an adequate picture. The first one makes God too historical and the second one makes Him to be a foreigner. I much prefer the Neoplatonic position with its essentially Aristotelian notion of God as Primal Being, or to speak more accurately, as the ultimate structuring force behind the structure of Being.

The difficulty I have with conceiving of God as the prime event among the multitudinous events going on at any one time in the universe is that it still tends to relegate His status to that of an incident instead of allowing Him to remain on the much more exalted level of a high principle, or Ultimate Factor responsible for the principles behind the processes involved in all things. I am a great believer in democracy among men, but the idea of a democratic deity running for office in a society of historical events is not very appealing to me; and historically, it has not been a very appealing idea in the history of the Great Religions of the world. The idea is inconsistent with the idea of a "High God", an idea that is found in most religions, although it is not incompatible with the idea of God as an incarnation. If what one wishes to emphasize is the human character of the

deity as seen in Jesus Christ, Shiva, or the Amida Buddha, namely, one who is the world but not ultimately of the world, the idea of deity in process has great merit, but if we wish to emphasize the regulative character of the deity, we must think of Him as having some very stable character or abiding essence that is not affected too much by historical circumstances. In the Jewish tradition "He who Is" cannot be "He who Becomes," and the idea of a developing deity will not likely find many adherents in Islam or Hinduism. To be more specific in reference to my own position, a deity in process, even one with a primordial core, is still a historical incident and is thus not free from chance as it may be a factor in any incident. I cannot tolerate the possibility of a deity whose essential character is subject to having been affected by chance factors. The one thing that most people who believe in God need to believe about Him is that he is not like us in being subject to the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune," as Shakespeare puts it.

The problem I have with St. Augustine's God is the extreme disparity that exists between His character and the character of the world. Although he made the world in the sense of starting, it and continues to hold it together the two are *structurally* divorced. A subject-object relationship exists between the two of them. The world is God's product, His offspring, and His instrument. I have the opposite problem with the St. Augustine's God from the one I have with the Process God. His God is too elitist, too self related, and too tyrannical in his function within nature. Although His God works providentially for man in the world. He is entirely too directive, too manipulative, and too much in control of the processes in nature.

God and Chance. How then, do I reconcile my high view of God as the Ultimate Organizing Factor behind the First Principles of the Universe with my view of nature as a series of events and processes? Does such a deity have any opportunity to act in the world? Does he get involved in any way with events in the universe so that He becomes a part of their history? The answer to all of these questions is "Yes" in some senses and "No" in others. I do not find it necessary to conceive of God as a conscious rational being who is constantly directing everything in the world or even consciously aware of what is going on each event in the world. I do not think that He decides that it is going to rain in Boston and be clear in Peoria on Thursday. This, however, is not to say that He does not have anything to do with what is going on. As the power behind the principles at work within the world his influence is effective in everything that happens, but it is in the main an indirect influence. As a rule He goes through channels and works his will through the normal working of the laws of nature. An ultimate super being has

the theoretical possibility of being conscious of any particular event and even of intervening in its history, but I do not think we can make any rules about the way this is done. If we also think of this supreme being as having a supreme will, He can will to act in the world, but I think He must always act in accordance with the principles that apply in that context. In short, He works in and through the principles of things to effect his will and not in contradiction of them. This means that whenever He works in the world He works with events and processes and thus is subject to those chance factors inherent in the operation of all incidents. Another way to say this is to say that when God works in the world He must work within the limitations of the way processes and events operate, and this means that His activity in the world is subject to chance to some extent. He is subject to chance as it applies in the normal operation of incidents and He is also subject to being limited by the results of accidents. Although a super being could theoretically avoid being subject to chance factors in the world, I do not think He does so, for to do so would be to violate the integrity of the very principles and processes which He is responsible for instigating. It would not be proper for Him to violate His own rules. In short, God's operation in the world is always according to the nature of the operation of the rules applicable in the history of events. He is subject to chance when dealing with events, but the chance factors He encounters in no wise affect his own nature in any serious way. Furthermore, His involvement in events and processes does not alleviate them from being subject to elements of chance or rule out the possibility of the occurring of accidents.

In the strict sense, the above view does not make God responsible for everything that goes on in the world. He is responsible in the sense that he is responsible for the principles on which processes operate, but He is not directly responsible for the particular set of choices that might be involved in two or more incidents becoming another incident and in no way can He be held to be directly responsible for accidents. His influence upon events is essentially an indirect influence.

God and Choice. The main way that the sort of God I depict can act in the world is through his influence upon those creatures capable of making choices. I see His influence upon the actions of men to be very much like the influence a parent or grandparent may have upon the decisions a child may make. They do not actually make the decision of the child, but they remain behind that decision as an ideal force that bears upon it. The Ultimate Power behind the First Principles of the universe is also subject to the choices of His creatures when He operates within the world. Jesus taught us that God is not a tyrant imposing His will upon us to accomplish his

purposes at our expense, but one who takes our choices quite seriously. The father of the Prodigal Son freely allowed his younger son to make his own choices, no matter how ill-advised and foolish they were, but the father nevertheless remained as an influence upon the decision of the son to return to his home. He did so by being what he was, a noble example of fatherly behavior. So it is that this is the way the philosophical God that I define works in the world. He works not through direct action from above but through His ideal influence upon all decision makers.

A God who is to be conceived in terms of the principles, or ultimate principle, behind events in nature rather than as something going on within the universe is considerable less humane than the God of Religion. Such a deity is not necessarily characterized by love and goodness, although these characteristics are not incompatible with Him. A case could be made that such a God is a God of justice and it could be minimally said of Him that He always works to increase value in all parts of the universe, as Plotinus clearly asserts. The God of philosophy is not the God of Religion !

A large collection of problems still remain for me in my effort to fit my *religious* belief in God with a process concept of what St. Augustine calls "the siderial universe," but these are too complex to consider in this short paper, and must wait for another time. If I did not believe in the God of philosophy, I would be forced, like Sartre and Bertrand Russell, to take human choices to be of crucial importance. I think we do have the capacity to make some choices that can determine the future course of our own history, and even the history of our nation and the world. But, in the final analysis, to believe in the God of Philosophy or the God of religion is to concede that "our little systems have their day," and that "our time is in His hands," as Tennyson suggests. Believing in God means that in the final analysis we do not understand the future final course of events for men or mice, in spite of all the cheap prophets who say they do, but we are willing to leave such matters up to the will of God. There is an important element of truth in Homer's view of the gods in the *Illiad*. Homer, along with many other theological thinkers, realized the will of God must be taken quite seriously in any attempt to explain the world. It is the final reference point for human meaning, as even Jesus suggests by his last words in the Garden of Gethsemane. But does not His integrity force God to take the will of other choosing beings quite seriously? The choices we make may well be a point of concern, and even of joy or distress to the deity, but they are hardly capable of making any serious difference in His essential nature or in His will for the future.

R. Baine Harris

Towards A Deeper Philosophy of Peace

John-Francis Phipps

'Henceforth history will no longer be divided into ancient, medieval and modern. We shall have to speak of the pre-atomic and atomic periods... A new historical epoch must be marked'. These are the opening words of John Somerville's *Philosophy of Peace*, which was first published in 1949—four years after Hiroshima.

Our present gregorian calendar distracts attention from the fact that 6th August 1945 marks a division in human history far more radical than any other, including the birth of Christ.¹

For the duration of this paper, at any rate, I would like us to think of this year as the 41 post-H, rather than the year 1986 AD. Keeping this alternative calendar in mind is a salutary mental exercise; it completely alters one's whole outlook. (Back in the sixties, Arthur Koestler proposed the use of such a calendar, but his suggestion has not as yet been taken up.)

In relation to the many millennia of history preceding 6th August 1945, we are obviously still in an embryonic state, still in the darkness of the womb of this new atomic age and still largely surviving on pre-atomic sustenance coming through the umbilical cord linking us to the old age. This paper is more about the metaphysical equivalent of natural childbirth, rather than a hi-tech delivery!

In his classic study of the survivors of Hiroshima², Robert Lifton observes that the 'hibakusha' repeatedly told him that they knew of no idea powerful enough to even begin to help them cope with the

1 See H. Wiesman, quoted in J. Garrison, *The Darkness of God: Theology after Hiroshima* (1982) p. 68.

2 R. J. Lifton, *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima* (1967) p. 18.

sheer scale of the situation they found themselves in. The word 'hibakusha' means a 'death-immersed' or 'explosion-affected' person. Metaphysically, psychologically and emotionally, we are now all of us explosion-affected persons, we are all 'hibakusha' in this deeper sense.

Claude Lanzmann, who has recently produced a nine-hour epic film on the jewish holocaust, asserts that any work that would do justice to the holocaust, must take as its first principle the shattering of chronology. If this applies to the genocide of the jewish holocaust, it surely applies all the more forcefully to the omnicide represented by more than a million Hiroshimas.

A threat of such overwhelmingly life-denying proportions as omnicide strongly implies the prior existence of something ultra-dead somewhere in the western psyche, the western way of thinking.

Compared to other cultures, one of the most striking features of ours is how very ill at ease we seem to feel with our conventional notion of time. We tend to feel subjugated, weighed down, oppressed and hemmed in by our time, which we perceive as being against us, not on our side, which we continually want to escape from and kill. As far as one can tell, no other culture has ever thought in terms of 'killing time'.

Our temporal images lay far greater stress on decay, destruction and death, than on the more creative and curative aspects of time. The predominant image is the sinister skeletal figure of old father time, with scythe. We do not think in terms of young mother time with a child at her breast. But this latter aspect of time is just as real as the connection between time and death.

One of the problems in our modern society is that we do not seem very good at making new myths and images. There is what Russell Hoban calls a failure of mythopoeic perception and he argues that if our myth-making faculties were not so shrivelled and atrophied, we would have a far clearer perception of the situation we now find ourselves in. For a start, we would see the bomb for what it really is—the enemy of *all* of us.³

Our culture in fact seems to fear and hate its time so much that maybe it feels the only means of escape is to blast its way out of its own temporal prison. The trouble is that the explosive charge being used is so great that it is in danger of blowing up not only the whole prison and its inmates, but the whole of the outside world as well. Prisoners planning an escape can normally count on the existence of the outside world. Omnicide suggests that there is some kind of subterranean desire to kill off time once and for all and make a

3 'A Bomb in the Myth of Time', *The Guardian*, Feb. 20, 1986.

really thorough job of it. The idea of massive overkill represents a weird sort of ultra-morbid temporal death over-insurance policy. There has to be strategic certainty that each and every percipient is killed at least once in order to ensure the ending of such a beastly time. It is like continuing to bayonet a corpse long after knowing that your enemy is dead. An extreme form of temporal sadism, or temporal necrophilia.

We now appear to have reached the very edge of the temporal map of our particular culture. Infact, since Hiroshima we have actually 'gone over the edge' in relation to preceding forms of time and history. That attempts to atomise time right down to fractions of milliseconds (nanoseconds) should occur at this juncture of human history seems significant.

What Bergson referred to as the spatialization of time⁴ has now been taken to its ultimate limits. Chronological measurement represents the superimposition of fixed, static, and therefore rather dead—spatial concepts onto the movement of duration, like a succession of photographic frames or stills. These symbolic spatial representations are then seen as 'bits' of time, the 'time' in question having by now become thoroughly reified. So the explosive charge seems to be intended to explode into an infinite number of fragments the imprisoning *space* that has been superimposed on time.

Despite its universal effect on all cultures, omnicide in fact represents a culturally specific statement about time. It represents an attempt on the part of one culture to impose its own form of linear triumphalism on all other cultures. This is absolute temporal totalitarianism.

The overwhelming majority of our fellow world citizens who have inhabited this planet have not confused a spatialized and dead concept of time with real, living time as integral experience. Non-judeochristian cosmologies often have no concept at all of beginnings and ends and linear causal chains. Their myths and rituals usually provide access to a greater form of time.

To this day, many of the 'hibakusha' refer to the 'christian bomb'. It did after all originate in minds conditioned by a judeo-christian way of thinking and it was originally produced, tested and dropped by a nation claiming to uphold christian values. Christian time was hoist with its own petard at Hiroshima.

One of the 'hibakusha', who was a Catholic priest living near Hiroshima at the time of the explosion, noticed that the initial blast had stopped his wallclock⁵. The silent and motionless clock seemed to symbolise just what had actually happened. For the 'hibakusha',

4 H. Bergson, *Time and Free Will* (1910).

5 P. Arrupe, quoted in J. Garrison, op. cit., pp. 70-1.

the old timeworld certainly came to a stop then and to the extent that the 'hibakusha' represent all of us, there is a sense in which our own old timeworld also ended on 6th August 1945. Hiroshima represents a para-historical event and we have all been projected outside or beyond the ordinary western historical process. In this sense, we are really living in a post-apocalyptic situation rather than a pre-apocalyptic one.

'Thinking about the unthinkable' is usually taken to refer to some future event. The mere fact that it is a future event means that, however probable, it is nevertheless something hypothetical. The unthinkable that really needs to be focussed on concerns the present and therefore real, actual, non-hypothetical situation in this year 41 PH. If it is correct to assert that there is a sense in which the greater global macrocosm now finds itself in a post—or para-historical situation, then it would seem a good idea to investigate how the perception of the individual microcosm can match up with this new timeworld we find ourselves in.

Thus both at the macro-global and micro-individual levels, we are faced with the same question: is it possible for what we in our culture call 'time' to end without the world itself coming to an end? Can we disentangle temporal conditioning from underlying reality?

There seem to be two main possible alternative perceptions, which can be roughly divided into the atomist-separatist on the one hand and the integrated-holistic on the other. Broadly speaking, we either subscribe to a form of metaphysical apartheid and perceive ourselves as being totally detached from the rest of the world, or we see ourselves as being an integral part of our own environment, as much as a tree, a dolphin or a mountain.

Despite the massive temporal indoctrination implicit in our modern urban-industrial society, the perception of time is anything but uniform. There is an infinitely vast range of temporal experience and most people seem to have experienced moments of heightened perceptual clarity. The varieties of temporal experience frequently involve a strong sense of 'time', as conventionally perceived, 'coming to an end'. Another common feature of such alternative temporal perspectives is the awareness of an infinitely expanded 'now'—the very opposite kind of 'now' to the atomist-reductionist version. This expanded 'now' is not seen as being bound up with the Genesis-Apocalypse time line. What is perceived and experienced has no beginning and no end. Frequently, as a direct result of this cleansing of the doors of perception, the perceived value of the world as a whole is immeasurably enhanced. Enemy image projection ceases and the other is seen to be ourselves.

The world citizen philosopher, Krishnamurti, spent most of his teaching life insisting that it is indeed a practical proposition for

people to actually experience the ending of time, in the sense of liberation from the conventional time thought causality connection.⁶ Two of his key insights could do with further philosophical exploration and seem particularly relevant today. The first is that love and peace are causeless and the second is that the individual is the world.

The whole dualistic notion of two radically distinct and separate timeworlds lies at the very heart of our cultural tradition and religious inheritance. This is responsible for many, if not most, of our metaphysical misperceptions. It follows that a culture that has spent many centuries projecting the highest timeless values away from this timeworld and into or onto another, ultra-hypothetical one, is not well prepared to perceive such values in *this* timeworld. Such perception is of course further inhibited by reductionist, repressive forms of positivism. As a result of all this projection and metaphysical repression, those who try and point out that all higher timeless values originate in the human mind and therefore belong to *this* world are almost invariably accused of atheism and of being anti-religious. This is exactly what happened to both Spinoza and Feuerbach, yet both had deeply spiritual perceptions of the world.

As for the notion that there is a close affinity and interconnection between the world macrocosm and the individual microcosm, this has a very ancient pedigree. It can be traced back to Taoist philosophy and in our own western tradition, the related idea of 'correspondence' also has venerable antecedents. The sixteenth century physician and visionary, Paracelsus, is one of the notable proponents of this view. Quite apart from ancient pedigrees, it seems reasonable to assert that each human being is the world in miniature, represents all human beings of all time.

The essence of the macro-micro perception is that what occurs in the material world at any given moment is a reflection of what is occurring in the human mind. It would need a very blinkered atomist-separatist to deny such a connection; but there seem to be quite a few around. Jung updates this ancient idea and relates it to everyday experience. He introduced the world 'synchronicity' to describe the process and his essay on the subject is subtitled 'An *Acausal Connecting Principle*'.⁷

As far as millions of people are concerned, synchronistic experiences are an integral part of life. They represent statements about an entirely different perception of time to the conventional version and are frequently accompanied by a deep sense of inner

⁶ J. Krishnamurti and D. Bohm, *The Ending of Time* (1985).

⁷ C. G. Jung, *Synchronicity — An Acausal Connecting Principle* (1955).

peace, compassion, a joy beyond pleasure and a sense of unity with the world as a whole. Such experiences are far more common than is generally realized,⁸ and there is no good reason to suppose that people who happen to live in parts of the world where surveys and research into this have not been conducted are denied similar experiences. Greater awareness of this aspect of human experience has clear implications for a radical improvement in east-west perceptions and a drastic reduction in cold war tension.

It was William James, at the turn of the century,⁹ who really pioneered investigating such experiences in an open-minded and methodical manner, free from both religious and positivist prejudices. Indeed, regarding such experiences as statements about time, rather than religion, provides an even more neutral vocabulary. Two world wars and the ascendancy of positivism greatly inhibited further research in this field, which was only taken up again in 1969, when the marine biologist, Alister Hardy, set up a research unit at Oxford (now called the Alister Hardy Research Centre).¹⁰

What this metaphysical liberation represents is the potential for our culture to undergo a profound temporal readjustment, bringing us back into the fold of the perennial philosophy of humanity — a more globally appropriate timespace for us to occupy, surely, in this post-Hiroshima era.

Aldous Huxley points out that political policies rooted in the 'eternity philosophies' tend to be tolerant and non-violent.¹¹ This is because such philosophies are in turn based on the direct experience of metaphysical liberation. The political implications of this nobler aspect of human experience clearly need deeper exploration. If the direct experience of timeless values is a normal and natural part of life, then politics, by its very nature, must be intimately involved with metaphysical liberation. Perhaps this is what Feuerbach meant when he said that politics is the religion of the future.

It seems significant that Spinoza, who stands supreme among western philosophers in perceiving the world 'under the form of eternity', should also have supplied one of the few positive definitions of peace: 'Peace is not the absence of war; it is a virtue born out of the strength of the heart', (*ex animi fortitudine*)¹² A person

8 D. Hay and A. Morisy, 'Reports of Ecstatic, Paranormal or Religious Experience in Great Britain and the US', *JSSR*, xvii, 3 (1978)

9 W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1901).

10 A. Hardy, *The Spiritual Nature of Man* (1979).

11 A. Huxley, *The Perennial Philosophy* (1946), see especially pp. 222-3.

12 B. Spinoza, *Tractatus Politicus* (Wernham ed.) p. 311 (4).

who perceives this world as expressing something eternal and therefore sacred would clearly be extremely well motivated to preserve the planet. Such a person would be morally and metaphysically incapable of contemplating for one millisecond the idea of allowing such an infinitely precious world to be destroyed.

We urgently need to remove the whole concept of peace from its other-worldly package and formulate a positive philosophy of peace based on the timeless values in *this* world. We also need to develop our own western home-grown version of the Hindu concept of 'ahimsa'. The usual negative rendering of this word as 'non-violence' fails to do justice to the more positive, creative and life-affirming aspects of this strength of the heart or 'fortitude of soul'.

The notion of beginnings and ends has its uses, particularly when applied to conference papers. So I shall leave Feuerbach with a relatively final word on our timeless theme. He held that it was granted only to a few to 'see the end of the present, to be raised beyond its boundaries and to feel through the hard skin and crust of the currently secure maxims and principles to the eternally bubbling spring of everlasting life... to press into the depths and perceive the pulsebeat of the creative new time'.¹³

The few must now become the many. Feuerbach also believed that 'History teaches us that just when something stands at the very verge of its total destruction, it once again raises itself with all its force, as if it wished to begin anew its already finished course of life'.¹⁴

13 L. Feuerbach, *Thoughts on Death and Immortality* (Massey ed., 1980) p. 16.

14 Ibid.



Probability : A Contribution of Carvaka Philosophy

B. M. Chamke

Men are born materialists. Materialism is ingrained in the very nature of human beings. It is this natural materialistic proclivity has been, Psychology argues, the very cause of rationalism which inevitably lands one into the Probability-region, where from one reaps positively nothing and can reach to any ultimate conclusion.

In India, Cārvāka School is said, generally it is presumed, to be the originator of exclusive materialistic approach towards life and entire universe. Hence this School is popularly known as Indian materialism; and the doctrine of Probability, it is claimed, to be its special contribution to Indian Philosophy.

In Cārvāka Philosophy we come across the following statements "Consciousness is invariably found in connection with the body¹. Soul is a natural phenomenon. It is foolish to think that the soul reaps the rewards of its religious and moral acts in future life². There is no another world than this, neither, heaven nor hell. Rewards in future life, eternal state of Moksha, rebirth etc. are the inventions of the impostors³. Owing to the impact of religious super-

१ देहमात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टात्मा इति प्राकृता जनाः

लोकायकिश्च प्रतिपन्नाः । — (ब्रह्मसूत्र - ३-३-५३-५४)

२ भूतेभ्यः चैतन्यम् — (बार्हस्पत्यसूत्र)

लोकायता वदन्त्येवं नास्ति जीवो न निवृत्तिः ।

धर्माधर्मो न विद्यते न पलं पुण्यपापयोः ॥ — (हरिभद्र- षड्दर्शन समुच्चय)

३ न स्वर्गो नैव जन्मान्यदपि न नरको नाप्यधर्मो न धर्मः ।

कर्ता नैवात्र कश्चित् प्रभवति जगतो नैव भर्ता न हर्ता ।

मिथ्या भूते समस्तेऽयमनु भवती जनः सर्वमेतद्विमोहात् । (सर्वदर्शन संग्रह)

भस्मिभूतस्य देहस्य

पुनरागमनं कुतः (बार्हस्पत्यसूत्र)

stitutions and dominance of ethical misbeliefs and prejudices upon the minds men are accustomed to the idea of another world, liberation, God; and when the religious illusions are destroyed, they feel a sense of loss and have uncontrollable void and privation. Nature has nothing to do with religious and moral values".

This was the stand upon which Cārvākas have erected the edifice of their own philosophy.

It is assumed that Brahaspati was the founder of this Darshana, and so this Darshana is brought under the caption 'Brahmaspatya Darshana'. Lokāyata is one more name given to this Darshana. It seems that the title cārvāka is a later addition. Again it seems that Cārvāka might be a name of an ardent disciple who might have been a follower of Brahaspati. Since eighth century onwards the title Cārvāka, its seems, might have come into vogue extensively.

Cārvākas are the materialist. They maintain that matter is the source of every action and motion in this universe. They define matter as the physico—chemical energy that can give rise to consciousness.⁴ Cārvākas were the powerful exponents of materialism who were the marvellously revolutionary thinkers in their interpretation with a totally new angle of insight, of this entire universe.

Cārvākas very rigorously and irrevocably advocate that ethical ideal for a man is an unqualified hedonism. Eat drink and be merry since death is unavoidable. Once disappeared appears never.⁵

Virtuous life, devoutism, prayer etc. are the delusions. Enjoyment and indulgence in sensual pleasures are the only reality.⁶ There is no need to be under the domain of religion and morality since they are deceitful and barren. Nothing demands man to control his passions and instincts for man is a product of four elements alone.⁷ He has natural right to enjoy and to be merry. If he does not do so he is bound to suffer and perish unwantingly leaving whatever is in his hand and running after illusions gaining nothing; and the moral and religious codes gestated by the impostors can not save any one. It is an illusion that there is an another world where one stays for ever. Another world or Parloka is nothing but a transfer of place, time and present state only.⁸


४ मद्भक्तिवत् चैतन्यम्
भूतेभ्यः चैतन्यम् —(बार्हस्पत्यसूत्र)

५ भस्मिभूतस्य देहस्य
पुनरागमनं कुतः । —(बार्हस्पत्यसूत्र)

६ यावज्जीवं सुखं जीवेत कणं कृत्वा घृतं पिबेत् । (बार्हस्पत्यसूत्र)

७ पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायूरिति चत्वारि
ते भेदचैतन्यम् । (बार्हस्पत्यसूत्र)

८ तथा पुनरनन्तरं देशान्तरं
कालान्तरं अवस्थान्तरं व परलोकः । —(बार्हस्पत्यसूत्र)



All these above views of Carvakas' exhibit that the materialism rebelled very hard against the ancient customs, traditions, religions and magic; and that they strove to erect a new philosophy of life on a purely and rigorously rationalistic basis.

The Lokayatas being of rationalistic inclination have persistently made efforts to erect every doctrine on the purely rationalistic basis. Even in their epistemology they have reached the extreme point as regards the nature and number of the sources of valid knowledge (Dnyan-Pramanas) They hold that perception (Pratyaksha) is the only source or means of valid knowledge.⁹ Every other means including inference (Anuman) can not be accepted since they have got no sufficient warrent for believing in the truth based on inductive relation (Vyapati). The ascertainment of this relation totally depends upon observed facts and, it is our experience, observation has got its own scope and limitations beyond which it can reach never. So the conclusions reached therefrom can not be universalized. It may be admitted for the sake of argument that observation can comprehend all the present events, but beyond human physical and mental capacities to observe the events removed by time and the events that to come is an impossibility. These same difficulties are found with the other sources, the Testimony (Shabda), Comparision (Upaman)¹⁰ etc.

Owing to the Carvakas' preclivity towards the means of right knowledge they are branded as a system of philosophy that objects the traditionality and naturally sprouts in scepticism and nihilism. The opponents of Cārvāka school conclude that this school is interested only in demolishing certain philosophical positions and not in positively building up of any.

These views of opponents are absolutely an error since they construe this school in accordance with their superficial understanding of the available broken, scattered and scanty data about it.

Unfortunately it has been very abstruce and difficult for scholars to find any original literature or at least a compendium that expounds the basic tenants of Caravakas school. A Sutra on it ascribed to Brahmaspati, the ... preceptor (Guru) of the Cārvākas, in mentioned in the old works The Indian proto — Philosophical literature of seventh century B.C., the Upanishadas contain a number of references to materialist views. Even we come across the references to Lokayata in Pali canons of early Buddhism, Arthashastra of Kautilya, Madhava's Sarvadarashana Sangrah, Haribhadra's Shad-darshan Samuchchaya etc. So it is generally assumed that Carvaka materilism can be explained in modern times on the basis of what the others had to say about it. Yet none of these is an authentic and adequate source of the Cārvāka materialism.

६ प्रत्येक्षमेव प्रमाणम्

१० अनुमानमप्रमाणम् —(बार्हस्पत्यसूत्र)

On a detailed survey of this school one is convinced that critic of it exaggerate the weak point of its doctrines and misinterpret and misrepresent its tenants.

It is generally assumed by the critics that Carvaka totally denounces the inference (Anumān) as a means of knowledge. This is a misfortune of this Darshana. But if we descend deeper and deeper into its heart we come across so many statements that the school has rejected such reasoning or inference as was employed to establish the existence of God, soul, reincarnation etc.

Cārvāka School accepts perception (Pratyaksha) as a source of valid knowledge, no doubt, but however, it in practice accepts inference as a Pramana provided it is either Lokaprasiddha (accepted by the people) or it is rooted in perception itself.¹¹

The critics have misunderstood the line of thinking of Cārvāka school and have gone away knocking about from the reality contained in the heart of this school and have put the caricature of it before the people. The reason behind this is that the Carvaka denounced the authority of the Vedas and priestly profession.¹²

The chief importance of this system is that it visualizes the picture of the many sidedness of ... philosophic activities in ancient period in India and that also brings towards our notice that liberty of thought and freedom of expression were in prevalence in those days.

The most glaring feature of Cārvāka is that whence the seeds of its thought line were rooted in this land they provoked independent and instagnated thinking in the field of philosophy and in practical life too, and pushed in the regorous rationalism as the means and criterion of valid and ultimate knowledge. The Caravaka School was the first formentation and movement in India that enhanced and intensified the importance and value of rationalism and crucial ... thinking as the means of conclusive knowledge.

Though the Carvakas School has postulated two means of right knowledge—the perception (Pratyaksha) and Lok Prasiddha Anuman — yet it was fully aware that these two means were not ultimate for whatever conclusions could be distilled with their hell were not authentic and all comprehensive and could not prove themselves ... applicable at all places and at all times. This attitude of Carvakas exhibits its firm faith in reason and its power.

So to find out a way Cārvāka school has introduced the probability doctrine in its philosophy; and so it comes to our notice that

११ लोकप्रसिद्धमनुमानं चार्वाकैरपि इष्यते एव । —(तत्त्वसंग्रह)

१२ सर्वं प्रतारणं मन्ये यज्ञदानादिकाः क्रियाः ।

अर्थवादो मतो वेरो ब्राह्मणा लोकवंचकाः ॥ —(जैमिनीय अश्वमेध अध्याय-६)

the epistemology, ontology and social ethics of its have been seized up and taken hold of by the probability doctrine.

To Carvaka every type of inference is nothing but probability itself. On a crucial thinking and prolonged and deep contemplation Cārvāka has reached the final and irrevocable conclusion that nothing is stable in this world, and so all events and facts are relative. Time and space are, as if, craftsman that can twist and mould every worldly happening in such a mystical way of which man, an unripe creature, is unfortunately incognisant and in pitch darkness.

Take for example, 'Rama can not digest hard bread', this is true but relatively true since Rama when a small baby can not digest the hard bread, but when reaches the young age he can do it very easily. Now the statement, 'Rama can not digest hard bread' is totally false one. So the Carvaka condemns inference as a source of valid knowledge. But one thing to be remembered here is that Carvaka admits Lokprasiddha Anuman which is, it says, based upon perception (Pratyaksha) itself. Here we should note that its stand is that inference can not be employed for establishing any dogma — God, soul, other world, Karma etc.

But, in worldly affairs, it admits this Lokprasiddha Anuman. What motivated the Carvaka to distinguish between inference (as represented by Nyayadarshana) and Lokprasiddha Anuman (as represented by Carvaka) is that Carvaka thought that a great deal of cheating was going on in the name of God, soul, Karma etc. It proclaimed and preached in society that God, soul, Karma, reincarnation could not be directly experienced and hence could not be proved by the help of inference either. This is a hoax; and it has been deliberately designed to serve as a source of livelihood for the social parasites.

Since Carvaka has condemned inference and its natural outcome, the testimony, comparison etc. as source of valid knowledge, and introduced probability doctrine in their philosophy,¹³ a new epoch arose in which a new critical logical method in all the fields—public life, scientific field, religious activities etc. — began to work and a rationalistic approach towards human culture, religion, philosophy became a criterion of all types of scholarships.

Cārvāka school was the first philosophy that condemned whatever was based upon superstitions and irrationality and commended the movement that caused people to treat rationalism as an ultimate criterion and as a door keeper while admitting any new truth, and that naturally begot scepticism and nihilism which, Carvaka thought, were the valuable features of a real philosopher who reflects with

freedom from presuppositions and religious superstitions and which naturally and inevitably tend to materialism.

Carvaka's probability doctrine has been so extensively and deeply rooted in human nature that David Hume and Bertrand Russell's rationalisms could not go more ahead than the point where Carvakas rationalism has already reached many centuries ago.

The probability doctrine is absolutely a new creation and fructification of Carvaka's critical thinking and deep contemplation. I think nobody dare dispute with this argument of mine.

There are some scholars who very boldly claim that probability doctrine is not an independent invention of Carvakas' alone, but roots of this doctrine are found in Jainas' Syadvada doctrine and in Anirwachaniyatā-khyāti of Advaita Vedant. But this view is not tenable and justifiable, and so can not be admitted since the Syadvada and Anirwachaniyatākhyāti are not the parts of Jainas' and Vedanta's Praman Vidya (the lore of means of right knowledge). Syadvada of Jainas' is the part of their metaphysics and the Anirwachaniyatākhyāti is that of the Vedanta's Māyāvāda.

So Jain and Vedant have ultimately come to the decisive conclusion that in the state of ecstasy and realisation of ultimate Reality all the means of knowledge (Pramana) automatically get dissolved and disappear. On realisation of Paramatma the Agam Pramanas prove themselves useless and unwanted. This is what the Indian Darshanas conclusively contemplate. They reflect that realisation transcends whatever is 'is'. Indian ... philosophy never stops at any point but reflects that human intellectual power have a dead limitation beyond which if anyone makes efforts to reach one has to inevitably meet disaster and deterioration; and it is here alone lies very essence of Indian heart. Indian Philosophy further directs us that realisation is not the matter of intellect but a matter of Godly power that is lying somewhere at a spot in the human body, which is unknown to the human intellect.

Cārvāka is never opposed to such a faith but argued that such Godly power etc. can not be proved by ... inference or perception and so can not be admitted.

This was the very stand of Carvaka upon which its rationalistic approach is stood.

In modern world the progress in science, mathematics, statistics and in social sciences is totally based upon this probability doctrine invented by Cārvāka philosophy. German philosopher Kant, the pioneer of modern rationalism, too, has admitted that the probability doctrine in Carvaka philosophy is a valuable and perpetual contribution to human culture, and that no science can go ahead until and unless it bases its stand on this probability doctrine.

From unknowable past the biological sciences could not make any progress or invent any new theory that could explain satisfactorily with sound proofs as to what soul or mind is and as to what body is and as to where their linking point to each other is. But Carvaka school has discovered a new horizon to the human eye that soul and body are not distinct from each other but they are one. A certain compound of four elements sprouts in a new entity that carries with it some exotic and strange attributes from those appearing with body. To this new entity which has sprung from matter itself we call soul or consciousness. Carvaka strongly state that one should not be bewildered of this mechanism that gives rise to consciousness from matter itself. It explains that in our daily life we find that certain ingredients used to prepare spirituous liquor possess no quality called intoxicating power, but the prepared liquor, it is our experience, is found to have this intoxicating power. So the Carvaka school strongly argues that the origin of consciousness from the material elements is not an impossibility but is a positive truth.

In the end I conclude that the invention of the probability doctrine by Carvaka's critical thinking has been a valuable and perpetual contribution to the modern world. The following facts are the result of this probability doctrine.

Love for individual hedonism, refutation of religious superstitions — God, Soul, Karma etc.—and rationalistic approach towards social and ethical values etc. are at work in modern age,. In sixteenth century Akbar, the Mughal Emperor, declared that Islam was irrelevant to the passage of time. In 20th Century our Bharat nation has adopted democracy as the best political policy, and the attitude of modern man is more scientific than religious and more rational than superstitious.

All these above illustrations exhibit that probability doctrine of Carvaka's is a lasting contribution to modern age and that if Carvaka would have been alive in this age would have definitely laughed loudly and sarcastically that he had succeeded.

Democracy in India is definitely a result and fruition of Carvaka's probability doctrine !

IV

The Notion of Intuition in Ethics — A Brief Survey

M. A. Hamid

The notion of intuition in philosophy or in ethics is not at all very recent. The word 'intuition' is derived from the Latin "intueor" which means "to look at" or "to directly see", — i.e., to have an immediate or direct awareness of some particular object of knowledge. It is an immediate cognition of some objects through feeling and as such, is quite independent of any consciousness of reasons or rational reflection that may be used in support of any particular belief or knowledge.

In religion, science and arts, too, intuition is used as a method of knowing. In religion, mystics usually claim to have attained an "inner voice" of some sort through a method in which they come into a direct contact with the Supreme Reality, i.e., God. Artists usually maintain that beauty can be known in no other way than an immediate apprehension of it. Scientists of all times have to depend on intuition to formulate their hypotheses and some philosophers, too, realised the importance of intuition in the knowing process.

The history of philosophy contains, apart from mystical thinkers, a long list of intuitionists; and the history of intuitionism in philosophy dates back to Socrates. Socrates, as he is portrayed into Plato's dialogues, is seen to have used it while recognising a "daimon" or voice which is to direct his course of action. Plato, an idealist as well as a rationalist, held the view that truth must be seen "with the eye of the soul", — thus appealing ultimately to the

¹ Aristotle later in his the '*Nichomachean Ethics*' freed himself from the Platonic influence and thought of 'good' as what accompanies activities conducive to happiness—the view which is known as Eudemonism.

intuitive insight. And Aristotle,¹ whose earlier ethical views seem to have been dominated by Plato's influence, defined 'good' in terms of the excellence of human nature which is to finally depend upon intuition. In the medieval period, intuitive experience was represented in Plotinus (205 — 270 A.D.) who developed a mystical philosophy in line with a kind of intuitive experience.

In the modern era, the ethical intuitionism is "the doctrine that what is right or wrong is something that can be known immediately without stopping to reflect on the matter or taking into account the consequences which belong to the action in question². According to it, a person can apprehend what would be right or wrong for him in any concrete situation; just as he can know a given colour when he would see it, or can recognize a particular sound when he would hear it. The principles of morality, accordingly, are self-evident. We are required neither to prove them nor to consider the reasons of facts on which moral judgements are to be based. Moral truths which, when known, are known by intuition; and if men can not know such truths intuitively, this is due to their defect either of physical sight or of intellectual discernment.

Moral intuitionism in the seventeenth century modern era, however, does not take a uniform expression. The first category of intuitionism which contends that the moral awareness in question can only be conceived satisfactorily as a form of sense-perception is known as 'moral sense theory'. Shaftesbury³ (1671-1713) and Hutcheson⁴ (1694-1747) were the chief exponents of this view and held that we know right and wrong in a manner we see colour through our sense-organs. The second kind of intuitionism known as rationalistic intuitionism maintains that it is reason or understanding which gives man the moral awareness. The principles concerning the nature of rightness or wrongness of actions are known intuitively by means of a reasoning process. Its advocates are R. Cudworth⁵ (1617-1788), H. Moore (1614 1687), S. Clarke⁶ (1675-1729), and R. Price⁷ (1723 1791).

2 C. A. Patterson, 'Moral Standards: An Introduction to Ethics', (New York : The Ronald Press Company. 1949); p. 77.

3 Anthony A. Copper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, was popularly known as Shaftesbury. His major ethical writing on "Enquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit" was first published in 1699

4 Vide, "An Enquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil" (1725), *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections* (1728), and *Illustrations upon the Moral Sense* (1728).

5 Generally known as the leader of the Cambridge Platonists, Cudworth explained his ethical view in his *Treatise on External and Immutable Morality*, published posthumously in 1731.

6 Vide, *A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God and Obligation of Natural Religion*, published in 1706.

These two types of intuitionism in the seventeenth century, i.e., moral sense theory and rational intuitionism became the centre of debate among their respective adherents. Bishop Butler (1692-1752), who was influenced by both the views, would emerge as a compromise between them. He argues that the existence of moral terms like 'right' and 'wrong' presupposes "a moral faculty; whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason".⁸ To him, everyman possesses a superior principle of reflection or 'conscience' as he prefers to call it. Butler also agrees with other intuitionists on the view that the moral properties which conscience discerns are logically distinct from all others. As he says :

"Everything is what it is, and not another thing. The goodness or badness of actions does not arise from hence, that the epithet, interested or disinterested, may be applied to them, any more than that any other ... epithet ... may or not ... but from their being what they are —"⁹

The intuitionists of the above two varieties, it is worth pointing out, was developed in sharp opposition to Hobbism¹⁰ according to which human nature including his morality is essentially materialistic, deterministic and egoistic. The intuitionists directed their attack at two points. The first was Hobbes's account of human nature as egoistic. They claimed that benevolence and a sense of duty are elements in human nature as such as the element of self-interest in it. As Clarke contended : "There is in all men a certain natural affection for the dependents or intimates; and that they 'naturally desire' to enlarge the circle until it includes the community of mankind"¹¹. The second attack was directed against Hobbes' attempt at reducing moral terms to non-moral ones. Clarke and Price argued that moral discourse cannot be reduced to non moral one without a change in, if not loss of, meaning.

Professor A. N. Prior draws similarity in view between the eighteenth century intuitionists' criticism of Hobbes and others and G.E. Moore's refutation of naturalistic ethics of Mill, Bentham and

⁷ His views concerning Rational Intuitionism are stated in his *Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals*, 1758.

⁸ *Dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue*, quoted in W. D. Hudson, *Ethical Intuitionism*, (London : Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1970); p. 29.

⁹ Preface to *Fifteen Sermons*, cited by W.D. Hudson, (See Ibid.).

¹⁰ The moral and political views of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) are enunciated in his *Leviathan*. Thomas Hobbes, whose views are shared by John Lock (1632-1704) and Mandeville (1670-1733), contribute to what may be called naturalism in seventeenth century's ethics.

¹¹ *A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attribute of God and Obligations of Natural Religion*, quoted in Hudson, *Op.Cit.*, p. 6.

others.¹² Regarding Price's anticipation of Moore's detection of the naturalistic fallacy, A. N. Prior says: "...; in fact, no other writer has anticipated Professor Moore quite so completely".¹³ The identity in approach between Price and Moore is also noticed by D.D. Raphael. Raphael says:

'It is, for example, rather startling to open Richard Price's book and find in its first pages exactly the same logical argument for the indefinability of moral attributes as has been used by Professor Moore in *Principia Ethica*'¹⁴

The moral intuitionism at the close of the nineteenth century took a new turn in the writings of Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900). Sidgwick in his *Methods of Ethics* (1874) anticipated a revolutionary change in favour of a contemporary intuitive and analytic moral philosophy and sought to found a partly utilitarian ethics upon an intuitive foundation of self evident moral axioms. The fundamental assumption of intuitionism, according to Sidgwick, is that "We have the power of seeing clearly what actions are in themselves right and reasonable".¹⁵ After devoting himself to an extremely careful investigation into what he called the 'morality of common sense' and analysing the claims of intuition which he had already decided to accept, Sidgwick proposed a new combination of utilitarianism and intuitionisms. As he says further:

"When I am asked, 'Do you not consider it ultimately reasonable to seek pleasure and avoid pain for yourself?', 'Do you not intuitively pronounce some action to be right and others wrong?', 'Do you not acknowledge the general happiness to be a permanent end?' I answer 'yes' to all these questions"¹⁶.

Sidgwick then concluded that the methods of ethics are three — (i) the methods of Egoistic Hedonism, (ii) utilitarianism, and (iii) Intuitionism. To him, it seems entirely reasonable that if one's own happiness is good, then others happiness is also good. Further, it seems to him reasonable that within certain limits, a greater balance of pleasure over pain is more worth aiming at than a lesser one. He is also of the view that apart from providing the needed intuitional foundation for his ethics, the fundamental axioms viz.

12 See Prior, *Logic and the Basis of Ethics*, Oxford, 1949 (Chapter The Naturalistic Fallacy: The History of Its Refutation). Moore assailed naturalistic Ethics in his *Principia Ethica* (Chaps. II, III and IV). To Moore, the basic value notion is indefinable and any attempt to define it involves what he calls the 'naturalistic fallacy'.

13 A. N. Prior, *Logic and the Basis of Ethics*, Oxford, 1949; p. 98.

14 *The Moral Sense*, Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 1.

15 *Methods of Ethics*, London: Macmillan & Co. (7th ed.), 1967, P. XXVIII.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

prudence, benevolence and justice imply an indeterminate and unanalysable 'good' of which they are to be regarded as distributive principles. Sidgwick's argument, in this respect, are mainly two-fold — the first argument concerns itself with his claim of ethical principles to be self evident and the second one is based on his criticism of the morality of common sense. Sidgwick thus anticipated G. E. Moore who in acknowledging his debt to the former says: " 'Good', then, is indefinable; and yet, so far as I know, there is only one ethical writer, Prof. Henry Sidgwick, who has clearly recognised and stated this fact".¹⁷

Intuitionism in contemporary moral thought is thus said to have begun with G. E. Moore, a philosopher of most distinguished ability and importance. His position in ethics is anti-hedonistic as well as anti-metaphysical. In the preface to 'Principia Ethica, Moore sought to distinguish between two kinds of questions: first, "What kind of things ought to exist for their own sakes?" and secondly, "What kind of actions ought we to perform?" The first question led Moore to find out the intrinsic nature of things in such basic ethical concept as 'goodness' and consequently, to declare that 'good' is a simple, non natural and indefinable property to be obtained by intuition.¹⁸ The second question led Moore to base moral obligations on the amount of good produced, so that rightness of an act is determinable in terms of maximum possible amount of good.¹⁹

Ethical Intuitionism right from Sidgwick has its emergence in the history of moral thought primarily as a reaction to Naturalistic ethics. The Naturalistic ethics, of which Mill (1806-1873), Bentham (1748-1832), and Spencer (1820-1903) are the main representatives, maintains that 'ought' can be defined in terms of 'Is', and value in terms of fact. Accordingly, ethical terms are definable in terms of non ethical ones; and ethical propositions in terms of non-ethical ones of a factual kind. For example, if "we ought to do ..." means "Society demands that we pay our debt," it follows that "we ought to pay our debt." Even the Naturalists went to such an extent as to say that ethical terms or judgements are not only to be defined; they

¹⁷ *Principia Ethica*, p. 17. Moore in the same passage continues: "... 'good' is indefinable, or as Prof. Sidgwick says, 'an unanalysable notion'.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 17.

¹⁹ It should be pointed out here that despite his belief in some form of utilitarianism in his notion of moral obligation, Moore's ethics as a whole is based on a non-natural intuitive foundation. The present writer elaborates this point in his Ph.D. Thesis 'A Study of Moore's Ethics' and tries to show that Moore's utilitarianism is ultimately based on his notion of intuition. For further clarification of this point please see P. Foot, *Theories of Ethics* (ed.), O. U. P., 1977; p. 2.

are also to be justified. Thus, for instance, when Perry²⁰ holds the view that 'good' means "being an object of desire", he also informs us that we can test empirically whether 'X' is good simply by determining whether it is desired or not. And, long before Perry, Hume²¹ was also defending another version of ethical naturalism according to which judgements of right and wrong and of obligations spring from our feelings and passions.

In refuting the above claims of the Naturalists, the Intuitionists held that value-concepts and value-propositions can neither be justified by nor be classified into factual propositions. Ethics does not "depend logically on facts about man and the world, empirical or non-empirical, scientific or theological".²² Value-concepts and ethical judgements are, according to them, intuitively known to be certain. They are self-justifying or, in Descartes' words, 'clear' and 'distinct' truths. This view is held by Sidgwick, Moore, Rashdall, Prichard, Ross, Carritt, Hartmann, and Ewing; and is called Intuitionism.

The intuitive approach to contemporary ethical thought is, however, of two distinct varieties. The first variety holds that value-concept like 'good' presupposes unique characteristics which are simple, indefinable, and that rightness of a thing or conduct depends upon its conduciveness to maximum good. This variety of moral intuitionism is characterised by T. E. Hill²³ as 'Realistic Value Theory' because it, on the one hand, approaches ethics from the view-point of the general theory of value and on the other hand, seeks, unlike the Idealistic value theories which sought to interpret value concepts in terms of reality, to take value as it is in concrete human experience. G. E. Moore (1873-1958) who is the fore-runner of intuitionism in contemporary thought is an advocate of this variety. He in his 'Principia Ethica' (1903) and other ethical writings affirmed the indefinability of good to be apprehended by intuition. To him, there is an intuitively known non-natural realm of value of which we can have an objective experience.

The other variety contends that 'right' and 'duty' are quite as unique and intuitively known as 'good is, and that 'right' and duty'

20 R. B. Perry, in his *General Theory of Value*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954 asserts such a view. He criticised Moore and other Intuitionists. He says: "The fact that good is undefined does not argue that it is indefinable; — on the contrary, it suggests the desirability of defining it." (See p. 35).

21 Hume says in his *Treatise* Everyman's Library edition, Vol. II, p. 220; "All morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any action or quality of the mind pleases us ..., we say it is virtuous."

22 W. K. Frankena, *Ethics* New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1963, p. 48.

23 In his *Contemporary Ethical Theories*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950; p. 294.

are not to be determined solely in terms of 'good'. Thus, whereas the first view regards 'good' as a primary concept in moral thought, the second view takes, along with 'good', the concepts of 'right' and 'duty' as also primary. The second variety is known as 'Deontological theories' of moral intuitionism — with Prichard, Ross, Carritt and Broad as its advocates.

To Prichard, the apprehension of duty "is immediate, in precisely the same sense in which a mathematical apprehension is immediate ..." ²⁴ Ross in his books 'The Right and the 'Good' (1930) and 'Foundation of Ethics' (1939) introduces the concept of prima facie duty and holds that duty is, in some cases, prior to value. Some of our prima facie moral obligations, Ross says, owe their validity to the good consequences in the manner act-utilitarianism ²⁵ thinks but others depend not on those good consequences but on certain relations in which we stand to others — debtor to creditor, father to son, etc. The conclusion Ross arrives at is that 'right' and 'duty' like 'good' are also basic ethical concepts to be known by intuition alone. The truths of ethics, say, avoiding cruelty in action, holding to generosity of conduct, and promise-keeping etc. are, to him, as self-evident as the truths of mathematics are.

As it is then evident, the debate in the contemporary moral intuitionism is on the question of the primacy of value concepts — Moore insisting on 'good'; and Prichard and Ross on 'ought' and 'right', along with 'good'. But both teleology and deontology of moral concepts presuppose value notions to be apprehended by intuition within the framework of non-naturalism. Both adhere to cognitivism as against non cognitivism which was advocated by Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, Toulmin and other later moral thinkers.

However, a large number of Non-cognitive moral thinkers would hesitate to accept the views of Intuitionism. The task of subsequent reaction to this objective and non-natural Intuitionism in ethics would be taken up by the Non-Cognitivists viz. Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, Nowell-Smith, Toulmin, P. Foot, J. Searle and others, according to whom, moral discourse is bound to be intimately connected with feeling, attitude, desire and decision; and as such, is subjective.

²⁴ H. A. Prichard, 'Moral Obligation', (Oxford : 1949); p. 4.

²⁵ Act-utilitarianism, which is also known as teleological moral theory, is maintained by Moore. Rule-utilitarian view of morality, which has been upheld by Prichard and Ross, holds that moral act should conform to a valid moral rule.

V

Are Studies of Conflict Resolution And Peace Science Fundamentally Misconceived ?

Gray Cox

Could it be that there are fundamental flaws in the ways in which most highly respected peace researchers go about their business ? This type of question is, of course, difficult to treat.

In a discipline which has achieved the level of what Thomas Kuhn calls "normal science puzzle solving", the evaluation of specific hypotheses tends to be relatively straightforward. However, if we are trying to choose between two competing theories, like Keynesian and Monetarist economic theory, things can get much more complex; typically no single "crucial experiment" can decide the case¹. But the difficulties get even worse when it comes to choosing between fundamental paradigms that differ in their definitions of the subject being studied, their metaphysical assumptions, their epistemology, and the research achievements they take to be exemplary of good work in the field. A wide variety of rational arguments may inform the choice, but—at least typically—people change paradigms through a process of conversion which does not involve deducing a conclusion so much as finding a world view—a world view in which they are now at home. The conversion is based largely on insights rather than arguments—insights that lead them to see the world in a new way.²

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- 1 cf. Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Program," Lakatos and Musgrave, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1970.
 - 2 cf. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970.

Often such conversions are precipitated by a growing sense of crisis, a sense that the current paradigm is not only failing to deal with anomalies of various types but that it is not getting anywhere. For example, scientists may find that basic hypotheses like "the law of rising expectations" are difficult to quantify in meaningful ways and seem to admit of counter examples that require ad hoc explanations that make them appear increasingly suspect. Also, one finds highly respected scientists beginning to make comments like the following, made by Kenneth Boulding, who has said that studies of the causes of war and peace :

... have been frustratingly disappointing. For instance, Professor Rudi Rummel's studies of the dimensionality of nations, while they have employed the most sophisticated statistical methods, have failed to come up with any clear correlates of the incidence of war and peace.³

Could it be that people who do peace research need a new framework of study—not just a new hypothesis or a new theory but a paradigm with a different definition of peace, and a different metaphysics, epistemology, and set of exemplary achievements which they emulate ?

Suppose for the moment that the answer is yes. Then a key question arises, the one this paper sketches an answer to : How might this paradigm differ from the current one and in what ways might it be better ?

The current paradigm of peace research—shared by Kenneth Boulding, Rudi Rummel, Walter Isaard, and Johan Galtung—is a paradigm characterized by a negative definition of peace itself, a conflict-centered view of human activity, and a Galilean/natural science view of methods in social research. Variant forms of it are adopted by many others, including social scientists who might not label themselves "peace researchers" per se as well as those who would and who publish in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* and *The Journal of Peace Science*.

Peace is conceived in static and logically negative way, as a state or condition distinguished by an absence—peace is defined in terms of what it is *not*, namely : war, violence, aggression, hostility, or other modes of conflict. (Galtung has a *morally* positive notion of "positive peace" but it too is defined in a *logically* negative way as an absence of "structural violence" and oppression.)⁴

The connections between this conception of peace and the current paradigm's metaphysics and epistemology are best grasped, initially, with some oversimplifications.

³ Kenneth Boulding, *Stable Peace*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1978, p. 25.

⁴ cf. Juergen Dedring, *Recent Advances in Peace and Conflict Research*, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1976, p. 20 ff.

The paradigm pictures social reality as a series of events governed by mathematical natural laws that are to be discovered using a method essentially the same as the one employed by Galileo and subsequent natural scientists.

The events of social reality are occurrences of conflict, and so the science of peace will be a theory of conflict and its absence, peace. Isaard has argued that peace research is, in fact, the Queen of the social sciences and that all of them can be integrated in a single theoretical construct whose modelled is developed as follows; "a. Begin with a basic production subsystem, with simple conflict among two participants over the joint action."⁵ Note that here conflict is viewed as essential to social reality, social reality is thought to begin with "simple conflict over the joint action".

This paradigm of peace research as "conflict science" adopts a Galilean epistemology which supposes that knowledge is to be acquired by constructing mathematical models which are empirically verified by observers who seek correlations of fact. The observers should aim to be spectators who manipulate social reality experimentally rather than participants who let value judgments bias their theoretical constructions.

To see why the elements of this paradigm have strong conceptual affinities, note the following. If scientific knowledge is value free—and there is no independent source of knowledge to tell us what the true or correct values are—then value judgments would seem to be subjective matter of preference. Rational actors will be able to use science to learn the laws of reality—to learn the mathematical laws that govern the way some events cause others—and this will tell them how to achieve their ends through instrumental actions by using things and people as means or instruments which cause their preferences to be realized.

But preferences differ. And each action has a range of effects with indefinitely large and spreading ramifications that inevitably bring agents into conflict. Even actions like eating, sleeping, and procreating—which Kenneth Boulding has suggested are "non-conflict" activities—turn out to have consequences which (once we become conscious of them) bring us into conflict with others.⁶ What I eat another does not and when I procreate I place a further demand on the world's resources—it is just these "non-conflict" activities that much of the world hunger conflict concerns.

5 Walter Isaard, "A Definition of Peace Science, the Queen of the Social Sciences", *Journal of Peace Science*. Volume 4. Number 1, Fall 1979, p. 20 ff.

6 cf. Kenneth Boulding, *Stable Peace*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1978 pp. 9-10.

And if conflict is an essential and ineliminable aspect of human life, then to get peace—by abating conflict—we have to abate life itself. Thus, on this view, peace can be conceived only as an absence. When we reduce life activity there is nothing left for peace to be—except remaining life activity that itself involves some conflict and thus is not, itself, peace. And total peace can only be total absence of life, the peace in which the dead rest.

There is a good deal more to say about this paradigm of peace research, but at this point its main features are clear. It supposes that peace research should use a mathematical, value free, method of observation and theory construction to study a social reality defined in terms of conflicts and their absences.

There is no question that this “conflict science” paradigm has been productive in significant ways. For example, it has led researchers to acquire large and useful bodies of descriptive statistics relevant to peace issues, it has led to important insights in game theory and the understanding of bargaining and negotiation, and it has fostered an attitude towards conflict which is healthy—a view of conflict that leads us to see it not as something to be avoided but dealt with squarely. The question is, has work done within this paradigm reached a point of diminishing returns—or at least marginal returns that are less than those we might get with an alternative paradigm?

We do not have to seek far to find an alternative, one we might call the “participatory cultivation of agreement” paradigm. It can be articulated by drawing on critiques of contemporary social science and exemplary work in peace research represented by Gandhi’s studies of *satyagraha*, Michael Sheeran’s study of the Quaker process of consensus, and Roger Fisher and William Ury’s *Getting to Yes*.

On this view, social reality is conditioned by the physical world in which it is lodged but it is structured differently and must be studied differently. Social reality consists not of events which are caused according to mathematical laws but of intentional actions and historical institutions which are structured in terms of ordinary or “natural” languages like English and Spanish.

One way to put the point, and begin to see some of its implications, is to say that peoples’ own understandings of social reality structures that reality. Their understanding is that of participants who speak a language learned in the context of practices that emerge and change over time. This self-understanding is flawed, typically, in at least five ways. It is tacit, vague, inconsistent, inaccurate, and incomplete. But it is an indispensable understanding for social researchers. To understand a community’s activities, researchers have to become participants who speak the language that defines that

reality. Their special task, as researchers, is to then try to improve upon the community's self understanding by reformulating it in ways that are more explicit, clear, consistent, accurate, and complete. For example, to study bargaining, researchers should go out and do some negotiating, and then they should critique current practice. One example of such "critical participatory research" is Fisher and Ury's analysis of "positional bargaining" in *Getting to Yes*.⁷ Another is Michael Sheeran's study, *Beyond Majority Rule: Voteless Decisions in the Religious Society of Friends*.⁸

Such critical participatory research should attempt to avoid bias by telling the whole story rather than just one or a few sides of it. But it must tell the story in the terms that it is structured—in the value laden terms that are used by the community to define its own activities. So such theories aim to be objective by being complete in the value judgments they consider and critique, *not* by being value free or by emotionally sanitizing their descriptions with phrases like "incidents of war".⁹

Further, such research does not expect to find unchanging mathematical laws governing social reality because the language and institutions that structure it are emerge and alter historically and are non-mathematical—except when people are distributing quantities of resources and the community itself uses a mathematical language to define and decide its actions' (This is why successful economic theories may look like Galilean-styled natural science studies. In fact, such theories are simply participatory accounts of communities' activities in the language of those communities — or in revisions of those languages that have been suitably critiqued for explicitness, clarity, consistency, accuracy, and completeness.)

If we adopt this view of social knowledge, then our understanding of social reality and rational action, in particular, are transformed. We see rational action as activity guided by attempts to cultivate an improved self-understanding — an understanding which is emergent. We do not know quite what our ends are or what means we are employing to achieve them. We engage in expressive actions like protest marches that bear witness to convictions, projects like work on a Nuclear Freeze campaign that develop a life of their own, and practices like "principled negotiation" and *satyagraha* that are understood in terms of rehearsal and performance in which we internalize a network of internally related skills and values rather than instrumental actions that use some means to achieve subjective

7 Penguin Books, New York, 1981.

8 Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, Philadelphia, 1983.

9 See Brian Fay, *Social Theory and Political Practice*, Holmes and Meier Publishers, New York, 1976.

preferences.¹⁰ On this view, we are, when most rational, thinking and acting to cultivate more explicit, clear, consistent, accurate and complete understandings of who we are, what we want, and how the world works.

In the context of this epistemology and metaphysics, a different view of peace can be articulated. Peace, we may suppose, is an activity rather than a state or condition. It is something we can *do*. And it is distinguished in a logically positive way. It is the process of cultivating shared commitments to further activity—commitments which are *genuine* in the sense that participants understand them and agree to them. These commitments themselves are not understood as states of *agreement* defined and writ in stone but as processes of *agreeing*. Whereas the old paradigm's view is encapsulated in the metaphor of peace as "the light at the end of the tunnel", the new one's is perhaps best evoked by the motto of the Fellowship of Reconciliation: "There is no way to peace. Peace is the way".

The "peace as active way" paradigm, like the conflict science paradigm, can take a variety of forms, but perhaps in its most distinctive and purest (or extreme) form, it supposes that there are objective values that can be known through a process of critical participatory research. Gandhi, for one, held this view. He held that human differences should not be viewed as *horizontal* oppositions resulting from different subjective preferences. Instead, they are elements of an emerging organic whole governed by values *higher* than any of us. Rather than seeing social reality in terms of conflicts to be resolved he saw it in terms of problems to be solved and failures to reach genuine consensus about the objective truths that ought to rule over us.

Now there are a great many sorts of arguments that need to be considered in trying to evaluate the relative merits of the conflict science paradigm and the participatory cultivation of agreement paradigm. At this point I will mention some—on one side—without rehearsing them in any detail: 1. The Galilean epistemology has failed to deliver what it promised. We have not discovered any value neutral, mathematical laws governing social reality, and we are not going to discover any because it is just not that kind of reality. 2. By viewing rational action as a process of cultivating our understanding of expressive activities, open ended projects, and emerging practices we are able to make a great deal more sense of most of what we do than if we adopt a narrow, instrumental model of rational action. And by seeing social reality as a network of emerging problems and solutions rather than a set of conflicts over

¹⁰ For an account of this notion of a "practice", see Alasdair Mac Intyre, *After Virtue* University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1981.

joint actions, we are able, for example, to understand the sense in which there really are non conflict activities—like artistic expression and scientific research. 3. By viewing peace as an activity we can perform and cultivate, we are able to give positive direction to our research. We are no longer left defining peace in terms of what it is not, we have an idea of what it *is* and of how to cultivate it.

Might it be that the opportunity costs of not adopting this paradigm are large—too large? Might we be at a point at which we should give up the conflict science paradigm and work within alternative sketched here? Perhaps peace research, as the Queen of the social sciences be built with a model that is developed in this way :

“a. begin by acquiring participatory understanding of communities of intentional agents whose activities are structured in terms of natural languages and historically emergent institutions; b. critique the self-understanding of those communities for explicitness, clarity, consistence, accuracy, and completeness; c. cultivate genuine, voluntary commitments to shared activities in expressions, projects, and practices”.

This paradigm is one which presents special tasks for philosophers. It has distinctive epistemic, metaphysical, and axiological commitments which are in need of detailed analysis, clarification, and critical revision. Such philosophical study is important not only for the improvement of the practice of peace as an active “way” but also to secure legitimacy for the new paradigm—whose researchers are often viewed as adopting “unscientific” and illegitimate methods because they adopt methods different from those of the still dominant positivist school of social research.

We should further note that in the development of this new paradigm a great deal is at stake. In an increasing number of global regions — and, above all, in relations between the superpowers — nuclear weapons have made war a matter of Mutually Assured Destruction. This means war can no longer serve its traditional function of settling international disputes and providing diplomacy with its final court of appeal. But what then can serve this function? The activity of peace discussed here provides one promising alternative. Adopting it will require us to rethink the nature of diplomacy itself which — contra Clausewitz — has longed been practiced as “the continuation of war by other means”. But this peace that is a “way” is an alternative that offers us the hope that disciplined and concerted efforts in research and practical action may yet permit us to continue to walk in the light in the midst of the dark times which are upon us.

VI

A Pathless Path to Freedom

G. N. Mishra

The human society has made tremendous material progress but still almost half of the population suffers from dire poverty, starvation, malnutrition and slavery. There is rampant exploitation, hatred, jealousy, fear, dishonesty, conflict and cruelty so much so that "we live in a world that is going to pieces, that has become quite insane, quite disorderly and a dangerous place to live in".¹ The world is beset with diverse problems which have made contemporary man confused and violent. There are revolts, inter-group bickerings and internecine global discontent and distrust which threaten to disrupt the world peace.

There are thousands of explanations of these problems which have evaded traditional solutions. The contemporary society needs total transformation with a view to achieving a lasting world peace, harmony and order and for this J. Krishnamurti's suggestion is that we should abandon traditional path. The root cause of all problems is 'I-consciousness' which must be transformed and transcended. What is needed is to 'see' with clarity things, others and one-self.²

Traditional paths, prescribed by the society which is hopelessly divided into various antithetical blocks, organisations, systems, ideologies, religious orders and diverse isms, distort truth and suppress freedom. Truth and freedom can truly be realised only by individual effort and that means to discover and tread one's own path. This, J. K. not only preached but also practised himself.

He was trained in the Theosophical tradition and was ordained as the head of the Order of Star by Dr. Annie Beasant and

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- 1 *The Wholeness of Life*, Krishnamurti Foundation India, 1978, p. 159
 - 2 *The Impossible Question*, Penguin Bks., 1972, p. 13.

Mr. Leadbeater who deciphered in his character a high quality of innate spirituality even when he was young. He was declared to become the World teacher and a special programme was chalked out for his education in England where he was sent along with his brother Nityananda. But J. K. felt that he was being enslaved and his inner urge to freedom expressed itself most forcefully after the sad demise of his brother in the Ojai valley of California. He was totally transformed, renounced luxurious life style, disbanded the Order of Star and gave away all its property. With the sole aim to 'set men absolutely and unconditionally free', he set out to tread the lonely path, travelling all his life all over the world, never staying for long at any single place like a true Sanyasin.

He felt that organised religions and ideologies have separated man from his bountiful mother making him alien in his own homeland. No religion, no teaching, no scripture and intellectual activity can remove man's sense of alienation and lead him from darkness to light. One has to choose one's own path through self-discipline and self awakening. A complete understanding of one's self is the key to solve all problems. "It is very important to uncover for oneself what one actually is; not according to the theories and the assertions and experiences of psychologists, philosophers and gurus, but rather by investigating the whole nature and movement of oneself; by seeing what one actually is."³ Self-awareness is immune to the inducements of the conditioned mind and dissolves all dualisms and contradictions.

Holistic

The self-awareness comes not analytically but holistically which means to see the self and the not-self as a whole. The division of the 'I' and the 'me', the observer and the observed, is the cause of disorder and conflict which can be resolved by dismissing analysis and adopting holistic method of choiceless action and that alone can lead to absolute order and harmony. "That can come about only naturally, easily, without conflict, when one is aware of oneself as a consciousness, aware of confusion, the turmoil, the contradiction outwardly and inwardly observing without any distortion."⁴ Reality gets disfigured by analysis as it lies in the totality or gestalt of its parts. It can be comprehended only holistically and 'to observe holistically is to observe — or to listen to — the whole content of something !'⁵

J. K. condemns both realism and idealism as methodological doctrines which partition Being into the object and subject and

3 *The Wholeness of Life*, p. 141.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 206.

5 *Ibid* p. 207.

assign absolute ontological significance to either. Against the realists, he says that what is known is not the only reality and against the idealists he asserts that the known is not a mere mirage. The earthly life is not an illusory appearance of something but it is the real expression of the Infinite itself. As a lotus needs mire to grow, so also man needs the transient mundane matter to evolve into perfection... So what thought puts together is reality like the table, the church, the state and even the illusion. But what is not contrived by thought, as Nature, is also real.

It is absurd to search for reality in 'what should be' at the tremendous cost of 'what is'. Truth is to be found in this very world, here and now, and not in any attenuated realm of grey abstraction as the Advaita vedantins do. Reality is creation and its manifestations are neither limitations nor hallucinations. There are degrees of manifestations and we should see them as they are not as they should be. According to J. K. matter, life, mind and spirit are the expressions of the Being and different levels. In things like a stone the creative life is at its lowest and in man it is at its highest. Man initially lived a savage life and gradually entered the society by imposing upon himself the social laws which proved to be golden fetters to maim his freedom. His spiritual search started with rites and rituals and not satisfied with them he tried to go to the reality beyond the images.

The search for truth can be fruitfully carried on with only individual efforts which alone can bring about the union of the Self with the original Spirit. This cannot be done logically but personally. "Thought can never understand that which is whole, that which is immeasurable, which is timeless."⁶ Concepts of causality, the logical categories of the subject and the object, the universal and the particular, are valid only in the realm of the finite, what is known, and any attempt to surreptitiously smuggle them into the realm of the Infinite results in the distortion of truth or what Kant called antinomies. "Seeing the Truth of it is intelligence and intelligence is not reason, logic or the very careful dialectical explanation; the latter is merely the exposition of thought in various forms; and thought is never intelligence."⁷

Logic or thought is not to be condemned but given its significance as a conditioned fact and if this is understood, it generates intelligence which elevates man to the realm of Truth. "Then you are out of this world, though you are living in it, you are completely an outsider."⁸

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

Scepticism

J. K., à la Descartes, adopts initial scepticism, against the final scepticism of Hume. He condemns all kinds of authoritarianism, because they suppress the sceptical spirit of inquiry and freedom. He says : "True scepticism and investigation are necessary. The spirit of scepticism exists in the scientific world; that is why technology has advanced so enormously. But the religious world has ceased to doubt and be sceptical, and so remains in darkness and superstition; it is held in belief and ritual."⁹

An intelligent man, according to J. K., first rejects all dogmas, beliefs and rituals and goes beyond the concepts. This enables him to 'see' the facts as they are without any mutilation by conditioned thought. He starts with doubts, denials and rejections and these lead him to an intelligent comprehension of certainty transcending all dualisms, dichotomies and contradictions. J. K. says : 'You must begin with doubt' completely doubting, then you end up with certainty. But if you start with certainty, then you end up in uncertainty and chaos.'¹⁰

Scepticism implies being independent and this is a prerequisite to any fruitful investigation. Dependence on any form—on people, friends authority or on subjective imagination, fantasy or knowledge—breeds fear and disrupts inquiry and freedom. When one realises this then one's 'mind becomes extraordinarily sensitive and therefore capable of learning and it disciplines itself without any form of compulsion or conformity.'¹¹ A sensitive mind is not limited by any set pattern whether objective or subjective. It is not static but constantly moving like a flowing river and in that constant movement there is no suppression and no conformity.

The seeker after truth must be absolutely free not only from all external authority but also from his own already gathered knowledge and experience because they block his vision and make his inquiry prejudiced. "Freedom from the known is the beginning of search. Unless the mind is free from knowledge as experience and conclusion, there is no discovery, but only continuance, however modified, of what has been. The past dictates and interprets further experience, thereby strengthening itself. To think from the conclusion, from belief, is not to think at all."¹²

Non-conformist

A lover of truth cannot be conformist. He must make his path and rules. Conformity, imitation and discipline are adopted as

9 *Within The Mind*, K.F.I. 1982, p. 150.

10 *The Wholeness of Life*, p. 172.

11 *The Impossible Question*, p. 26.

12 *Commentaries on Living : Third Series*, (ed) Rajgopal D , B. I. Pub 1960 p. 279.

devices for achieving security but they cannot offer truth of freedom which, on the contrary, they not only hide but also disfigure. "Conformity is gratifying; it assures security to the disciple, and gives power to the disciple as well as to the teacher. Through conformity there is the strengthening of the authority, secular or religious; and conformity makes for dullness, which they call peace."¹³ Conformity is considered necessary for discipline and social solidarity. It helps continuity and brings about fellow-feeling. But this is what, according to J. K., hinders the search for truth and suppresses freedom. He writes: "Freedom cannot be found in retreat, in any system or belief, nor through the conformity and fear called discipline. Disciplines cannot offer freedom; they may promise, but hope is not freedom. Imitation as means to freedom is the very denial of freedom for the means is the end; copy makes for more copy, not for freedom."¹⁴

Attention and choiceless action

Starting with doubt, denial and rejection of authority, one can arrive at certainty through meditation which involves concentration choiceless action and attention. Concentration involves resistance and hence effort and divisions which necessitate choiceless action which means transcending all divisions without effort. It is just an awareness. In attention one destroys even the centre of awareness and goes above the observer and the observed distinction. It is limitless. "When you have gone through all this... then in that total silence there is a movement which is timeless, which is not measured by thought—thought that has no place in it whatsoever—then there is something totally Sacred, timeless"¹⁵

Attention awakens intelligence and this brings an insight into truth. It is effortless, goal-less and conflict free path which takes us direct at the heart of Being or what Heidegger would call *Sein*—the thinghood of things. It is the stage of emptiness and silence where the experience becomes fathomless and the language fails to communicate. It is what Jaspers calls the stage of Shipwreck. "The brain becomes extraordinarily quiet when in this process of inquiry; when there is silence, there is great perception. In this silence, there is emptiness, an emptiness that is the summation of all energy."¹⁶

The method of formal reasoning is not enough to reach this stage. It must be controlled and supplemented by perceptive reasoning and existential involvement because in that case alone 'reality, actuality and truth melt together in an infinite movement of self-

¹³ *Commentaries on Living*, 2nd series, 1958, p. 102.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *The Wholeness of Life*, p. 176

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

knowing'.¹⁷ This is the state of liberation in which the individual is not annihilated as the Advaitin mistakes but becomes his 'whole' which J. K. calls Beloved, Truth, Life, God or Intelligence. It is the end of ignorance and beginning of a new life. A liberated man lives the life which is egoless and motiveless and is not disturbed by any extraneous influences. He maintains poise between love and reason and his awakened intelligence offers him perfect perspective of 'what is'.

This is the stage of being alone but 'aloneness is not withdrawal from life; on the contrary, it is total freedom from conflict and sorrow, from fear and death... This aloneness is emptiness; it is not the positive state of being or not-being. It is emptiness; in the fire of emptiness the mind is made young, fresh and innocent.¹⁸ Aloneness which implies freedom is not to be achieved in any hypothetical hereafter but here and now. But it requires great intelligence, courage, alertness and wisdom. J. K. writes: "To live alone needs great intelligence; to live alone and yet be pliable is arduous. To live alone, without the walls of self-enclosing gratifications, needs alertness; for solitary life encourages sluggishness, habits that are comforting and hard to break."¹⁹

Loneliness is not isolation but a pathless life. This is not to sever all social relations but to comprehend them in a unique way. There is no path to wisdom because all paths are separative, exclusive or isolative. Wisdom which means the understanding of one's relationship with the field, with thought and with everything, is pathless. Hence, "to withdraw, to isolate oneself in order to find, is to put an end to discovery. Relationship leads to an aloneness that is not of isolation. There must be an aloneness, not of the enclosing mind, but of freedom. The complete is the alone, and incompleteness seeks the way of isolation."²⁰

J. K.'s pathless path may not be completely new since even Indian Philosophy emphasises individualistic efforts in the final stages in the search of liberation. It may not be suggestive of any panacea for modern ills and confusions. Rather it may create more if not understood in proper perspective. But it is significant in stressing the need of self awakening, of transcending the discursive methodological doctrines of realism and idealism. His iconoclastic scepticism bordering on nihilism, being logically untenable, may not be palatable to many. No one can begin in vacuum and all the traditional paths are not completely infructuous, and if they are, then his precepts are equally so. But what is significant in his suggestion is that it is the individual himself who is the maker of his destiny because traditional precepts can show him only the path and not make him walk on it. He rightly draws our attention to the individual as the centre of Truth and Freedom but the concept of individuality needs further explanation.

17 Fritz Wilhelm, "Reality, Actuality and Truth" in *Within the Mind*, p. 131.

18 Patwardhan, S., "On What I Have Understood", in *Within Mind*, p. 138

19 *Commentaries on Living*, 2nd series, p. 101.

20 *Ibid*, p. 102.

VII

The First Steps of Affirmation of the Marxist Philosophy after the Socialist Revolution in Bulgaria

Latyo Latev A Dimitar Dimitrov

The socialist revolution (on the 9th September 1944) has opened a wide horizon before philosophy in Bulgaria. The development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy during this period passes through two relatively different stages. The first one is related to the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. The main tasks in that period were put forward by Georgy Dimitrov during a discussion with the editor of the Bulgarian journal "Philosophical thought" Todor Pavlov : overcoming the fascist and idealistic trends, development of the methodological functions of Marxist philosophy and rising its role in the formation of a new ideology of the working people.

The second period is related to the victory of socialism in the socio economic sphere of our society. The solutions given by the historical April Plenum in 1956 contributed greatly to the strengthening and the development of our Marxist Leninist ideological front and created good social-psychological climate for scientific work.

Right after the victory of the socialist revolution Marxist-Leninist philosophy in our country took a governing position. The only idealistic trend in philosophy that existed almost a decade after the socialist revolution was the rheumcism of Dimitar Michaltchev. A great struggle was lead against it and it was overcome in 1953 finally. As it is known Marxist philosophy has considerable traditions in our country. Continuing the deed of Dimitar Blagoev and acad Todor Pavlov, the Bulgarian philosophers develop

successfully some of the problems set forth by the needs of the socialist practice and the scientific cognition as well as the ideological struggle. One of the main trends in the philosophical research is in the field of dialectical materialism. Traditionally relatively greatest part of research belongs to the gnoseological problems. In that connection the problem of reverberation is central. A starting point in elaborating this problem is Todor Pavlov's **THEORY OF REFLECTION**, published in 1936 as well as his other studies concerning reverberation, information etc. The problem of reverberation has been interpreted in our philosophical literature differently. The problems of typology of reverberation, reverberation and interrelation are well developed. Different types of reverberation and the question of activism of reverberation are analysed. The studies on the nature and specificity of the gnoseological image, its structure, characteristics, stages and formation are of great interest. It is important that the achievements of the theory of reverberation are of great significance not only for gnoseology but also prove ideological and methodological value in interpreting modern physiology, biology, psychology, cybernetics and other sciences. The investigations on consciousness as the highest form of reverberation are very fruitful. The relatively badly developed question of the ontological aspect of consciousness is actively studied now. There are also a number of monographs devoted to the categories objective and subjective, ideal and material, etc. One of the main trends of investigation in gnoseology is the study of the problem of the relation between truth and practice.

The elaboration of ontological problems is another trend in our Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Matter as a fundamental philosophical concept is paid greatest attention. More particularly, questions concerning definition of matter, its attributes and characteristics are investigated. The laws and categories of dialectics are studied. Real achievements are present in elucidation of the content, coordination, subordination and principles of classification of the categories of dialectical materialism. Different principles for classification of the categories are proposed. The problem of dialectics as a general theory of development, as well as logic and gnoseology is elaborated very intensely.

The achievements of the Bulgarian philosophers in the field of methodology and logic of science are significant as well. A number of monographs concern the problems of historical and logical methods, the system-structural method, as well as the questions of general methodology and heuristics in scientific cognition. Questions concerning structure of scientific theory, experiment, specificity of mathematical knowledge, correlation between general and specific methods are elaborated to a certain degree.

The scientific investigations in historical materialism are intensive and fruitful. Right after the socialist revolution the problems of historical materialism turned to be central social practice at that time set out the problems concerning the character of the revolution and the specificity of the newly established government; the role of the people as well as the problem of the forces of historical development; state and democracy, classes and class structure. Later on fundamental theoretical questions of historical materialism have been elaborated. A number of collective and individual monographs concerning the subject matter, methodology, structure and content of historical materialism have been written. One of the debatable questions during the fifties was the relation between historical materialism and sociology. The conception of sociology as a science separate from historical materialism was generally accepted as a result and an Institute of sociology was established in 1968.

One of the central themes in the scientific apparatus of historical materialism. Besides elaborating different categories, principles of their classification are proposed as well. The Bulgarian philosophers have achieved certain merits in elaborating the fundamental categories of historical materialism as for example social life and social consciousness, structure, laws and forms of social consciousness; regularities of social life; the nature of social cognition; basis and superstructure; causality and laws of social development; problems like negative phenomena in society, the role of structural approach in social sciences, specificity and nature of socialist way of life, ideology etc. The Bulgarian philosophers have contributed significantly to studying the problems concerning the development of socialism and more particularly the stages in building communism. A lot of publications reveal the main characteristics and regularities in building of the developed socialist society, the role of that stage in building the communist society. Besides that the laws, prerequisites and social effects of the scientific-technological revolution as well as its influence on social relations, culture and personality are studied. Recently the problems of speeding up the implementation in public production of the latest achievements in scientific-technological revolution are actively studied. The urgent problems of social management and intellectualization are elaborated, too.

The Bulgarian logicians study a number of problems of dialectical, formal and symbolic logic. More particularly, the study the interrelations between formal and dialectical logic, history of logic, the problems of non classical logics etc. Of certain interest are the studies of the Bulgarian logicians on the objective content of the logical laws, the problems of semantics, the argumentation of the inductive proves, classification of propositions, the questions of modal logic, the problems of relations, of logical paradoxes, as well as critical analysis of logical positivism.

The philosophical problems of the natural sciences are actively studied. A considerable part of this field of investigation concerns philosophical problems of physics. One of the central themes is causality.

A subject matter of importance for the Bulgarian philosophers are a number of questions concerning the interrelation between philosophy and other sciences, the relation between empirical and theoretical cognition, certain gnoseological and theoretical questions of physics, the philosophical problems of quantum theory, of theory of relativity, of cosmology, the specificity of scientific revolutions, the mode of thinking etc.

Characteristics of chemical forms of reverberation and specificity of cognition in chemistry are studied as well.

Not a small part of the philosophical problems of the natural sciences concern some questions of biology and medicine. Acad. Assen Kisselinchev's studies on the relation between the theory of reverberation and Pavlov's theory of the central nervous system are significant. A number of questions of molecular biology and genetics, biochemistry, biophysics, neurophysiology, ecology etc. are being discussed actively.

The studies of the Bulgarian philosophers in ethics are worth mentioning too. Investigations on the questions of the subject-matter and the structure of this science, of the nature and specificity of morality etc. are carried out. Ethical problems of different spheres of public life are treated—morals in groups of colleagues, in science etc. There are some publications on particular categories of ethics as for example the good, the trust, the happiness and others.

As for the field of aesthetics, the deed of Todor Pavlov as an aesthetician and literary critic is continued in a number of studies. Here should be mentioned the discussions on the subject-matter of aesthetics, on the nature and the character of the beautiful and on the socialist-realistic method. Some considerable studies on particular aesthetical categories like the ridiculous, the tragic, the ugly etc. were published. Also it should be mentioned that specific spheres as for example theatre, cinema and mass culture have attracted scientific interest.

The field of scientific atheism, which is of real significance for our society is developed considerably. The basic questions of the subject-matter and structure of the science of religions, the process of overcoming the religion, some traditions rites and rituals are being discussed. The empirical sociological investigation on the religiousness of the population in Bulgaria has to be pointed out. Its results appeared to be important resource for some governmental decisions.

There was a considerable advance in the field of history of philosophy. Publications on ancient, Middle-age and classic philosophy were published. The critical analysis of the trends in contemporary non-marxist philosophy develops, successfully. Attention is set on the history of different philosophical disciplines like logic, ethics, aesthetics etc.

The activity on systematic study of history of Bulgarian philosophy has intensified and as a result a publication (in four volumes) was released.

More and more efforts have been concentrated on elaborating the basic methodological problems of history of philosophy, in particular—the argumentation of the problematic categorical analysis.

As an inference it can be pointed out that after the socialist revolution in our country the investigations in philosophy are actually carried out in all directions of philosophical cognition. The following generalized features, characterizing this sphere of knowledge in Bulgaria during the last decades should be pointed out :

First. Institutionalization of philosophical knowledge. The philosophical investigations have been concentrated in several institutions—Institution of philosophy at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Academy of Social Sciences and Social Management at the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Faculty of philosophy at the University of Sofia, as well as the departments of Marxism Leninism at the different institutions of higher education.

Second. Establishing of the collective manner of scientific research. The number of collective publications, series of publications of different authors is still growing (particularly in the field of historical materialism, logic, theory of reverberation etc.)

Third. Widening the range of investigation of phenomena and regularities and extending the analysis or in other words, extensive as well as intensive development of the philosophical knowledge is present in our country.

Fourth. Methodologization of the philosophical investigations. That is—the interest towards “ensurance” of the investigation in different scientific fields with a philosophical methodology strengthens.

In conclusion we would point out that Bulgarian philosophy has achieved considerable successes during the last few decades and the most important is the quick transition on modern level of scientific investigation—a process, which, in other social circumstances would have lasted much longer.

VIII

Effect of Prolonged Motivational and Emotional Deprivation on Retention

Khurshid Alam

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to examine the effect of prolonged motivational and emotional deprivation on retention. The concept of prolonged deprivation was initially used by Tripathi and Misra (1977) taking in view with physical and experimental dimensions which appear to be energy of sufficiency or deficiency in the development of some cognitive functioning. Prolonged deprivation is a multidimensional psychological construct embracing a wide range of environmental and organismic variables, and refers to a dispossession or loss of privileges, opportunities, material goods and the like relatively for a longer period (Tripathi and Misra 1975; Misra and Tripathi; 1977). It also refers to all possible aspect of experiential input on individual during his life time. Newcomb (1970) and Legmeir (1968) have defined prolonged deprivation as insufficient satisfaction of basic needs for a prolonged period.

It has been observed by several investigators that deprivation of various kinds such as sensory—muscular, motivational, emotional, social, parental, cultural and economic etc. result in deficient cognitive functioning, specially in complex perceptual task. Numerous studies on various facets of deprivation (Panda, 1976; Miller, 1968; Dass, 1969; Chopra, 1969; Sen, 1976; White, 1970; etc.) In relation with academic performance have been conducted to show the inhibitory effect of the former on the latter. Tripathi and Misra (1975) studied the relationship between cognitive abilities and prolonged deprivation and found that prolonged deprived are cognitively less developed than their counterparts. Sinha et al. (1982) have reported that there is negative relationship between deprivation and cognitive efficiency. Sharma and Bhargava (1980) have also reported an

inverse relationship between academic attainment and prolonged deprivation. Recently, Sharma (1983) studied academic performance as a function of prolonged deprivation and found that with the increase in the prolonged deprivation, there is a corresponding decrease in the academic performance of the pupil. More specifically, Saeeduzzafar and Khurshid (1984) studied retention in relation to prolonged deprivation and found that prolonged deprivation impairs memory.

The above review of studies reveals that there is a large body of evidence to show that prolonged deprivation has detrimental effect on cognitive processes. It has also been reported by Saeeduzzafar and Khurshid (1984) that prolonged deprivation impairs memory but which of the component of prolonged deprivation is relatively most inhibitory and which is the least, are yet to be identified.

The present study aims at estimating which component of prolonged deprivation, namely, motivational or emotional, impairs memory more seriously. To the best knowledge of the present author, no attempt has yet been made to investigate which component of prolonged deprivation affects memory more seriously. The present research is a step in this direction.

METHOD

Subjects : 45 undergraduate male students of Aligarh Muslim University, served as subjects in this experiment. They were drawn from the large sample of students whose deprivation had been tested with the help of PD scale developed by Misra and Tripathi (1977). They were assigned to three groups on the basis of their scores on prolonged deprivation scale. Thus there were 15 subjects in each group.

Materials and apparatus : Prolonged deprivation scale (PDS) developed and standardized by Misra and Tripathi (1977) was used to classify the subjects into three groups, namely, motivational deprived, emotional deprived and not deprived. PDS is a five point scale consisting of ninety six items covering fifteen components of prolonged deprivation such as (1) residential-accomodation; (2) Physical environment of home; (3) economic status; (4) food (5) Clothing; (6) educational experiences; (7) rearing experience (8) Childhood experience; (9) Parental characteristics; (10) interaction with parents; (11) motivational experiences (12) emotional experiences (13) experiences of recreation and travel; (14) religious experiences and (15) miscellaneous quasicultural experiences, PDS were scored as instruction given in its respective manual.

The apparatus used in this experiment was electrically operated memory drum in which timing device was so adjusted as to allow each syllable to be exposed for 2 seconds at a regular interval of

2 sec. in between two exposures. The stimulus material employed in this experiment was a list of ten nonsense syllables.

Procedure: All the subjects were tested individually and all the three groups were run simultaneously i.e. first subject was tested from the first group, second subject was tested from the group II, third was tested from group III, fourth was tested from group I and so on.

The learning and test sequence for each group of subjects was as follows: Using anticipation method of learning, each subject was presented a list of ten non sense syllables one by one, each for two seconds. Then a cue e.g. 000 was presented for two seconds during which subject was asked to investigate and report verbally the nonsense syllable that followed the cue. Irrespective of his correct or incorrect anticipation, the first nonsense syllable appeared on the memory drum again for two seconds and the subject was required to anticipate the second nonsense syllable that followed the first. The second nonsense syllable, then, was exposed for two seconds and the subject was asked to anticipate the third nonsense syllable that followed the second. In this way the whole list was presented to the subject. This procedure was repeated until the subject anticipated all the nonsense syllables correctly. At the end of the last learning trial (e.g. in which the subject recites all the nonsense syllables correctly), a retention interval of 20 minutes was given to the subject during which he was remained engaged in reading some unrelated light material. This was done to control the rehearsal of task material. At the end of the retention interval, the subject was asked to recall the nonsense syllables one by one in any order within 20 seconds. The number of nonsense syllables he recalled correctly determined his retention score.

RESULT & DISCUSSION

The mean recall scores and S. D. scores obtained by emotional deprived group, motivational deprived group, and non-deprived group are computed, and the summary of which is presented in table I. The recall performance of emotional deprived group (Mean = 4.4) is poor than the recall performance of motivational deprived group (Mean = 5.6) and non deprived group Ss (Mean = 6.9). Therefore, it may be inferred that emotional deprivation impairs retention more seriously than motivational one. However, 't' test was implied to determine whether the difference between these two means is statistically significant or not.

For detailed analysis, mean recall scores of these three groups were compared with each other and their significance of difference was determined by 't' test which appear in table II. The mean recall scores (4.4) obtained by EDG Ss are less than the mean recall (6.9) of NDG Ss and the difference between these two means is statistically

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significant ($t = 8.421, P < .01$). Similarly, recall scores of MDG Ss (Mean = 5.6) are significantly ($t = 6.01, P < .01$) Poor than the recall scores of NDG Ss (Mean = 6.9). In the same way recall scores of EDG Ss are compared with the recall scores of MDG Ss to know which of the two components of prolonged deprivation impairs memory more seriously. The mean recall scores (4.4) of EDG Ss are significantly ($t = 3.13, P < .01$) less than the mean recall scores (5.6) of MDG Ss. Thus, it may, safely, be concluded that both components of prolonged deprivation have an adverse effect on retention but emotional deprivation impairs memory more seriously than motivational one.

TABLE—I

Showing mean recall scores and SD scores of EDG, MDG, NDG Ss.

Groups	Mean recall scores	S.D.
Emotional Deprived Group (EDG)	4.4	.670
Motivational Deprived Group (MDG)	5.6	.645
Non-Deprived Group (NDG)	6.9	.854

TABLE—II

Showing mean recall scores, S. D. scores and 't' value

Groups	Mean recall scores	S.D.	't' value	P
EDG Ss	4.4	.670	8.42	.01*
NDG Ss	6.9	.854		
MDG Ss	5.6	.645	6.01	.01*
NDG Ss	6.9	.845		
EDG Ss	4.4	.670	3.13	.01*
MDG Ss	5.6	.645		

* Significant at .01 level

In the light of foregoing results it can be argued that the contentions of Panda, (1976); Miller, (1968); Dass, (1969); Chopra, (1969); Sen, (1976); white, (1970); Tripathi & Misra, (1975); and Sinha (1982) that various facets of deprivation adversely affect the cognitive functioning are true. The findings of the present study provide indirect support to the study conducted by Sharma (1983) who found that emotional deprivation affects academic performance of the pupils more seriously than the motivational deprivation. The obtained results also provide empirical support to the study conducted by Saeeduzzafar and Khurshid (1984) who reported that prolonged deprivation has detrimental effect on retention.

On the strength of the above results, it is concluded that the recall performance of the pupils is more influenced by emotional

deprivation. In other words, retention is adversely related to a greater extent to emotional deprivation rather than motivational deprivation i.e. emotional deprivation put the pupils into most disadvantaged conditions, the affects and effects of which have prolonged effect upon the mental growth and scholastic performance. The emotional detachment and withdrawal of parental affect in the family when prolonged become major source of frustration; and consequently adversely influence the cognitive development and feeling components of the children which ultimately inversely affect the retention power of the pupils. Thus, it appears that cognitive functioning is largely shaped through experiential background in which his personality is developed. Therefore, care has to be taken to make every provision for eradicating these basic components of prolonged deprivation so that a deep-seated feeling of deprivation, and frustration as a consequence of it, affecting the developmental processes may not take place.

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IX

Karma-marga in the Bhagavadgita Or the Dilemma Free-will versus Predestination

Francisco Zuniga

"I find a solace in the Bhagavadgita That I miss even in the Sermon of the Mount. When disappointment stores me in the face and all alone I see not one ray of light, I go back to the Bhagavadgita. I find a verse here and a verse there and I immediately begin to smile in the midst of overwhelming tragedies..."

M. K. Gandhi

Introductory Words

The Bhagavadgita is more a religious classic than a philosophical treatise. It is not an esoteric work designed for and understood by the specially initiated but a popular poem which helps even those "who wander in the region of the many and variable". It gives utterance to the aspirations of the pilgrims of all sects who seek to tread the inner way to the city of God. We touch reality more deeply, where men struggle, fail and triumph...

The preceding words are the opening words of Radhakrishnan excellent *Introductory Essay* and we choose these words and to work on the Bhagavadgita because we like simplicity as restraint in ornamentation. We think that the biggest "truths" and the most difficult theories can be said and explained in an easy way without looking for the pedantic presentation; without asking for the pedantry of the difficult.

Though its simplicity (by his clear and comprehensive summaries) the Gita has a profundity and wisdom which insist on a world wider and deeper than wars and revolutions can touch.

The suggestions set forth in the Gita about the meaning and value of existence are essential for keeping together the world as against any materialistic vision product of the acceptance of the external of civilization.

Though the teaching of the Gita are not presented as a metaphysical system, the Bhagavadgita is not only metaphysics but also (and more) ethics; The science of reality brahmavidya and the art of union with reality (yogasastra).

The Gita opens up new paths for the spiritual life of man because Truth has a guiding and saving power. The emphasis of the Gita is on the Supreme as the personal God who resides on the heart of every being; He is the source and sustainer of values.

The differences of interpretation of the Bhagavadgita (and of any written, oral or visual message) are generally held to be differences by the view-point adopted, based on the personal background and on the environmental conditions. Next is our personal interpretation of one of the many important aspects of the Gita. The interpretation of another sect humble pilgrim looking for the city of God.

In determining the purpose of any treatise, we must see the question with which it opens and the conclusion to which it leads. The Bhagavadgita opens with a problem. Arjuna refuses to fight and raises difficulties. In principles his reasons for abstention from activity and for retreat from the world seem reasonable; to convert him is the purpose of The Bhagavadgita. It raises the question whether action or renunciation is better and the Teacher emphasizes the need for action. But let's these personages speak by themselves.

"Therefore, without attachment, perform always the work that *has to be done*, for man attains to the highest by doing work without attachment".¹

Here work done without attachment is marked as superior to work done in a spirit of sacrifice which is itself higher than work done with selfish aims.

"So knowing that work done also by the men of all who sought liberation. Therefore do thou also works as the ancients did in former times".²

The ignorant person action for self-purification and the wise perform action for the maintenance of the world. As the ancients carried out the work ordained by tradition, Arjuna is called upon to do his duty as a warrior.

1 Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgita, III, 19, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1976, p. 138. The Italics is ours.

2 Ibid. IV, 15, p. 162.

"Therefore at all times remember Me and fight. When thy mind and understanding are set on Me to Me alone shalt thou come without doubt".³

Remember Me and fight. It is not fight-only-on the material plane that is intended here. It is the fight with the powers of darkness that we have to carry on perpetually. We must engage in the work of the world retaining our consciousness of eternity, the brooding presence of the Unchanging God.

"Therefore arise thou and gain glory. Conquering thy foes, enjoy a prosperous kingdom. *By Me alone are they slain already.* Be thou merely the occasion, O Savyasacin (Arjuna)".⁴

The God of destiny decides and ordains all things and Arjuna is to be the instrument of One who fulfils His own purpose. Arjuna is self deceived if he believes that he should act according to his own imperfect judgment. No individual soul can trespass on the prerogative of God. In refusing to take arms Arjuna is guilty of presumption.

"Fixing thy thought on Me, thou shalt, by My grace, cross over all difficulties; but if, from self conceit, thou will not listen (to Me) *thou shalt perish*".⁵

Here is the core of our work and one of the most polemic topics in "perennis" Philosophy : the dilemma, free-will versus predestination. Apparently, man is free to choose salvation or perdition ("from self-conceit") but if we foolishly believe that we can resist the will of the Almighty, we will come to grief ("thou shalt perish"). Challenge of God is due to self-sense and it is powerless ultimately.

"If indulging in self conceit, thou thinkest "I will not fight; vain is this, thy resolve. *Nature will compel thee*".⁶

The desire "not to fight" will only be the expression of his surface nature : his deeper being will let him to fight. If he casts down his arms for fear or suffering and holds back from the light, and if the war proceeds without him, and he realizes that the consequences of his abstention would be disastrous not only to himself but to others, he will be impelled to take up arms by the remorseless pressure of the Cosmic Spirit. He should try therefore to further and cooperate with the cosmic evolution instead of denying and opposing it.

It is Arjuna's lower nature that will cause the confusion and the fall from the greater truth of his being. When Arjuna sees the truth;

³ Ibid. VIII, 7. p. 229.

⁴ Ibid. XI. 33, p. 280. The Italics is ours.

⁵ Ibid. XVIII, 58. p. 372. The Italics is ours.

⁶ Ibid. XVIII, 59, p. 373. The Italics is ours.

he can act, not for selfish ends, but as a conscious instrument of the Divine. The disciple must put aside all selfish fear and obey his Inner Light which will carry him past all dangers and obstacles. God lays down the conditions and it is for us to accept them. We should not waste our strength in fighting against the stream.

"That which, through delusion, thou wishes not to do, O son of Kunti (Arjuna), that thou shalt do *even against thy will*; fettered by thy own acts born of thy nature"... "The Lord abides in the hearts of all beings, O Arjuna, causing them to turn round by His power as if they were mounted on a machine".⁷

Arjuna will be driven to do it by the compulsive power of his nature. The relations of our unborn nature and its fateful compulsion are regulated by the Divine who dwells in our hearts and guides and constraints our development. Is the power that determines events (which we give the name of fate, destiny, chance...) a blind, unfeeling, and unthinking will?

The Spirit that rules the cosmos, the Lord who presides over the evolution of the cosmic plan, is present in every being and will not let us rest. The Supreme is the innermost self of our existence. All life is a movement of the rhythm of His life and our powers and acts are all derived from Him. If, in our ignorance, we forget this deepest truth, the truth does not alter. If we live consciously on His truth, we will resign all actions to God and escape from our ego. If we do not, even then the truth will prevail. Sooner or later we will yield to the purpose of God. The Supreme desires our free cooperation using us for His work.

Arjuna is called upon to co-operate with God and do his duty. He must change the whole orientation of his being. He must put himself at the service of the Supreme. His illusion will be dispelled, the bond of cause and consequence will be broken and he will attain shadowless light, perfect harmony and supreme blessedness.

"Thus has wisdom more secret than all secrets, been declared to thee by Me. Having reflected on it fully *do as thou choolest*".⁸

God is seemingly indifferant, for He—aparently—leaves the decision to Arjuna's choice. His apparent indifference is due to His anxiety that each one of us should get to Him of own free choice. He constraints no one since free spontaneity is valuable. Man is to be wooed and not coerced into cooperation. He is to be drawn, not driven, persuaded, not compelled. It seems that the Supreme does not impose His command and that men are free at any moment to reject or accept the Divine call.

7 Ibid. XVIII, 60, 61, p. 374. The Italics is ours.

8 Ibid. XVIII, 63 p. 375.

But from XI, 33 (...By Me alone are they slain already...) Krisna seems to uphold the doctrine of Divine predestination (enhancing the dilemma) and indicate the utter helplessness and insignificance of the individual and the futility of his will and effort. The decision is already made and Arjuna can do nothing to change it. He is a powerless tool on God's hands. Commenting on it Radhakrishnan says :

"... And yet there is the other note that God is not arbitrary and capricious but just and loving. How are the two to be reconciled? The numinous idea of the predestinating and solely acting God which induces in us the feeling of the utter dependence on God, the 'wholly other' standing over against us in absolute antithesis, is here expressed. The intense intuition of the power of God comes out here and in Job and in Paul : 'Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus ?' "

We need not look upon the whole cosmic process as *no* thing more than the unfolding of a predetermined plan, the unveiling of a ready-made scenery. The teacher here is not so much denying the unforeseeableness of human acts as affirming the meaning of eternity in which all the moments of the whole of time, past, present and future, are present to the Divine Spirit. The radical novelty of each moment of evolution in time is not inconsistent with Divine Eternity. As Radhakrishnan says :

"The ideas of God are worked out through human instrumentality. If we are wise, we so act that we are instruments in His hands. We allow Him to absorb our soul and leave no trace of the ego. We must receive His command and do His will with the cry 'In thy will is our peace'; 'Father, into thy hands I commend my Spirit'. Arjuna should feel, 'Nothing exist save Thy will. Thou alone art the doer and I am only the instrument'. The dread horror of the war repels him. Judged by human standards, it is quite incomprehensible but when the curtain is lifted, so as to reveal the purpose of the Almighty, he acquiesces in it ... "10

What Arjuna himself desired, what he might hope to gain in this world (or the next) do not count any more. Behind this world of space-time, interpenetrating it, is the creative purpose of God. Arjuna must understand that Supreme design and serve it. Every act is symbol of something far beyond itself.

"Slay Drona, Bhishma, Jayadratha, Karna and other great warriors as well, *who are already doomed by Me*. Be not afraid. Fight, thou shalt conquer the enemies in battle".11

9 Ibid. pp. 280-281

10 loc. cit.

11 Ibid. XI, 34. p. 281. The Italics is ours.

God knows the direction of their lives and their appointed goal. There is nothing however small or insignificant that has not been ordained or permitted by God. Arjuna will be externally master of nature and inwardly superior to all possible accidents, because God ordained on this way.

So, we have a warrior whose duty is to fight a war against his own people, but exercising his free-will he doesn't want to fight. On the other hand, he must do that (like it or not) because it is already decided. Arjuna's predestination is to fight as Aeschylus's Oedipus is to marry his own mother and to kill his own father. *Allea jacta est.**

"Therefore let the scripture be thy authority for determining what should be done and what should not be done. Knowing what is declared by the rules of scripture, *thou shouldst do thy work in this world*"... "But even these works ought to be performed, giving up attachment and desire for fruits. This, O Partha (Arjuna), is *my decided and final view*" ... "Verily the renunciation of any duty *that ought to be done* is not right. The abandonment of it through ignorance is declared to be of the nature of 'dullness'¹²

The teacher is decidedly for the practice of Karmayoga. Actions are not to be set aside: only they have to be done without selfish attachment or expectation of rewards. Salvation is not a matter of outward action or inaction. It is the possession of the impersonal outlook and inner renunciation of ego. Karmayoga is an alternative method of approach to the goal of life—according to the Gita and culminates in wisdom.

* The conflict between the doctrine of human freedom and that of predestination has roused a lot of discussion all around the world (India was not an exception) and through all human history. During the Scholasticism, i.e. Thomas Aquinas holds that freedom of the will and human effort play a chief part in man's salvation. though the will itself may need the support of God's grace. "Whence, the predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled... and therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it can not be impeded by them" (Cf. Summa Theologica, Part I Q. 23, Art. 8). Man has the freedom to refuse the grace offered to him by God.

Bonaventura thinks that it is God's intention to offer grace to man but only those who prepare themselves for its reception by their conduct, receive it. For Duns Scotus since freedom of the will is God's command, even God has not direct influence on man's decision. Man can cooperate with God's grace but he can also refrain from it. We can add a lot of different opinions, from philosophers, scholars and literates but this is not our main purpose. Any way such a dilemma is a very well known one.

12 Ibid. XVI, 24, p. 341; XVIII, 6, 7; p. 353. The Italics is ours.

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"Knowledge as a sacrifice is greater than any material sacrifice, O scourge of the foe (Arjuna), for all works without any exception culminate in wisdom".¹³

The goal is the lifegiving wisdom which gives us freedom of action and liberation from the bondage of work. Spiritual freedom is not inconsistent with activity. The activity of the liberated is free and spontaneous and not obligatory.

The teacher recommends the full active life of man in the world with the inner life anchored in the Eternal Spirit. The Bhagavadgita is therefore a mandate for action. It explains what a man ought to do not merely as a social being but as an individual with a spiritual destiny. The Gita adopts the view developed in the Bhagavata religion which has the twofold purpose of helping us to obtain complete release and do work in the world.

The Gita asks us to live in the world and save it. The teacher of the Gita points out the extreme subtlety of the problem of action. It is not possible for us to abstain from action.* Nature is ever at work and we are deluded if we fancy that its process can be held up. Nor is cessation from action desirable. Inertia is not freedom.

We must insist in saying that the binding quality of an action does not lie in its mere performance but in the motive or desire that incites it. Renunciation refers, not to the act itself but to the frame of mind behind the act. Renunciation means absence of desire. So long as action is based on false premises, it binds the individual soul. If our life is based on ignorance, however altruistic our conduct may be, it will be binding. The Gita advocates detachment from desires and not cessation from work. Radhakrishnan says :

"When Krishna advises Arjuna to fight, it does not follow that he is supporting the validity of warfare. War happens to be the occasion which the teacher uses to indicate the spirit in which all work including warfare will have to be performed... His reluctance to fight is not the outcome of spiritual development or the predominance of sattvaguna but is the product of ignorance and passion..."¹⁴

If ignorance, avidya, is the root of evil, wisdom of jnana is the remedy. Realization of wisdom is not what is accomplished in time. Wisdom is ever pure and perfect and is not the fruit of an act. An eternal attainment devoid of change cannot be the result of a temporary act, Karma prepares for wisdom. Action performed in the spirit of sacrifice ceases to be a source of bondage. In Radhakrishnan's words :

* In J. P. Sartre's words man is condemn to be free and in J. Ortega y Gasset's words all men act by deciding, and even those men who don't want to decide, had decided not to decide.

¹³ Ibid. IV, 33 p. 169.

¹⁴ Ibid. Cf. Introduction p. 68.

"The Bhagavadgita gives us a religion by which the rule of Karma, the natural order of deed and consequence, can be transcended. There is no element of caprice or arbitrary interference of a transcendent purpose within the natural order. The teacher of the Gita, recognizes a realm of reality where Karma does not operate and if we establish our relation with it, *we are free in our deepest being*. The chain of Karma can be broken here and now, within the flux of the empirical world. We become masters of Karma by developing detachment and faith in God".¹⁵

On the other hand (and as it was already mentioned), Arjuna knows that he is only the instrument for the work of God. When the long agony of Arjuna had borne its fruit, he learned that in God's will is his peace.

"Destroyed is my delusion and recognition has been gained by me through Thy grace, O Acyuta (Krishna). I stand firm with my doubts dispelled. I shall act accord with Thy word".¹⁶

Arjuna turns to his appointed action, not with an egoistic mind but with self knowledge. His illusions are destroyed, his doubts are dispelled. The chosen instrument of God takes up the duty set to it by the Lord of the world. He will now do God's command. He realizes that God made us for His ends, not our. Arjuna had the attack of temptation and won his way to a liberating victory. He feels that he will fulfil the bidding of God as He is there to strengthen him.*

The individual intelligence, mind and senses function for the great universal purpose and in its light. Victory or defeat does not disturb, as it is willed by the Universal Spirit. Whatever happens, the individual accepts without attachment or aversion. The traditional rules of dharma are to be followed because He established them and He upholds the moral order. The rules are not ends in themselves, for union with the Supreme is the final goal.

CONCLUSION

The problem of freedom versus determinism (though a common locus) has meaning only with reference to human individuals. It

1 Jesus says : "I seek not my own will but the will of Him who sent me" It means that to will what God wills is the secret of divine life. When Jesus cries : "May this cup pass from me". Was He yet having His own preferences and asked for personal satisfaction ? Did He wish to escape the bitter humiliation and death ? We don't know, but when He uttered "Thy will be done", he gave up His separate existence and identified Himself with the work of the Father who sent Him".

Cf. Marx XIV. 32-41; John XIV, 31.

15 Ibid. p, 70-71. The Italics is ours.

16 Ibid. XVIII. 73; p 381.

has no application neither to God (whatsoever conception we have of It) nor to animals and plants. If man is but the simple creature of instinct, if his desires and decisions are only the resultants of the force of heredity and environment, the moral judgments are irrelevant.

Man is a complex multi dimensional being, including within him different elements of matter, life consciousness, intelligence and the "divine spark". He is free when he acts from the highest level and uses the other elements for the realization of his purpose. But when he is on the level of objective nature, when he does not recognize his distinction from not self, he becomes a slave to the mechanism of nature. But even in the lowest forms of nature there is an element of spontaneity and creativity inexplicable in terms of mechanical forces. Nature is an order of determinism but not a closed order.

Man, the subject, should gain mastery over man, the object. Object indicates determinism from without; subject means freedom, indetermination. Our bondage consist in our dependence on something alien. When we rise above it we can make our nature the medium for the incarnation of the spiritual.

Life is like a game. We did not invent neither the game nor the rules. But we can play the game well or play it badly. Our life is a mixture of necessity and freedom, chance and choice. The aim of the Gita is not only to help Arjuna with his choice but to be a valuable aid for the understanding of the supreme ends of life.

Arjuna declares that his perplexities are ended and he would carry out the command to fight. The ideal (though it seems a paradox) which the Gita sets before us is ahimsa or non-violence and this is evident from the description of the perfect state of mind, speech and body in Chapter VII, and of the mind of the devotee in Chapter XII. Krsna advises Arjuna to fight without passion or ill-will, without anger or attachment and if we develop such a frame of mind, violence becomes impossible. We must fight against what is wrong but if we allow ourselves to hate, that ensures our spiritual defect.

Radhakrishnan says in his Introductory Essay that "...the emphasis of the Gita on lokasamgraha, world-solidarity, requires us to *change the whole pattern of our life*. We are kindly, decent men who would be shocked and indignant if a dog is hurt, we would fly to the protection of a crying child or a maltreated woman and yet we persist in doing wrong on a large scale to millions of women and children in the comforting belief that by doing so, *we are doing our duty* to our family or city or state. The Gita requires us to lay stress on human brotherhood".¹⁷

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 69. The Italics is ours.

Of course we must change the whole pattern of our life; we also know "decent" people who shoot civilian aircrafts by protecting national defence; we know people who invade other people territories by supposedly safe-guarding "democracy" and "freedom"; we know people who put bombs on cemeteries, headquarters and hospitals doing their "duty"; we know people who receive the Holy Eucharist after massacring an entire population. All this is lamentable and we must put to an end this craziness if we want to survive in the human order. Life is a battle, a warfare against the spirit of evil. Creative process is one of perpetual tension between two incompatibles, each standing against the other. By their mutual conflict, the development is advanced and the cosmic purpose furthered. In this world there are many elements of imperfection, evil and irrationality, and through action, dharma, we have to change the world and convert the elements, which are now opaque to reason, transparent to thought.

While the Buddhist ideal (i.e.) exalts a life of contemplation the Gita attracts all those souls who have a relish for action. Action is for self fulfilment. We must find out the truth of our highest and innermost existence and live it and not follow any outer standards. For it, the state of spiritual freedom consists in the transformation of our whole nature into the immortal law and power of the Divine.

The freed soul is inspired by Divine knowledge and moved by the Divine will. His purified nature is assimilated into the Divine Substance. Any one who attains this transcendent condition is a yogin, a realized soul, a disciplined and harmonized being for whom the Eternal is ever present.

The teaching of the Gita is yoga and the teacher is yogesvara, when the human soul becomes enlightened and united with the Divine, fortune and victory, welfare and morality are assured.

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Note : All the quotations are from Radhakrishnan's *Bhagavadgita* though we also read K. T. Telang, A. Mahadeva Sastri; L. D. Barnett; Annie Besant and Bhagavan Das; Sri Aurobindo, W. Douglas, P. Hill, D. S. Sarma; F. Edgerton; Swami Prabhavananda and C. Isherwood: introductions, comments and essays on their respective *Bhagavadgita*.



Perception—its description and Identification

S. W. Bakhli

Do we really, in the sense literally, meaningfully and honestly, doubt that we are *seeing* people assembled in this room, that there is a voice *heard*, that we are *touching* tables and chairs in this room? I hope not. Other wise nothing meaningful could transpire here. But if it is so, that is, if we do not ordinarily doubt these things, what is this row about? Why should perception pose a problem to the philosophers and why do philosophers vie with each other in resolving the problem of perception by introducing, to quote Max Black, "a shamefully ambiguous term", "sense-data"¹, and others like 'phenomenalism'? The reply to such a question would be that, although ordinarily we *do* not doubt our perceptions, we nevertheless, *can* doubt them, since, we are told, we *can* be mistaken about our perceptions, as it witnessed in the cases of illusions and hallucinations. The assumption, of course, is that in our activity of knowing, whether by means of perception or inference, one must be absolutely certain in our knowledge that we get. And it is now generally agreed that it is this concern about, almost an obsession for, certainty that has led philosophers to introduce such terms as 'sense-data', and 'phenomenalism', in attempting to find out a solution to the problem of perception. But what *is* the problem of perception? It can be formulated thus: perception being what it is that is fallible how can it give us absolutely certain knowledge? The importance of its resolution can hardly be overstressed considering the empirical tradition in contemporary Western thought. Without further ado, covering the familiar ground I propose to consider the problem under the following heads:

1 Black, Max.—'Language of Sense-data', "*Problems of Analysis*", Cornell, 1954, p. 79.

- (1) Nature of experiential statements
- (2) In corrigibility of experiential statements
- (3) Description and identity of perception.

I

Before we take up these points, however, a couple of observations on 'phenomenalism' should be in order.

(a) The issues central to phenomenalism can be identified thus : (i) The question of the possibility of mistake in present (tense) experiential statements. The question in other words, about the in-corrigibility of empirical foundational statements and (ii) The question of the possibility of existence unperceived. The question, in other words, of the tenability of phenomenalism. These two issues should be better kept distinct, the first being epistemic and the second being ontic. On both these scores phenomenalism can be examined. It can be shown, that is, that there cannot be any absolute, or logically in corrigible foundations, and also that objects can exist unperceived. It should be noted, however, that the one does not imply the other. The proved possibility of error in present experiential statements does not imply the possibility of objects existing unperceived.²

(b) The sense datum theorists share several features with the phenomenologists. Both for example are concerned with giving the contents of experience *qua* phenomena. Both share the empirical tradition, with its concern with the nature, structure and order of experience. But though the sense datum theorists, share these features with the phenomenologists they should not be treated as identical. Since whereas the former is a dualist holding that reality-physical objects-cannot be known directly but only through sense-data, the latter is a monist contending that there are only sense data to be dealt with. As Ayer puts it. "The world does not contain sense-data *and* physical objects, in the sense in which it contains chairs *and* tables, or in the sense in which it contains colours *and* sounds. One is inclined to say... that phenomenalism must be true on the ground that the only alternative to it... is the iron certain theory of perception that physical objects are there sure enough but we can never get at them, because all we can observe in sense-data."³

II

As suggested above it is generally agreed that it is the quest for certainty which led philosophers to what are called 'experiential statements'. They, however, differ in explaining their nature. The

2 Harrison, Ross—'Perception', "On what there must be", Oxford, 1974, pp. 118-149.

3 Ayer, A. J.,—'Phenomenalism', "Philosophical Essays", Macmillan, 1954, p. 143.

variants on 'experiential' statements are 'basic', 'protocal', 'atomic', 'foundation', 'observation', statements. The question which I would like to consider about the nature of experiential statements is thus : Are these statements ostensive or synthetic in nature ?

The experiential statements, it should be remembered, are those which refer to experience which a person is said to have, irrespective of the private or public status of the object of such experience. Thus 'I feel a headache' and 'This looks to me to be red', or 'That speak in the sky is appears a star', are both experiential statements, though the object referred to in the former is private whereas that referred to in the latter can be said to be public. Now the question before us is whether such statements are ostensive or synthetic. The question is important because such a statement contains a demonstrative component and a descriptive one, and is supposed to characterize some 'present state of the speaker' or some 'present content of his experience.' Now, if we consider such a statement as one of identity the statement would be ostensive, and if we take it as one of predication the statement would be synthetic. But if it is ostensive, it will not be informative, though certain, and if it is synthetic it will not be certain, though informative. And further that if it is ostensive it cannot serve as a foundation of knowledge, since it will be only private and knowledge must be public and communicative. An ostensive experiential statement will consist of a demonstrative component referring a sense datum and the descriptive component describing that which is referred. The typical form of such statements is this : 'I see (hear, smell, feel etc.) an *x* like sense-datum.' Thus 'I see a doglike sense-datum' and 'I am acquainted with an auditory sense datum' are ostensive experiential statements, and not 'I see a dog' and 'I hear a noise'. In a situation in which the speaker uses such sentences the speaker is referring to, 'pointing out' or 'picking out' the sense-datum, and shows the hearer that the speaker is trying to talk only about the 'immediately given'.

Now the question that we should consider in this context is this: Can we meaningfully talk about 'picking out' or 'pointing at' sense-datum ? Let us contrast this with picking out or pointing at a physical object, say a certain animal, *hansa*, for example, and let us suppose one had to teach somebody how to use the word '*hansa*'. Now, one thing that can be granted in this situation, the situation, that is, in which one is teaching the other how to use a word, is that no matter how good a definition were supplied by looking in the dictionary, we would not be prepared to say that anybody had fully mastered the use of '*hansa*' unless he could recognize a *hansa* if he had occasion to see one, as in a zoo or in a photograph. In other words, he should be able to say in an appropriate situation "*That* is a *hansa*". It may be possible for a man to point out, recognize or

identify *hansas*, without any notion of what he meant by '*hansa*'. In this way he can learn what Black calls an '*ostensive rule*' for the use of '*hanse*', without having yet mastered what Black calls the *syntactical rules* for the use of the word.⁴ Although in learning an ostensive rule for the use of a word, one inevitably learns a little of that words' grammar, such as, for instance, that what is pointed at is an *animal*, and not a rock and to say '*A hansa is a species of animal*', and this would be to provide a syntactic rule, still these rules are relatively independent of each other. One might be good in mastering the one without being so in the other. Now, can we say the same about '*sense-datum*'? As Black suggests we *Can* say this but only metaphorically, and not literally⁵ and the reason is that to '*pick out*' an animal, such as a *hansa*, or a material thing, such as a chair, is to distinguish it from other animals or material things., in other words, to classify it. One knows what it is to search for an animal of a certain kind, but one is at a loss to know what it is to search for a *thing*, since '*Thing*' is not a genus word.

The upshot of the above contrast is that the experiential statements about sense-data, cannot be said to be ostensive. But can they be said to be synthetic? Let us consider this point bearing in mind that an experiential synthetic statement like an ostensive one will also consist of a demonstrative component and a descriptive component but with a difference. And the difference consists in the fact that synthetic statement is predicative, while the ostensive statement is an identity statement. The synthetic statement being predicative goes beyond what is immediately given and thus adds to our knowledge of the given. This addition to our knowledge of the given takes the form of a judgment about its class and its relation to other sense data. But such a '*going beyond*' or '*transcendence*' would raise a problem about the *transition* from the given to the inferred. How is the transition effected and, when effected, judged to be veridical? Thus arises the problem of illusion. Can we then say that the experiential statements are synthetic, which describe the sense-data rather than *record* the existence of them? If we say this that will lead us to dualism of sense data and physical objects with its unbridgeable linguistic, epistemic and ontological gaps.

III

What sort of incorrigibility is claimed by the phenomenalist to the experiential statements is our next question for consideration. According to Ayer to say that these statements are incorrigible is not to say that one's *assessment* of their truth or falsehood cannot ever be revised, but to say that one's *grounds* for accepting them

4. Black, Max—'*Language of sense data*', "*Problems of Analysis*", Cornell, 1954, p. 59.

5. Ibid. p. 62.

may be perfect. As he puts it : 'It is misleading to talk of a class of incorrigible, or indubitable, statements as though 'being incorrigible' or 'being indubitable' were properties which belonged to statements in themselves. The suggestion is rather that there is a class of statements which in *certain conditions only* cannot be doubted, statements which are *known incorrigibly* when they are made by the right person in the right circumstances and at the right time. Thus, in my view at least, the sentences 'he has a headache', when used by someone else to refer to me, 'I shall have a headache' used by me in the past with reference to this moment, and 'I have a headache', all express the same statement., but the third of these sentences alone is used in such conditions as make it reasonable for me to claim that the statement is incorrigibly known. *What is 'incorrigible' in this case is the strength of the basis on which I put the statement forward* ... It is in this sense only that the statement may be regarded as not being subject to any further tests.'⁶

But obviously such statements form a minority of the statements we ordinarily make. The majority of the statements assert *more than* is strictly contained in the experiences on which they are based., they go 'beyond' the evidence. The statements of memory and prediction are such statements. These statements forming the majority are made now about what other present judgments were or will be on the phenomenalist interpretation these are the only ones in which mistake is allowed. However, even in the case of the so-called incorrigible statements the question which arise are these : Can one be not mistaken in characterization of one's present experience, in describing it ? And if one *can* be mistaken, what sort of mistake that can be—verbal or factual ? In other words, can the statements which are incorrigible be not incorrectly formulated ?

A verbal mistake is committed when in wrongly describing *what is given* one uses a wrong word. As Ayer says, "... to be in doubt as to the nature of something which is given, to wonder, for example, what colour it looks to me to be, is to be in doubt the meaning of a word. And, correspondingly, to mis-describe what is given is to misuse a word. As against this, if I were to *predict* what something, *not yet presented to me*, was going to look like, I might very well be making a factual mistake."⁷

Thus on a phenomenalist account, if I make a mistake this is a mistake in the objects that I predict I shall be confronted with or a mistake in the objects that I remember having been confronted with. It is not a mistake about the object that I am at present confronted with.

6 Ayer, A. J.—"*The Problem of knowledge*", Pelican, 1956, pp. 55-56.

7 Ibid. pp. 62-67.

But let us have a closer look at these three types of judgments, v.z. the memory judgments, prediction and present judgments, in order to examine the phenomenalist's claim that it is only the first two types of statements which are prone to error, the last being immune to it, 'waving a flag of incorrigibility', to quote from Black.

In this context two points can be made. (i) Present judgments form an important set of statements for phenomenologists because of their interest in perception. Since all judgments about the world were taken to be related to perceptual judgments, perception, and so present, judgments appeared as a component of all other judgments—memory and prediction. The point worth considering is this. ; If present judgments not only form part of every judgment about how the world was, is or will be, but also are the part of every judgment that relates that judgment to the world, how is it possible to exempt present judgments from the possibility of error. Ross Harrison suggests that the special status of being incorrigible is given to the present judgments because of the phenomenologists' interest in perception, and adds, "If this perceptual preoccupation is ignored, however, there are much more natural ways to analyse the judgments that are not present judgments. For present judgments can be taken to be those judgments in which the time at which the state of affairs judged was supposed to exist was the same as the time at which the judgment was being made. More obvious analyses of the other judgments ... are, therefore, judgments which are made either before or after the time at which the state of affairs judged is supposed to exist. No memory or prediction of past or future perception is implied by such an analysis., the other judgments...are regarded, on the contrary, as just as straight forward judgments about how the world was or will be as present judgments are about how the world is."⁸

On this, what Harrison calls, 'new analysis', present judgments are of the same status, position or importance as other judgments about the world." The only difference, "he says", is in the relation between the time at which the judgment is made and the time at which the state of affairs judged is assumed to exist. ... They therefore, belong to the same major area of thought as the others do, and together they form the basis of anyone's thought about, and comprehension of, the world with which he is surrounded."⁹

(ii) The motive of the phenomenologist in giving the special status, namely, of being incorrigible-factually, if not verbally—seems to be the denial of the possibility of existence unperceived. Since the factual mistake, mistake in what is immediately given, will imply

8 Harrison, Ross—"Perception", *"On what there must be"*, Oxford, 1974, p. 127.

9 Ibid. p. 128.

the possibility of existence unperceived. Verbal mistake, it may be suggested, pose no problem to the phenomenalist, for it can be taken care of by the assumption that the person in question knows the language. But one may ask in the first place whether verbal errors can be eliminated in advance and secondly how such a distinction can be made. The distinction was introduced, it may be recalled, to enable certain judgments 'judgments of sense-data' to be treated as foundational and to ward off the possibility of objects existing unperceived. But as pointed out in section-I of this paper the possibility of error in present judgment does *not* imply the possibility of objects existing unperceived. The fact, for example, that the judgment 'Here is a hippopotamus' was mistaken only shows that the person did not perceive a hippopotamus. It does not follow from this, however, that something, say a hippopotamus, exists unperceived. All that follows is that either a hippopotamus exists unperceived or that there is not a hippopotamus to be perceived. Yet it must be the latter possibility since the person was taken to be mistaken in his judgment that there was a hippopotamus. So it does not follow from the fact that a mistake has been made that there is anything which exists unperceived. The phenomenists are mistaken in confusing the two questions which should better be kept distinct, the questions, namely, of the possibility of mistake in present judgment (or of incorrigible foundations) and the question of the possibility of existence unperceived (or of the truth of phenomenalism).

ii

Although factual mistake in the present experiential statements about sense-data does not imply the possibility of existence imperceived, it *does* imply the mistaken identification of the object of perception. Such a situation arises more in the case of visual perception than, for example, in the case of taste or smell. It is this point which Strawson¹⁰ considers in his 'Perception and Identification' while examining the distinction which Hampshire draws between 'a non committal description of something perceived on a particular occasion' and 'an identification of it as a thing of a certain kind.' The non committal description are non-committal because the speaker cannot, for the moment, commit himself further with confidence. He wonders, but neither knows nor thinks he knows, just what it is that he is perceiving. The 'identifications', on the other hand, represent answers to his wonderings, or askings, about what it is that he is perceiving, what the phenomenon is of which he can for the time being give only a non-committal description. Hampshire mentions various features of non-committal description in respect of which they are generally contrasted with identifications. Such

¹⁰ Strawson, P. F.— "*Freedom and Resentment*", Methuen, 1974, pp. 85-107.

descriptions (i) 'must not imply that the thing referred to is a thing of a specific kind', (ii) they carry no implications about the origin, causal properties, history, possible uses of criteria, of identity of the thing referred to, (iii) they do not represent it as 'standing in specifiable relations to things of other specific kinds in the external world', (iv) they are descriptions available to one for whom the object is 'so far wholly unidentified', (v) they are 'purely aesthetic' descriptions. The class of such non-committal descriptions includes descriptive phrases, introduced by a demonstrative adjective, which can properly figure in a question of the form 'what is that so-and-so?', *addressed by one person to another*. For example, the phrase 'that dark elongated shape over there' will be of this kind as it can figure in the question, 'what is that dark elongated shape over there', addressed by A to B.

It can be observed at this stage that such a concept of non-committal descriptions is an extended legacy of the views which Price held about the term 'sense-data' being 'neutral'. Price said, "The term 'sense-datum' is meant to be a *neutral* one. The use of it does not imply the acceptance of any particular theory. The term is meant to stand for something whose existence is indubitable (however fleeting), something from which all theories of perception ought to start, however much they may diverge later."¹¹

Strawson joins issue with Hampshire by arguing for the view that anyone who used this form of words in seriously addressing a question to another person would "*ordinarily* be taken to be committed to the belief" that the 'dark elongated shape' which he saw was at least something that could be seen also by anyone else with vision no worse than his own, standing near him and looking in the direction he indicated, and observes, 'It will not do to say that the phrase 'dark elongated shape' does not by itself carry any such implication. When we are enquiring into the commitments that our words carry, we must consider the context and manner of their use. If I say, 'I could see, in the harbour, the dark elongated shape of the submarine', I am normally committed to the claim that there was a (certain) submarine in the harbour and that I could see it."¹² In this context the question which Strawson raises and considers is this: Whether such a kind of commitment will be excluded from the so-called class of non-committal descriptions? and his answer is that it *does* count as a member of the class. In order to bring home this point Strawson considers the following questions of the same form containing the non committal descriptions :

11. Price, H. H.— "*Perception*", London, 1950, p. 19.

12. Strawson, P. F.— "*Perception and Identification*", "*Freedom and Resentment*", Methuen, 1974, pp 86 87.

- (1) What is that dreadful noise ?
- (2) What is this curious smell ?
- (3) What is this lump in the bed ?
- (4) What is that long, low grey expanse on the horizon ?
- (5) What is that red mark on your cheek ?
- (6) What is that gleam in the valley ?
- (7) What is that large object on that table wrapped up in tissue paper ?

These questions resemble the original example in that one who asks them would normally be taken to be committed to the belief that the phenomenon which is the subject of his inquiry is something publicly perceptible. And Strawson claims that all these cases of description possess the characteristics of non committal descriptions. Thus, for example, the description in (4)—‘that long, low grey expanse on the horizon’—does not imply that the thing referred to is of a specific kind, since the thing referred to might in fact be a bank of cloud, an island or stretch of coast, or it might again be simply a special visual effect of bad light and atmospheric conditions. And these are things of very different kinds. But what is true of such a ‘visual’ description is not true of sound and smell in (1) and (2). Since the alternative answers to these questions might be respectively, ‘Pile-driving machines in the next block’, ‘The Salvation Army’, ‘A freight-train going fast’ for (1) and ‘Burnt paint’, ‘Size’, ‘Cats’, ‘The children have been experimenting’. And, says Strawson, “It is obviously quite implausible to say that *the thing referred to* by the questioner, by means of the descriptive phrase ‘that dreadful noise’ or ‘this curious smell’, is any of the things mentioned in such answers as these., ... we seem forced to say, in these cases, that the thing referred to *is* just a noise or a smell. This difference from the visual case is important.”¹³

It is important because it bears on the doctrine of Hampshire’s which Strawson discusses viz.. Hampshire’s denial that one who gives a non-committal description has ‘picked out’ a ‘phenomenal object.’¹⁴ The reason for such a denial are two : (1) that one cannot properly be said to have ‘picked out’ something unless one has some criterion of identity and (2) that the only thing, if anything, that one could relevantly be said to have ‘picked out’ in a situation of this kind is the same thing as ‘the thing referred to’ in one’s inquiry as to the nature of that thing. In other words, in this sort of situation the speaker succeeds in making a reference to something perceived, but it is a reference to something he knows not what., so there is no particular kind of thing he can be said either to have discriminated (‘picked out’) or to be committed to the existence of.

¹³ *ibid.*, pp 89-90.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 95-101.

Against this argument Strawson points out that unless he could discriminate such an object, it is hard to see how the situation in question could arise, how he could make his inquiries at all. But then a sharp distinction between the visual object discriminated by the observer and the 'thing referred to' in his question, the object which he perceives and as to the nature of which he is quite uncertain is called for. In other words, we must distinguish, according to Strawson, (P. 101) between the object seen but as yet unidentified (the phenomenal object) and the object when identified (the identified object).

Besides these situations in which the perceiver is committed to the publicly perceptible status of what he perceives Strawson considers situations in which the perceiver is *not* so committed. One such case will be in which the perceiver is genuinely *uncertain* as to the public or private status of what he perceives. And as a model of such a case he suggests the following.¹⁵

A man submits to experiments in the course of which (a) sometimes he is shown coloured shapes on a screen or other publicly perceptible objects and (b) sometimes the operation of his optic nerve is interrupted, but his brain is independently stimulated in such a way as to produce visual impressions similar to those which he has in case (a). He knows that this is the character of the experiment but does not know whether alternative (a) or alternative (b) is actualized on any given occasion, and is unable to tell from the character of the experience. On each occasion he is asked to describe 'what he sees'. Then, indeed, whatever form his descriptions take, they will be non-committal as between the public and the private status of 'what he sees'. This is the model of what Strawson calls '*radical uncertainty*' as to the status of what was seen. And his point is that such a radical uncertainty has '*nothing to do*' with the inability to give 'firm' descriptions of what one sees except in 'purely aesthetic' terms. He concludes by saying. "I conclude that the visual field is not a fruitful one in which to search for examples of cases in which there is uncertainty as to the private or public status of what is perceived *and* in which precisely *this* uncertainty is reflected in the fact that the subject can give only 'purely aesthetic' or (in Hampshire's sense) non-committal descriptions of what he perceives."¹⁶ (p 105)

Thus we see that the contrast between description and identification is necessarily involved, and assumes different forms in, situations 'seen', 'heard', 'smelt', 'touched' and 'tasted'.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 105.

XI

Review of Husserl's Phenomenological Method as an Extention of the Cartesian Method

Filita Bharucha

SECTION—I INTRODUCTION

The philosophical tradition from Descartes to Husserl has followed the methodological principle 'claim only what you see clearly'. This emphasized the assumptions that one can deal with all things from the point of view of isolated pure subjectivity and that one must deal with all things from the point of view of intersubjective communication. It was considered as the original and general medium of communication. The rationalist trend in philosophy which Descartes emphasized had to encounter several oppositions. Descartes' polemics against Locke and other empiricists initiated his drive towards a scientific and indubitable inquiry. Husserl likewise reacted strongly to the contemporary works of his times before his genius could unfold the phenomenological method.

The phenomenologists arrived at their standpoint of transcendental subjectivity due to their opposition to the following schools of thought: (a) Reductionism (b) Scientism of the positivists (c) Realism and Idealism as briefly outlined below:

(a) Reductionism was a method that dealt with 'nothing-but-attitude' in philosophy. Psychologism is just one kind of reductionism which tried to show that the principles of logic, mathematics etc. were reducible to psychology. This is illustrated by sentence of the kind "Logical laws are nothing but psychological laws". The phenomenologists rejected this method as they wanted a 'presuppositionless philosophy':

(b) Scientism, especially with reference to the view of Mach and Avenarius, regards scientific statements as premises in philosophical arguments. This was not considered tenable by phenomenologists, in particular, through Husserl who rejected the Natural Standpoint, which is defined as that knowledge which begins with experience (Erfahrung) and remains within experience.

(c) According to phenomenologists, empiricism of Husserl and others was an example of phenomenalism. This was a view which regarded the physical objects as well as human beings to be mere collections of observable sensory properties. This was not accepted by them, as they attributed this viewpoint to a not very careful examination of physical objects.

The reaction of the phenomenologists in solving the old problem of abstraction was similar to that of Meinong in denying that abstract ideas were either ideas in the mind or mere abstractions. In particular for Husserl 'abstraction' is just a misnomer, for our procedures in coming to apprehend what he calls higher order entities, e.g. numbers, classes, universals, relations and propositions. However these higher order entities, even if non-actual, are considered to be authentic subsistent terms. Husserl aimed at scientific exactitude. He believed that phenomenology was not only a philosophical but a scientific method. This, according to most thinkers, appears doubtful but then we think that we must not overlook the fact that Husserl worked with a spirit of scientific detachment and contributed fruitfully to German phenomenology for the growth of existentialist thought.

Phenomenology originated with Brentano (in 1871) when he published a book called 'Psychology from an Empirical Point of view' where he outlined a programme of descriptive psychology relying on the notion of intentionality. According to Husserl, phenomenology would not have begun but for Brentano's efforts to convert the scholastic notion of 'Intentionality' into a descriptive root concept of psychology. It is of interest in the context of this paper to note that Brentano raised the question regarding the essential difference between the objects of empirical psychology and the objects of other kinds of empirical sciences. This is exemplified by the difference between the method of study of birds by ornithologists and the study of thoughts, emotions etc. by psychologists. The phenomena with which psychologists are concerned are 'ideas' which refer to not what is observed (or conceived) but the act of doing so (perceiving). Husserl did not accept this distinction between the psychological and physical. According to him there was a parallelism between the structure of a subjective act and its referent. For instance, in Logic Husserl wished to study both the subject's immediate experiencing and deducing and also at the same time the logical laws which

enable a valid deduction to be made. Husserl did not wish to distinguish between the act and the object (*Cogito* and *Cogitatum*) which must both be described.

In conclusion, we note that the upshot of the phenomenological reduction or 'putting the world in brackets' (*Aufhebung*) would be to show how the ordinary objective world was dependent upon the perceiving and thinking subject (transcendental subjectivity).

SECTION—II

In this section we shall discuss the nature of phenomenological investigations in philosophy. As pointed out in the introduction, Husserl and other phenomenologists rejected the natural standpoint, the natural knowledge is that which is defined to be that knowledge which begins with experience (*Erfahrung*) and remains within experience. Hence in the theoretical position which is called the natural standpoint, the total field of possible research is indicated by a single word 'the World' (*das Welt*). In this position, the concepts 'true being', 'real being' and 'being in the world' are phrases whose meanings appear to coincide. Sciences of experience are sciences of facts, that is, they posit our experiencing as having a definite spatio-temporal experience. However, the theoretical position of the standpoint is limited due to the contingency facts which is called 'matter of factness' (*Tatsachlichkeit*). The contingency factor is not a mere connection between spatio-temporal facts but has the character of essential necessity and therewith a relation to essential universality. This is due to the fact that an individual object is not simply and quite generally a 'this there' or something unique but it has its own proper mode of being and its own supply of essential predicates which must qualify it. Besides whatever belongs to the essence (*Eidos*) of one individual object can also belong to another. Hence the broadest generalities of essentials tend to 'delimit regions' or 'categorise individual objects'.

Most phenomenologists, in particular Husserl, thought that experiences must be analysed in intuition in their essential generalities and not as experiences of real occurrences in the natural world. Empirical insights can be transformed into essential insights (intuition), a possibility which is itself not to be understood as empirical but as essential possibility. The object of such an insight is the corresponding pure essence or 'Eidos'. For Husserl, the Eidos is an object of a new type. Just as the datum of empirical intuition is an object, so the datum of essential intuition is pure essence. Essential intuition is consciousness of something, that is of an object, a something, 'self given' within it, but which can be presented in other experiences. The Eidos can not only be exemplified intuitively in the data of experience and the data of perception, but also in the mere data of fancy (imagination). Hence with the aim of grasping an

essence itself in a primordial form, we can set out from corresponding empirical intuitions, but we can also set out from non-empirical intuitions, that is those that do not apprehend 'sensory existence'.

The setting out from non-empirical intuitions was forwarded by the phenomenologists because they emphasized that this world is not there for an individual as a mere world of facts and affairs but as a world of values, a world of goods, a practical world. The complex forms of the manifold shifting spontaneities are related to this kind of a world. The phenomenologists emphasized that when one is consciously awake, one is presented with a world which appears to be constant, that is, remains the same for the individual. This argument prompted Husserl to return to the 'Things Themselves' By this, he meant meanings attached to objects which are not connected by remote, confused, figurative intuitions but obtained by the 'Eidos' of the objects. For this, Husserl proposes the 'Phenomenological Reduction Method' (Epoche'). The Phenomenological Reduction Method' can be understood as the description of phenomena only after we have 'bracketted existence' (Aufhebung), namely, suspend our belief in the existence of objects. This implies that we do not view the object, say X, as the world presents it in order to grasp its Eidos. In order grasp the Eidos he suggests the 'Free imaginative variation method'. This method involves a preliminary description of the object X and then the transformation of the description by adding and deleting predicates contained in the description. With each addition and deletion of the predicates we investigate whether the amended description can still be said to describe an example of the same kind of object X. In this way we arrive at the necessary and invariant features of the object X, which are considered to constitute the Eidos of the object X. The free imaginative variation method outlined above requires a special kind of thinking called 'reflective thinking'. The result of this reflection is not a factual statement or an empirical generalization but a statement about the necessary conditions for any object being an example of the sort of things considered in our reflection.

It is interesting and important to note that phenomenologists believe that all activities which are reflectively described and clarified after bracketing existence (Epoche') are intentional activities. The 'Theory of Intentionality' was an attempt to modify the Cartesian and Lockian theories which stated that 'What I am aware of, when I am aware of something, must always be an idea.' The modification began with the distinction between the act of perceiving an object and the object itself, that is, the distinction between the idea and the ideatum... It was denied that what an 'act is of' is itself 'the act' for they believed that 'contents' are not real part of mental functioning, nor can all possible contents be lodged in the actual

world of space and time. This principle of intentionality leads the phenomenologists to reject the Cartesian question: Given only 'our clear and distinct ideas', how do we relate the content of our mind with the non-mental object outside the mind? They refused to distinguish between the contents of the mind as discrete examinable slices of experience and the objects to which the consciousness is directed.

In conclusion, Husserl rejects the natural standpoint as he thinks that the natural attitude is embedded in the contingent world of space and time. According to him this was necessary before philosophy could be given a scientific form. In view of the above discussion presented by the phenomenologists some objections can be mentioned against their position.

Husserl appears to separate 'essence' completely from the existence of an object on account of his rejection of the natural standpoint. It is doubtful whether the mind of man can hold 'essence' before itself, totally independent of actual and mental existence, for essence appears to be related to mental existence in general. Husserl appears to make the error of reading into 'essence' that what belongs only to the 'mental existence of essence'. Secondly, if one were to question the validity about the way in which the philosophy is supposed to master this area, namely, wither by description or by experience or by both. The first two objections do not seem tenable as there may be obviously an experience which is never described and a description for which there is no experience. Thirdly, there is no conclusive proof of the 'inner sense' with which we could 'look at' what Husserl calls the 'acts'. The problem of elucidating 'eidecting intuition' remains as the riddle of inner consciousness and does not appear to have been solved completely. The assumption that one can see with a mental eye (the inner sense), the essences and their interrelations appears vague. Wittgenstein has mentioned that he does not believe in such a mental eye and even if we had one it would be of no use to philosophy as a communicative enterprise. Indeed the author thinks that Husserl has presented phenomenology as an egocentric metaphysics. The reason being that in turning from the naive performance of an act of measurement to the attitude of reflection (observation) the former necessarily changes,

SECTION—III

We now proceed with the "extension" programme of the Cartesian method in Husserl's method of epoche in its significant aspects. The attempt to doubt everything which Descartes undertook in order to set up an absolutely indubitable sphere of Being, should serve only as a device of method to bring to light the secluded essence of things. He who attempts to doubt is attempting to doubt (Being)

of some form or other or it may be Being expanded into such predicative forms as "It is". The attempt does not affect the form of Being itself.

It is clear that we cannot perform the following two acts in the same act of consciousness—

- viz. (i) doubt the being of anything,
(ii) Being what is substantive to this Being under the terms of a Natural Theories and so confer upon it the character of "Being actually there".
(Vorhanden).

The attempt to doubt any object of awareness in respect of its being actually there necessarily conditions a certain *suspension* (*Aufhebung*) of the thesis. We do not abandon the thesis we have adopted nor make any change in our conviction, which remains in itself so long as we do not introduce new motives of judgement. Yet the thesis undergoes a modification, whilst remaining in itself what it is. We set the thesis "Out of Action" or "disconnect it". In spite of the fact that we "Bracket it", it remains there like the bracketted in the bracket, like the disconnected outside the connectional system. The thesis is experience as lived (*erlebnis*), but we make no use of it.

The above process enables us to arrive at a definite but unique form of consciousness,* which clamps on to an original simple thesis and transvalues it in a peculiar way. However, one should not simply identify the consciousness with that of "mere supposal" e.g. that of nymphs etc, since we are not disconnecting a living conviction that goes on living. The universal epoche' in the sharply defined and novel sense we have given to it can step into the Cartesian attempt to doubt. However, the limiting consideration for epoche is that one does not deny the "fact world" as in the case of a sophist or sceptic. Rather I use the "phenomenological epoch which bars me from using and judgement that concerns spatio-temporal existence. (*Dasein*).

We can consider the suspension of existential assent (epoche) as dictated by the "*Cartesian—Leibnizian*" principle, which states that in a vigorous science only apodeictic truths are admissible, i.e. those truths the contradictory of which is unthinkable. Husserl thinks that since the natural attitude is embedded in the contingent world of space and time it must be reduced before the philosophy can be given a scientific form. The cartesian notion of indubitably requires him to retain the individual self and its reflective experience, so far there is nothing in the Phenomenological reduction which was not contained in Descartes' Methodic Doubt. According

* Called phenomenological residuum

to the 'First Meditation' Descartes proposed to call into question everything which he had ever been taught or which he had ever assumed to be true, in order to find some clear and distinct ideas that he could not doubt them. Just as Descartes advocated the method with a view to build a "marvellous new science" on strictly geometrical lines, so Husserl thought that he would arrive at a "first philosophy". In his Cartesian Meditations he states that the goal of epoche was transcendental subjectivity.

In the first meditation Husserl acknowledges that the Cartesian "Cogito" was the necessary background for the Phenomenological reduction. But Husserl says that Descartes stopped in the middle of the road (Why?).

- (a) Descartes said that the cogito reveals a 'res' or a substance or a thinking substance. Therefore, Descartes did not understand that the function of the cogito is to reveal a condition or a premise necessary to all substances.
- (b) Descartes used the Cogito as an axiomatic foundation to a system built with mathematical precision rather than for an open field for research on the meaning of reality.
- (c) The formula 'Ego Cogito' is incomplete, It should be 'Ego Cogito Cogitara'. These Cogitara are responsible for the "Objective" meaning of all essences present in the consciousness and which are fully revealed to the consciousness by the epoche as the field of research and philosophical progress.

SECTION—IV

WHEN THEY TWO PARTED*

Husserl's theory of our perception of the world is a complete break with the Cartesian theory and by this I mean that it is a break not only with Descartes and his followers but also with the British empiricists. The only sense in which Husserl's 'Cartesian Meditations' can be cartesian is that they claim to be scientific and that they "show the concrete possibility of the Cartesian idea of a philosophy as an all embracing science grounded on an absolute foundation."

In all other respects phenomenology presents a total opposition to Descartes. The insistence of Descartes on "clear and distinct ideas" as a foundation for philosophy which seem to be like the introduction of epoche in phenomenology led to difficulties.

- (a) The only ideas which seemed to satisfy the "clear and distinct" criterion for Descartes were mathematical ideas.
- (b) Since he regarded ideas as the contents of the mind and having certain properties of clarity, obscurity, distinctness, etc, the question arose of relating them to the external world. Descartes conveniently resolved his dilemma by recourse to the goodness of Deity who would not give us the ideas which seemed to be.

* Husserl and Descartes.

related to the external world if they were not really so related. Hence the Certesian problem became one of relating what I am aware of, to what there is.

Husserl in the last chapter of 'Ideas' said that only the essence and not the existence of each being is subordinated to and dependent on consciousness. Therefore the distinction he made between essence and existence becomes irrelevant. To him, the essence is every thing which can be rationally known and knowable so the existence is absorbed by the essence, i.e. the essence is the only element exhausting and energizing the fullness of rationality (For Husserl). The Phenomenologist has no choice but must think that any existence outside the consciousness is absurd and unthinkable. In fact it would be the existence of nothing, since content and meaning and an ontic quality are contained and justified only with the consciousness. To hold any other position would be to cease to be a phenomenologist. The Cartesian question that given only 'our clear and distinct ideas' how do we relate the content of our mind with the non-mental thing outside the mind.

The phenomenologist totally rejects this question (on account of the concept of intentionality) to distinguish between the contents of the mind as discrete examinable slices of experience and the objects to which the consciousness is directed. The Fourth Meditation comes to the Categorical Conclusion "The problem of the existence of the universe is an absurd problem".

SECTION—V

Our approach to the world is governed by rules of meaning and expression, of selection and elimination in perception and comprehension. "Though we may be completely involved in this approach, *there is nothing necessary about the logic of the approach itself.*"* Not only is it modifiable but even its *raison d'Être* can be revived. I agree with the above challenge to "logic" as it stands today. I think there must be added to logic a new dimension. "4th dimensional logic," which deals with rules in a different realms of human consciousness. I think that it is only through this that we will be able to meet the "communicative necessity" of phenomenological studies. The public language subjected to this "new logic" will enable us to describe (filter) a personal experience. The method (technical) for the revival of this** "new logic" is under survey. If one succeeds it will open up new vistas in philosophy and perhaps traditional philosophy will slide into the "Historical past" forgotten and silent.

As Marvin Farber says "The Phenomenological method requires a well defined attitude for which all mundane beliefs are not merely suspended temporarily but for always as a matter of principle"..... The transition from our common sense world to the transcendental being would require a channeling of one's entire *Weltanschauung*. However the question remains with me... "why should one summount the conscience and arise to the ontological level to realize the foundation of itself? Why?

Perhaps you could answer !

* The Phenomenological Attitude in Samkara Vedanta
Philosophy East and West. Vol. 22 No. 3, —Dr. R. Sinari

Book-Reviews

Maheshwar Neog : *Early History of the Vaisnava Faith and Movement in Assam* Sankaradeva And His Times, pp. 400, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Bungalow Road, Delhi, Reprint 1985 Price Rs. 200/—

Dr. Maheshwar Neog the author of this work is Saint Sankaradeva Professor at Panjabi University and was formerly Jawaharlal Nehru Professor at Gauhati University and is a well known scholar. Sri Sankaradeva of Assam, who lived in the 15th 16th centuries, is one of the greatest saints and sages of our country who spent his life in bringing before his people the ideals of a good life conceived on the background of a faith in single deity.

This volume gives a very detailed survey of Sankaradeva with a full account of his background and a resume and appraisal of his work. It is quite a comprehensive volume and contains all about the Hindu Culture as it expressed itself through Vaisnavism and the Eka-saraniya faith which may be described as Assam's expression of the medieval Bhakti Movement.

The whole Book is divided into XII chapters as follows :

I. Introduction : Materials for a study of Sankaradeva and His Times is subdivided into I. Biographical Literature — growth of Guru caritas or lives of Vaishnava Saints A. Caritas of Sankara, Madhava and their immediate followers (1) The early group and (2) the later group; B. Independent caritas of later saints, C. Attempts at history of the growth of Vaisnava institutions; D. Suprious accounts E. Modern works on Sankaradeva and his movement, F. Contemporary evidences II. A. Historical literature B Sanskrit works of tantrism. II The Political Condition of the country anterior to and During Sankaradeva's times : His Ancestry is subdivided into I Introduction—the political environment of Kamarupa in the 14th and 15th centuries, II Arimattas's family. II The Bara-Bhuyas of Kamarupa-Assam, III The rise of Ahom and koc powers and IV The history of Cabdivaras Siromani Bara Bhuya family, III Social and Economic Background which has been further subdivided into : I. The People, II. Economic conditions of the People, III. Different Cults and IV. Education and Learning; IV. Early History of the Vaisnava Movement subdivided into I. Life and personality of Sankaradeva, II. Life and Personality of Madhava-deva, III. The apostle of Sankaradeva and Madhavdeva B. The chief followers of thegurus and other Satttriyas; V. Literary Works of Sankaradeva — A consideration of 28 works; VI. The Doctrines of the Faith: The Bhakti Ratnakara; VII. Sankaradeva's Philosophical Views; VIII. Sankaradevas Dramatic Art and Technique,

IX. Vaisnava Music and Dances; X. The Art of Manuscript Preparation and Illumination; XI. Neo Vaisnava Institutions and Practices, and XII. Social Implications of Sankaradeva's Bhakti Movement.

Dr. Neog is a well known author and scholar and has written on a number of subjects — Language and Literature Religion, History, Epigraphy, Cultural history, Music, Dance and Drama, Painting etc., He has particularly covered aspects of the North-Eastern region of India fairly broadly in his writings. He has to his credit several books, particularly — Sankaradeva and His Times; Early History of the Vaisnava Faith and Movement in Assam, Religions of the North East, Bhaona — the Ritual Play of Assam, Rhythm in the Vaisnava Music of Assam, etc. etc.

Dr. Neog has treated all aspects of the subject. The Religious life of Sankaradeva's has been depicted on the background of the economic and cultural life as well as the historical, literary and artistic aspects of Assamese Bhakti Movement. Literary works of Sankaradeva, The doctrines of the Faith: The Bhakti Ratnakara, His Philosophical Views, Sankaradeva's Dramatic Art and Technique, Vaisnava Music and Dances, Neo-Vaisnava Institutions and Practices and Social Implications of Sankaradeva's Bhakti Movement. All have been thoroughly very well written. Indeed the book is a great contribution to the life, teachings, Philosophy and the thoughts of Sankaradeva on different aspects. Dr. Neog's Book is a great contribution to the saint of Assam who has influenced the life of Assamese particularly in the 15th and the 16th Century when he lived and even after. He is one of the greatest saints who propounded Bhakti Movement through his great works.

Dr. Neog's work is of great importance which depicts Assamese culture in its entirety. It is indeed a very thorough and exhaustive book. In the end a very exhaustive Bibliography has been provided in 22 pages which is full of research material for doing further work. This will be very helpful to the students of Philosophy.

Dr. Neog deserves our most heartfelt congratulations on this scholarly book of his. Publishers also deserve thanks for publishing such a nice book.

William Gerber : *Serenity, Living with Equanimity, Zest and Fulfillment by applying the wisdom of the Worlds Greatest thinkers*, pp. 456, University Press of America, Lanham, New York, London. (1986) Price \$ 37.50, Paper back \$ 18.75.

This book is an interesting book on Applied Philosophy. It is somewhat different from traditional books in Philosophy, many of which are on technical problems and tend to neglect spiritual hunger. This book, says the author attempts to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Most of the ideas on serenity based on the statements

Book-Reviews

of sages and saints, poets and prophets, novelists and essayists, of widely differing periods and cultures. Several inspired seers have been referred these ideas and they include from Homer to Shakespeare, Plato to Robert Frost, Cicero to Freud, Isaiah to Goethe, and Confucius to Albert Schweitzer. The questions this book seeks to answer include: The best way of understanding the factors which prevent us from living serenely, and the credible system of ideas and practices is there which will enable us to overcome the obstructive factors and to live a life of liberation, independence, equanimity, meaning, zest, and fulfillment.

The whole book is divided into three parts, besides Preface which introduces the approach to serenity. Part I From Drudgery and Distress of Equanimity and Endurance is divided into two chapters: Obstacles to attain in serenity consisting of The Human Predicament, The Web of Experience and our ways of Acting; The Second chapter Overcoming the Obstacles and finding the road to serenity includes (1) Liberation from a Kind of Blindness, Waking up to a new aliveness; Self discovery (2) Liberation from a Kind of Zombiism, Savoring the Here and Now; Understanding Oneself and Others, and (3) Liberation from suffering: Concerned detachment; attainment of serenity. Part II Enhancing serene living through Self management and Personal fulfillment which is subdivided into (1) Self-Shaping and Self Direction consisting of Self Possession, Self Acceptance, Self Esteem, Self Mastery and Self Development and chapter (2) Self-Fulfillment consists of Zest, the Discovery of Meaning, and Exaltation, and the Joy of Loving and Caring; Part III Techniques for Achieving the foregoing goals which consists of (1) Regular Serenity Techniques for all Seasons is divided into Techniques for Promoting Awareness and Detachment in ordinary situations, in negative situations and also Tabular Summary of Regular Serenity Techniques; and lastly Supplementary Serenity Techniques, for Particular Time Spans consisting of Serenity techniques for the parts of a Day, for the days of the week, and for the days of the Year.

In the end 363 Source References have been provided which have added to the utility of the book and Index is also very helpful.

The whole book is very well written and tries to explain Serenity in all its aspects and has provided understanding of serenity, the techniques for attaining serenity. It is one of the best books on applied philosophy and covers an interesting subject. Mr William Gerber deserves congratulations on bringing out such a nice volume on Serenity.

Saul Friedlander, Gerald Holton, Leo Marx, Eugene Skolnikoff (editors): *Visions of Apocalypse End or Rebirth*. pp. 268, Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 30 Irving Place, New York, N. Y. 10003, Price \$ Cloth 28.50 and Paper back \$ 15 00 (1985).

This volume attempts, among other things, to place these ancient themes in the widest historical context: What are the roots of Western thinking about the end? How has the apocalyptic imagination expressed itself over the centuries? To what extent is the contemporary perception of imminent danger influenced by the legacy of hopes and fears about the future of humanity, whether their origin be mythological, historical, religious, psychological, literary or scientific.

The whole book is divided into four parts: Part I consists of four chapters: 1. Harold A. T. Reicha, *The Archaic Heritage: Myths of Decline and End in Antiquity* 2. Amos Funkenstein, *A Schedule for the end of the world: The origins and Persistence of the Apocalyptic Mentality*, 3. Saul Friedlander, *Themes of Decline and end in Nineteenth-Century Western Imagination*, 4. Frank Kermode: *Apocalypse and the Modern*; Part II consists of three chapters: 1. Harvey Brooks, *Technology-related catastrophies Myth and Reality*, 2. Robert S. Morison: *Biological Eschatology*, and 3. Robert J. Lyften, *The Image of "The end of the world": A Psycho-historical View*; Part III consists of 1. Matei Calin escue, *The End of Man in Twentieth century thought Reflections on a philosophical metaphor*, 2. Andre Reszler, *Man as Nostalgia: The image of the last man in Twentieth-Century Postutopian Fiction*, 3. Richard Poirier, *Writing off the Self*, Part IV Philip Morrison, *the Actuary of our species: The end of humanity regarded from the Viewpoint of science*.

It is an interesting book contributed by eminent scholars from various fields. The editors belong to four different disciplines, Professor of European History, Professor of Physics, Professor of American and Cultural history and Professor of Political Science: Contributors are also very eminent scholars and belong to different disciplines such as: Professor of Technology, Professor of Comparative Literature, Professor of Philosophy, Professor of Psychiatry, Professor of Biology, Professor of Physics, Professor of English, Classicist, and European History.

The essays are written by eminent personalities and divided into four parts: The first group of essays deals with Apocalyptic belief, beliefs in and renewal, including beliefs in the total end; The second group specific contemporary threats of catastrophe, The third analyzes modern thinking and writing about the end of Man. The concluding essay considers the fate of our species from the vantage of a distant star. Each section considers a different way of envisaging the end. It is every good collection of 12 essays and each essay in this volume, in its own way, charts a possible decent toward the abyss, and each in its own way leads toward an act of faith in life, in mere being beyond the last thought.

It is interesting book and covers different aspects of Apocalypse—End or rebirth from several angles.

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The Ideal of A Rational Morality*

Marcus George Singer

It has been said that the every young American wants to grow up to be president. But that was never true of me. The height of my ambition was merely to be president, someday, of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association. Alas, I never made it, though I came close. Just as I was about to be promoted from Vice-President of the Western Division to its presidency, the Western Division disappeared, to be replaced by a hitherto unknown entity entitled the Central Division, and I find now that I have the distinction, such as it is, of being the first president of the Central Division. Well, so much for ambition.

As Ernan McMullin pointed out two years ago¹, this is a special occasion, at least for the speaker, for it provides a special and indeed unique opportunity—and also, I cannot forbear adding, responsibility. A Presidential Address is not—or ought not to be—just another paper, though any one may turn out to be just another presidential address. And I feel oppressed by the demand to say more than I have time—thought I hope not more than I have reason—to say. This being so, I shall borrow liberally—always, of course, with the consent of the author—from material already published, and also from work in progress, not already published, and present for the most part a summary or sketch or overview, meant to be intelligible to the ear. And if you think that some essential argument

* Presidential Address delivered before the Eighty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Western (now Central) Division (or the first Annual Meeting of the Central—formerly Western—Division) of the American Philosophical Association, St. Louis, Missouri, May 2, 1986.

"Reprinted from Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, vol. 60, No. 1, September 1986, with the consent of the author and editor".

is missing, content yourself with the thought that it is here, only unexpressed.²

Yet I want to say something first about the very idea a presidential address. In selecting a topic, a theme, a manner, I have not lacked for advice, a great deal of it useful—except for the fact of their mutual incompatibility. I had no idea there were so many theories of what a presidential address should be, each with something to be said for it. Though I am not about to give a presidential address on presidential address theory, I did for a time contemplate that as a fitting accompaniment to our essentially reflective activity. I have had in mind throughout the exalted image of philosophy expressed by Gilbert Highet: "Beneath every serious dispute in the world of scholarship lies a judgment of value; and when that point is reached, science and scholarship must bow their heads in silence. Only one voice may still be heard: the voice of philosophy. There speaks reason"³ Although that is a great and moving aspiration, those of us more closely connected with the clamor of philosophical debate may find it hard to say, when a philosopher speaks, "There speaks reason"—especially given the unwanted presence of ideology in the philosophizing of so many of our colleagues (though never, of course, in our own). But as for philosophy itself—as distinct from philodoxia, the love of opinion—yes, that is the ideal. "There speaks reason", and it is an ideal worth every effort to forward and to pursue.

Thus I am impelled, by a process almost beyond choice, to talk about the ideal of a rational morality—in which speaks reason—and in the process will say something about proving and using moral principles, the principle and province of conscience, the essential role of decisions, and moral freedom. In short—thought I recognize that it might after a while begin to seem "in long"—a sketch of a moral theory. And that it is about morality, or in ethics, seems only fitting considering my past offences in this area. where I have, I have been told, become expert at committing subtle fallacies.

I

In 1924 there appeared a symposium volume entitled "Our Changing Morality"; among the authors was Bertrand Russell, who contributed a piece called "Styles in Ethics". The book dealt mainly with changes in the status of women and attitudes towards marriage divorce and sexual relations. Now there is no doubt that sexual morality has changed and has been changing, and if the authors thought it had changed a great deal by 1924, they, as we all know now, hadn't seen anything yet, and maybe, in the same parlance, we haven't seen anything yet either—though it is hard to imagine what else there is to see. However, if morality is changing, how can there be a single true morality? Indeed, can there be any true morality?

The Ideal of A Rational Morality

There can. There can because the concept of morality is systematically ambiguous. It can mean either positive morality, or personal morality, or true or rational morality.⁴

What is called positive morality could also go under the name of conventional or received or accepted or customary morality, and, by a sort of anomaly, positive morality is largely negative. Positive morality is the customary or accepted morality of a given group at a given time. This also is an ambiguous conception. The positive morality of a given group consists in the rules or principles or standards the members of the group generally follow in their conduct, whether or not they profess to or are even aware of them. But it also consists in the standards the group professes to follow or believes it follows, whether it actually does or not. As we all know, practice does not always follow precept, and precept does not always determine practice. For some purposes it would be important to emphasize this ambivalence; I shall not stress it at the moment. By positive morality I mean some combination of these. Thus the positive morality of a group is its conventional morality, in the sense of the standards most members of the group normally follow or profess to follow or believe they follow or think they should follow, in their own conduct and in their criticism of their own conduct and the conduct and character of others. The precepts of positive morality are the precepts that are taught to the young and supported by characteristic forms of social pressure, such as expressions of approval or disapproval, acceptance or ostracism. There is no doubt there is such a thing, even though we are not always aware of what it is until we find ourselves criticizing it.

When we criticize the morality of our own society, we do so, at least in the first instance, on the basis of our own personal moral standards, which perhaps we think should become the standards of the group but which clearly are not in actuality. One's personal morality consists in one's own ideas of right and wrong, which sometimes do guide one's conduct, and if they do not guide one's conduct, at least they guide one's judgment of others. Here also we must distinguish between the standards one professes to follow and the standards one actually does follow, and here also by personal morality I shall mean some combination of these. But personal morality must be distinguished from positive morality because we recognize that our personal morality must be distinguished from positive morality because we recognize that our personal morality is not always congruent with the morality of the group to which we belong. If a group has attained that level of civilization at which individuality is discernible, it will contain people who have ideas of right and wrong not always congruent with that of the group, which sometimes puts them in the position of being critical of or in conflict with the group

to which they belong. And of course a person's morality is not just a set of principles; it is a complex of conduct, character, and values—that is, things a person regards as important. It includes the person's moral beliefs, but is not restricted to them. It reflects the person's character and is expressed in the person's conduct, both overtly and in more subtle forms. One's morality is expressed in one's conduct even in cases where it does not determine the conduct, where, for instance, one acts contrary to one's morality. For such conduct gives rise to feelings of guilt or shame or remorse, which are expressions of one's morality (as on occasion they are expressions of one's fear of breaching positive morality or public opinion). But in distinguishing one's personal morality from the morality of one's society the emphasis is on the standards that are part of one's own idea of right and wrong, whether in agreement with one's society's or not.

I doubt if many if any would deny the distinction between positive and personal morality, and the account I have given is fairly standard. (There are of course problems about how exactly they are to be defined, as there are problems about how they interrelate and how they ought to.) I have not distinguished between manners, morals, and mores, nor have I said anything about the role played by customs, traditions, and laws. Nor will I. What I must get to is the existence of rational morality, which may seem more dubious. Yet its reality is not far to seek. It is a presupposition of any criticism of positive morality, past or present. It is presupposed in our critical moral judgments, those based or thought to be based on reasons, that there is a rational or true morality that our judgments represent. The existence of rational morality should be manifest to anyone who has ever had a change of mind on a moral matter. "I used to think that was all right, and now I see that it is wrong" (or, "I used to think that was wrong, and now I no longer think so") represents the form of such a change of mind. What one is thinking in such a case is that the judgment previously made is false, though once believed true, and that it is corrected by the judgment that is now held and believed true. Thus one has a conception of a more rational morality which, though elusive, is an essential presupposition of the process of thinking about one's change of view, or even having one. Where one has a belief that the positive morality of one's group (which, say, approves of slavery or torture or a caste system or apartheid or a lower wage scale for females than for males) is unjust or wrong or unjustified, one has a belief that this conventional morality ought to change and that the change ought to be in the direction of a more rational, equitable, justified arrangement. What one thinks in such a case is not just that conventional morality does not correspond to one's own personal morality (though confusion on this matter is rife in practice, with some thinking that is

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sufficient for refutation, when all that it does is pit one outlook against another), but that it cannot be approved of at the bar of rational morality.

Thus, whenever one criticizes some precept or practice, not with mere irritation or aversion or anger but on the basis of reasons, one is appealing to an idea of a rational morality which provides the basis for the criticism. And at least a glimpse of this rational morality is provided to anyone who has ever changed his or her mind on a moral matter for what one regards as good reason. "I was mistaken," one thinks, "I was in error. It is hard to realize, this, and even harder to admit it. But if I am to be honest with myself, if I am to be able to maintain a sense of my own integrity, I must admit that I was mistaken, I was in error." In thinking this one is necessarily thinking that something that was once and perhaps for a long time a part of one's personal morality has to this extent changed, and that the change is in the direction of a more rational or correct morality.

What is essential to this process is that the change of mind be thought to be rationally based, that it not be conceived of as some thing resting solely on whim. What I am claiming is that we cannot make sense of a change of moral *belief* or *judgment* or *opinion* apart from the conception of a rational or true morality. A change in one's tastes or preferences is of a different order and is not a change of moral belief. I used not to like broccoli, now I do; I used to like squash, now I don't; at an early age I liked strawberry ice cream, and after a while no longer did. (And I am not wholly inconstant in my food tastes: I am not now and never have been a liker of Brussels sprouts.) But whether or not I think I understand the causes of this change of taste, I do not for a moment think of it as something rationally based or that my later preferences are more rational or correct than my previous ones. (There are, to be sure, cases in between, where a change in taste is brought about by a conviction that some substance is harmful, as where one gives up smoking; in my own case, I used to prefer milk to whiskey, and it is not too many years ago that I came to see how childish that preference was. No doubt opinions on this latter point will differ; still these are changes that are not merely changes in taste or preference but are mixed).

In matters of taste or preference, as distinct from matters of judgment and opinion, the concepts of truth and falsity, of being correct or incorrect, are not involved. (The conception of "good" and "bad" taste provides a complication here, but I am thinking primarily of taste in the primary sense, not in the aesthetic sense.) If I think I am "changing my mind" (to use the conventional characterization), I do not think of it in terms of a change in likes or

dislikes or preference or inclination. I think that I have progressed from believing something false to believing something true, or at least to believing something more rationally based. Thus, in changing one's mind and in having the idea that one previously was mistaken in what one believed, one has the conception of a rational morality which is presupposed in the very process of thinking about and attempting to describe the change in opinion. Thus it is evident that the idea of a rational morality is involved both when we think some criticism of positive morality is rationally based — and not just something we don't like —, and also when we recognize the phenomenon of changing our minds on a moral matter, which itself involves a change in our personal morality. (And these three conceptions of morality, so different and yet in some ways so similar, may well involve one another.)

II

Positive morality, then, is the morality we find around us. We are born into a culture and acquire its moral outlook as we acquire its language. We are in this sense creatures of traditions and institutions, and morality is one of the institutions that mold us. The existence of positive morality is a social fact, as indubitable as any social fact can be, even though just what it requires or permits is not always clear or indubitable, and in some cultures, such as ours, is easily confused with public opinion, which is variable, unstable, and transitory, and can be played upon by demagogues, propagandists, and advertisers. The more heterogeneous the society the more complex or confused the requirements of positive morality are. We are also born, or enter freely, into various groups or associations or sub cultures, and these can have moralities different in important respects from that of the wider society. This creates conflicts and engenders moral problems, and helps generate a sense of personal or individual morality, which sometimes only appears to be individual but is really only another species of positive morality, that of a sub culture. It turns out to be hard to avoid the influence of positive morality, and may not be avoidable altogether.

Is morality an institution? It is often said to be. But it is also said to be the basis on which institutions can be judged or criticized, and it is hard to see how it can play both roles at once. Our distinction enables us to see. Positive morality is an institution; personal morality is a social and psychological fact, hardly an institution, except in the impossible case of a society of absolute individualists. But rational morality is not and cannot be an institution. It is the basis for all fundamental criticism of social institutions, including the institution of positive morality. In his *Liberty Mill* was criticizing not just law and not just opinion, but also the positive morality of his time and place, as he did in *The Subjection of Women*.

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But he did this from a position partly inside that society and partly outside, a perspective supplied in part by the positive morality of his society, which allowed such fundamental criticism to take place, and partly by the perspective of his complicated form of utilitarianism, which was put forward not as itself a form of positive morality but as something to modify it and eventually to replace it—and a very radical replacement it would have been.

The rules of positive morality and the attitudes they engender are often narrow, vicious, stupid, and cruel. They can be the results of ignorance, superstition, prejudice, fear, and folly, can embody taboos and dessicated habits, can be oppressive intolerant and unjust. But we can make such judgments only from the perspective provided by a more rational morality. Positive morality cannot by itself distinguish fundamental moral rules, essential to the survival of the society and the welfare of its members (such as the rules prohibiting murder, assault, mayhem, enslavement, rape, robbery, and gross dishonesty) from local rules, which vary across time and space and which constitute the part of morality that is felt as changing, sometimes giving rise to feelings of being adrift. But there is also no doing without positive morality. It is because we are brought up in a culture that has a morality that we are enabled to acquire a morality of our own and hence the capacity to improve on the morality of the group. No doubt an individual can do without a morality, for a time, as an individual can do without a language, but no society can. One of the tests of any proposed change in morality is whether it could serve as the morality of a group and work and find acceptance, in actual practice and not just in the imagination of the theorist. The received morality is what is generally accepted and conformed to, almost as something natural and certainly as something habitual. Nothing can replace it that is not capable of becoming habitual and seeming natural.

Let us return now to the book of 1924 on *Our Changing Morality*. The distinction between positive and rational morality, though implicit in some of its discussions, was nevertheless not recognized. The editor, for instance, starts by speaking of "the subject of sex", says that "men and women are ignoring old laws. In their relations with each other they are living according to tangled, conflicting codes", and then speaks of "the gap that was left when Right and Wrong finally followed the other absolute monarchs to an empty nominal existence somewhere in exile".⁵ But this is double confusion: between morality and sexual morality, and between rational and positive morality. When Right and Wrong follow other absolute monarchs to extinction or exile we have Hitler's gas ovens or Stalin's Gulag or more up-to-date torture chambers. Here evidently right and wrong are being identified with the dictates of a narrow social code, and that is the mistake of moral parochialism.

Russell also was involved in this confusion. He says, accurately, that "In all ages and nations positive morality has consisted almost wholly of prohibitions ... The Jews ... prohibited murder and theft, adultery and incest, the eating of pork and seething the kid in its mother's milk. To us the last two precepts may seem less important than the others, but religious Jews have observed them far more scrupulously than what seem to us fundamental principles of morality". But this already incorporates a distinction, unrecognized, between positive morality, which varies with time and place and class and religion and can be or seem largely irrational, and "fundamental principles of morality", which make implicit claim to rational status, a claim that makes no sense apart from the conception of rational morality. And Russell sees no incongruity in going on to recommend "lines of argument by which it is possible to attack the general belief that there are universal absolute rules of moral conduct". Again we have confusion between positive and rational morality, and between morality as such and sexual morality. Thus Russell says, "Broadly speaking the views of the average man on sexual ethics are those appropriate to the economic system existing in the time of his great grandfather." Yet he doesn't hesitate to juxtapose remarks on "popular morality" with claims about "the morality that ought to exist", nor does he hesitate to proclaim that "Sexual morality, freed from superstition, is a simple matter... Relations between adults who are free agents are a private matter, and should not be interfered with either by the law or by public opinion, because no outsider can know whether they are good or bad". This claim may be perfectly sensible, even correct — and it is certainly one that most people in this society who regard themselves as advanced would today accept —, but it is not so as a report on popular or positive morality. It is both an expression of Russell's personal morality and a claim, stemming from that personal morality, of what a rational sexual morality would be. But this admits the distinction that has been clouded over.⁶

The positive morality of our society, as we know, has changed enormously, especially on matters relating to sex. But attitudes relating to sex have changed before, and can change again, back to a state of greater rigidity. That our views on these matters are now different is no proof that our present attitudes are sound; no matter how much we think they are. Fashion rules and fashions change even among intellectuals; advanced thinkers as well as professed rebels against society are not immune from its influence, may be even more prone than others to confuse the dictates of current intellectual fashion, sanctioned by peer pressure, with the provisions of rational morality, as they claim to have an outlook more advanced than that of the ignorant and uncultured masses. But that something is accepted, even by our own special in-group, is

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no proof that it is right. If we are rational on such matters we recognize that our present attitudes, though they have evolved from earlier, can still be wrong, and must rest, if they are to be rational, on something firmer than present attitudes or current acceptance, even if they are the attitudes of people who agree with us.

Hume's conclusion that "the rules of morality... are not conclusions of our reason" has generated much controversy.⁷ Yet, though his premises are questionable, his conclusion is true, in the main. For Hume was writing about positive morality, not of rational morality, of which he had no conception, and the rules of positive morality are not, let us face it, "conclusions of our reason", or anyone else's either. Hume thought this a good thing, regarded morality much as Wittgenstein regarded language, as perfectly in order as it is. Some of us, however, are not so sanguine about natural developments, think there are ways in which positive morality has improved over the years, and possibly also ways in which it has retrogressed. One of the suppositions of rational morality is that rational thought and discussion is one of the ways in which positive morality can be improved, though improvement is bound to be slow and no one can be sure how much of it is ever due to rational processes. The question is not whether the rules of positive morality are conclusions of our reason but whether they can withstand rational scrutiny, and what sort of rational scrutiny is appropriate to the rules of morality.

It is interesting that on this matter Hume and Bradley were much in agreement. For Bradley insisted that "There is ... no need to ask and by some scientific process find out what is moral, for morality exists all round us..."⁸ But immorality also exists all round us. Bradley's claim is true of positive morality, and understood thus is both true and a valuable observation. Positive morality, however, is not self-sufficient and can be corrupted. It is no accident that the title of the next chapter of Bradley's *Ethical Studies* is "Ideal Morality", but ideal morality does not exist all round us. If we have in mind ideal or rational morality, there is need to ask and find out what is moral.

III

The ideal of a rational and true morality, then, is presupposed in our critical moral judgments, those based on reasons, and also in the phenomenon of changing our minds on a moral matter, where this is regarded as not a matter of whim or taste but as something resting on reasons. The expression "changing our minds" is a curious one, containing a curious ambiguity. It sounds like something we do deliberately and on volition, like changing our shoes or our selection from a dinner menu. Sometimes, when we are merely choosing a course of amusement, or are in a situation where there is

no question that we can choose what to do — as in choosing to go to the circus or the opera or the zoo or stay home instead —, we can decide one way one moment and then “change our minds” the next, and this is a matter of volition or whim, having no more basis in reason or necessity than choosing to change our clothes. But when we are exercising judgment about what is true or what is right, the language of “changing our minds”, though perfectly natural, is nonetheless deceptive. The true relation is that our minds are changed, but we do not choose to change them. Though our judgment may in the end actually rest on whim, we cannot think so or we could not think of it as a judgment on a matter of what is true or what is right. We necessarily think of it as something over which we have no control but must go along with. If you and I are discussing some matter on which we disagree, and I come to think that you were right and I was wrong. I may describe the phenomenon that occurs by saying “I have changed my mind”, but that is just a *façon de parler*; you have changed my mind, or, rather, your argument has, and I have no more control over that, as distinct from the admission of it, than I do over your argument itself. Here is genuine necessity, the true home of determinism, the power of reason.

It is something of this phenomenon, with which every philosopher has to be familiar, that I have in mind in talking about rational morality. But so far we have caught merely a glimpse of it, and we want more than a glimpse. More than a glimpse can be gotten, and I go on to give some account of its contents, principles, structure, and limits.

The following are some central provisions of a rational morality:

(1) A rational morality rests on principles, which provide its basis.

(2) These principles are capable of rational proof though this proof might not be evident to all who are rational.

(3) Some of these principles are fundamental, others subsidiary, established by reference to the fundamental principles.

(4) It contains rules of conduct, more specific than principles, which in turn rest on reasons, reasons that relate to the principles.

(5) The principles of a rational morality allow for different rules for different conditions, and provide the basis for determining justified exceptions to the rules.

(6) But some of the rules are fundamental and changeless, as long as human beings retain certain essential features, such as being mortal, capable of being deceived and taken advantage of, capable of feeling pain. Such rules relate to the condition of being human, a presupposition of their applicability.

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(7) The rules and principles of a rational morality must be acceptable in human conditions and relate to human purposes, not to purposes that are made up *a priori* having no relation to the realities of human life. This is consistent with great variety of human conditions and purposes and values, as it is consistent with certain uniformities.

(8) The principles and fundamental rules of rational morality must apply to all human beings in all societies, and can be excepted or inoperative only under conditions that they themselves allow for.

(9) Judgments made in a rational morality are made on the basis of reasons and on knowledge of the relevant facts — though this is perhaps a feature of rational moral persons rather than of a rational morality itself.

(10) It is not necessary that specific moral judgments on concrete cases made within a rational morality be conclusively supported or even in agreement. Often conclusive reasons will not be available, as a matter of principle. Thus it may be reasonable for one person to think that some action is right in some situation, and for another to think something else right in that same situation; given that each judgment is reasonable, there will be reasons for each; given the impossibility of attaining conclusive reasons (which would rule out variability of judgment), each would be justified in acting, and judging, on his or her own judgment.

(11) The rules and principles of a rational morality leave a realm of moral freedom, where it is open to each person to decide and act as he or she thinks best or wants or is inclined, without breaching any rule or principle of rational morality. This will occur even in situations that are felt to be moral and to generate moral problems. That is to say, there is a realm of moral freedom where each person must decide individually what to do, and no right answer can be deduced or otherwise obtained from the principles. The opposite state is one of moral fanaticism, where it is supposed that in every situation there is just one course of action that is morally right and that this is or must be uniquely determined by the principles. This is the fallacy of exclusive rightness.

(12) It follows that in a rational morality in most situations what specifically ought to be done, as distinct from what ought not to be done, is not deducible from the principles. One must decide.

In listing some of these provisions of a rational morality, I have had in mind some things Holmes said about law. "It is revolting", Holmes said, "to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV". One difference between law and morality is that a rule of morality cannot be laid down, though it can, if not fundamental, be established in a community by acceptance and occasionally by agreement. But the idea is

the same. It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of morality than that so it has been since time immemorial. That is the reason that often operates in customary morality; it cannot operate in rational morality. (To have no better reason for a rule of rational morality is an impossibility, though if everyone else accepts and acts on a certain rule that may be a reason for doing the same.)

Holmes also observed that

a body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in words.¹⁰

Again, although there are differences between a body of law and a morality, Holmes's second observation also has application to morality. Thus: "a morality is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in words." This, though it is put more teleologically than I would think best, comes close to the ideal of a rational morality. We are still some way from the ideal of a rationalized legal system, and even farther from the ideal of a rational morality. But we are now closer at least to an idea of what it is.¹¹

At times I have spoken of the *existence* of rational morality, at other times of the *ideal*. Is it in existence or is it an ideal? In part, both. When I speak of its existence, I do not mean that there is some place, say Rationalia, where rational morality is accepted and practiced. I mean that the idea of it is available to us, that the idea is not self-contradictory and neither fiction nor figment, and that there are occasions when it is embodied in conduct and character. But mainly I want to emphasize its status as an ideal. It is not now fully existent and most likely cannot become fully existent. When we talk about positive or personal morality, we are talking about something that already exists. But rational morality can never exist as the morality that people have in the way positive and personal morality do. When we talk about rational morality we are talking about something that does not as such already exist but that, to some degree and to some extent, ought to. We can describe it in general terms and delineate its general features. The progress of moral philosophy itself is an attempt to carry out this project, and we cannot predict the specific results of future inquiry. (If we could get them now.) And clearly rational morality is better than existing positive and personal codes, and in that sense desirable. Hence rational morality is ideal because it is not now actual, is better than what is actual, worth aiming at, and capable of some realization, even if not in full.

[By rational morality I do not have in mind, even though I refer to it as such, In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar, India. Bradley, Lindsay,

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Lamont) have called Ideal Morality, morality beyond the morality of justice or claims and counter-claims, a morality of service and self effacement. I am not sure whether such a morality is ideal, or whether it is for human beings or for saints. An ideal to be serviceable must be anchored in the actual and the possible.]

IV

One fundamental principle of rational morality is that one's conduct and one's judgments should accord with one's principles; the opposite is hypocrisy. This principle is not unknown in positive morality, but it is breached as often as the principles on which a group behaves differ from the principles on which it professes to, and that also is not unknown. Since the very same ambiguity affects personal morality, with occasional twinges of conscience and feelings of guilt if not shame, it is evident that this *principle of coherent principle* is already felt, even if dimly, therefore recognized even if breached. But, allowing for occasions on which one might be justified in practicing something other than what one preaches, no morality can be rational that does not abide by this principle.¹²

This principle links with the principle of justice — the generalization principle — and also with the Golden Rule. For the Golden Rule directs us to judge and determine our conduct on the same standards we use in judging the conduct of others, whether we are affected by it or not.¹³ The generalization principle, which states that what is right for one person must be right for any similar person in similar circumstances, is still liable to misconceptions, some of them identical with misconceptions of twenty five years ago, some of them ingenious innovations. [Some years ago I embarked on a project of reconsidering the theory of generalization in ethics, have still some way to go.¹⁴ But I have seen no objections to the generalization *principle*, as distinct from the generalization *argument*, that I regard as anywhere near being valid, though not all are easy to answer.¹⁵]

The principle of justice is also involved more or less clearly in positive morality — depending on how enlightened the positive morality we have in view is with respect to fundamental principles. Now my argument for this principle was, basically, that it is involved in all moral reasoning and all genuine moral judgment — moral judgment based on reasons rather than whim or preference. Given this — it is a large given — we have all the proof of it we can ask for or need.¹⁶

There is an obvious relation between the Generalization Principle and the Golden Rule. But years ago when I first wrote about this topic, I did not get the relationship straight. Now, twenty-five years later, I still don't have it straight, and I do not want to get into that again now. Both principles are involved in Golden Rule

thinking, an essential component of moral reasoning. Golden Rule thinking helps bring out the rational character of rational morality. Hans Reiner, a German philosopher of the phenomenological school, has provided the most discerning account of the rationality of the Golden Rule I have seen, and I paraphrase and abbreviate it here.

The Golden Rule implies that "I should order my conduct consistently with my judgments of the conduct of others". In doing so it "presupposes a moral standard" and also "gives us a standard to judge our own conduct by in referring us to our judgments of similar conduct on the part of others". It thus refers us "to a norm that it does not ... explicitly contain, but that each of us takes for granted ...". As Reiner puts it, "Every one of our judgments about the conduct of others ... presupposes a moral norm"; consequently, "we must have long ago *acknowledged* some norms to be valid... What we have in consequence is a moral *a priori* to order our conduct by; an *a priori* that is admittedly neither formulated nor proved in the abstract, but that we still previously acknowledged to be valid in certain applications. Our acknowledging this", Reiner adds, "is of greater importance than any philosophical proof."¹⁸ I myself regard these observations, which bring home to us what we already think and must think, as providing a philosophical proof. And the "world-wide dissemination of the Golden Rule" shows that it is acknowledged independently of language and of culture, and is consequently a principle both of rational and of positive morality, acknowledged even when it is violated. Violations of it typically occur when people who mistreat others do not think of them as people, and this is a failure of imagination and sympathy as well as of moral discernment.¹⁹

V

I have argued, though only in a cursory way, that a moral principle can be proved by showing it to be involved in all moral judgement and moral reasoning, and that this can be proved true of certain principles. This, however, is a very severe and restrictive test. Other sorts of proof are possible and necessary.

An article of thirty years ago opens with the argument that ultimate ethical principles must be arbitrary. One cannot derive conclusions about what should be merely from accounts of what is the case; one cannot decide how people ought to behave merely from one's knowledge of how they do behave. To arrive at a conclusion in ethics one must have at least one ethical premise. The premise if it be in turn a conclusion, must be the conclusion of an argument containing at least one ethical premise. And so we can go back, indefinitely but not for ever. Sooner or later, we must come to at least one ethical premise which is not deduced but baldly asserted. Here we must be a-rational; neither rational nor irrational, for here there is no room for reason even to go wrong.²⁰

The argument is fascinating, even though the general point is a familiar one; it is also mistaken. The author, Brian Medlin, claims that this account of "the logic of moral language" cannot be resisted by argument. But that is false. Let us simply restate the argument, replacing "ethical" by "logical" throughout and making similar changes where appropriate. Presto:

ultimate logical principles must be arbitrary. One cannot derive conclusions about what must be merely from accounts of what is... To arrive at a conclusion in logic one must have at least one logical premise. This premise, if it be in turn a conclusion, must be the conclusion of an argument containing at least one logical premise. And so we can go back, indefinitely but not for ever. Sooner or later, we must come to at least one logical premise which is not deduced but baldly asserted. Here we must be a-rational; neither rational nor irrational, for here there is no room for reason even to go wrong.

Now any argument to the conclusion that "ultimate logical principles must be arbitrary" must have something wrong with it; it makes use of those very same principles of logic that it declares to be a-rational. One thing wrong with it is the assumption that argument to ultimate principles must take the same linear form as argument to less ultimate conclusions, namely deduction from premisses of the same type, and this easily leads to the seductive infinite regress regress. (Another error is the assumption that "to arrive at a conclusion in ethics" — presumably this means a conclusion about a moral matter — one must deduce it from an ethical premise. Moral judgments are judgments, not deductions; they are not themselves deduced; they can be supported, defended, argued for or against, justified or established, but not deduced.) The linear inference idea has the further implication that *no* principle could be ultimate, for it must be either arbitrary, in which case it is not established, or else deducible from another, which must in turn then be ultimate, *und so weiter*.²¹

Consider the following similar argument: "Proof will not do (for acquiring knowledge of right and wrong), for since you may prove some moral judgments only by assuming others, all moral judgments cannot be proved".²² On this argument, not all moral judgments can be proved, because in every argument some have to be assumed. But this also would imply that *none* can be proved. And this also proves nothing, for again the same argument can be reframed with respect to logical claims, and would then imply that nothing whatever can be proved. If nothing whatever can be proved, then the conclusion of this argument cannot, yet it claims to be itself a proof. A "proof" that nothing can be proved is no proof at all; so the argument that we cannot have proof on matters of right and wrong is fallacious.

The operative idea in these accounts — it is a fairly standard one — is that a moral principle cannot be proved because in the process it would have to be deduced from other moral principles, which supposedly generates the infinite regress difficulty or else is somehow circular. I have now argued that embracing skeptical arguments of the kinds just considered are fallacious. But this is still not enough. Something more is wanted, no doubt, something more positive — a valid and substantial argument to a fundamental moral principle. It is to me surprising that it has been thought for so long that such an argument cannot be supplied. For it can and has been.

From among several available alternatives I select for presentation one developed by Hardy Jones (unfortunately the late Hardy Jones) in 1979. Jones's argument is based on Sidgwick's procedure in *The Methods of Ethics*, and is in essence and in outline as follows:

- Premise 1: If conflicts and confusions in common sense moral judgments can be clarified and resolved by some principle P, and if these judgments can be systemized and explained by P, then P is an ultimate moral principle.
- Premise 2: Conflicts and confusions in common-sense moral judgments can be clarified and resolved by the Q principle, and the Q principle can explain and systematize these judgments.

Therefore: The Q principle is a fundamental moral principle. Jones pointed out that neither premise is itself a moral principle. "so a fundamental moral principle can be established by means of premises... not themselves... moral principles".²³

Sidgwick, of course, thought this form of argument established the principle of utility as fundamental. Whether it does this depends on whether the second premise is true of the principle of utility, and that is another inquiry. The same form of argument could establish as fundamental any moral principle that accomplished the task called for by the first premise. And whether the argument works in any case depends on whether the major premise truly states the conditions sufficient for establishing some principle as fundamental, and that also is another inquiry. The point is that the argument is substantial and valid, and the premises are not themselves moral principles. Proof in ethics is available without circularity or infinite regress.²⁴ The argument for it is of course not simple. But why should it be supposed to be?

I move on to another line of argument for establishing moral principles, albeit subsidiary not ultimate ones, which illustrates logical relationships among them and shows that rational morality has a logical structure.²⁵

Consider any moral rule, say the rule that lying is wrong, and let us suppose that it is established. If it is established, it is not as

a rule that holds in every instance, but as one that holds generally or presumptively. Lying is sometimes justified, and if this provision is not recognized, we can make no sense of conflicting rules and claims. Consider now the principle that every violation of a moral rule must be justified, and the further principle that one is never justified in doing something that it is presumptively wrong to do merely by the fact that one wants to. It follows that one is never justified in doing merely for the sake of doing it something that it is generally wrong to do. Hence, from the rule that lying is generally wrong it follows that lying for the sake of lying is always wrong. And this is readily generalized: given any moral rule to the effect that some kind of action is generally wrong, it follows that it is always wrong to do an act of that kind just for the sake of doing it.²⁶

It also follows that there are universal absolute rules of moral conduct, and that it is possible to formulate universal moral laws that have no exceptions. We just have. [To be sure, I have said nothing about the standard of proof on which I am relying, or on the standards of proof that are appropriate—and there is in every proof a standard of proof that is presupposed. This is matter for a larger work, not essentially summary in character.]

VI

I want now to say something about how moral principles can be used, and their limitations. The application of principles to concrete cases, especially difficult or controversial ones, constitutes the classical and difficult problem of Casuistry, now due for another hearing. There is a tendency on the part of philosophers, especially those enamored of game-theoretic considerations, to look for some sufficient, infallible, and complete action guide.²⁷ There is and can be no such thing. Moral principles only circumscribe an area of moral freedom. They do not tell us what to do within this area. They only determine its parameters. If there is something that it is wrong to do, that is something that ought not to be done; if there is something that it is wrong not to do, that is something that ought to be done. But in most circumstances of life we have to choose between or among things that are neither wrong to do nor wrong not to do; we are in the area of moral freedom, and we must decide what to do—or what we ought to do—and take the responsibility and the consequences of so deciding. Within this area one has the right to do as one thinks best or as one pleases or is inclined, and whatever one does within those parameters is not only morally right but does not require justification. The demand that one always justify one's conduct is often taken as the typical demand of moral philosophy. It is not, is only the typical demand of inveterate moralizers and moralistic busy bodies. Its typical expression takes the form

of moral fanaticism, the encrusted and caked-over idea that every thing we do requires justification. That is false.²⁸ Something requires justification only if there is some *prima facie* reason to think that it breaches some moral rule or principle. Actions within the parameters of moral freedom by definition do not; what requires justification is the demand that they be justified, and it cannot get it. This is not a merely epistemological point; it is morally wrong to demand justification of an action in the area of moral freedom, since the demand itself is an interference with moral freedom, is a terrible precedent for moral education, and has no place in a rational morality. (This is, incidentally, one significant disanalogy between ethics and epistemology. What we do does not normally require justification; what we believe does. Normally we have the right to do what we please; we do not normally have the right to believe what we please.) This point is summed up in the "Mind Your own Business Principle", within its limits as fundamental and undeniable as The Principle of Factual Relevance: "Do not judge without knowing the facts"; and also one on which there is a great deal more to be said, though I am not now about to say it.

One of my favorite characters in all literature is Moreland, in Anthony Powell's *Dance to the Music of Time*, who, though he has decided opinions on just about everything, from the management of world affairs to how other people should conduct their lives, is unable to decide what to order from a menu, so that his friends end up ordering for him. Although there may be some process he could go through to become more decisive when faced with a bill of fare, he did not need a course in assertiveness training, and there is surely no set of principles from which he could deduce a decision on what to order. (But a "deduced decision" is surely no decision at all.) And there are problems involving the interests of others that can similarly be resolved only by deciding, where if one waits too long one loses the opportunity to decide. Someone in love with two people who cannot have both—at least in matrimony—, cannot determine whom to marry by derivation from any set of moral principles, positive, negative, personal, or rational. No doubt this is not a moral problem, even though there are moral relationships involved, but there are moral problems of this same order. There is the example presented by Sartre, the most persistently discussed example in recent moral philosophy, of the young man in France during the Nazi occupation who tries to decide whether to go off to join the Free French or to stay home to care for his mother. But one reason our young man (whose name, research has revealed, was Pierre) cannot easily decide is that he is ignorant of relevant facts about what is going on around him at the moment and of what will happen as a consequence of deciding one way or the other. Sartre

mentions the possibility that if Pierre goes off he might get stranded in Spain or be stuck at a desk job, not something he was aiming at. However, Sartre does not mention the possibility that if he goes off he might get caught in a Nazi dragnet and hanged, nor the possibility that if he stays behind he might get drafted into the German army and sent to the Russian front²⁹. If either one of these could be known to be in the offing, the decision would be relatively easy; if both are, it is worse, and Pierre has then only the choice of being shot or being hanged. But no moral principle will decide that either.

Yet this does not show that moral philosophy is somehow deficient. Neither does it show that in every moral situation one must decide for oneself on the basis of instinct or feeling and there is no criterion apart from the value that one supposedly in this way creates for determining whether one's action is right. Nonsense. If Pierre had hit on the stratagem of shuffling his mother off this mortal coil and then with a free heart setting out for England, no matter how unencumbered by remorse he felt himself to be, his decision would have been wrong, decidedly. Of course, our Pierre would not even have thought of doing a thing like that. He already accepted certain moral principles that made this abstract possibility morally and therefore emotionally unavailable. There are "objective criteria" available even though they do not decide for us.

Pierre's situation illustrates what I mean by the area of moral freedom. Within the parameters circumscribed by fundamental rules and principles, he is free to decide what he ought to do; as long as he stays within these parameters, whichever choice he makes will be right. [I am here ignoring the possibility of in-between solutions such as staying home and joining the local Resistance.] Coming down, after long deliberation, on one side of the question or the other, the choice may well seem to the agent as though it is what he "ought" to do. This is natural enough. For the situation is one in which one has the right to act in one way or the other, so that either course of action is morally permissible, and the psychological phenomenon of this being felt as "what I ought to do" does not gainsay this. It shows only that one feels the choice is morally sanctioned, and so it is; it is only not morally required. [In such a situation, what one ought to do, within the limits of moral principles, is what one feels one ought to do, and this can be equivalent—in fact if not psychologically—to what one is, all things considered, most inclined to do.]

[Imperfect duty situations fall within the area of moral freedom. Kant defines a perfect duty as one that allows no exception in favor of inclination. An imperfect duty then is one that allows exceptions in favor of inclination. Kant maintains that the maxim of refusing to help others who are in need of help when one is not in need of

help oneself cannot be willed to be universal law. I have argued elsewhere that this is sound, will here only suppose that it is, for the sake of illustration.³⁰ This would establish the duty to help others who are in need of help. But the duty is imperfect, because indefinite, not determinate. From the rule itself it cannot be determined who is to be helped, under what circumstances, to what extent, in what way, and at what cost. It is up to the agent to decide this, and the agent *must* decide. There is no way to answer these questions by deduction from basic rules or principles, which determine only the parameters of these duties, what ought not to be done not what ought to be done in a situation of imperfect duty. One decides for oneself on the basis of one's interests and sympathies and inclinations. How one decides will reflect one's character and values, and no doubt there is advice of a general kind to be offered on such matters as well, but I do not deal with such matters here. I also do not deal with the special case of one who needs help in deciding. There are all sorts of agencies around to offer *such* help.]

[Here is where value theory and judgments of character come in. But no one has yet discovered (though some have claimed to) a workable and justifiable formula (much less a universal one) for helping or giving—either whom to give to or how much to give. We are reduced to judgments such as “stingy” or “generous”, “sensible” or “foolish”, “thoughtful” or “selfish”—often made without knowledge of the circumstances. The matter is especially complicated where there is large scale deprivation because no one person's giving can be effective unless coordinated with that of others, and the questions “What ought I to do, if others do the same?” and “What ought I to do, given that others will not do the same?” come to the fore. But I am not about to launch here on these problems connected with generalization in ethics.]

The concept of moral freedom is essential for dealing with the problems otherwise presented by the principle of conscience: “Every one ought to do what they think they ought to do”.³¹ Sidgwick thought this principle, or something very like it, self-evident, formulated it in a number of contexts. For instance: “It is a necessary condition of my acting rightly that I should not do what I judge to be wrong”; “It is our duty to do what we judge to be our duty”; and “No rule can be recognized, by any reasonable individual, as more authoritative than the rule of doing what he judges to be right”.³²

But on this principle of conscience, taken without restriction, if we judge it to be our duty to hurt or eliminate people we do not like, then it would be our duty to hurt or eliminate people we do not like and this apparently objective principle of conscience or *sympathy* would eliminate all objectivity, and all rationality, from morality. It is a great favorite with undergraduates, who are given to

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g. as though it summed up all moral wisdom, "I can't say it's wrong for you, I can only say it's wrong for me; everyone has to decide for himself what is right or wrong, for himself"—which is an exact quotation of an inexact thought. This anarchic idea is regarded as a principle of tolerance, and actually recommended on moral grounds. Of course it is confusion. We have here the inchoate moral wisdom of "Don't make judgments—it's wrong", which is it is evident incoherent. [There is a notion about, fairly recent, that there is something wrong with being "judgmental"; and so there is, if being judgmental is understood as making judgments when they are out of place. A judgmental person is one who is constantly judging others even in situations where judgment is not called for. "Never make judgments" does not follow from "Don't be judgmental". Yet the two are often confused.]

Apply now our concept of moral freedom. The principle of conscience embodies an unstated restriction to such situations. One who is in such a situation already accepts basic principles defining the situation as what it is. Everybody ought to do what they ought to do, but only in a situation of moral freedom and within the moral parameters,—that is to say, as long as they do not do anything determinately wrong. And this does not give moral title to anyone to do something determinately wrong if he can only bring himself to think it right. This is perfectly compatible with an extrapolation from the negative principle of conscience, "Nobody should ever be required to act against his or her conscience", a principle that is fundamental—though of course not ultimate—in any rational morality.

We are now in a position to see the truth in a number of widely held though narrowly based accounts. (1) Not all ethical statements are true or false. Some merely express feelings or attitudes or inclinations (in particular those unsupported by reasons and those expressing the resolution of a problem in a situation of moral freedom). Hence there is some vindication for emotivism. (2) Not all moral judgments are objectively based, nor can we expect unanimity on matters where there are reasonable things to be said in different directions. Hence there is *some* vindication for subjectivism, for there are some situations where it applies. (3) Some moral problems are to be decided by deciding, rather than inference from general principles, and there are situations where there is no objectively right answer independent of the wishes or inclinations or values of the one deciding. Hence there is some vindication for existentialism. (3) In certain situations what is right is relative to the standards of a particular culture and cannot even be understood apart from those standards. This is, actually, only an application of the axiom that the character of every act depends on the circumstances in which it

is done; Nonetheless, it provides some vindication for relativism. (5) There are situations in which there is no one right answer, objective and the same for all, to the question "What ought I to do?", and these situations are more numerous than has been supposed. Hence there is some vindication for moral skepticism.

Yet all such views are examples of *hasty* generalization in ethics.

[On the other hand, such one-sided views have clouded over the ideal of rational morality. Their merits have consisted in the stimulus they have provided to reflective thought, the merits of good false hypotheses. From the point of view of philosophy, if not from the point of view of morality, these merits are considerable. If skepticism didn't exist, we should have to invent it — and very often we have.]

We should note, however, that the ideal of rational morality has been made available to us only through the work of philosophers, and practically every element in the idea is due to this on-going, even sacred, tradition. Without reflective thought on morality, which is moral philosophy whether practiced by professed philosophers or not, there would certainly have been morality, but there would have been no improvements in morality, hence no moral progress—this is true even though some instances of moral progress have been won only at immense costs in blood and pain. Since they enter into this tradition, even unwillingly, some debt is owed even to professed irrationalists and immoralists—whether they would like it or not. It is the tradition of moral philosophy, and the practice of morality, that has made the idea of rational morality possible and available. We are the present beneficiaries of this work, often carried on in great agony of spirit, and we must also regard ourselves as carrying on a tradition which, though in essence the same, will be in substance somewhat different—and, we can hope, better—for our having assumed this responsibility, which is to humanity, morality, rationality, and philosophy itself. I cannot think of any commitment or any calling that is higher, more noble, more exhilarating, or more important. And, and on this I end, it is also fun.³³

NOTES

- 1 Ernan McMullin, "The Goals of Natural Science", *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 58 (1), September 1984, p. 37.
- 2 Material not actually read on the occasion, for reasons of time, has been put in square brackets. A number of points made in brief and undoubtedly dogmatic fashion are taken in summary fashion from sections of a book underway now for years than I care to remember to be called *Justification and Proof in*

Ethics; some others are from an unfolding project of reconsidering the theory of generalization in ethics (see below, notes 14 and 16).

- 3 Gilbert Highet, *Man's Unconquerable Mind* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 96. Cf. pp. 93, 89.

4 I here and in the next section make use of some ideas, even unto the exact wording, expressed in "Judicial Decisions and Judicial Opinions", *Criminal Justice Ethics*, 2 (1), Winter/Spring 1983, pp. 27 ff., and in "Ethics and Common Sense", forthcoming (so I have been told) in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*. Of course the distinction between positive and personal morality has been developed by many writers, especially Herbert Hart and Neil Cooper [see References], and my idea of a rational morality bears some resemblance to what Kurt Baier in *The Moral Point of View* referred to as true moralities; cf. e.g. p. 183. On rational morality, see also Peters, *Reason and Compassion*, pp. 22-3, 66, 76-7, 79, 114. [And I have just noticed—4 June 1986—that some ideas presented here appeared earlier in C. S. Lewis's *Mere Christianity* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1960), which includes Lewis's *The Case of Christianity* of 1943, in Preface and chs. 1-3].

- 5 *Our Changing Morality*, Freda Kirchwey, ed., (1924) New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1930), pp. v, vi; the passages by Russell are on pp. 3, 11, 12, 14.

6 I am not here attempting to show anything about the moral philosophy of Russell, which, for all his well-deserved eminence as a philosopher, is something he had little talent for, and I now drop the reference. I wanted it only as an example. But I recognize the possibility that I may be misinterpreting him and that even if I am not I may receive a sharp rap on the knuckles from zealous members of the Bertrand Russell Society. Russell makes much of a distinction between an ethics of rules, which he doesn't like, and an ethics of ends, which he does. I regard the distinction as incoherent.

- 7 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888). Bk. III (1740). Part I, Sec. I, para. 6, p. 457.

8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 5.5563. Max Black, *A Companion to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus'* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964). supplies other references on p. 305. (My thanks to Denny Stampe for reminding me that this passage was in the *Tractatus* rather than the *Investigations*.)

- 9 F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, p. 187. Cf. Bradley's *Collected Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), vol. I, p. 122: "... I am

speaking of the world and morality as we know them I recognize no other criterion. The world of our fancies and wishes, the home of absolute categorical imperatives, has no place in legitimate speculation."

- 10 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", 10 *Harvard Law Review* 1897 at p. 469; in *Collected Legal Papers* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1921), pp. 186-87, Holmes's statement of when "a body of law is more rational and more civilized" omits—but perhaps it merely omits to mention—one essential consideration. The condition mentioned can be met by a repressive and immoral body of law, if only it is in this way rationalized. Efficiency is only an indirect virtue, and by itself has no value. For this ideal to be genuinely an ideal instead of a monstrosity, it must be understood to be in accordance with fundamental and justifiable moral principles.
- 11 The ideal of a rationalized legal system is only analogous to the ideal of a rationalized morality, and it is easier to see how a rationalized legal system can be brought about or approximated to than how a rationalized morality can be brought about. But one way is by rationalizing the body of law of a society, since morality is in so many ways dependent on law.
- 12 It would not be too difficult to establish that this principle of coherent principle, or principle of accordance between principles and conduct, is involved in positive morality, since it is so often appealed to and implicitly conceded. If so, then positive morality presupposes rational morality—a result that strikes me as surprising and a counter-example to Burke's thesis that no discoveries are to be made in morality. [Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790) (Everyman's Library ed., 1910), p. 83.] Now, if positive morality presupposes rational morality, and if rational morality presupposes positive morality (I think I have already shown how), then they are conceptually (though not existentially) polar or interdependent. I suggested earlier that the three conceptions of morality involve one another. This is part of the argument for that suggestion. There is a brief account of polar or interdependent concepts in "Some Reflections on Rights: Human, Natural, Moral, and Fundamental", *Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters*, vol. 72, 1984, at p. 63.

In "allowing for occasions on which one might be justified in practicing something other than what one preaches", I was allowing for the shred of truth in Sidgwick's doctrine of esoteric morality: "it may be right to do and privately recommend, under certain circumstances, what it would not be right to advocate openly; it may be right to teach openly to one set of persons what

it would be wrong to teach to others; it may be conceivably right to do, if it can be done with comparative secrecy, what it would be wrong to do in the face of the world..." (Henry Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 489 *et seq.* But cf. p. 484: "And whatever it is right for him to do himself, it is obviously right for him to approve and recommend to other persons in similar circumstances".) Sidgwick's discussion, in Bk. IV, chs. iv & v, of the problems involved in attempting to reform positive morality on the basis of rational considerations is still by far the best of any known to me, a classic and invaluable source on this topic. The Sidgwick's discussion revolves around utilitarianism as the basis of rational morality is merely incidental, not essential.

- 13 This is argued in "The Golden Rule", *Philosophy*, vol. 38, October 1963, at pp. 301-2
- 14 For instance, in "The Principle of Consequences Reconsidered", *Philosophical Studies*, 31 (1977), 391-410; "On Pollock's Dilemma for Singer". *Ibid.*, 38 (1980), 107-110; "Consequences, Desirability, and the Moral Fanaticism Argument", *Ibid.*, 46 (1984), 227-37; "Gewirth's Ethical Monism". in *Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism*, ed. E. Regis, Jr. (Chicago: University Press, 1984), 23-38; "On Gewirth's Derivation of the Principle of Generic Consistency", *Ethics*, 95 (January 1985), 297-301; and "Universalizability and the Generalization Principle", in *Morality and Universality*, ed. Nelson Potter & Mark Timmons (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), 47-73. I hope I am not catching the disease of referring over and over to my own writings. I regard this as a special occasion, with special prerogatives and special responsibilities. This must also be my explanation, and apology, for the extraordinary, and outrageous, number of footnotes (=end notes). When once caught up in footnote fever it is hard to get over it, and the rule ought to be that every footnote ought to be justified beyond any reasonable doubt, and then, if necessary, should if at all possible be integrated into the text. The special conditions of this address made that not at all possible, and when once a rule is breached, it is like a dam bursting—so here they are. I deliberately do not speak to the matter of justification. This is, as I said, a special occasion, and if everyone on just such an occasion were to go footnote-wild the consequences would not be disastrous. Unfortunately, too many of our colleagues think every occasion is just such an occasion—which is absurdly false—or else they do not recognize the rule, which is a pity. The consequences for philosophical writing—if writing is the word—are just about disastrous, and get worse all the time, as philosophers try to ape lawyers of scientists, and too often manage only to combine the worst features of each. For some further observations on this matter (special prerogative again) I refer the

reader (I hope there is still a reader) to "The Principle of Consequences Reconsidered" (just cited above—beginning of this note), p. 409n2. Of course there is no good reason to make the avoidance of footnotes itself a form of fetishism, as Ryle in his later writing was I think inclined to do, along with reviewers for *The New Yorker*. It is well to remember that the best part of Popper's *The Open Society and its Enemies* is, arguably of course, the notes at the end.

- 15 The Generalization principle states that what is right or wrong for one person must be so for any similar person in similar circumstances. The generalization argument (which is indifferently either an argument or a principle) states that if the consequences of everyone's acting in a certain way would be undesirable then no one ought to act in that way without a reason. Some reviewers—why, I cannot fathom—did not see the difference. The generalized principle of consequences states that if the consequences of a certain kind of action would be in general undesirable, then it is wrong in general to act in that way. This also, though distinct from the generalization argument, has sometimes been confused with it—though in this case the excuse is more plausible.
- 16 This argument was developed in *Generalization in Ethics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961; Atheneum, 1971), chs. 2 & 3.
- 17 In *Generalization* it was stated (p. 16) that the Golden Rule is an immediate consequence of the Generalization Principle; in "The Golden Rule" it was stated (pp. 302, 309) that the Golden Rule is at the basis of the Principle of Justice (=the Generalization Principle). This discrepancy was deftly pointed out by Martin Scott-Taggart in "Recent Work on the Philosophy of Kant", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 3, July 1966, sec. 9, pp. 198 ff., which also has some interesting coverage of Reiner (cf. note 18).
- 18 Hans Reiner, *Duty and Inclination: The Fundamentals of Morality Discussed and Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), pp. 278-288; cf. pp. 209-10.
- 19 Tocqueville has some singularly acute observations on this phenomenon in *Democracy in America*, vol. II. Bk. III, ch. 1, entitled "How Customs are Softened as Social Conditions Become More Equal"; for instance: "At the time of their highest culture the Romans slaughtered the generals of their enemies, after having dragged them in triumph behind a car; and they flung their prisoners to the beasts of the Circus for the amusement of the people. Cicero, who declaimed so vehemently at the notion of crucifying a Roman citizen, had not a word to say against these horrible abuses of victory. It is evident that, in his eyes, a barbarian did not belong to the same human race as a Roman" (New York: Vintage Books, 1954), vol. II, p. 177.

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- 20 Brian Medlin, "Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 35, August 1957, p. 111.
- 21 I take the term "linear inference", and something of the conception, from Bernard Bosanquet, *Implication and Linear Inference* (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1920), esp. pp. 21ff.
- 22 Jonathan Harrison, "Moral Scepticism". *Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume XLI, 1967, p. 203
- 23 Hardy Jones, "Are Fundamental Moral Principles Incapable of Proof?", *Metaphilosophy*, 10, April 1979, pp. 155, 156.
- 24 The following is a good example of the received approach: "In ethical argument, as in all other types of argument, the series of validating premises cannot regress to infinity. There must be some premises which themselves are not validated—and which presumably not only cannot be but do not need to be validated. These are 'axioms', as it were, of a deductive system. Any ethical validation must therefore assume certain prescriptions which themselves cannot be validated". This last is the most though not the only fallacious move, but there is no doubting the siren-like character of this argument. (John Ladd, *The Structure of a Moral Code* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957], p. 152.)
- 25 The essence of this argument is in *Generalization*, 121-2, 214, 337-8.
- 26 Cf. O'Brien in Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty Four* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), p. 267: "The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power." O'Brien, quite evidently, was ignorant of fundamental moral laws. But we knew that on other grounds. With everything else so inverted in Newspeak, it would be surprising if rational morality were not. Of course, Orwell tells us that the words "honor, justice, morality ... had simply ceased to exist" (p. 308) and "there were no longer any laws" (p. 8), though there was certainly punishment. (It is possible that there were no longer any laws?)
- 27 For instance: "By a complete principle of action I mean a function whose domain includes every possible situation in which a person might find himself and whose values include every possible action he might perform. A complete principle determines an action for every possible situation". (David Gauthier, "The Impossibility of Rational Egoism", *Journal of Philosophy*, 71 (14), August 15, 1974, p. 441.) But there are no "complete principles of action", never have been, couldn't be, and it wouldn't be a good thing if there were.
- 28 This point has been seen and put nicely by J. R. Lucas in "Discrimination and Irrelevance", presented at the Joint Session of

the mind Association and the Aristotelian Society in July 1985 and only available, at this writing, in Unbound part II of the *Aristotelian Society Proceedings* LXXXVI, 1985/6, pp. i-xviii at pp. vi-ix, xi. Cf. *Generalization*, 111-12

- 29 Jean Paul Sartre. *Existentialism and Human Emotions* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, pp 24 6. I discuss this problem and some similar ones in "Imperfect Duty Situations, Moral Freedom, and Universalizability", presented at a conference at Marquette in October 1985, which may possibly at some time or other appear in print, any my brief discussion here is in large part drawn from there.
- 30 Elsewhere=(1) *Generalization*, pp. 267-74; and (2) "Reconstructing the Groundwork", *Ethics*, 93, April 1983, at p. 574.
- 31 This is usually stated in the form "Everyone ought to do what he thinks he ought to do". But as so stated there is a suggestion—obviously absurd—that it does not apply to females, that is, to human beings normally referred to by the pronouns "she" and "her", or else that another principle, in which "he" is replaced by "she", must be stated to cover this other half of humanity—also absurd. I have come after long thought and much heated and conservative complaint to realize the point of trying to avoid the use of "he", etc., in this double way, where it is not too inconvenient or clumsy to do so, even if this involves some ungrammar. The rules—the positive morality—governing the use of the pronoun "he" and kindred expressions are in process of change, at least partly in response to reasoned complaint, and we cannot now be certain what they will turn out to be. But further resistance is futile, since the sexist use of "he", etc., is now just as jarring as circumlocuted attempts to avoid it. Better to sin against grammar than against one's mother, one's sisters, and one's aunts, especially since you know that eventually grammar will go along.
- 32 Sidgwick, *Methods*, pp. 344n, 345, 394. Brenda Cohen has an interesting discussion of this principle, which she calls the principle of non-dogmatism, in "An Ethical Paradox", *Mind*, 76, April 1967, pp. 250-9. Cf. Santayana, *The Life of Reason*, vol. 5, ch. 9, pp. 24C-1: to suggest that a rational being out to do what he feels to be wrong, or ought to pursue what he genuinely thinks is worthless, would be to impugn that man's rationality and to discredit one's own. With what face could any man or god say to another: Your duty is to do what you cannot know you ought to do; your function is to suffer what you cannot recognize to be worth suffering? Such an attitude amounts to imposture and excludes society; it is the attitude of a detestable tyrant, and any one who mistakes it for moral authority has not yet felt the first heart-throb of philosophy."

The Ideal of A Rational Morality

- 33 My appreciation to Claudia Card, Don Crawford, Hack Fain, and Lester Hunt, who, hearing an early version of some early points, persuaded me to make it a late version—and to go with it. This, of course, by the conventional rules of positive academic morality, makes them responsible, collectively if not individually, for all excesses, of omission as well as commission. My appreciation also to Kurt Baier and John Silber for some very useful advice of a general sort; it would be ungrateful to try to determine just how much responsibility they bear, in consequence, for the results, but it is considerable.

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Life — An Unsolved Mystery

M. C. Sharma

The universe around us looks like a noble perfection. It is the greatest research laboratory, with no ends or limitations. The life and its origin looks like a unfolded treasure of mystery—an unsolved equation, which is still to be solved. One of the noblest creation of it, is a human being — a nature's gift—a reproducer, discoverer and the investigator. He can be represented as a unit of universe — or a mini universe itself. He is the highest representation of the animal kingdom — a perfection of life bestowed with mightiest intellectual unit, the brain — which is the biggest computer ever produced. It computes every thing which is feeded in to it by various sense organs of the body viz., the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue and the touch.

It is this existance of man who since its creation alongwith other activities, has always tried to ponder over the question of origin of life and has tendered various speculations, theories and thoughts to unfold the secret which looks like a mirage in a desert. To my mind the life can be represented by a simple formula.

Chemistry+Physics=Biology

that is : Matter+Energy=Life

A Person of religious entity may put it in terms of god as

Parwati+Shiva+Bramha—

Matter+Energy=Life (the creator or creation)

The body is composed of five elements.

Chittij Jal Pawak Gagan Sameera.

Panch Tatva Yeh Adham Shareera. (Tulsi)

Chittij: The earth is a solid part, *Jal-* The water as a liquid part, *Pawak-* the *agni* as a thermal part, *gagan-* The sky the super space as a Bio part and the *Sameer-* the air as the gaseus part.

All these elements generate energy in the form of heat, light, electricity, sound and magnetism. And these physical forces bring out life in an inmate (in organic elements) to make them organic and viable.

During the origin of universe these various tatvas appeared in a regular order of appearances. The first to appear was the sky element followed later by the air, the *agni*, the water and lastly the earth.

The Biological phenomena developed out of these tatvas are as follows :

The sky element developed *sabad*—the *nād* that is a sensation of sound. The air element produced touch—a sensation of perception, the feeling. The *agni* element provided vision—a sensation of light and heat. The water element provided *ras*—a sensation of taste and the earth element provided *gandh*—a sensation of smell.

Role of various tatvas information of body structure

Apart from various sensation provided by these tatvas they play an important role in the physiological development of the body. The *Ākāśh tatva* is born out of *Mahākāśh*—a super space, a space having non-physical spectra, Cosmos. It seems to be absolutely absolute and maintains the laws of nature. It is full of discipline and is fixed and is certain in its action. It contains the nucleus, of life—the consciousness. It may be regarded by a few as the parent power—the god—the omnipotent the creature with the creati. The sensation of *sabad* (*Nād*) may be the result of atomic explosions constantly going on with huge amount of elemental energy generated from time to time. This biological phenomenon gives rise to development of consciousness—the brain with its multiple functions. The air element was next in origin to the sky element which, apart from the molecular presence of sky elements helped in contributing the touch—a sensation of perception of touch pain and temperature, by way of cutaneous nerve endings. This is also an important media through which the Bio-Atom of life is transferred inside the body to give life to a developing adult embryo. The *agni tatva* relates to the vast energy produced in the universe by solar system—the biggest source of energy to a viable life. Apart from physical metabolic energy it provides the light—the vision and thermo regulation of the body. The water tatva being the liquid element provides glue to keep the tissues in position. It helps in formation of blood, lymph, enzymes, semen and various secretion of body. It maintains texture, softness, complexion, and hydration of the body.

The earth element which is supposed to be a part of solar system contains all these elements together which are necessary for the development of body. Apart from contribution of *gandh* a sense

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of smell it helps in the development of the solid part of the body that is the bones, muscles, skin, nails etc. The development of nervous system is very complex and slow in origin and thus the birth of a human embryo takes longest time for development in uterus of a mother. Thus the birth of a human being is perhaps the last achievement of evolutionary process due to the slow development of an advance organ like brain

The development of life is a very complex process—a conglomerate phenomenon and may be described in four phases :

- 1 Elemental Phase : Depending on the contribution of various *ratvas*.
- 2 Reproductory Phase : Reproduction of elemental phase with modifications.
- 3 Bio-Atomic Phase : Inception of life in new born immediately after the birth.
- 4 Physiological Phase : Of development of body after birth.

Elemental Phase : This relates to the contribution of various *ratvas* to the living body and, accordingly different species with different ratio of sense organs and body development evolved from the time of inception of universe. In this phase the role of Chemistry (the matter) is tremendous which with various physical energy (Physics) helped in originating Viability in an inanimate object. This process has been constant, regular with multiple revolutionary changes from the development of a minor amoeba bacteria and viruses to hydra, obelia to the last stage of development of mammals. The numerous cycles of life formation from asexual reproductory phase to reproductory phase may have been in process which is beyond the description. This phase is merely a speculative. It is gradual and long lasting in duration for which theories and philosophy can be a matter of logic apart from any experimental proof of scientific achievement which may emerge out to justify. The role of struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest has definitely played their part in evolutionary process. The development of biped (human being) from quadruped position of a chimpanzee may also be the evolutionary process. Since the brain takes more time to develop and function the birth of human embryo is late. The horizontal posture of quadruped may be a negative aspect of its intellect. It is only the erect posture where the function of brain becomes more active, speculative and imaginative as seen by the fact that the intelligence develops more when the child starts walking erect, or in the position of sitting and standing during meditations and *samadhis*.

Reproductory Phase : It is the reproduction of elemental phase with modifications. This phase is the stage of seedling of the elemental evolutionary phase of life where different species were

formed according to various *tatvas*. These various species started re-growing after the formation of earth depending on befitting conditions of atmosphere and their climatic effects. The impregnated ovum resulting in, zygote formation by multiplication of its cells, refigures itself into different body structures give a definite shape and characteristic of the parents. This development may be independent of the nutrition maintained inside an isolated egg shell or may be parasitically helped in the mothers womb. This development takes definite time and may vary from species to species. This development is just like a construction of a building which even after completion is not fit to run independently unless lighted by another factor—an onset of phase of Bio Atomic life.

Bio-Atomic Phase : This phase indicates the inception of life in a new born immediately after the birth. It can be regarded as a phase of opening ceremony of a newly constructed house which needs just switching on. It is revival of life in a new born by pulmocutaneous stimulation of air which helps in suction of air by a new born. The air entry is a definite proof of a living status of an infant (Medicolegal aspect of infanticide). If the lungs of dead infant float in water it is a proof that a child was born alive. This indicates the importance of air entry which brings Bio-Atomic factor—a most important factor which stimulate the cardio respiratory centre lying deep in medulla. The reflex cry of a new born child indicates the presence of *Ākash Tatva*. If the air entry does not occur the infant is supposed to be born dead. The Bio Atom is invisible.

Clinical experience shows that this Bio Atomic phase plays an important role in maintaining life and activity of a living body. At birth when a asphyxiated baby is born air is needed for revival. At the time of operation some time due to anesthetic error or some sudden reflex there is cessation of respiration and heart beat when the need of artificial respiration is eminent and unless proper measures are taken the person may die. Cessation of respiration for more than 3 minutes brings irreversible changes, when the heart gets exhausted and becomes silent and the brain ceases to function and death occurs.

Physiological Phase : It starts after the birth of a new born. This phase starts soon after the birth when the air gives life, the water initiate metabolism and the solids (food) provide nutrition and growth. The body passes from the age of an infant to childhood, adolescence, adulthood and old age as a normal physiological process if not diseased or destructed. Apart from this normal physiological development where metabolism, respiration, circulation, excretion, reproduction all play their role the other factors also govern the body. To my mind the definite role of all the phases is needed for development and growth of an individual (a) Role of elemental

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phase and the ratio of various elements in individual has direct effect of cosmos, the various *Nakshatras* and their rays and their physical forces of light, electricity, magnetism, sound and heat. They have direct influence on psychosomatic—factors and behavioural pattern of an individual which maintains the movement, action and direction which may be called a fate of an individual and can be studied as a vast chapter of the science of Astronomy and its effects.

(b) Reproductive Phase : Plays its role when an individual is born with genetic malformation due to genetic disorders.

(c) Bio-Atomic Phase : This phase relates to the non-entry of air—during birth thus depriving the passage of Bio-Atomic energy where a asphyxiated child is born.

Conclusion :— Thus it seems that the matter (the various elements) contribute in development of a living individual and the earth itself has become a fertile field for various evolutionary developmental changes from ages to come. Different species are formed and destroyed and recontinue to form depending on the various natural factors. The Physical forces give rise to energy and not the Viability which comes only by air which brings the Bio Atomic force (also called the *Jeevātmā*) to continue with the physiological development. This Bio Atom of life is invisible and it come with air and goes with air. All these phases are so much intertwined that they form a complex system which still needs scientific analysis. The production of Bio Atom is an un ending process, since it is only an energy and not life in itself. It only stimulate the process of life by striking at the Cardio-Respiratory Machanism which feeds the nervous system, a most sensitive system of the body which governs the function of life. The body is a complex Chemistry (matter) energised by Physical forces (Physics) thus giving a Biological life present in a form of human structure—a complete unit of universe.



Transcendental Personality Splitting

Tore Hoisaether

Depersonalization in "true" mystical states

Atypical or "false" depersonalization or derealization are experienced in spontaneous "true" mystical states, which are experienced with open eyes and usually for a short time, although they are probably capable of lasting much longer. The interior and exterior alteration is not experienced as something unreal or foreign, but as something completely real and natural (with an inner unity), although the experience can seem somewhat "strange". It is accompanied not by a feeling of unpleasantness, but of harmony and deep calm. One does not feel oneself to be actually another person, or a person outside the real self; there is no loss of identity. One experiences wonder at the change, and one is left posing questions. There is no lack of interest in the surroundings (in nature) and these seem more harmonious than usual. One is completely conscious of the world about one. The surroundings give the usual impression but have in addition acquired an aura of unity, calmness and solemnity. One's awareness of one's own body is reduced.

In "true" mystical states the various qualities of ego consciousness: subjectivity (the ability to distinguish between subject and object), identity (the awareness of being the same as I was 10 minutes ago) and activity (I am the one who determines my behaviour), are normal (follow the usual pattern)

The individual is himself the central figure, observing and experiencing his surroundings. In "true" mystical states judgement remains good, with logical arrangement of thoughts and conceptions, although one may appear somewhat absent-minded. Exterior sensory impressions and interior experiences can be held firm. There is a harmonious interplay between the spiritual functions, and there is no lack of control over actions, although these may take place

somewhat automatically. What is done appears to be motivated. There is unity and co-ordination in experience and conduct, Conduct appears to be the same as in ordinary states. There appears to be no reduction in the ability to react to stimuli, and the experience of time seems unchanged.

In my own case my physical and psychic condition have been good both during and after the mystical state, and there have been no side-effects. There is no feeling of tiredness during such experiences, and one does not become sleepy. Neither has the mystical state borne the stamp of suggestion, self-hypnosis or trance.

An experiment carried out described in another earlier paper : "Mysticism" shows that one is somewhat remote during such experiences. Formal conversations are carried on, with no emotional contact. One is able, however, to choose whether one wishes contact with another person, and neither the ability to associate nor the emotional life are characterized by sluggishness or apathy.

The function of will is a result of the actual state of mind. There is normal control of will and the ability to carry on normal actions ; I intend, and know, what I am doing, and it is possible more or less by an act of will to break contact with the "true" mystical state. This is a clear and concentrated state with an extension of consciousness: e.g. increased ability to concentrate, with full powers of attention and the ability to direct this attention as one wishes, in addition to pronounced integration. One's consciousness of self is not lost. One's attention does not wander unchanged from place to place, with no selection of sensibly interrelated objects, and a haphazardly chosen object does not capture one's full attention.

By the term "ordinary clear consciousness" we understand the ability to orientate oneself accurately and flexibly in the exterior world, and the subjective understanding of this ability. To this is added the associated ability to orientate oneself in the interior world with its stock of thoughts and memories, and finally the ability to act in accordance with these confident orientations. It must be mentioned, in connection with this point, that there is no inner dis-orientation or lack of orientation with regard, for instance, to the location in which one finds oneself during a "true" mystical state.

Transcendental personality splitting

In a "true" mystical state an atypical splitting of the personality takes place. This splitting can occur very suddenly, and is very deep-reaching, as the experience can be compared with a kind of "sleep". If the ego so desires, the personality can be split into four parts. There may also be fewer parts, as the ego which makes the decision is the "centre" of the personality during a "true" mystical state. The ego has planning and integrating functions: the ego is

the psychic unit which takes the initiative, makes decisions, plans, evaluates, overcomes obstacles, in short, organizes and governs individual psychic activity. All the egos and "partial personalities" co-operate or work in parallel. In a way the whole of the splitting process consists of integrating or synthesis. If two egos and two "partial personalities" arise they consist of: the synthesis ego (made up of the ordinary ego and the transcendental "partial personality" which is simultaneously present), the "disintegrated" "partial personality" (consisting partly of the ordinary ego and partly of the transcendental "partial personality", both components being present simultaneously), the transcendental "partial personality" (which is passive) and the ordinary ego. When the synthesis ego is in control one can carry out experiments and be realistically adjusted to daily activities, but when the transcendental "partial personality" is in control one is completely taken up by the transcendental world with its experience of harmony and deep calm, inner unity, quietness, solemnity, reality itself, the "veil" (which can seem like a kind of very thin "fog", an experience which is probably due to bio-chemical factors), an altered experience of spatial depth, a unity with one's surroundings and between the objects in these surroundings. The "disintegrated" "partial personality" refers to a splitting between the experience of objects as the unity between them, and a synthesis between the interior and exterior world, while one simultaneously experiences objects as completely separate, as are also the interior and exterior worlds. There can also occur here a "splitting" of linguistic understanding, value expressions not being understood (being without emotional content), although they can be present as normal associations. There may be disharmony between thoughts and feelings or between language and feelings (and it should also be possible to carry out actions which do not correspond to natural feelings) when this "partial personality" is present, so that thoughts or words (value expressions) do not have the normal and natural emotional content, or there may be a lack of the normal correspondence between value expressions and exterior means of expression. This is due to the complete harmony of the "true" mystical state. When such a "split" "partial personality" is present friends may seem like "strangers", but are nevertheless well recognized.

In "true" mystical states one experiences for brief moments (seconds) the outermost limit of the human mind, the point at which "nothingness" (the absence of thoughts, conceptions, emotions, actions or stimuli) and the "universal" (absolute unity of everything) meet, to combine in a synthesis.

In a "true" mystical state, in which both a synthesis-ego and a transcendental "partial personality" may be present, one may experience processes in the realms of those that relate to memory,

Transcendental Personality Splitting

thought or fantasy, which are almost outside the ego. In other words, one can introspectively realize that beside the main stream runs another stream of thoughts, a kind of dreaming, fantasy or recollection. All this seems to belong in another context, a context which it is often difficult to grasp clearly if one tries to focus one's attention upon it, in a state between waking and a kind of sleep.

A number of researchers have accepted the concept of the "co-consciousness" and have found it particularly useful in clarifying a number of phenomena related to the so-called personality changes or multiple personalities.

In a total split of the personality the following takes place with regard to memory; the synthesis-ego can remember circumstances from the time before the mystical state, and knows of the ordinary ego and the other "partial personalities" existing before the commencement of the state. The synthesis-ego also knows of the ordinary ego and the other "partial personalities" during the state, and can remember earlier synthesis egos from other "true" mystical states. The ordinary ego underlying the synthesis-ego can remember elements, and all the "partial personalities" from far back, and knows of these during a "true" mystical state. The transcendental "partial personality" does not know of the other "partial personalities" or the ordinary ego before or during the experience (because concentration on the transcendental world is complete), but knows of all the other transcendental "partial personalities". When the state is over all the egos and the two "partial personalities" are remembered.

Memory consists of the ability to place an element of consciousness in the past, and arrange it logically and consistently in time and space. It is the ability to convert perceptions into organized concepts. It is the spiritual overview, the wide spiritual horizon which allows the element of the spiritual universe to be available to the self, and to be called up in a sensible arrangement when needed.

In a splitting of the type we have considered, it is a "superior" ego which controls the whole state; when one ego or one "partial personality" is active, the others are latent. In other words, there are several egos or "partial personalities" which control consciousness in turn. In such states the "superior" ego (the ordinary ego) obtains "power" through the transcendental "partial personality". Probably such splitting has the purpose of permitting the individual to gain a better understanding of transcendental.

After a "true mystical experience one returns to one's normal state, but finds oneself more harmonious and better integrated than earlier.

This form of splitting is not due to conflicts, but to the existence of "true" mystical states. Experiments carried out during such

experiences (described in my paper: "Mysticism") also indicate that there are no morbid symptoms, and that there is contact with reality (experimental writing and drawing). The splitting described is due to quite other factors than other forms of splitting of the personality. It represents a healthy manner of getting into contact with the transcendental world, so that the splitting can result in a richer life with a new outlook and other values. For this reason it does not lead to, for instance, psychiatric treatment. This form of splitting must nevertheless be considered as a statistical deviation.

Schizophrenia and the "true" mystical experience

If we compare the "true" mystical experience with schizophrenia the following must be mentioned: in schizophrenia the nature of the psychosis lies in the basic core of the personality, the ego, losing its mastery. The integrity of the total psyche becomes more or less dissolved, and in serious cases appears to be completely lost: the hierarchy of the ego, its hitherto unbroken history, with itself as the central point, is no longer present. One can therefore speak of a psychological decentralization as a decisive criterion for the occurrence of the symptoms which distinguish a schizophrenic psychosis. The central feature of the symptoms of schizophrenia is a splitting process, a dissolution of the harmonious interplay between the spiritual functions. Schizophrenes have a disturbed ego-consciousness or a disturbed integrity. During a psychosis, especially schizophrenia, the patient may alternate between opposite qualities of character, and can be two different people without himself realizing this. The feeling that one determines one's own actions can also be disturbed. The condition also involves a discrepancy between the thoughts and the actions of the patient, his feelings having no connection with the exterior modes of expression employed.

In psychoses, especially schizophrenia, a deep reaching and permanent alteration can take place in the patient's experience of his own personality. The patient may, for instance, identify himself with an object or another person. The few autobiographies available of schizophrenes reveal that the individual's whole world suddenly collapses or is altered. Every day occurrences are seen in a new light, every-day objects appear strange, and the patient's own body no longer feels the same. Both people and surroundings appear unfamiliar. In certain mental diseases the phenomenon of derealization is seen, the patient often feeling the approach of a catastrophe.

The subjectivity of the ego-consciousness can be disturbed in serious depressive psychoses and in schizophrenia, where the patient no longer has the normal feeling of being sharply separate from his surroundings, or where the patient feels himself to be an automaton, or feels that he does not exist. The ability to distinguish between oneself and the surrounding world is also deeply disturbed during a

mescaline or LSD intoxication. A person in a mystical state has an experience of depth which does not allow objects to be seen in isolation, but as interconnected objects; the nebulous and flat experience of spatial depth in a psychosis, on the other hand, leads to uncertainty with regard to the relationship of objects to one another, and to the ego.

In view of what is mentioned above and earlier in this paper concerning "true" mystical states, it will be seen that there are some special features of the personality during these experiences which can be superficially reminiscent of the abnormal features of schizophrenia, but which also reveal the great difference between "true" mystical states and schizophrenia. Such states must, however, be seen as a whole, and the "deviating" elements of mysticism must be viewed in the context of the other elements of the state, and will then become more comprehensible. It can be mentioned also that these few "symptoms" occur only during the altered state, and have never been present before or after the occurrence of "true" mystical states. In view of this it must be possible to state that such deep-reaching splitting has nothing to do with a psychosis, but represents, on the contrary, an experience superior to the ordinary or normal state.

This will give a different concept of the relation between "true" mystical states and schizophrenia, or, alternately, one can to some extent view mysticism or schizophrenia from a different point of view.

The function of the brain in transcendental personality splitting

The limbic structures which have been assigned significance for the emotional processes (which may be due to a newly-discovered hormone, neuro-peptide) may be of great importance in the above-mentioned experiences, allowing, for instance, the "interior" state to bring about an exterior experience of unity. The limbic system uncovers, for that matter, the subjective interior world.

Already Hughlings Jackson established that stimulation of the anterior section of the temporalis gave rise to experiences of derealization with regard to the surroundings, and to the individual as part of these. The specific gravity of the body can also be experienced as stronger or weaker than the normal. Derealization and depersonalization ("alienation"), although "false", and the feeling that the body is lighter than at other times, in addition to a reduction in the perception of one's own body, also occur in transcendental personality splitting in "true" mystical states. A somewhat automatic mode of action, and the feeling that friends are somewhat "foreign" (in my experience), can also be seen in relation with this.

In addition, alterations in the perception of time, a greater flexibility (association and drawing experiments carried out) may indicate the involvement of the right-hand side of the brain, which is otherwise intuitive and passive. That the left hand side of the brain is involved is shown by (normal) actions, good judgement and practical experience (experiments can be carried out). In "true" mystical states the right-hand and left hand sides of the brain co-operate.

If a comparison is made between schizophrenia and the above-mentioned experiences, it can be pointed out that both states probably have their foundation in the limbic system, but that in the "true" mystical experience there is harmony between the interior and the exterior world, and the state is integrated under the control of the ego; the neo-cortex is of great importance, and the connection between the left-hand and right-hand sides of the brain is much better than in schizophrenia.

I have not been able to find in the literature a description of this type (which is an independant work) of transcendental personality splitting (with no control from outsiders). There is little literature available on the relationship between "true" mystical states and schizophrenia.

The form of splitting described in this paper, on the basis of several spontaneous experiences undergone by the author, may be completely normal in a transcendental reality, containing a religious dimension (conceived as a revelation of a higher reality). In another reality there may be other psychological and physiological laws, which give a picture of a wider world.

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IV

Dialectic : Hegel and Marx

B Nirmala Devi

'Dialectic' is generally applied to any closely reasoned argument or refutation of doctrines. Philosophers interpret dialectic in idealistic and materialistic ways. They ground themselves in the theory of dialectics of nature and of civilization, which forms an important method of its analysis. There is a basic polarity in the universe which exemplifies unity and multiplicity. The dialectical understanding of the flowing of events, in nature, is as old as the time immemorial. There are contradictory forces in the Universe. The philosophy in all times has developed concepts fitted to the dualisms represented by these contrasted forces and realities. These are described as wholeness and particularness, static and dynamic, and identity and difference.

Zeno is considered to be the first discoverer of the dialectic, because he invented irrefutable arguments against motion, change and the void¹. We can find dialecticians in the East from Buddha, Yajnavalkya and Nagarjuna to Sankara and in the west from Zeno, Heraclitus, Democritus, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach and Karl Marx.

There are many views about dialectic with regard to this concept different philosophers have expressed their views in their own ways. The paper is confined to the analysis and understanding of the two fore-running divergent exponent of dialectics, one representing the idealistic interpretation viz., Hegel and the other Marx, the materialistic interpretation.

I

The base of Hegelian Dialectic is the dialectics of Plato and Aristotle. Hegel's rational dynamic, underlying and dialectical

¹ Zeller, *History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 613

process is ultimately spiritual, although as no contradiction can ever be final. Hegel said Dialectic is "the life and soul of scientific progress, the dynamic which alone gives immanent connection and necessity to the body of science"². Hegel builds his philosophy on the foundations laid by Fichte and Schelling. He agrees with the Fichte in insisting on a logical method indeed, he undertakes to put the world-view of his friend Schelling on a rational scientific basis, with the latter, in identifying logic with ontology or metaphysics, and with both in conceiving reality as a living developing process.

Hegel developed a theory of dialectical Idealism. According to him the true reality and basis of all that exists in an impersonal mind or reason which we called the Absolute Idea. Hegel opines that thought proceeds from the most simple abstract and empty concepts to the more complex, concrete and richer one notions. He calls this method the dialectical method and distinguishes three moments or stages of it. To begin with an abstract universal concept (thesis) this concept gives rise to a contradiction (antithesis), the contradictory concepts are reconciled in a third concept which therefore is a union of the other two arrives (synthesis). The concept suggests new problems and contradictions which in their terms must be resolved the other concepts. And so the dialectical process, which seeks to follow the evolution of reality, continuous until we reach ultimate concept or notion, in which all oppositions are resolved and preserved. But no single concept not even the highest represents the whole truth; all concepts are only partial truths: truth or knowledge as constituted by the entire system of concepts, every one of which has evolved from a based concept. He speaks as though thoughts or notions think themselves; there is an inner necessity in them, they are like a growing organism that unfold its capacities and becomes a concrete organised wholes '*Concrete Universal*'.

The kind of thought characteristic of a formal deductive system is called by Hegel the thought of understanding. Understanding is, for Hegel the principle of all bourgeois virtue, the quality that makes a man stick to the duties of his calling.

For Hegel, Dialectic is not the end of philosophizing; it is only a moment, an aspect in philosophical thinking. A dialectical rhythm essentially involves a triplicity of stages. We find three elements, in Hegel's dialectic. They are, (i) the dialectic opposition against Kant's anti-Rationalism, and consequently the re-establishment of rationalism supported by a reinforced dogmatism. (ii) The incorporation of dialectic into logic, on the ground of the ambiguity of expressions like 'reason', 'Laws of Thought' and so on, and (iii) the application of dialectic to the whole world based on Hegel's

2 Hegel. *Science of logic*, Tr. A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin Ld., London, p. 148.

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panlogism and his philosophy of identity—these three points seem to be the main elements within Hegelian dialectic.

Hegel actually used his dialectic in the form of triads in his own writings i.e., 'The Phenomenology of Spirit' and 'The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences.' Each of these works consists of a main triad, which is divided into subordinate triads and so on.

Thus the phenomenology has a main triad whose members are (a) consciousness, (b) self consciousness and (c) reason consciousness is subdivided into (i) sensuous certainty, (ii) perception and (iii) understanding. Self-consciousness has only two main headings: Independence and dependence of self consciousness, and freedom of self consciousness. though the last sub division is the unhappy-consciousness. Reason has a couple fourfold sub-division. Its first sub-division, entitled certainty and truth of Reason, has three main sub-divisions concerned, respectively, with observational Reason, practical Reason and the individuality, which is real in and for self. Its second sub-division entitled spirit, has three sub-divisions concerned respectively, with the true spirit (morality). Through this series of dialectical spirals Hegel professes to prove that the self-consciousness which the spirit achieves in philosophy as the supreme phase of consciousness experience to which all other types of experience inevitably lead.

The encyclopedia has a main triad, whose members are (i) the science of logic, (ii) the philosophy of nature and (iii) the philosophy of spirit. The logic divides into (a) the doctrine of Being, (b) the doctrine of essence and (c) the doctrine of Notion. The philosophy of Nature has a main triad mechanics, physics and organics while in the philosophy of Spirit (psychology) objective spirit (law, morality and politics) and Absolute spirit (a study of art, religion and philosophy).

He has constant recourse to nature and history, he introduces forms that the abstract development of concepts. It is on his power to introduce such forms, and to illuminate them surprisingly by philosophical concepts, that Hegel's unique genius consists. No other philosopher has shown a like blend of factual knowledge and conceptual skill.

II

The Hegelian Dialectic aroused great opposition from certain quarters and gave rise to reactionary movements. Karl Marx opposed the method of dialectic proposed by Hegel, saying that Hegel is limited in the scope of dialectic to reason or thought. Marx considered Hegel's notions of dialectic a most important tool for understanding history, but through powerful influence of Feurerrbach, Marx supplied a materialistic basis for the dialectic Hegel being

an idealist, couldn't arrive at a genuinely scientific understanding of dialectics. His philosophy suffered from deep-seated internal contradiction between system and method. Marx observes that development in nature, only takes place in the bosom of the Absolute Idea, constituting its base. The Absolute Idea itself, having attained a certain stage in its development, ceases to ascend further and comes back, which shows that Hegel's dialectics is exclusively retrospective. To quote Marx Hegelion dialectic is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, and you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.³

But it was left for Karl Marx to explain better the basic roots of the universe procedure of the dialectic in human reason. Marx stood out as the greatest materialist in the history of the struggle for socialism. He was a novel materialist because he understood the historical conditions and true character of primitive societies and fought to eradicate the exploitation and injustice on the basis of his novel method 'Dialectical Materialism'.

Materialists assume that nature and matter are primary and consciousness secondary i.e., idea derivative and property of matter. Dialectical materialism studies the most general laws of the development of nature, society and human thought. It was created by Marx and Engels as a scientific philosophical outlook on the world and forms an effective method of cognising and changing it. Marx formulated many theories and propositions. Among them all, dialectical materialism occupies a pivotal position. Marx dialectics roots itself in the basic conception of his materialism.

Marx's attitude to life's problems was shaped by the dialectical materialistic conviction. Even the first chapter of his Communist Manifesto opened with the words, "the history of all hitherto existing society in the history of class struggles"⁴. The change-over from the primitive society to feudal society and from the Feudal society to the bourgeois society have been effected according to Marx by conflicts between different groups. "Free man and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, in a word oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes"⁵. Thus according to Marx the contradictions of the bourgeois society can be resolved only by conflicts.

3 Karl Marx, *Capital* Vol. I Progress Publications, Moscow. 1977 p. 29.

4 Marx Karl, *Communist Manifesto*, Progress Publications, Moscow, p. 40

5 Ibid., p. 40 41

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Marx's theory of conflict is once again grounded on two pillars i.e., materialism and antagonism, which determined the nature of his social philosophy and social strategy. Although Marx like his Master, Hegel gave the dialectic, he coloured his dialectics in a materialistic orientation. To Hegel, "the life process of the human reason i.e., the process of thinking, which under the name of the idea he even transforms into an independent subject is the real world and the real world is only the external phenomenal form of 'the idea', with one on contrary, the idea is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thoughts"⁶. Thus as Marx claimed "my dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite"⁷.

The essence of dialectical materialism of Marx is that the moving spirit behind history and human civilization is gross materialism. Material forces and material relationship are the only reality in the historical setting and social frame work. From this concept of materialism as conceived by Marx follows his concepts of class antagonism, that matures into and manifests itself in the mutual conflict of economic groups which in the pre socialist society assumes the form of a dialectic between the bourgeoisie and the proletarian into which the society is divided. In every epoch of history the economically privileged classes tried to exploit the economically under privileged classes, for their own self interest that foments class antagonism. Marx accordingly said : "Hitherto, every form of society has been based on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes"⁸. Thus the philosophy of antagonism rooted in dialectical materialism.

Therefore the violent overthrow of privileged class by the proletariat revolution is a necessary concomitant of his novel philosophy dialectical materialistic development through conflicts

Marx applied the principle of dialectical materialism to the interpretation of history. He opines that economic conditions determine historical phenomena. Man must eat to live and his life depends upon the measure of success with which he produces what he needs. Production of wealth is the most important human activity. In primitive stage the means of production are owned by the community and they are meagre. In ancient stages owners of slaves and of the means of production get every thing substantial and the poor and the slaves who receive very little from the exploited lot. In feudal stage, the feudal baron owns land, the most important means of production and exploits the serfs. In the capitalist stage, the

6 Marx, Karl : *Capital* Preface p. 19, Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow.

7 Ibid., p. 19.

8 Marx, K., Engels, F. : *Manifesto of the Communist Party* Progress Publications, Moscow, p. 59.

capitalist owns all the important means of production and makes the workers wage slaves or tools.

Marx says that according to the relentless law of history a particular class owns and controls the means of production, and by virtue of this exploits the rest of the people. The capitalist class makes use of the state as an instrument of oppression and exploitation. Thus at every stage there are broadly two classes: the owners of means of production and exploiters on one side and the exploited on the other. Every exploiting class at each stage gives rise to an opposite class. Hence thesis and antithesis can be noted. Feudal barons and capitalists form the thesis and the serfs and the proletariat respectively constitute the antithesis.

Marx seeing that the dialectic is on the material order and therefore in the struggle between the classes, have resolved. The principle cause, of movement and change would disappear, a classless society would emerge where all the forces and interests would be the perfect balance and this equilibrium would be perpetual. According to Karl Marx, among above all societies the socialist and communist society is the highest and perfect one.

III

Differences :

There are many differences between Hegel and Karl Marx about the concept of Dialectic. Firstly, Hegel's concept of Dialectic is the idealistic form and the concept of Dialectic of Marx is in the Materialistic form. Idealist dialectic of Hegel based on the thesis, antithesis and synthesis. It is in the abstract form. Marx accepts the form of the Hegelian dialectic but introduces the content of his own. Marx dialectic is concrete and materialistic.

The spirit of the Hegelian philosophy was primarily religious and the systematic logic a rational theology. The heart of the Hegelian philosophy, Marx declares to be nothing but "the speculative expression of the Christian, Germanic dogma of the opposition between spirit and matter, God and world"⁹. In and behind the Hegelian system Marx saw the God at Western Christendom. A red thread of promethean atheology runs through all of Marx's philosophical writings.

As a student, Marx had written in the spirit of Hegel's method without parties no development and without division no progress. Marx saw no contradiction and believing that to preserve peace it may sometimes be necessary to fight for it. A class struggle i.e., which gives victory to my group under certain conditions will move

⁹ Marx K. & Engels, F., *The Holy Family*, Progress Publications, Moscow D 1 185

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readily abolish classes then will class collaboration which by negotiating class interests tends to perpetuate them.

Hegel had argued that men agreed for the most part in their religious, moral and juristic thought because there was at work in them a universal spirit, the idea. Marx on the contrary said that the ideas of each epoch grow out of and reflect the actual material conditions of the historic world. For this reason, thinking comes after the material order has affected men's minds.

For Hegel complete philosophical system is possible but for Marx it is impossible, since the world is developing and infinite and is inexhaustible both in quality and quantity.

Marx addressed himself to the problem of resolving contradictions of man and in the realm of society as concrete individual as a whole and not merely life as a rational being while Hegel was interested in resolving contradictions in the realm of thought, or reason or ideas, which is never contradicted. Marx was interested in dialectically arriving at a form of state which is the best and which will not meet with any contradiction i.e., communism.

V

Parapsychology: History, Problems, Perspectives

Koubrat Tomov

Introduction

In the beginning of the book special emphasis is laid on the fact that these are already repeatable experiments of a new type in parapsychology and therefore its acknowledgement seems forthcoming. At present it is not universally acknowledged because its real achievements are not known and because there is still no theoretical explanation of parapsychical phenomena. After that the aims of the book are formulated. The main ones are: the theoretical explanations of parapsychological phenomena from the point of view of modern science; the real state of things in parapsychology; elucidation of the problem of the place of parapsychology in science and society; discussion of the parapsychological inferences applicable to different fields of science including philosophy and sociology; formulation of the problem of parapsychology and advancing a theory; and last but not least the author makes an attempt to show us how to think so that we can avoid in future any negative attitude towards new discoveries as it was the case for instance with genetics, cybernetics and parapsychology itself.

Historical Notes

This chapter underlines the vagueness existing in the formulation of the concepts of parapsychology and they are defined in their most widely accepted way. Parapsychology is defined as a science of telepathy, clairvoyance, psychokinesis etc.—phenomena taking place without the participation of the sense organs or without the use of those qualities of the sense organs which are familiar to use. The term “extrasensory perception” is also explained. Definitions are given of telepathy, telesthesia, psychokinesis etc.

Further a detailed classification of the parapsychic phenomena is given. They are divided in three groups: informational, energetically and predictional phenomena; there are also other classifications of these phenomena.

Three periods are outlined in the history of parapsychology; preclassical history—from ancient times till 1882 when London Society for Psychical Research was established; classical history of parapsychology—from 1882 to (approximately) 1970 when according to the author repeatable results were obtained and new history—after 1970.

The preclassical history deals briefly with the roots of parapsychology—in religion, mythology, idealistic philosophical and occult teachings, customs... The fundamental questions of this history are formulated: how mankind have come to these phenomena etc.

The classical history discusses the activity of the London Society and other societies for psychic research: information is given on international symposia, conferences and congresses on parapsychology. The basic questions of this period are the elucidation and systematisation of all ideas and experiments. The new history comprises the international manifestations of parapsychology (psychotronics and describes its situation in science and society.

To clarify the attitude of society to parapsychology better the author dwells upon literature—fiction, science-fiction and popular literature—where parapsychical phenomena are discussed. He points out the role this literature has played and is playing.

The link between parapsychology and yoga is of great importance. It is shown that the parapsychical phenomena were known to yoga long ago.

Describing the present state of parapsychology the author provides a list of scientific and other publications and also repeatable experiments. The latter comprise: psychokinesis, radiesthesia (biophysical effect), telepathy, sensitivity of animals and plants to man's emotional state, bioenergetic treatment. The importance of the Hirlingian effect of the bioplasm and biofield is underlined not only as related to parapsychology but to science as a whole.

The opponents of parapsychology are divided into two groups. The first group considers the parapsychical phenomena impossible in principle. The second group finds that we still cannot speak of repeatable parapsychological experiments.

Parapsychical Phenomena and their Peculiarities

More than seventy examples of parapsychical phenomena are described in the beginning of this chapter. After that the peculiarities of parapsychical phenomena are discussed. The first of them is

their liminality i.e. the fact that they usually take place on the threshold between consciousness and subconsciousness: the second peculiarity is their relative independence from distance, barrier, language, biological differences (links established with plants and animals, bacterial culture) etc. Then the author considers their contradiction with the law of preservation of energy, the law of causality and with the necessity of receiving the parapsychical information via receptors—all these are imaginary contradictions.

It is pointed out that there are often parapsychical dreams and that para-phenomena often take place in certain states (phases) of consciousness. The theory of probability proves inapplicable as a proof for the existence of parapsychical phenomena.

Thus a detailed introduction to the problems of parapsychology is achieved.

Philosophical-Sociological Problems and Perspective of Parapsychology

The basic questions of parapsychology are formulated: are these phenomena possible in principle? Is a given fact parapsychic or not? What are the mechanisms and laws of these phenomena? It is shown that these phenomena do not run counter to the most general principles of science, but they may run counter to some laws because of the limited sphere of their (of the laws) applicability.

The close relation of parapsychology with psyche and consciousness makes the author analyse the concepts "material" and "ideal". The chief inference drawn from this analysis is that any movement of psyche and consciousness is a movement (aspect, side...) of some kind of matter after which radiation appears and it carries with itself the information about the subjective content of the psyche and consciousness.

Further the author considers in details the sociological problems and prospects of parapsychology: occurrence of parapsychic abilities, the importance of these phenomena in the life of man and society, the problems that arise in connection with parapsychology, the scientific inferences of parapsychology (formal scientific hypotheses, general scientific hypotheses and inferences, philosophical-sociological result: and prospects of parapsychology). According to the author the parapsychic abilities are the beginning of a new form of consciousness or super-consciousness (cosmic consciousness). In connection with this the question of whether man needs new sense organs is discussed. The answer is affirmative because the increasing requirements to man will by necessity lead to the development of new informational channels.

Special emphasis is laid on the problem of discussion in science more particularly in parapsychology. "Technical" and essential

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mistakes made in discussing parapsychology are considered. The author shows the roots of these mistakes and expressed the opinion that the situation in parapsychology is analogical to the situation existing by the end of the 19th c. and the beginning of 20th c. when the newest discoveries led to a "physical idealism" as this was described by V. I. Lenin in his book "Materialism and Empiriocriticism". The author believes that at present there are grounds of speaking of "psychological idealism". In his opinion the dialectic thinking is lifted up to a higher level than the physical one. The basic requirement of dialectic thinking is for us to assume that facts exist outside our consciousness and not to reject these facts only because somebody interprets them from an idealistical point of view.

Natural-Scientific Problems of Parapsychology

In the beginning of this chapter some logical problems are considered. More special emphasis is laid on the electromagnetic hypothesis of the bearer of parapsychical information and on discussions this hypothesis. This is done after creating a theoretical model of the fundamental parapsychical phenomena. Many facts and hypotheses are given as explanations of the informational parapsychical phenomena.

In the section dealing with telekinesis experiments on moving objects and on radioactive decomposition of elements are described. Their analysis shows that these phenomena do not exceed the energy capacities of human organism.

The chapter also outlines some models of prediction based on some new scientific hypotheses and laws.

Theoretical Foundations of Parapsychology

The chapter begins with the assumption that one of the theoretical foundations of parapsychology is coherency. Coherent processes condition the activity of the brain on the whole and parapsychical phenomena particularly.

After that the author dwells on the concept "information" and gives a fresh definition of it: information is another mode of existence of organization. The qualities as the information thus defined are considered. After all the other mode of existence of organization is the existence of the organization of bodies in new conditions and forms where this after mode of existence can be used for different purposes including for reproduction (or production) of informational sources.

A new definition is also given to the concept "energy": energy is the ability of the system to achieve selfmodification. Different forms of prognostication are also considered. All this is done with the purpose of understanding better the three types of parapsychical phenomena.

Further in the book new hypotheses and postulates of a high degree of probability are given. On the basis of all this the author gives new definitions of the basic concepts of parapsychology. For instance now parapsychology is defined as a science of the natural methods and means by which living organisms receive direct information about the movement, structure and organization of bodies or act on them from a distance. This definition is explained in details.

Informational parapsychology gives a model of telepathic phenomena and through it the main characteristic feature of spontaneous telepathy are explained. In energy parapsychology there is a model of psychokinesis (the essential things here are the field qualities and the holographic qualities of the brain and man's trust in his own abilities), a model of telepathic suggestion and psychical decomposition of objects and also the materializing of visual images. Predictional parapsychology makes use of the isomorphism between structures and functioning of brain and Universe and a new model of prediction is suggested.

Much attention is devoted to the requirements to the parapsychical experiments and the necessary conditions for their successful carrying out. Special emphasis is laid on the role of the subjective conditions and requirements. On the basis of this analysis the way of carrying out telepathic experiments is shown. Its essence boils down to increasing the emotional excitement of the inductor, to activating the orientation-research reaction and to taking measures against the percipient and inductor's getting accustomed, to it.

The index contains the basic concepts of parapsychology and also those concepts necessary for the theoretical explanation of parapsychological phenomena.

A summary in Russian and a summary in English is given in the end of the book.

The bibliography comprises about 700 sources.

VI

J. L. Austin on Perception

L. G. Chincholkar

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate and assess the views of J. L. Austin on perception.

Austin did not set out to work out specific theory of perception. He spelt out his views on perception especially when he commented upon the relevant point of view of Ayer.¹ The intention here is not to evaluate the theory of Ayer but to examine the views of Austin on perception as are evident to us from his commentary referred above.

Austin begins his enquiry with the examination of what is called "sense-data". That is, we do not perceive a physical object at all when we "perceive" it, what we perceive is the "sense-data" thereof. The material object is never directly perceived by us. It is our construction based upon sense data. This is the theory Austin is in total disagreement with.

He believes that this doctrine, "is a typically scholastic view attributable first, to an obsession with a few particular words the uses of which are over-simplified, not really understood or carefully studied or correctly described; and second, to an obsession with a few (and nearly always the same) half studied facts."²

He points out that there is no reason to distinguish between the "sense-datum" and the "material thing." "Material thing" is a term which has been in vogue "already" simply as a "foil" for "sense-datum" and there is no reason to divide the "material thing" into artificial and purely linguistic distinctions as "sense datum" and "material thing"³ Such a dichotomy is false.⁴ We should do away with the habit of such unnatural complications at the cost of natural clarities in the name of philosophizing. "Ordinary words are much more subtler in their uses and mark many more distinctions

¹ In "Sense And Sensibilia"

² Sense And Sensibilia, p. 3.

³ Ibid. p. 8.

⁴ Ibid. p. 9.

than philosophers have realised; and that the facts of perception, as discovered by, for instance, psychologists but also as noted by common mortals, are much more diverse and complicated than has been allowed for."⁵ Philosophers should desist from inventing artificial and complex terminology and the theories based thereon at the cost of simple facts of life to which we have been unmistakably and naturally accustomed. There is no such thing as sense data as against or other than material thing. We have been knowing the material things directly, naturally without the forced interception of sense-data.

There is no state such as "sense perception" nor do "sense-perceptions" deceive us. In fact the senses are "dumb."⁶ They do not tell anything either about truth or falsity. Philosophers have also created artificial dichotomy between the veridical and the illusory perceptions. "Deceived by the senses" is a worthless metaphor.⁷ The plain man would prefer to say that his senses were deceived rather than he was deceived by his senses",⁸ and there is no reason to swallow the suggestions either that what the plain man believes that he perceives most of the time constitutes a kind of things (Sc. 'material objects'), or that he can be said to recognize any other single kind of cases in which he is 'deceived'.⁹ Ayer's distinction between the material object language and the sense-datum language is untenable, Austin points out. The logical relation between them is not literally concerned with "existence" of anything. Ayer speaks as if sense-data in fact existed and as if material things were constructions on the sense-data.¹⁰ Since sense-datum itself is a fiction sense-datum language is also fictitious. The material object language which is almost construction thereon is ultimately reducible to sense-datum language. They are futile exercises the professional philosophers have chosen to indulge in.

Austin further points out that no sentence is intrinsically and completely incorrigible.¹¹ There could be no sentence which once uttered would remain beyond correction or subsequent alteration forever. There is no difference in the *kind* of sentence I utter but in the circumstances under which I utter it. "Once one drops the idea that there is a special *kind of sentence* which is as such incorrigible, one might as well admit (what is plainly true always) that *many kinds of sentences* may be uttered in making statements which are in fact incorrigible—in the sense that, when they are made the circumstances are such that they are quite certainly, definitely and un-retractably true."¹²

⁵ Ibid. p. 3.

⁶ Ibid. p. 11.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid. p. 33

⁹ Ibid. p. 14.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 107.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 112.

¹² Ibid. p. 114. "If I carefully scrutinize some patch of colour in my visual field, take careful note of it, know English well and

It is also a wrong presumption that there is a special kind of sentences "Whose function it is to formulate the evidence on which the other kinds are based."¹³ This statement is wrong on account of two reasons. (1) It is not the case that whenever "material object" statement is made the speaker must have and could produce evidence for it."¹⁴ (2) Besides the formulation of evidence is not the function of any special kind of sentence.¹⁵ "The evidence, if there is any, for a 'material object' statement will usually be formulated in statement of just the same kind; but in general any kind of statement could state evidence for any other kind, if the circumstances were appropriate."¹⁶

Austin clarifies that it is a wrong idea that material object statements are as such not conclusively verifiable. It is also a wrong idea that sense-datum sentences are as such incorrigible.¹⁷ There is no reason why the material object statement should not be verifiable. I can—if I so decide—verify whether there is a table in the next room or not.¹⁸ and the verification can be certainly conclusive.¹⁹

Much of the confusion, Austin states, arises because we fail to distinguish between the various types of uses of the world and the different shades of the meaning of the words like see,²⁰ perceive, look, seem etc. He further points out that such words are mistakenly used synonymously resulting into avoidable ambiguity. Even one such word like look,²¹ appear²² is used differently in ordinary language. "Seems" normally shares the structure of "appears". A term which is often misused by the philosophers is "real".²³ The inability—rather lack of necessary care required in the use of the terms—has been a source of confusion throughout the literature of those whom "sense data" of "the material objects" have either "appeared" or "looked" or "seemed" to have occupied unalienable importance in their theories of perception even though the sense-data are actually non-existent. The sense-datum is a linguistic imagery and not a factual assertion.

When we perceive an object we do perceive it "directly". There is no reason why philosophers should use the word "directly" spe-

pay scrupulous attention to just what I'm saying, I may say, 'It seems to me now as if I were seeing something pink'; and nothing whatever could be produced as showing that I had made a mistake. But equally. If I watch for sometime an animal a few feet in front of me in a good light, if I prod it perhaps, sniff, and take note of the noises, it makes, I may say, 'That's a pig; and this too will be 'incorrigible', nothing could be produced that would show show that I had made a mistake'. (p. 114)

13 Ibid p 115

16 Ibid

19 Ibid p 120

22 Ibid p 35.

14 Ibid.

17 Ibid. p. 117.

20 Ibid. p. 99

23 Ibid p 64,65

15 Ibid p. 116

18 Ibid p 118.

21 Ibid. p 34

specifically. Do we ever "perceive" an object indirectly, Austin asks. We never do so. Therefore the introduction of the phrase "direct perception" is not only meaningless it is also dangerous. Though "a great favourite among philosophers it is in fact a "less conspicuous snake in the linguistic grass."²⁴ It is absurd and false²⁵ to say that the objects such as table, chair, pen etc are never directly perceived by us. Ayer's argument therefore that "even in case of veridical perceptions we are not directly aware of material things,"²⁶ is as surprising as it is untrue, Austin points out. This brings us to the examination of the equally forced distinction between veridical and delusive perceptions.²⁷ How are we to distinguish between the two perceptions? The difference according to Ayer²⁸ is of degree and not of kind. If the veridical and delusive perceptions are not qualitatively different it would follow that all the perceptions are always dubious and we can never be certain of any of the perceptions including the so called veridical perceptions. The difference itself between the two becomes superfluous and impossible to understand. The only legitimate way out is to recognise the propriety of direct perception of a material object as it is without the avoidable and fictitious interception of the sense datum thereof. Ayer's distinction between the "qualitatively delusive" and "existentially delusive" perceptions²⁹ is untenable.

It is natural for Austin to deny any theory of perception which exaggerates the place and importance of illusion. He rejects the "argument from illusion"—the view that it is "produced as establishing the conclusion that some at least of our perceptions are delusive."³⁰ He also rejects the view that illusion and delusion are the same things.³¹ He disagrees with Ayer in that the examples cited by Ayer, that is, refraction, mirage and reflection in mirror are the cases of illusion.³² The genuine cases of illusion could be optical illusion—of two lines of equal length, one is made to look longer than the other or the Headless Woman on the stage.³³ He distinguishes such illusion from the delusions which are "primarily a matter of grossly disordered beliefs, (and so, probably behaviour) and may have nothing in particular to do with perception."³⁴ He however allows—as a case of delusion wherein a patient who sees pink rats where "he is not clearly aware that his pink rats are not real rats".³⁵

Austin does not subscribe to the view that we do "perceive" the illusions, that in illusion sense data "exist" though corresponding material objects are absent; that illusion is not a fiction but only an

24 Ibid. p. 15.

25 Ibid. p. 19

26 Ibid. p. 45.

27 Ibid. p. 46.

28 Ibid —as quoted p. 48, 51.

29 Ibid. p. 78.

30 Ibid. p. 22.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid. p. 21, 22.

33 Ibid. p. 22, 23.

34 Ibid. p. 23.

35 Ibid.

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unfaithful presentation of "something" which "exists" there. If we accept sense data in case of illusions we may be led to accept the same under normal circumstances also.³⁶ A dreamer has neither illusions nor delusions. He simply dreams.³⁷ To dwell upon the theory of sense-data on the basis of certain abnormal, exceptional occasions³⁸ is to construct an abnormal and unrealistic theory of perception. And this is repugnant to the facts of life and contrary to the aims of philosophy.

Critical Estimation :

The acknowledged influence of Austin on contemporary theory of perception, especially on what is known as Oxford Philosophy is remarkable. As is known he was against the scholasticism in philosophy and strived in his own way to bring it within an easy reach of "Common mortals".

Austin has rightly pointed out the linguistic ambiguities in the field of philosophy which are responsible for much of the avoidable confusion in the understanding of the basic issues. His charge is that the philosophers have complicated the philosophical language at the cost of its natural clarity. This is understandable but not always tenable. Does ordinary language admit of clarity and precision? Does meaning in the ordinary language claim indisputable expressions? Unfortunately not. A philosopher tries to specify the connotations of the terms he uses to avoid—at least to minimize—the possible confusions in the understanding of the issues in question. If he has failed to achieve the task it does not by itself either belittle his language or upgrade the ordinary language. When a term for example "real" does not admit of one meaning or is used differently in different contexts, it is natural, even useful, to be cautious in its specific use unlike what we are accustomed to do in ordinary language. If however confusion grows with specifications it is better to avoid them. Unfortunately we have not so far been able to devise any confusion—proof linguistic order and Austin has not rendered us any help in this respect.

Austin however has to be appreciated for his concern for clarity in thought. It is with this intention in view that he has ably distinguished between the various uses of customary verbs like appear, see etc. We have to thank him for the carefulness with which he has made clear the various shades of meaning involved in the use of appear, look, seem etc.³⁹ It is a fact that they are often used synonymously occasionally miscarrying the meaning of the terms used by the perceiver. Austin rightly points out⁴⁰ that we must not lose sight of the "sort of situation" we are dealing with when we say the

³⁶ Ibid. p. 32.

³⁷ Ibid. p. 27.

³⁸ Ibid. p. 20.

³⁹ Sense And Sensibilia p. 36, 37.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 43.

immersed stick "looks" bent. Consideration of the circumstances under which we perceive an object affords clue to the understanding thereof. He has also very carefully classified the various senses in which "see" is used. The distinctions are as helpful as they are important.

He disagrees with Ayer that the sense datum sentences are "incorrigible." He rightly points out that no sentence is beyond correction or amendment.⁴¹ If my commitment is to remain absolutely minimal the only way to secure this is to not commit at all.

He rightly points out that there is no "special kind of sentence which is as such incorrigible", and that, "many kinds of sentences may be uttered in making statements which are in fact incorrigible."⁴² He is also right when he points out that "formulation of evidence is not the function of any special sort of sentence."⁴³ We have also to note that the argument Ayer advances⁴⁴ to justify conclusive non-verifiability of material object statement and his doctrine that "the notion of certainty does not apply to propositions of this kind."⁴⁵ have been adversely commented upon by Austin. It appears that Ayer's contention that to verify a proposition of this kind conclusively would imply "self contradictory feat of completing"⁴⁶ an infinite series of verifications emphasizes a relevant point. There is however no reason to limit this difficulty to any special kind of proposition. It, in fact, embraces all kinds of propositions. It applies to both, the sense datum statement and material-object statement. Besides, verification implies a means independent of that which is to be verified. No proposition could thus be verified except under the circumstances in which it is made. And if we are under the circumstances under which it is made there is no need for us to verify the proposition since it is certain to us at that level. Therefore the question of verification of a proposition is always linked with the circumstances appropriate to it and cannot be decided in isolation therefrom.

Thus it may be said that Austin rightly points out that there are no kind or class of sentences which are incorrigible, which form a base for verification and evidence of other sentences. He is also right in contradicting the view that the "material things" must be based on evidence and are in need of verification. As he points out neither the expressions used for the material things are intrinsically vague nor those used for sense data are necessarily precise. It is open to disagreement that the material things can be conclusively

41 "There isn't there couldn't be, any kind of sentence which as such is incapable, once uttered, of being subsequently amended or retracted." Ibid. p. 112.

42 Ibid. p. 114, 115.

43 Ibid. p. 116.

44 Ibid. p. 117.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

verified.⁴⁷ In fact neither the sense data nor the material things can be conclusively verified.

This draws us to the question of certainty about the statement in respect of what is "perceived" by us. Even though we may not arrive at the highest perceptual certainty—which appears impossible to arrive at—it need not either discourage us or call in question the normal perceptual operations given to a normal mind.

Whatever the real nature of an object of perception it is clear that the object of perception does not always "exist". There is no reason to believe that a perception is or has to be always of an "existent" object. Also it is not that when we talk of material things it is the way we talk about it that is important, that it is linguistic and not factual. In fact determination of linguistic phraseology to account for the implication of the perceptual process and the results thereof is futile unless the fact of perception is realistically accounted for.

Even if we agree with Austin that "what we 'perceive' can be described, identified, classified, characterized, named in different ways,"⁴⁸ It does not seem to warrant any criticism of Ayer's conclusion that "'perceive' must have different senses." Ayer's different "senses" actually do not appear to contradict Austin's different ways of the description of the "perceive"

The criticism of Austin against the "surface" of what is perceived is more linguistic than factual.⁴⁹ In fact the "surface" connotes the general "appearance" of an object as perceived by the perceiver. There is no reason to limit it literally to a surface of a table or of a cat. The world is not constitutive of the tables and cats only. It also has to be noted that the description of what has appeared need not always be totally faithful to the object as it is believed to be. It also does not imply that either all the things have "surfaces"—as in case of a table—or that we always see the "surfaces" of the objects. Inability of describing shape or surface of a table or of a cat does not justify the contention that their understandable description is not possible.

If the perception were so simple, indisputable and direct as Austin seems to be under the impression of there could not possibly be any occasion for any illusion. Nobody would dispute the chairs, the tables, the mountains and the rivers so "directly" perceived by Austin. Nobody would probably deny their "existence" as the objects of "direct" perception. The sense-data need not be allowed to mediate between the perceiver and such directly perceived object. The difficulties however arise when we directly "perceive" a table that is not in "existence".

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 123, 130.

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 98.

⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 100.

The illusion comes to the scene only when the perceived object is found to be other than or different from what actually "exists". The sense-datum theorists do not accept any intrinsic difference in kind between the veridical and delusive perceptions.⁵⁰ Austin's criticism on this that the perceptions of them are indistinguishable is right. It would appear that even if the perceptions of the two were indistinguishable it does not entail that there is no intrinsic difference in kind between them. When I "perceive" a book I do not know whether my perception thereof is veridical or not. I presume it to be veridical unless otherwise found to be not so. Austin is right in saying that the perceptions, as such, of the veridical and the illusory categories are indistinguishable.

When I perceive a veridical object i. e. a tank, and when I perceive a non-veridical object i. e. mirage there is no difference in the kinds of perceptions thereof. Even when I perceive a mirage a perceptual certainty and the process are the same as when I perceive a veridical table. There is no intrinsic difference in the kind of perceptions here. If it were not so there would not be any occasion for non-veridical perceptions. Also it is improper to say that there is no qualitative difference between the types of knowledge acquired through the respective perceptions. To say this would mean that a lion in the dream is commensurate to a lion in the waking state and connive at the qualitative difference implicit in their orders of existences.

Ayer's distinction between the "qualitatively delusive" and "existentially delusive" perceptions⁵¹ corresponds to what may be called illusion and hallucination. Ayer understandably says that in a qualitatively delusive perception something other than what is actually perceived as an object "exists". But it is not clear how he justifies his existentially delusive perceptions wherein "material things which they seem to present do not exist at all"⁵². It is not true to say that in existentially delusive perception the object does not "exist" at all. There could not be a perception of "non-existent" object. Or is it a tacit acceptance of the view that a mind has a capacity to create non-existent objects so realistically as to be actually perceived by it. Even in existentially delusive perception the existence of the corresponding material things has to be accepted. It has to be recognized that the existence of such a material thing belongs to a category other than those to which "qualitatively delusive" and "waking" perceptions belong. There is no verifiable, separate "privileged sense-data"⁵³ (which presents only "real" qualities of an object) known to us of which "sensible constancy", "me-

50 Ibid. p. 48 also p. 44.

51 Ibid. p. 78.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid. p. 81.

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asurability" and "predictive value" would constitute "meritorious features".

When "in fact what we see is a stick partly immersed in water"⁵⁴ it is the immersed stick that we see. Though the "bent" stick is admittedly an appearance unfaithful to the "real" stick it does not negate the fact that the on-looker unmindful of this fact "perceives" the bent stick as a real stick. The same is applicable to a case of mirage. It is not the case—as Ayer believes—that in case of a mirage we perceive an object which does not exist.⁵⁵ When we see the bent stick unmindful of what it is we do not realise that we are under an illusion. The illusion is the result of the confusion between the two orders of existences.

Austin's account of a dream is not satisfactory. To say a dream to be a dream is not to explain it. That we dream is a fact. That we "perceive" object during the dream is also a fact. How do we then know a dream to be "unreal"? Is dream really "unreal" in the sense of being non-existent? Do we not "perceive" objects—as we do in a waking state—in a dream? How is it then that we believe it to be unreal? Dream, in fact, is not an illusion in a dream. It is believed to be an illusion only in relation to a waking state. That is, under the dream—without the slightest doubt about its being normal and true occurrence—things are as normal as they are in the waking state. The "perceived" table in a dream evaporates only upon the termination of the sleep. The "fact" then becomes a fiction. Austin's account of dream is neither complete nor illuminating.

Austin has also not clearly distinguished between the illusion and—what he calls—the delusion; and the dream. He has not given any reason why he does not agree with the cases of illusion i.e. refraction, reflection, mirage etc. cited by Ayer.⁵⁶ He has, it appears, reserved the term illusion for optical illusion or for a "Headless woman" on the stage.⁵⁷ He does not clarify why the mirage etc. is not entitled to be called an illusion. His "delusion" which is a grossly disordered belief,⁵⁸ has nothing to do with the perception. This is understandable. If delusion is not concerned with perception we would never know it to be a delusion. Besides if a delusion were a totally "non-existent" "entity" how does he allow a patient to "see" the pink rats "where he is not clearly aware that his pink rats are not the real rats."⁵⁹ How the "non-existent" pink rats are "seen" by a patient? The fact appears to be that Austin did not clearly formulate his ideas in respect of the issues involved in this context and the ambiguity prevails.

54 Austin Ibid. p. 30.

56 Ibid. p. 21, 22

58 Ibid. p. 23.

55 Ibid. p. 32.

57 Ibid. p. 22, 23.

59 Ibid.

It has also to be looked into how we know that an error in perception has occurred except by the further knowledge of the object. Defective mediums or senses apart does not a normal person "perceive" an illusion? Is unfaithful appearance of an object an outcome of the defects in the senses only? Are those who "see" illusion abnormal? All this required elaboration. It has to be noted that, unlike what Austin believes, illusions are neither exceptional nor are they always an outcome of abnormalities. Normal persons "perceive" illusions. Illusions are facts and they "exist" as objects given to "direct" perceptions "exist".

As we have seen normal persons can and do "perceive" illusions, it is however possible that we may never know that we are under an illusion. The difficulty with the illusion—or with all non-veridical perceptions—is that it is only after we know them to be so that we realise we were affected thereby. And many illusions may pass by as perfectly normal and "factual" occurrences in the absence of any occasion for their verification. The Tulsidas, for example, would have never known the object he climbed up by to be a snake but for the enquiry thereof thereafter. But for this the snake would always be a rope for him throughout his life. Many such illusions in normal life may and do pass off as direct and authentic perceptions of the objects in the absence of any after-enquiries and scope for any doubt about the veracity of the perceived objects.

If it is realised that existence implies different categories of "existences" it would help us obviate the difficulties in respect of the "existence" of the "factual" material thing, illusory objects, "hallucinatory" objects and the perceptions in the dream. In fact they all "exist" unless all of them are deemed to be the creations of an imagination of the perceiver. Non-acceptance of the mediacy of sense datum is insufficient to justify the direct and truthful perception of an object as advocated by Austin. To deny existences to all the categories other than the one in which we are under the comfortable impression that we have perceived the "factual" material things is to refuse to face the possible unaccustomed—and possibly uneasy-facts and be satisfied with self-imposed deviatory isolation. The perceived "non-existent" existences are not arbitrarily borrowed from nothingness and materialized by the perceiver at his will.

Ayer accepts that something "exists" even in illusion. When Austin accepts the perception of an "non-existent" object either in illusion or in delusion (the pink rat) he implicitly accepts a type of "existence" which he deems to be "factually" non-existent. He appears to accept tacitly even sense datum which "looks like a barn" while actual a church.⁶⁰ Ayer has properly questioned whether

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Austin has really refuted the sense data.⁶¹ It implies an acceptance of a "non-existence which in fact is only an order of existence qualitatively different from the existence to which we are accustomed to call "factual" existence.

The fact that whether in illusion or in delusion we perceive something which we believe to be in "existence" remains undeniable. We actually "see" the dagger in delusion and this can not be denied. That Macbeth "perceived" it remains a fact. That things "exist" in dream remains unquestionable. The waking existence is indisputable. In fact a careful consideration of what is "perceived" in perception will make it clear that what we perceive "exists" in some way or the other. It never happens that we perceive something which does not exist at all. To be "non-existent" is different from being a non-entity. Macbeth's dagger is not non-existent in the sense of being a non-entity. If it is said to be non-existent it only means that it belongs to an order of existence different from the one to which we choose to accord sanction as being the only order of "existence". Thus the non-existence of a dagger is relative to what we dream to be the "real" order of existence though we may not have any valid reason to believe it to be so. If any order of existence does not fit in the pattern of what we believe to be the real existence it does not entail that it is non-existent. Really "non-existent" object could not ever be "perceived". Whether it were an illusion or a hallucination or a dream the "perception" of an "object" therein is not a perception of a "non-existent" object but of an object that "exists" as it also exists in case of an object perceived in a waking state. Only the order of their respective existences differ. One never perceives a non entity.

It should now be clear that Austin has not effectively dispensed with the sense datum which haunts our perception of the material thing. His inability mainly stems from his unsatisfactory dealing with the problem of illusion.⁶² To connive at it—as he seems to have done—is not to render reasonable account of it. But it is

⁶¹ A. J. Aver in "Has Austin refuted sense data?" from "Symposium on J. L. Austin" edited by K. T. Fann. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. London. p. 284.

⁶² R. J. Hirst in his paper on "A Critical Study of Sense And Sensibilia", edited by K. T. Fann—"It seems to me one of the tragedies of recent English philosophy that undoubtedly brilliant and influential leaders like Austin and Wittgenstein have been so blind in their philosophizing to the importance of scientific findings. 'Philosophy begins in wonder', said Aristotle but these latter day exponents have conspicuously failed to wonder how it is that hallucinations and illusions occur or even how perception itself takes place. As a result there is a brittle superficiality in their cleverest performances in this field." p. 253.

equally clear that unless it is shown to be consistently in order with the "direct" perception of a material thing the sense-datum could not be forced to beat an effective retreat.

The sense-datum theory fails to justify how a sense-datum ever could be commensurate to the material thing of which it is claimed to be a presentation. There is no way to verify the faithfulness of the sense-datum to the material thing. Austin's criticism of the theory on this account is quite justifiable. But Austin has not succeeded—rather he does not seem to have tried it—in solving the difficulties he himself has raised. If we directly perceive the object as it is how is it that we perceive—though occasionally or even exceptionally—an object other than what actually it is? That is, how does the phenomenon of illusion creep in? Austin has not found a way out of this difficulty.

The non-veridical perceptions could be classed as an illusion, a hallucination and a dream. Illusion is supposed to be based upon the deceptive appearance of an "existent" object. Thus in place of the rope we "perceive" a snake wrongly on account of the deceptive similarity between them. In hallucination there is no such "external supporting object" as is found in case of an illusion. Macbeth's dagger is believed to be the creation of his neurotic mind. It is however to be made clear that Macbeth "perceived" the dagger. Its "existence" for him is convincing. Similarly the Pope "perceived" in a dream belongs to a different category. The illusion and the hallucination are non-veridical perceptions belonging to a waking state. The perceptions in a dream belong to a different category. The perception of the Pope in a dream turns out to be not veridical only upon the termination of the sleep.

It is to be noted that in all these cases—whether veridical or non-veridical—we "perceive" the objects. The "perception" even in non-veridical category does not betray any sign of being so unless found otherwise upon investigation. Their "existences" do not contradict the veridical existences. They also do not contradict each other. They form the conciliatory and consistent orders of existences offering satisfactory solution of the occurrence of non-veridical perceptions simultaneously rendering the "omnipresent" mediacy of the sense-datum ineffective and redundant.

VII

Ignorance and the Limits to a Pure Phenomenology

George J. Seidel

We know a great deal about ignorance.

For in the same way that we are aware that there is knowledge plain and simple ("I know that I am alive and awake"), so also do we know that there is ignorance plain and simple ("I do not know exactly when or how I will die"). Similarly, just as there are degrees of knowledge, so also are there degrees of ignorance. There are degrees of my knowledge, and my ignorance, of a foreign tongue. There are whole classes of words for things I do not know, since I have never had occasion, or the need, to learn them. I do not know the words for kitchen utensils in French. Though had I studied at the Cordon-blue rather than attending lectures at the College de France I am sure that I would have learned them.

In other words, I can know that I am ignorant, know that I do not know something. There are things, specific things, that I do not know; and I am thoroughly aware that I do not know them. I know that I am ignorant of Chinese, even though I do not know that there is a Chinese language; and I know that I am ignorant of it. And in the same way that there are things I know I do not know, so also are there are matters I am unaware that I do know. By means of drugs or hypnosis I could likely be made to recall events or locales experienced long ago, matters which I am not aware that I do, in fact, know.

And in the same way that I know that I know, that is, have self-conscious awareness, so also is it possible for another to know that I am totally ignorant of my own ignorance. This may be termed deep ignorance. It is the theme of a thousand and one soap operas: John does not know that David is really his son by Marsha

when John was suffering temporary amnesia, since Marsha has told no one, lest her husband William, who thinks the child is his, discover the fact, and fly into yet another fit of jealous rage.

There are consequences to ignorance. And these can be serious. There is the ignorance of the "unexamined life." Deep ignorance often contains the seeds of tragedy, for oneself as well as for others. But the consequences of ignorance can be good as well as bad. My ignorance of the mechanical defects in a used car I am contemplating buying may be bad for me; but it is an unexpected boon for the used car salesman. That I am ignorant of a great deal that goes on in my own body is probably just as well. Indeed, I become aware of the workings of my digestive system only when I suffer from indigestion. I am reminded that my system is constantly producing antibodies to attack alien viruses only when it misses a new one and I succumb to the flu. On the other hand, my ignorance of a symptomless disease, such as high blood pressure or glaucoma, is particularly dangerous, since I am then unaware of the need to take proper measures to counter the progression of the disease. Finally ignorance can have no particularly significant consequences one way or the other. My doctor's ignorance of aerodynamics does not affect his delivery of health care to me his patient.

Ignorance of the future is, of course, both good and bad. My ignorance of an impending storm as I head up into the mountains is not good. On the other hand, it is just as well that I do not know all the possible dangers involved in a necessary, but risk-filled, undertaking or in a major life-choice decision, since I might not then take the plunge; and my life, and perhaps the lives of others, could be the poorer for it. There is a sense in which ignorance is, indeed, bliss. We know that we are (fortunately) ignorant of the intricate detail of our individual futures.

These are times when the humble admission of ignorance, "I don't know", is not only the true and proper response but also the wise and prudent one, for example during an oral comprehensive examination. It can be more than embarrassing to be caught out in the pretence of knowledge when what soon becomes readily apparent is its conspicuous absence. It was against this sort of "knowledge" that the feigned ignorance of Socratic irony operated so effectively.

But in addition to the feigned knowledge which is really ignorance, there is also the ignorance of the person that does not want to know, or one who is too lazy to overcome his or her ignorance about a certain matter. This is what is sometimes termed crass or supine ignorance. There is the mother who does not really want to know what her teenage offspring may be up to, not wanting to know the

were, preferring to believe the best. There is the man who will not see a doctor, since he is fairly certain that the examination will indicate the necessity of a radical, and unwanted, change in life-style. Sartre's "bad faith" is along these lines, a consciousness that is in denial, one which prefers not to admit to itself an actual state of affairs.

It would, however, be incorrect to imply that ignorance is merely a subjective phenomenon. any more than being-unable-to see something (or anything) is merely the result of an organic condition such as poor eyesight or blindness. Being unable to see something (or anything at all) may occur for the very objective reason that there is no light (or too much), or because the light waves are beyond the range of normal vision, or because what is not seen cannot be seen, since it is not, and perhaps cannot be, there at all. According to Parmenides we must be forever ignorant of "exists-not." What does not exist cannot be known, because it is impossible. Indicative of this, in his view, is that whenever we attempt to think or talk about what does not exist, we end up thinking and talking nonsense. We know that we shall be forever ignorant of such "things" as mermaids, perpetual motion machines, or fountains of youth. Phylogenetically, a half-woman (warm blooded animal) half fish (cold blooded animal) simply can not be (at least not without some complicated heat-exchange system between the two halves). We know we shall never encounter a perpetual motion machine; there is friction. There is no fountain of youth: biological processes are irreversible. Obviously, we are not entirely ignorant in the matter of such impossibles, since we do know them to be impossible, as also the reasons why. Still, we know that we shall never know, in the sense of experience, such "things."

There is, of course, a different in saying "I don't know this or that" and saying "It can't be known." The latter is more difficult to maintain convincingly. Kant's thing in itself, as a limit to possible experience, is declared unknowable. But it is unknowable only for beings with finite human understanding operating on the necessary basis of sensible intuition. The thing in itself would not be unknowable *in itself (per se)*, since beings possessing intellectual intuition, such as God or angels presumably, would be able to know things-in-themselves would be unknowable from the standpoint of theoretical reason, such noumena as God, freedom, soul would be known as necessary postulates for morality from the viewpoint of the practical reason. Hence, Kant's things in themselves are unknowable, even *quoad nos*, only from one point of view. And even from this viewpoint of speculative reason they can be thought, and thought of as consistently possible, if problematic. In the Kantian scheme, then, we are not entirely ignorant of the "unknowable"

thing-in-itself. even though we may be ignorant of what, precisely, "it" might mean in strict (theoretical) knowledge terms.

There is, of course, a religious dimension to ignorance. For example, in the gnostic religions of India, the Hinduism of the Upanishads or Buddhism, there is *avidya*. However, this lack of knowledge is not some species of conceptual or scientific ignorance. Rather, it is the ignorance of the specific religious truths that would lead to enlightenment and liberation. Similarly, in the mystical tradition of the West there is the "ignorance" described in the *Cloud of Unknowing*, a mystical treatise from fourteenth century England. However, what is really represented here is the denial that God can be known or experienced by intellectual means, and the insistence that God can be "known" only by the "sharp dart of love". In other words, the "knowing" that would take place in and through contemplative prayer would come from the affective rather than from the intellective part of the human soul.

There is also ignorance in law. Ignorance of the law, it is said, is no excuse (*Ignorantia legis neminem excusat*). Ignorance of the law prohibiting cocaine possession is not, legally speaking, an excusing cause. On the other hand, in matters of fact ignorance can be an excusing cause (*Ignorantia facti excusat*). The fact that I am in possession of cocaine because someone has slipped it into my luggage, unbeknownst to me, would be an excusing cause in law.

However, such ignorances, whether in relation to law, or in relation to religious truth, do not appear relevant philosophically. Indeed, the thrust of the gnostic religions, as of religious mysticism generally, is that the religious "knowledge" that would lead to salvation or liberation cannot be gained by conceptual means. As such, the stance is specifically anti-philosophical. And in the case of the law the ignorance referred to is a presumption rather than a disposition or a state.

There are, of course, philosophical positions or attitudes which declare certain matters to be unknowable, or at least not knowable with certainty. The agnostic holds that the existence of God cannot be known, for reasons obviously different from those of the religious mystic, on account of the different meanings attached to the word "know". Similarly, the skeptic, with whatever degree or level of skepticism would say that there are certain "things" that cannot be known, at least not with a requisite certainty. The skeptic does not say that knowledge is impossible. For even the position that knowledge is impossible is an undecidable position. Perhaps, somewhere, somehow, if only by accident, something might be known, even for certain. The skeptic must be skeptical about absolute skepticism. In other words, the skeptic does not say that knowledge is impossi-

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ble, only specific knowledges. Skepticism is largely parasitic on previously extant philosophies; which are known. Further, whatever may be the specific knowledges disclaimed, these will often depend upon highly sophisticated arguments and are defended with genuine knowledge claims. The skeptic may claim not to know certain things, with whatever degree of certainty; still, the skeptic does not claim not to know. No philosopher could be comfortable pleading total ignorance.

But why, it may be asked, even discuss such a philosophically depressing topic as that of ignorance? One reason might be the Platonic position that the unexamined life is not worth living. Indeed, vice and ignorance come to be identified in Plato's thought. According to Socrates/Plato virtue is knowledge and thus is it teachable. If one really knows what justice is, then he or she will act justly. Conversely, if persons do not act justly, then it must be because they do not really know, they are basically ignorant of, the idea of justice. Vice is simply ignorance. And ignorance, because it would make virtue (which is knowledge) impossible, would be the most serious of vices.

But although ignorance may be the ultimate philosophical evil, is there perhaps some benefit that might be derived from a study of its profile. And the answer is, I think, yes. It can be made to relate to the "fundamental question concerning the intrinsic limits of a 'pure' phenomenology." Cf. Stephen Tyman, "The Phenomenon of Forgetting," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 44 (1983) 46.

Tyman attempts to tackle the problem of a "pure" phenomenology by analysing forgetting as the "vanishing point of consciousness," while at the same time trying to avoid what he sees as the possible pitfall of a transcendental phenomenology verging upon idealism. Drawing mainly upon Husserl's analysis of memory in the *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* (especially 9, 13, 14, 24, and 26), Tyman argues that in the case of the forgotten the limit of consciousness is encountered: the past is experienced as empty. In trying to recall the name of someone I have not seen in a long time, I come up empty. Thus, he characterizes the essence of "the forgotten" as "a dimension of consciousness in which memory is continually frustrated (Tyman, p. 54).

In the course of his thought-provoking article Tyman also alludes to the sort of "forgotten" implied in the Freudian notion of the unconscious. Now when my Freudian analyst informs me that I suffer from an Oedipus complex, and I respond that I am not at all aware that I have at any time desired to kill my father and marry my mother, he can answer: "Of course not, you wouldn't be aware of it. It is unconscious." Which is certainly a safe statement on

my analyst's part. It is tautologically, if not trivially, true to say: one is unconscious of that of which one is unconscious. It would appear to be the obverse of Husserlian intentionality: unconsciousness is always unconsciousness of...that of which it is unconscious. Now my analyst may insist that there is an "object" to that "act" of being unconscious of...something. It has been repressed. However, so far as my consciousness would be concerned there is no such object. And if there is no *noema* without an intentionally correlated *noesis*, then, in the absence of both object and act of consciousness, it may be concluded that in the case of the forgotten or the repressed we have encountered the vanishing point of consciousness. (Incidentally, the tie between the forgotten and the unconscious is contained within the very meaning of the German word *unbewusst*. Something forgotten is *unbewusst* in the sense of being *nicht mehr bewusst*. If I am no longer aware of something, then I am unaware of it).

However, in the case of the name which I try mightily to recall, and come up empty, it often later comes to me. Which means that it was never really lost to consciousness, just not immediately accessible to present consciousness. Husserl does note that as soon as retention ceases there occurs a void or empty retentional consciousness. But then he adds the phrase, in parenthesis, *wenn man das behaupten darf*: if one may speak thus (*Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, 9). It is only a manner of speaking. For as he points out later (14), talking about a melody Heard at a concert in one's youth, when we run through it again in our imagination, that "object" of consciousness is not so much constituted as "reconstituted." He refers to this as reproductive memory (15). If it was reconstituted or reproduced, then that means that it was somehow still there in consciousness. For what has sunk back into the past of a present stream of consciousness has not sunk through the bottom of the stream bed of consciousness, but lies there as sediment, not entirely motionless, but moving along hidden beneath more immediate conscious flow. For in speaking of protentions in 24 of the same work Husserl notes that the posited horizon of recollection is oriented toward the future. And this is why past retentions, even presumably "forgotten" ones, are able to color (*Farbung*) present intentions. Such "forgottens" move along hidden beneath present conscious flow, coming to the surface in protentions.

What has been forgotten, then, is still immanent within consciousness. And there is a specific object here. It is my school-mate's name that I cannot recall. For I have not forgotten his face or voice, certain familiar mannerisms, shared events from our youth, etc. I do not come up entirely empty. By the same token, I do not think that phenomenology has any intrinsic difficulty with the

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Freudian unconscious. If something has, indeed, been repressed, there is both an object and an intentionally correlated act of repressing relative to the repressed object. If phenomenology would have any difficulty with Freudian psychoanalytic theory, it would be over the theoretical constructs that form its doctrine. These would have to be returned to their original data in consciousness for hermeneutical examination.

Matters that are forgotten represent specific objects for consciousness. If someone asks me if I speak German, I answer yes, even though I am thoroughly aware that there are proprieties of conversational German I have forgotten, such as the endings for strong and weak ending adjectives. There are specific intentional objects to my forgetting, along with the awareness that I have forgotten them. Even so, when asked if I speak German, I answer confidently yes. My knowledge of German is still immanent within consciousness. One never loses a language. Back in a German-speaking context the language comes back, even many of those proprieties I thought I had forgotten. Similarly if someone asks a piano player who plays largely by ear if he can play a particular tune, he may ask the one requesting to hum a few bars. And soon the melody, along with the chord changes (though not necessarily the bridge), come to him. The song was immanent within consciousness. This is what Husserl is getting at, I think, when he makes the distinction between an enduring immanent object and an object in the manner (*im Wie*) in which it is known as actually present or as past (*Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, 9).

Thus, when Tyman speaks of the forgotten as "a dimension of consciousness in which memory is continually frustrated" there is the implicit recognition that what cannot readily be recalled is, nonetheless, still a part of consciousness. Indeed, being frustrated is itself an act of consciousness with its own appropriate object, which in this case would be something not there for immediate conscious recall. For if Husserl's notion of the sedimentation of all experience is fundamental to his phenomenology, as it appears to be in *Erfahrung und Urteil*, then it might be questioned whether a human memory, which is finite, might totally forget anything, no matter how mixed up or garbled might be the reproduced memory. It may be impossible to forget totally. Old people may be unable to remember what happened yesterday, or even an hour ago; yet, happenings of fifty years ago seem absolutely clear to their minds. Perhaps, an infinite memory might have the infinite ability to forget. Which would have interesting implications for a Supercomputer, or God.

But although I have my doubts about the phenomenon of forgetting as the candidate for revealing the "vanishing point of cons-

ciousness," and thus as the means for establishing the intrinsic limits and possibilities of a "pure" phenomenology, there is one phenomenon endemic to the human condition which will, I think, exhibit that limit: and that is human ignorance

The sort of ignorance that might function in this regard would not be the "ignorance" I have regarding the surrounding world when I am not conscious, asleep for example. Even when asleep I am not completely unaware or totally ignorant of my surroundings. If the room is too hot, I throw off the covers: if too cold, I pull them up, without ever regaining a full waking consciousness. Even when asleep I am not ignorant. There are degrees and levels of unconsciousness, as of consciousness.

Similarly, my ignorance of Chinese will not qualify as the ignorance which would act as the limit to consciousness, since, as was noted, I know that there is a Chinese language; and I am aware that I do not read or speak the language. A known unknown enters a bracket of a special sort. By the same token, something which I am not aware I do know, some forgotten childhood experience or event, would also represent a *noema* for which there would be a corresponding *noesis*, were I made to "recall" the event or experience, in however garbled or jumbled a form, through hypnosis or the drug sodium pentathol. Likewise, it is possible to know something, yet lack access to that knowledge. There is the phenomenon of amnesia, in which, as a result of some traumatic experience, the person becomes ignorant of his or her identity. This does not mean that there is not an identity there; only access to it (or from it) has been blocked. There is an intentional object of consciousness there, and not just a possible object of consciousness, much less a possible consciousness of a possible object.

Even in the case of Sartre's "bad faith," the case of a consciousness in denial, of not wanting to recognize or find out something, the supine ignorance which prefers to remain ignorant, even here there is the ignoring (act) of an ignored (object of the act). There is a specific ignored object belonging to a specific conscious act of ignoring, and this taking place in a model setting. This is precisely why crass or supine ignorance becomes morally reprehensible. I may not want to know, or refuse to consider, the conditions under which the migrant farm workers and their families are forced to live, on account of the moral stance I might be required to take.

My ignorance of the future toward which I live, or which appears to come toward me, along with the anxiety I experience regarding certain of its aspects, is also by no means objectless. There is an intentional attitude toward an area of obscurity as an area of obscurity. It is not an area of total darkness; for there are glimmers of light and hope as well as of worries and fears. Indicative of this intentional

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attitude which I have toward this obscure and uncertain future is that I maintain a certain basic attitude toward it, for example one of acceptance or resignation, or the refusal to accept or acquiesce to it. Further indicative that there are definite objects correlative to specific acts of consciousness is the fact that I take certain precautions, get a weather report before heading off into the mountains, weigh the pros and cons in a major life-choice decision. The future is not a total area of ignorance without acts of consciousness in co relation to it. Indeed, the way we face the future, or refuse to face it, is very much definitive of our character.

What, then, would be the ignorance that would function as the intrinsic limit to the possibility of a pure phenomenology?

Ignorance comes to be revealed primarily in the phenomenon of the discovery of error, since the latter will be based upon at least some level or degree of ignorance. If I had known that the car was nearly out of gas I would surely have stopped at the last station. But now I know why I erred. The gas gauge does not work. Of this I was ignorant.

What this means is that ignorance appears to consciousness only with its disappearance, with the discovery of the error that was based upon the ignorance. It would not be accurate to say that the deficiency was simply in the mind of the knower. There was a certain objectivity to the ignorance; the gas gauge was defective, and thus did not make known to consciousness the actual state of affairs. This sort of thing comes as no surprise to consciousness. As Husserl notes in the *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* (25): the appearing side is not without its not appearing side. Matters do not appear totally, completely, and entirely to consciousness except, perhaps, in their disappearance, in which case their appearing to consciousness can be constituted only in another modal setting, such as the memory or the imagination. The dinosaur that is given to consciousness as an extinct species no longer necessitates a disconnection from the matter-of-fact world. The bones in the Smithsonian would necessitate such a disconnection. However, the "reconstruction" of extinct mesozoic lizard (a *Wesensschau*) from those extinct bones in consciousness would be constituted by an act of the imagination.

From the fact of empty gas tanks and defective fuel gauges I know that there are matters of which I am often ignorant. It may be tautological to say that I do not know what I do not know. Still, the tautology is far from trivial if I am motoring across the desert Southwest in the middle of the summer. The "what" in the what-I do not know, that which I am totally unaware of, necessarily lies beyond the fringe of consciousness. There is no object of consciousness there. And the reason why there is no object is because there

is no intentionally correlative *act* of consciousness, no activity on the part of consciousness to which there might be a corresponding object. Consciousness is simply inactive relative to that "non-object": the empty gas tank. Indeed, there may be subsequent knowledge as to the why of the consciousness' inactivity in this regard, namely the fact of the defective fuel gauge. Thus, the reason why there is no object in the case of ignorance is because there is no act, no directional beam of consciousness shining out at all, or at least not in the requisite direction. It is this that becomes manifest in the subsequent discovery of the reason for the error.

This characteristic of activity, the actionality (*Aktualität*) of consciousness is emphasized by Husserl in the *Ideas*, 35. It is characteristic of the stream of mental processes, and is manifested especially in the case of phantasized "objects". Indeed, he also insists that "the stream of lived experiences can never consists of nothing but actionalities"; there are also non-actional modes of consciousness. Something that has been forgotten, slipped beneath immediate conscious grasp could be an example of this. Nevertheless, the fundamental characteristic of the act of consciousness (*Bewusstsein*) is that of activity. Consciousness is not a static state for Husserl; it is a performative activity.

This activity may be seen most clearly in crass or supine ignorance or in a consciousness that is in denial: the ignoring of that which is ignored. For it may become more and more difficult for the mother of the troubled teenager to ignore what is really going on after his third arrest for cocaine possession. It becomes more and more difficult to ignore the plight of the families of the migrant farm workers when the poor health and education of the children become more and more apparent. More and more activity may be required to ignore what is being ignored in the face of mounting evidence. Similarly in the case of denial: it may require more and more activity on the part of consciousness to deny the denied, for example that I have a serious illness requiring drastic corrective measures.

Likewise in the case of an experience or an event that has been repressed or the amnesia that is suffered as a result of a severe psychological trauma, there is a consciousness actively at work actively repressing or blocking out the memory of the extremely unpleasant occurrence. Indeed, in the case of the amnesiac one's actual personal identity has been forgotten, and this deliberately and intentionally (*bewusst*), in keeping with Husserl's broad sense of the word consciousness (*Bewusstsein*). For no matter how deeply submerged that loss of memory may place one's personal identity from immediate consciousness, that identity is still there. Two phenomena indicate this. Firstly, it may be possible for the psychiatrist to assist the

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amnesiac in re-constituting that memory of personal identity by having him relieve the trauma that originally occasioned the amnesia. Secondly, there is continuing active resistance on the part of consciousness, again taken in the deeper sense of that term, to facing the personal pain present in the traumatic event which prompted the consciousness to *choose* amnesia—and the word “choose” is undoubtedly the correct one here—in the first place. Husserl was early on aware of the possibility of the coexistence of contradictory acts of judgment within one and the same consciousness (Cf. *Logical Investigations*, 27). And if there can be contradictory propositions within one and the same consciousness, then there must also be corresponding acts within consciousness correlative to those objects, and opposed to each other. There is every reason to believe that the amnesiac conscious does, and does not, want to remember. Of course, we may say that the amnesiac wants to remember his or her identity, but not the traumatic event or experience that occasioned its loss. However, the trauma cannot be so easily separated from the identity which was unable to sustain the trauma in a fully waking conscious fashion. And it is still a personal consciousness that does both. That is the only consciousness there is.

In any case, it is not the ignoring or the repressing or the denying which represents the sort of ignorance (the ignored, the repressed, the denied) that would function as a limit to pure phenomenology. For in all such cases consciousness is still actively constituting objects to those acts of consciousness. Indeed, more often than not the consciousness is overactive. The mentally ill person spends a great deal of time and uses up a great deal of psychic energy keeping certain matters from surfacing up from the depths of conscious flow. The paranoid must expend a great deal of mental energy to maintain that people—absolutely everyone?—are out to get him. Even in the case of the what I do not know, the malfunctioning fuel gauge which failed to inform me of the empty gas tank so that I made the error of not stopping at the last gas station before driving into the desert, even here there can occur a filling content for that “non object,” with corresponding acts to supply that fill. It is true that I do not know the when or the how of my own demise, I do not know what I do not know. However, there are light beams that penetrate the dark obscurity of that future in terms of acts of consciousness that would indicate past family history, my bad health habits, or a doctor’s report. Still, I can always persist in denial: “What do doctors know.”

There is, however, a species of ignorance which is forever beyond the pale, an ignorance which is not, and can never be, constituted or reconstituted as an object for conscious acts of any sort, since consciousness is simply inactive on that score. This is deep

ignorance. Again, this is not simply the tautological "I do not know *what* I do not know." This is simply the obverse of intentionality: consciousness is always ignorant of...that of which consciousness is ignorant. Nor is it the ignorance, or better, the nescience (or innocence) of the child. There is something charming about the naive credulity of the child. Deep ignorance is much more distressing, and often much more tragic. The socio-path, one for whom the categories of moral good or moral evil simply have no meaning, one who is simply a-moral, suffers from deep ignorance relative to the ethical realm. The depth of the ignorance does not consist in not knowing *what* one does not know. Rather, the amoral person does not know *that* he or she does not know the difference between what is morally right and what is morally wrong. There is total inactivity on the part of the consciousness of the sociopath relative to questions of morality. Indicative of this fact is that when the consequences of the actions of the amoral person prove deleterious socially he or she may simply wonder what all the fuss is about. There is, after all, a philosophical basis for the M'Naughton rule in law, however that use might be restricted by legal interpretation.

The same is the case with the pathological liar. There is a deep ignorance of the truth. The truth does not mean anything. The lies that are told do not even, necessarily, rebound to the advantage of the pathological liar. The intention of deliberately deceiving others may not be present at all. Moral responsibility may not even enter the picture. The person simply constantly lies, and is not even aware *that* he or she is constantly lying. The ignorance is deep because there is a self deception even regarding the fact of deception. The pathological liar about his or her own lying. That is why it is pathological. There is an ignorance ignorant of its own ignorance.

Deep ignorance, then, is not simply the ignorance which is ignorance of *what* it is ignorant of. There is, at least, a possible filling object here, an ignorance which can, and perhaps will, be overcome sometime in the future. Rather, deep ignorance is the ignorance *that* one is even ignorant. And the scary thing about such an ignorance is that we can never be certain but that we are ourselves may be subject to such deep ignorance, unaware even where to look for it or search it out.

It is deep ignorance, then, the ignorance which is ignorant of its own ignorance that would establish the intrinsic limits and possibility of a pure phenomenology. Such a deep ignorance would be beyond the horizon of an actional consciousness, even beyond the non-actional modes of consciousness. There would be no object here, with no activity on the part of consciousness to constitute an object for itself. To be aware that one is even unaware would be to be aware.

In his article Tyman attempted to tackle the problem of the possibility of a pure phenomenology, while avoiding the pitfall of a transcendental phenomenology that would verge on idealism. Whether Husserl's transcendental phenomenology does, or does not, end up in idealism is a question which has been and will be endlessly debated. Indeed, instead of reducing body (*Leib*) to consciousness Husserl could have, as did Merleau-Ponty, reduce consciousness to the body-consciousness of the *corps propre*. He did not take that route. And I think there are good Husserlian reasons why he did not. He required a constituted world intentionally co-related to a constituting consciousness, set off from the matter-of-fact world, in order to make possible the phenomenological description of essences in reduced experience. However, if it is an idealism it strikes me as an idealism of a benign sort. It is not an absolute idealism in the sense of a Fichte or the early Schelling. Husserl never denies the reality of the matter-of-fact world. Indeed, that world can also be an object of phenomenological description, again granted, at the level of reduced experience. Further, there is a depth to consciousness which belies the narrow circularity of an absolute identity between the real and the ideal, subject and object. And that depth descends all the way to the bottom of the enduring flow which is consciousness, right down to ignorance and, below it and out of sight, deep ignorance.*

* Special thanks are due to James Mish'alani of the University of Washington for his helpful comments and criticisms on an earlier draft of this paper.

VIII

Philosophy Behind the Relationship Between Life and Literature

S. V. Joga Rao

Here is a sample survey in this regard :—

1. HOMER :

The Illiad and Odyssey — Both epics presuppose the long drawn-out and complex events of the Trojan War, a War which had an economic cause no doubt, but which is best known in this blending of myth and history. Although Homer is a creative artist and not a philosopher, his poems furnish proof of the Greek genius for imposing order on all things. This Philanthropic principle laid down by Homer in his epics was the massive bed-rock of the Athenian tragic dramatists who, several centuries later, looked back to Homer for much of their inspiration.

2. GREEK DRAMA :

Aristotle conceived of tragic art as a dramatic representation of universals. Individual freedom, Sin, man's relation to God — these are the themes of Aeschylus, expressed with majesty and burning force. In many ways Sophocles is unlike Aeschylus. His mighty wings beat less urgently at the ramparts of heaven; not man against God, but man against man is his theme. He accepts destiny more stoically: for him change is the rule of life: Wealth and gladness come and go: nothing is stead-fast but the strength of soul. Euripides through his plays, preached the revolutionary and sweeping doctrine that man is the measure of all things. He searched for man-made standards of right and wrong. Aristophanes' tremendous creative power and rollicking humour made almost every sham in the Life of contemporary Greece an object of his mockery. The 'Wasps' ridicules Athenians who are fond of litigation. The 'Birds'

is a fantasy which pokes fun slyly at customs and idiosyncracies by presenting a utopian city in the air. The 'Frogs' is a parody on proud and arrogant writers. The 'Clouds' make fun of the Philosophers and the intellectuals who have decided limitations and human weaknesses. In his *Thesmophoriazusae* and *Ecclesiazusae*, the world fares far better when women take over literature and the state.

3. PLATO'S REPUBLIC :

As all of you know, is the first and one of the most illustrious in a series of great books which deal comprehensively with the nature of man and the nature of human commonwealth.

4. SHAKESPEARE :

Was one of those who found the words to express our deepest secrets. He sets us free from the prison of self. An artist — Thaumaturgist, he gives sight to our eyes and hearing to our ears, so that we may partake of that fuller life we yearned for. His plays, in their abundance of life and comprehensiveness of spirit, contain our lives.

5 FRENCH REVOLUTION :

At a time when France, under the Rule of Louis XV who inherited only evils and none of the virtues of his predecessors, was notoriously misgoverned, over-taxed, impoverished and oppressed by tyranny and taboo from the ruling class, the face of France was metamorphosed by Revolution of the people aroused by the hue and cry of the literary Muse. Voltaire was the vivacious mind of the Revolution and Rousseau was its heart. They both contributed to the uprising which brought down the Bourbon monarchy. The heroic song that led the Revolution — "The Marseillaise" became one of the most popular songs in the natural history of France. Victor Hugo's 'Les Miserables' was certainly an attempt towards upholding the dignity of the Human spirit.

6. RUSSIAN REVOLUTION :

This has metamorphosed the entire face of Humanity — its political understanding and considerations and its social life, attitudes and experience. Literature proved itself to be a powerful vehicle for the revolutionist thought and for any kind of expression for the matter of that. Dostayevsky was one of the early pioneers of the revolutionist thought. His 'Crime and Punishment' and 'Brothers Karamazov' beside many others are replete with human sensation and emotion wherefrom it is understood that Sigmund Freud drew his inspiration for formulating his 'Theory of Psycho-Analysis'. In fact, he, according to me and so many Western critics also, is the greatest fiction — writers of the world particularly because life and literature in their true spirit became in his hand inseparable ingredi-

ents of the hard core of the texture of his fiction. In Leo Tolstoy's 'War and Peace' the concepts of life of Buddha, Jesus Christ and Mahatma Gandhi had a peculiar confluence. Gorky's 'Mother' and Maykovsky's poetry in the second phase of his life lead the torch of revolution already lit into the nooks and corners of the pitch darkness of the pithy human life and society, resulting in an awareness of the urge of the age and new awakening. Lenin is more a propagandist than a literature, but his concept of literature brings about a harmonious blend betwixt its aesthetic and purposive aspects, which opened a new vista of thought in Chernishevsky's philosophy of literature. Boris Pasternak who was awarded the Nobel Prize for his "Dr. Zhivago" but refused it with self-respect was full of social consciousness and for him literature is a matter of life and life is a matter of literature.

7. SOME MORE WRITERS OF THE WEST :

Byron inculcated the sense of Political liberty in Greek people down-trodden by the oppression of the Turks through his song and in fact he died in the swamps of Missolonghi fighting in the cause of Greek independence. His poem wherein Napoleon Bonaparte bids farewell to his mother-land on the eve of his deportation to the isle of Elba, is a memorable poem as it roused a patriotic fervour even in the mind of a citizen of his enemyland. However, his Don Juan pulls back the human spirit into the regales and relapses of love and romance which are deemed more sensual than sublime. Yet, it is a lively smile on the lips of the Literary Muse.

William Congreve in his "The Way of the World", a Master-piece of the Restoration comedy and Sheridan in his 'Rivals' an 'A School for scandal' project the playful profile of life, compromising a gay mood with a tense situation and circumstance.

Emile Bronte in her "Wuthering Heights", Jane Austin in her "Pride and Prejudice" and Pearl S. Buck in her "Good Earth" and 'Gone with the Wind' are more concerned with life than literature. Literature for them is only a means of expression to preserve their thought for posterity.

'Eckerman's conversations with Goethe' reveals to us the elegant image of that great literateur of the world and his (Goethe's) 'Faust' present to us a soul-stirring experience of the Human Spirit.

Emerson, Thoreau and Walt Whitman, the greatest American writers authored the noble thought of ancient India in their works and proved how rich and relevant it is in its relation to life and literature.

8. THE INDIAN THOUGHT :

In the occident, the impact of the society on literature is more felt than vice-versa whereas in the Orient, more so in India in particular, the impact of literature on society is in greater dimension. This is because Indian thought is undoubtedly richer in both the aesthetic and the didactic values of life and literature. Religious—no fanaticism—but fervour coupled with philosophical vision draws its literary values from the subtle experiences of real life of the immortal mankind of all time and all clime. This is exactly what we can discern and understand from the 'Mahabharata' of Vyasa, the greatest epic of the world. Bhatia Bana in his 'Kadambari' Strikes at the keynote of the kindred experience that arises out of the human relationship in its various allotropic modifications—thereby offering a unique and lasting message to the entire mankind that bridges of love, friendship and fellowship can only devour the disunity and misunderstanding between men and women which deforms the mankind since generations and pave the way for its thorough wellbeing.

Some Telugu authors, Tikkanna and Vamana in the Past, and Veeresalingam, Gurazada, Viswanatha, Chalam and Sri Sri while setting themselves to the task of literary creation, viewed life in its broad spectrum with an outlook of their own but with a universal vision and without sacrificing aesthetic values. As such, their compositions are full of vivacity and vigour and artistic and crafty expression.

CONCLUSION :

This is only a brief and scappy survey, but yet I sincerely hope that it gives a lay man a glimpse into the realm of literature in its relation to life.

Literature is Literature when only it can embrace the human aspiration and experience though not in its entirety but with a universal outlook and salubrious aesthetic values.

Books-Reviews :

Dr J. J. Shukla : *Knowledge and Reality*, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad, pp. 270. Rs. 10/- Published by and can be had from the Registrar, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad by sending the price + Postal expenditure by M. O.

Various interesting attempts to understand the Ontological approach of Indian Philosophy from the existential/Phenomenological point of view of Western Schools of thought, have been made by Prof. (Dr.) N. V. Joshi, Prof. (Dr.) R. A. Sinari and others. One such attempt has been made by Dr. J. J. Shukla in his book '*Knowledge and Reality*', published by the Gujarat University, Ahmedabad.

The book begins with an Introduction regarding the Phenomenological approach prevalent in western philosophy which provides the background for the second and the third chapters. A detailed study of Subjectivity, Inwardness with reference to the existentialists Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Husserl and others have been discussed in these chapters. Heidegger's 'Dasein' has been well criticised for its abstraction and consequent relapse. Also the dialectic of Hegel has been closely inspected enabling the author to conclude that the Hegelian absolute is a Pseudo Unity. Husserl's Phenomenological approach advocating the suspension of all our natural stand-points as a starting point has been followed by a discussion of Sankaracharya's phenomenological approach which according to the author reinterpreted the unity of things themselves as Existence. The author has also mentioned the influence of Vedic etymology and reduction.

In his fourth chapter "Dynamism of The Real" the author discusses 'Thought' as an inner dynamism. There is an interesting description of consciousness as existent consciousness and of Self-Consciousness as Knowledge. Dr. Shukla refers to the NYAYA SCHOOL when he discusses knowledge as a relation between subject and Object. The introduction of the section "Subjectivity of the Object of Knowledge" leads to the discussion of the role played by Creative Imagination. This provides grounds for discussing Words as an expression of Consciousness. The chapter also includes sections where the author mentions Wittgenstein's position as well as the failure of the "Logical Positivist" movement.

In chapter Five some of the topics of particular interest are the following :

- (a) Stress on the elimination of Subject-object praxis
- (b) Brahman of Indian Philosophy
- (c) Dasein is abstraction

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- (d) Opposition of Ontic and Ontological
- (e) Logic is in need of apodeictic certainty
- (f) Category mistake in Husserl
- (g) Husserl's Intentionality is Psychological.

The book ends with a chapter on "Totality and Temporality" which is a good analysis of concept of temporality in its historic totality. The static view of reality taken up by dialecticians has been stressed. The various views of the Buddhist, Nyaya-Vaisesika, Samkhya-Yoga schools as well as the western approach to temporality have been mentioned.

As described in the earlier paragraphs we note that the book primarily deals with a study in the correlation of Epistemology and Ontology with reference to Western and Indian schools of thought. However, Dr. Shukla seems to be rigidly categorical or dogmatic in his approach when he mentions in the preface to his book that "I am now fully convinced that the correct philosophical approach must be Ontological and must not be epistemological which remains confined to dualities". One cannot afford to overlook the following view expressed by Walter Kaufman "...that the existentialists and analysts will get together is not likely. But, if the feat of Socrates is to be repeated and philosophy is to have a future outside the academics there will have to be philosophers who think in the tension between analysis and existentialism". However, one finds it difficult to agree with Dr. Shukla when he points out that the phenomenological method used by Husserl, Sartre, Kierkegaard and others stop at expressing phenomena does not undertake the creative follow-up without which the phenomenological approach remains incomplete.

A general remark in conclusion suggests that it would have been very much appreciated if the printer's devils would have been avoided and an explicit mention made about the omission of diacritical marks through out this book. The book is priced quite reasonable (Rs. 10/— only) for its contents and general layout

Dr. S. G. Mudgal &

Dr. Miss. Filita Bharucha

Kalu Rinpoche : *The Dharma*, That Illuminates All Beings like the light of the Sun and the Moon, pp. 222, State University of New York Press, State University Plaza, Albany, N.Y. 12246 (1986).

This is one of the recently published best books on Buddhism. Most of the teachings presented here were given orally by Kalu Rinpoche in 1982 at Kagyu Thubten Choling, his retreat centre in upstate New York. These teachings provide an authentic introduction to the foundations of Buddhism as taught in its three Vehicles—the Hinayana, Mahayana and Vajrayana—and offer groundings in Bud-

dhist analysis, conduct and practice for beginning and advance students. The compilation is thoroughgoing which is an important book for scholars, practitioners and general readers. This book consists of hard to find materials from the Karma and Shangba Kagyü traditions, practitioners will find fundamentally useful methods, and others will find a fascinating account of human and non-human affairs and conditions.

Kalu Rinpoche is one of the great meditation masters of the Buddhist tradition, whose teachings have been sought by all four schools of Buddhism in Tibet.

The whole book is divided into eight chapters : beside Introduction, Epilogue: The Eight Thoughts, Appendix I: The Five Skandhas, by Lama Norlha, Appendix II: Glossary of Technical Terms and Index : Chapters 1. Kalu Rinpoche on Teaching in North America, 2. The Four Noble Truths, 3. The Four Dharmas of Gampopa, 4. Bardo, 5. Mandala, 6. Vows, 7. Women, Siddhi, Dharma, 8. Mahamudra.

In the Introduction chapter Kalu Rinpoche's life has been described. Both husband and wife were devoted to practice. In his early years Kalu Rinpoche awakened the excellent habits of virtue and abandoned concerns for possessions and pleasures of this life, wandered at times in the wilderness of mountains. Travelling freely in the mountains, Rinpoche would chant mantras, blessing the animals, fish or insects he might encounter. Rinpoche studied the teachings of the Sutras and tantras, receiving not instruction and empowerments from many of the great lamas. At the age of twenty-five Rinpoche departed to do an extended solitary retreat in the desolate mountains of Kham, wandering without possessions, taking shelter wherever he could find it, seeking and needing no human company. For twelve years he lived like this, perfecting his practice and offering everything to develop impartial love and compassion for all beings. "There is no higher siddhi than compassion". In the 1940s he began visiting monasteries, traditional centres of many schools and lineages, all over Tibet, and on a visit to Lhasa gave teachings to the Regent of the young Dalai Lama. Rinpoche first went to Bhutan where he established two retreat centres and ordained three hundred monks. In 1965 he established his own monastery. Rinpoche visited to Europe and North America four times.

In chapter I Kalu Rinpoche on Teaching in North America has described what he taught in America., during four visits to Europe and America. In Chapter 2 The Four Noble Truths and chapter III The Four Dharmas of Gampopa. The Four Dharmas of Gampopa provide a concise survey of the entire Path, divided into four levels. The First Dharma: The Mind Turns towards Dharma; The Second Dharma: Dharma Becomes the Path; The Third Dharma: The path dispels confusion. The Fourth Dharma: Confusion arises as primordial Awareness; In chapter 4 Bardo the six Bardos have

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been explained. Bardo literally means "an interval between two things". Besides six kinds of Bardo many other things have been discussed: The Five elements and the nature of Mind; The Five elements and the Physical Body, The Five elements in the Bardo, the Mandalas of the Peaceful and wrathful Deities, The Possibility of Enlightenment in the Bardo, The Bardo of Becoming, The Symbolism of the Mandala of Deities. Chapter 5 discusses Mandala, Mandala is a Sanskrit word which the Tibetans means centre and circumference. In the Manadala Offering, a centre with its surrounding forms a complete system, and constitutes an ideal conception of the universe. In this chapter the Variety of Cosmologies, Making Pure Offerings, The Importance of Motivation, The mental attitude is the most crucial factor in any situation; The chapter 6 Vows consider The three levels of vows, the five basic commitments. Moral discipline plays an important role in Buddha's teachings. The last words the Buddha spoke before Nirvana. The teacher can show the way to liberation, but we have to experience it for ourselves. In chapter 7 Women, Siddhi, Dharma, it is mentioned if you have faith, confidence and diligence, if you have compassion and wisdom, you can become enlightened. The Ultimate Nature of Mind is neither Male nor Female. The Buddha said, "The greater the power, the greater the misery; the greater the wealth, the greater the miserliness; the more caught up we are in samsaric situations, the greater our self deception. In chapter 8 Mahamudra has been considered thoroughly and examined in this chapter: The Nature of Mind; The Nature of Experience, Devotion to the Lama, Practice, and Mistakes and Misunderstandings. He writes if you understand the nature of these teachings and practice them well, there is perhaps no single more effective practice, you are open to all sorts of errors. Then there is Epilogue: The Eight Thoughts is aspiration prayer, the Eight thoughts of a Great person was made by Kalu Rinpoche.

Primordial Awareness In Epilogue The Eight Thoughts have been expressed. Besides Epilogue we find Appendix. Lama Norla ha has written a chapter on Five Skandhas and in the end given Outlines of the Five Skandhas have been provided which is a very good concise description and in Appendix 2 A very useful Glossary has been provided which is a very scholarly one Very important Buddhist terms have been provided. This is in itself an important and useful addition to this book.

On the whole the book is very well written and informative contribution to the Buddhism by an eminent and internationally known scholar. Kalu Rinpoche deserves our most heartfelt thanks for bringing out such a nice, comprehensive book on Buddhism and the Appendices are very well written and informative. This book will attract the attention of Buddhists. Non Buddhists, general readers and scholars. State University of New York Press deserves thanks for publishing such a nice book on Buddhism by a mystic Saint.

Chhaganlal Lala : *Bhakti in Religions of the World*, with special reference to Dr. Bankey Behari Ji, pp 248, B R Publishing Corporation, Delhi 110052 (1986) Price Rs.

Dr. Chhaganlal Lala originally belonged to Sind, migrated to Vrindaban in 1947. Since 1951 he attended the Satsanga of Dr. Sri

Bankey Behari Ji Maharaj in Vrindaban till he resumed his Academic career in 1966 when he passed his M.A. in Philosophy. In 1972 he was awarded the Ph.D. Degree of the Agra University. He also obtained the D.Litt. Degree from the Agra University. At present he is serving as a lecturer in English in Sri Nimbark Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya, Vrindaban. His several articles have been published in several journals.

The present book of the author is a comparative study of the four main religions—Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. The author has very nicely discussed Bhakti and the teachings of noted Bhakti leaders, especially Dr. Sri Bankey Behari Ji, a noted spiritual and mystical leader of Vrindaban.

He has quoted several classical scriptures and epics, the author points out that all these religions enjoin moral and spiritual virtues in prayer, charity, worship and belief in God. Various means of God realisation have been outlined out of which Bhakti predominates, followed by practice of the Divine Name and renunciation. The author has very nicely highlighted the basic identity between the tenets of various religions and exploded the myth of superiority of any one religion over the others. It is an interesting book on four religions which will attract general readers, academicians and research scholars.

The whole book is divided into six chapters: besides Preface, Prologue, Introduction, Bibliography and Index which are as follows: 1. Epistemology : The Scriptures of the Four Religions, 2. Philosophical Doctrines Siddhanta, 3. Bhakti as Means of God-realisation in Four Religions, 4. Practice of Divine Name as means of God-realisation in Four Religions, 5. Practice of Renunciation in Four Religions and lastly 6. General conclusion. Dr. Chagan Lal has discussed critically Epistemology, philosophical doctrines, means of God Realization, Practice of Divine name, Practice of Renunciation. In Introduction the author has very ably given historical Background of the four Main Religions of the world and their comparison. The Religious history of India has been divided into : (1) The Pre Aryan period, the Vedic Period, The age of Revolt, The Pauranic age; Evolution of Synthetic Hinduism, Saivism, Saktism, Vaishnavism, further developed southern Vaishnavism, Bengal Vaishnavism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam (Mohammedanism and Sufism). He has shown good comparison and contrast of four religions. Hinduism has given four paths viz., Karma, Jana, Yoga and Bhakti. Bhakti has been treated in all four religions. Special emphasis has been given to Bhakti. All the four religions have their revealed scriptures which enunciate the same fundamental principles. Several quotations have emphasised that Bhakti' or love of the Lord has been accepted by all the four religions except Hinayana Buddhism.

Dr. Bankey Behari says : The love of God is not the legacy of one country, sect or religion.

We congratulate Dr. Chaganlal Lala for bringing out such a concise and scholarly contribution on Bhakti in four main religions. The book will be appreciated by scholars as well as general readers. The publisher are also to be congratulated.

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The Development of Positive Psychotherapy

Psychotherapy Instead of Psychopathology

Nossrat Peseschkian

If thou wishest to bring order to land,
thou must first bring order to the provinces.
If thou wishest to bring order to the provinces,
thou must bring order to the cities.
If thou wishest to bring order to the cities,
thou must bring order to the families.
If thou wishest to bring order to the families,
thou must bring order to thine own family.
If thou wishest to bring order to thine own family,
thou must first bring order to thine own self.

MEANING AND LOSS OF UNITY

This oriental wisdom contains a basic problem of every realization of meaning, whether it be the attempt to change social relationships and improve concrete living conditions, shape human interaction, influence marriage and the family, or promote the health of individual people. According to what is seen as primary, one aims at political developments, social change, the transformation of interpersonal relationships, the family and individual persons. Each of these goal orientations presupposes a decision grounded in ideology and Weltanschauung, and starts from concrete concepts that are stamped by history, culture, and special interests. Although there is scarcely any difference in the desire to solve disturbances, difficulties, misunderstandings, and lack of meaning, the representatives of the different solutions fall into mutual contradiction,

In view of this situation, we are convinced that it can't go on this way, and that in today's circumstances something decisive must happen. The goal seems to be known, but the ways to it are different. The more positions and reactions differ, the more they have one point in common: one sidedness. This is the reason why today's world crisis withstands every effort to bring it under the control of the normal remedies of social authority. If once again a world war threatens, we call the crisis "political" and strive to dominate it through the instruments of the power of the state. If a depression is shaping up, we call the crisis "economic" and seek to overcome it with economic instruments. It would be just as logical to call the crisis "religious" and to hope for a solution through the influence of religion. In reality, the crisis is simultaneously political, economic, psychological, medical, scientific, and religious, but mankind possesses no responsible, normative means of authority that could synchronize all factors and call into existence a worldwide plan taking into account all factors. It is not surprising that many people feel helpless in the face of this loss of unity.

An example shows the relatively of meaning and meaninglessness, which are attributed to one's own behavior.

"My husband is married to his profession. He is an excellent scientist. Everyone is impressed by his work. When he just speaks about his work, you can't help but listen with fascination. But he pays so much attention to his mind that he forgets his appearance and his health. Once he's into his creative process, he works through the night, hardly eats anything, and drinks coffee by the quart to stay awake. That usually brings on terrible upset stomach. Then I see him grimace at the pain and hold his belly. But I've never heard him complain. His clothing and his appearance are unimportant to him. Unshaven, he looks like a robber, not like a scientist. I find it very, very embarrassing when other people see him that way. Finally, his neglect falls back on me, and I can imagine what people say behind our backs." (48 year old natural scientist's wife with depression).

Against this background should be seen, for example, the rules of interpretation, according to which explanations of behavior are given in the different professional approaches. In general, theories are dependent on worldviews, views of mankind, and ideologies.

TRANSCULTURAL ASPECTS OF THE POSITIVE FAMILY THERAPY

Since 1968 I have been working on a new method of psychohygienics and psychotherapy. I have tried to examine the behavior and conflicts of patients from viewpoints that were somewhat unconventional. The motivation for starting this new method may have been that I am, personally, in a transcultural situation.

It is the effect of a new development that national, ethnic, and cultural groups open themselves to the outer world, i.e., toward other groups. This trend carries new possibilities, which we shall describe as transcultural problems. They can therefore be reduced to two basic problems :

1. What is it that all men have in common ?
2. By what do they differ ?

An important reason for my own concern with Positive Psychotherapy may also have been that I am in a transcultural situation. I am an Iranian, but have been living in Europe since 1954. In this time, I have noticed that many modes of behavior, habits, and attitudes are evaluated completely differently in the two cultural groups. This observation, which I had already made during my childhood in Teheran, applies particularly to prejudices of a religious nature. As Baba's, we were always in the cross fire between our Islamic, Christian, and Jewish schoolfellows and teachers. This led me to reflect on the relations existing between the religions and on interpersonal relationships. I came to know the families of my schoolfellows and to understand their behavior on the basis of their philosophy and their conception of the family. Later I witnessed similar confrontations, when during my specialist training I experienced the tension existing among psychiatrists, neurologists, and psychotherapists or psychoanalysts and the violence with which psychiatric and psychoanalytical ideas conflicted. I began to take an interest in the intrinsic nature of this type of tension and the reason behind it. Of particular importance for me was the realization that the family could have another form and organization from those I had experienced in my childhood and youth. The family in which I grew up comprised not only my parents and brothers and sisters, but a multitude of relatives and other dependents with whom we had close ties. In it I experienced a feeling of belonging to a group, of reciprocal care and security, but also a feeling of dependence and restriction. The typical American family, which sets great store by its independence, seemed to me—with all its advantages—to complement the Oriental system. I came to regard the family as a kind of switch-board where certain capabilities and human possibilities are developed and others are suppressed. The family thus exerts powerful influence in many areas of life. It helps to determine one's choice of career and spouse and affects how one relates to other people and faces one's own future.

These ideas led me to look at people primarily in terms of their personal relationships. Even in psychotherapy, I no longer regarded a patient as an isolated individual. As in my own development, I began to look at a person's transcultural situation. I wanted to find out what shapes him into what he is.

From these aspects, my attention was drawn to the meaning of social standards for the socialization as well as for the development of interhuman and intrapsychic conflicts, and I found in Oriental as well as in European and American patients that behind the existing symptoms, as a rule, were conflicts the origins of which are usually found in a number of recurring behavior standards.

These experiences and reflections prompted me—in the field of psychotherapy as well—to regard the individual not merely in isolation, but also in the context of his interpersonal relationships and—as was the case in my own development—his “transcultural” situation, the things that in fact make him what he is. The transcultural approach colors the whole of Positive Psychotherapy. Part of my work involves investigating the relationships between culture and disease and between cultural concepts in twenty different cultural groups.

This transcultural view is evident throughout all of Positive Family Therapy. We give it such great importance because it helps us understand the individual's conflicts. It can also be important in dealing with such social issues as the treatment of illegal aliens and refugees, foreign aid for the Third World countries, problems in dealing with members of other cultural systems, interracial and transcultural marriages, prejudices, and alternative life styles adopted from other societies. It can also be applied to political problems brought about by transcultural situations.

EAST-WEST CONCEPTS: ON THE QUEST FOR MEANING

I have tried to bring together some attitudes which seem to be typical of Eastern and Western thinking and feeling and to compare them with one another. The differing conceptions of the same behavior create different ways of reacting in the members of different cultures. In the varied interpretations are reflected these groups' interpersonal rules of the game. They indicate which behaviors are considered “normal” and when the dividing line of abnormality or illness has been crossed. When we make it clear that the same behavior is evaluated according to different standards in another culture or at another time, and that there it may be considered commonplace or even desirable, we get a broadening of horizons, and we no longer measure the behavior according to the given standards of value, but rather compare these standards with other concepts. For interpersonal relationships this means calling prejudices into question, dissolving fixations, and lifting barriers to communication, through the relativization of our own value judgements. The consideration is the basis of a therapeutic principle of Positive Psychotherapy. We don't so much call attention to a conspicuous behavior, as ask about the rules of the game which first made this behavior

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seem conspicuous. This takes place through our bringing views, concepts, and rules of the game from other cultures into relationship with the family and therapeutic system. By the West, I mean the geographic regions of Middle Europe and North America, which represent Western thinking. The geographic region of Asia and Africa corresponds to the concepts which we label Eastern. Here it becomes clear that we are dealing with ideal types, as these regions themselves encompass a wide variety of concepts, view of man, and Weltanschauungen. It's right here that a danger exists, in terms of a dilemma facing the transcultural procedure. On the one hand, the transcultural approach seeks to mediate among the differing conceptions and to find forms of metacommunication in the discussion of conflicts and thereby to tear down prejudices. On the other hand, the characterizations tied to transcultural procedure, such as "the German," "the Persian", "the Oriental", "the Italian", "the Frenchman", etc., can lead to stereotypes and prejudices. For this reason, it seems important in transcultural descriptions always to bear in mind that we are dealing with a type casting, i.e., abstractions and behaviors of a statistical majority, which always permit exceptions and which may be contradicted by individual cases. In this sense, there exists a possibility of paradoxes, which we may encounter without much ado, for example, the "Prussian oriental", who takes punctuality, orderliness, and accuracy very seriously, and the "oriental Prussian", who, with his tolerant and lax orientation toward punctuality could fit right into the atmosphere of an oriental bazaar. Another difficulty becomes clear. What actually is a culture, that object with which transcultural inquiry concerns itself? Does such a unit, closed in upon itself, ingrown and capable of being culturally set apart from the outside world, still exist? We are, of course, dealing here with nuances, but they are of great significance.

FOUR FORMS OF DEALING WITH CONFLICT AND HOW THEY WORK


In order to understand human conflicts, we inquire about the contents carried out by them. In the psychosocial realm, these contents are not static, but develop their own dynamics. They are most clearly evident in our relationships with the people who are important to us: our parents, grandparents, siblings, spouses, children, and others. The arising conflicts are played out on many levels at the same time: in the way we deal with experiences and in our relationships with our partners, our family, and larger social groups. To do justice to these various aspects, the contents with which we describe such conflicts must appear in these relational levels.

We want to deal with the various possibilities for grasping these conflict contents. We want to show how they influence the conflict

dynamic. Although these methods are not dependent on one particular therapeutic arrangement, their focus is found in family therapy.

Despite all cultural and social differences and the uniqueness of each individual, we can observe that all people rely on four methods for dealing with their conflicts. When we have a problem, feel upset, burdened, or misunderstood, live in constant tension, or see no meaning in our lives, we can express these difficulties in the following four ways. These four ways are also linked to our four ways for learning and knowing. They enable us to see how man perceives himself and his environment and in what way reality is tested.

1. Body (by means of the sense)
2. Achievement (by means of reason)
3. Contact (by means of tradition)
4. Fantasy (by means of intuition)



These forms for processing our conflicts are relatively broad categories that each person establishes with his own ideas, wishes, and conflicts.

Example: The father reacts by escaping into his work (achievement); the mother reacts by withdrawing, by avoiding social contact (contact); the child reacts with physical complaints (body). These various reactions can then lead to communication problems.

Each person develops his own preferences for dealing with problems that arise. Through hypertrophy of one way of dealing with conflict, the other forms fade into the background. The choice of one particular form depends to a great extent on the individual's learning experiences, especially ones stemming from childhood. The four forms of reaction are modelled in the concrete life situation as typical concepts.

The shift from one area to another is much like moving from an old apartment to a newer, more beautiful one. Although it has its advantages, it also involves a lot of effort and expense; it requires that one leave one's old environment and establish contact with new surroundings, new people, and new developmental possibilities that one cannot yet control.

It is important to think carefully about these defensive attitudes, for they do not mean that one doesn't want to change; they

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mean that the idea of changing one's perspective and revising one's concepts is already such a real possibility that the person feels he must resist it. This is why we protect the patient and enable him to develop a change of perspective step by step, using models of conflict reaction that he can control himself. By offering positive interpretations, the therapist supports the patient's family in its quest for new discoveries.

BODY/SENSES

In the foreground stands the body-ego feeling. How does one perceive his body? How does one experience the various sensory impressions and the information coming from the environment? Information received through the senses is censored by acquired value standards. The individual sensory qualities can become conflict-laden in connection with the particular experiences. At the beginning of his development, a child establishes contact with the world through his senses. The totality of the activities is controlled by the senses.

Sleeping and feeding rhythms can be very important for the development of the child's punctuality. Some people panic when they hear someone crying. Memories of parents crying angrily or of the parents pleading that the children be quiet make noise subjectively unbearable. Other sensory qualities can also be affected.

Concepts such as "What's brought to the table gets eaten"; "One should torment his body so he doesn't lose his desire for death"; "You look pale, so you must be sick"; "Food and drink hold body and soul together"; et cetera can influence a person's attitudes to the body and to physical illnesses. They are one reason why people react to physical problems in such different ways—why some live like hypochondriacs, always expecting pain or illness, why others suppress their physical disorders.

Behavior/ concept	West	East
<i>Illness</i>	When a person is sick, he'd like to have rest. He is visited by few people. Visits are also perceived as social control.	Here, when a person gets sick, the bed is installed in the living-room. The sick person is the center of attention and is visited by many family members, relatives, and friends. For visitors to stay away would be seen as an affront and lack of sympathy.
<i>Eating</i>	"Whatever is placed on the table will be eaten.	It is customary and the best manners to leave a

<i>Behavior/ concept</i>	<i>West</i>	<i>East</i>
	It's better to make yourself sick to your stomach than to leave something for your host." No "courtesy portion" is left on one's plate.	residue of food on the plate. In this way, one signals to the host that one is satisfied, and that he has provided more than one can eat.
<i>Pain</i>	The sufferer mostly stands alone, either because he wants to "solve his own problem" or because the others have no time for him or say, "Let him see how well he gets along". In addition, the sufferer often has to bear the feelings of indifference, rejection, or sadism.	The sufferer, whether suffering from material need or psychological and physical pain, is taken into the social body of the extended family and cared for. The responsibility is borne collectively. This involvement gives the one affected a certain emotional security.

ACHIEVEMENT (REASON)

This dimension is especially important in industrial society, particularly in the American-European cultural circle. It includes the way the norms of achievement are defined and incorporated into one's self-concept. Thought and reason make it possible to solve problems in a systematic, conscious way and to optimize achievement. Two opposing conflict reactions are possible: (a) escape into work and (b) escape from the demands of achievement. Typical symptoms are problems of self-worth, excessive demands, stress reactions, fear of failure, difficulty with concentration, and deficit symptoms like pension neuroses, apathy, fear of success, et cetera.

CONCEPTS

- "If you can do something, you are someone".
- "First school, then play."
- "Business is business and fun is fun."
- "When you're learning you can't be the master."
- "Time is money," et cetera.

<i>Behavior/ concept</i>	<i>West</i>	<i>East</i>
<i>Punctuality</i>	Great emphasis is laid on punctuality. Tardiness is seen as weakness, as blameworthy. One would rather renounce contact with the person he is meeting than bear tardiness. "Punctuality is the courtesy of kings."	Here a tolerant attitude prevails toward punctuality. One accepts it when someone arrives late, so long as he does come (contact). "You're not late, we started early."
<i>Learning</i>	One learns through reading books.	Knowledge is imparted through conversation and contact.

CONTACT (TRADITION)

This area comprises the ability to develop and maintain relationships: with oneself, one's mate, family, other people, groups, social classes, and foreign cultural circles, and animals, plants, and things. Patterns of social behavior are characterized by individual experiences and by tradition. Our possibilities for forming contacts and the socially acquired criteria that govern them are regulated: one expects his partner to show, eg., politeness, honesty, justice, order, activity in certain areas of interest, et cetera and one seeks partners who match these criteria in some way.

We can react to conflicts by carrying the problem into our relationships with the environment. One extreme is the escape into sociability, whereby the protectiveness and activity of the group are supposed to help defuse the problem. By talking with other people, one tries to gain sympathy and solidarity: "When I'm upset about my mother-in-law, I usually call a girl friend and talk to her about it for hours on end". Here we find social hyperactivity, emotional dependence on groups, et cetera. But the reverse can also take place. One can withdraw from the group, distancing himself from the people who upset him. He feels inhibited and avoids social gatherings and other opportunities to get together with people. The symptoms are: inhibitions, unconscious need to cling to someone, fear of contact, prejudices, autism, et cetera.

Concepts

"What do I need other people for?"

"Man by himself is weak; when united with others, he is strong".

"Guests are a gift from God".

"You rely on yourself, but never on other people".

"A person without friends is only half a person".

Behavior/ concept	West	East
Choice of marriage partner	It is held to be a sign of independence and maturity to choose one's own partner.	The choice of marriage partner is strictly governed by the extended family. The marriage is embarked upon and sealed in harmony with the family and the new marriage carries on the family tradition.
Tender- ness to- ward children	First of all, children are held to be cut out for soft forms of tenderness. Tenderness is mostly only imparted up to a	Children are often hugged and kissed by all the members of the family. People like to couple the kiss with a gentle biting and the hug

Behavior/ concept	West	East
	certain age, and after wards is held to be "unsuitable."	with pinching. The child experiences the devotion, and the "pain" does not provoke anxiety, because the reference person laughs at the same time. The mutual touching and handling continue throughout one's whole life. Similar tenderness rituals are developed towards women.
<i>Wedding</i>	In the Western culture area, the orientation to the wedding as an administrative act has grown stronger. In an avoidance of big spending, independence and the loosening of parental ties are documented. Weddings do not exceed the financial condition of the bride and groom vis a vis their parents.	It becomes a feast, often with several hundred guests present as a tribute to the highly valued social contact and the extended family. The wedding itself takes place before a great number of witness. The groom must bear the financial burden of such a feast for several years to come. In part, this has a certain protective function for the wife, on the other hand, her moral commitment to her husband is thereby strengthened.
<i>Conflicts with the mother and father-in-law</i>	Restricted by the independent choice of partner, the parents are mostly faced with facts accomplish which they have to put up with, even if they are more or less openly opposed to them. Parents in-law and sons or daughters-in-law must first get used to each other, and one often seeks to avoid points of friction through spatial separation. Complications ensue when the parents-in-law involve themselves in the couple's problems, and morally compel the daughter or the son to take sides.	Here, the parents and other relatives participate in the choice of the marriage partner and can bring into the discussion a partner who most nearly corresponds to their expectations. Conflicts arise out of the close connection which the children maintain with their parents, even after marriage. Rivalries between parents and parents-in-law are headed off through the traditionally prescribed relationships to the parents in-law. Mother-in-law/daughter in-law conflicts take place when they appear, under the cover of pronounced politeness. When it comes to open conflicts, another alliance usually ensues.

	West	East
<i>Behavioral concept</i>		
<i>Forms of contact</i>	Keeping one's distance is preferred, in keeping with the shrinking of contact which is learned throughout the course of socialization. Tenderness is suppressed and concealed behind matter of fact forms of social intercourse, such as hand shaking and nodding,	Here, one spontaneously expresses one's feeling, not only to ward the members of one's family, in ways which are maintained throughout one's whole life. There is pronounced ritual and greeting through embracing.
<i>Depression</i>	Middle Europeans and North Americans develop depressive moods because they lack contact, they are isolated and suffer from a paucity of emotional warmth. The contents of the depressions differ in many respects from one another. In the foreground are anxieties which can be related to external appearance, beauty, and sexual potency, but also to social isolation, orderliness, cleanliness, and especially thrift.	In the orient, depressions are more likely to develop because people feel overburdened by the narrowness of their social obligations and involvements, which they cannot back out of. In terms of contents, anxieties about fertility, social appearance, and the relation to the future are in the foreground.

THE FOUR FORMS OF DEALING WITH CONFLICT, AS USED IN POSITIVE FAMILY THERAPY

When family conversations turn away from customary areas of the conflict and take up issues that had previously been avoided, there is usually some resistance. The shift from an achievement-oriented attitude is thus associated with the revision of a number of concepts and habits. Revising one's concepts is usually perceived as a painful process, one that often produces a lot of guilt. In other words, the change of perspective within the four forms of conflict reaction is not simply a cognitive process carried out by reason alone. On the contrary, it involves feelings to a great degree (affective and emotional), but at the same time represents potential change of deeply embedded behavior.

The therapist tries to determine the psychodynamically effective connections based on the information at hand—the patterns of actual capabilities and the patient's ability to love and to understand. The concepts, derived from the person's live story, keep individual

psychic contents separate from the conscious and remove them from its control. In view of the four areas for dealing with conflict, this process can be described as insufficient differentiation, as one-sidedness. When, for instance, the area "achievement/understanding" occupies the midpoint, it can mean that one's relationships to one's body and to other people (contact) are suppressed. Even fantasy is regulated by this imbalance. Individual dreams and fantasies likewise deal only with achievements. Similar mechanisms can be observed with regard to one's ability to love and, as we will see later on, with regard to the actual capabilities.

To be sure, man has potential access to all the possibilities for dealing with conflict, but his concepts allow him to take up only a few of them, thus blocking his access to the other forms for dealing with the conflicts. In large part, the therapeutic task involves making these concepts conscious and available. The therapist seeks to uncover the patients' Psychodynamic backgrounds and provide easier access to the previously undifferentiated capabilities.

Working with the instruments of Positive Family Therapy is in this sense a way to open up the preconscious and the unconscious.

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Change And Time : Parallels Between Chinese-Thinkers And Bergson

A. Appanramanujam

INTRODUCTION

Henri Bergson's Philosophy in the West has revolutionised philosophic thought in the twentieth century. His crusading zeal for the cause of anti-intellectualism or his steadfast opposition of rationalism and above all his steering a middle path between the traditional opponents of realists and idealists are the main features of his philosophy. The philosophy of change which he advocates in his monumental work "*Creative Evolution*", though was not new to Greek Philosophers like *Heraclitus* and Aristotle, attains its perfection only in the hands of Bergson. With a scientific bent of mind supported by the knowledge of biology and mathematics he is able to expound his views on evolution in his own characteristic way. But is it true that only the occidental Philosophers like *Heraclitus* and Aristotle influenced Bergson to develop his philosophy? Were not the Orientalists aware of this concept of change before Bergson? Already we have the *Ksanika Vāda* (the doctrine of momentariness) of Buddha in Indian Philosophy. This Buddhist tradition was later imported from India and incorporated into the Chinese culture. Apart from this the Chinese themselves had developed a philosophy similar to Bergson's philosophy of change. Taoism and Confucianism (551-479 B. C.) are the main branches in Chinese thought which accommodated such a philosophy.

One of the important concepts of Bergson's philosophy is Time. In this regard H. Wildon Carr, the best interpreter of Bergson's philosophy in England, observes: "Time is not a merely formal quan-

titative and external relation of a reality that is essentially timeless. It is a quality of reality in the profoundest sense of that term"¹. In this article we are trying to see the points of similarity between the Chinese Philosophers and Bergson with special reference to the concepts of 'Time' and 'Change'.

The Philosophy of Change Bergson's views :

The principle that change is original and ultimate involves the conclusion that reality is free activity. But free action is creative action. Our inner life is a continuous change, an endless flow, in which the whole of our past enters into our present to create an unforeseeable future. The evolution of the world can be best understood as a creative process producing divergent forms of beings out of one vital impulse namely 'elan vital'. Such evolution is truly creative because it freely brings into existence novel forms, which could not be predicted from their antecedent conditions even by an omniscient mind. There is no repetition which was existing already. because the world as a whole, and in each of its living parts, is constantly growing, that is, swelling like a snow-ball as it is advancing. By supposing *one* original impulse at the back of all, the theory of creative evolution can account for unity and harmony, and by supposing the spontaneous disruption of the same principle it can also account for novelty, diversity and discord. "Life is a movement, materiality is the inverse movement, and each of these two movements is simple, the matter which forms a world being an undivided flux, and undivided also the life which runs through it, cutting out in it living beings all along its track". We must not think of things which are created and a thing which creates for things and states are merely views, taken by our mind, of becoming. There are no things, there are only actions. Worlds are still being born. God has nothing of the already made; "He is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation...is not a mystery; we experience it in ourselves when we act freely".

Bergson and Taoism :

Coming to the Chinese concept of change, there are of course different ways of viewing change and its meaning. We shall discuss here Taoist and Confucian attitudes. First let us take a look at the Taoist view. According to Chuang Tzu, the world is in a universal flux, but all changes in the world are equally the work of Tao. Therefore he asks us to make no distinctions among them but simply to follow the natural course of things. The following quotation will help us to understand Chuang Tzu's views. "All things are one. Which is short and which is long? Tao has neither beginning nor

¹ H. Wildon Carr, *The Philosophy of Henri Bergson*, *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 8, 1909-1910.

end. Things are born and die, and their completion cannot be taken for granted. They are now empty and now full, and their physical form is not fixed in one place. The years cannot be retained. Time cannot be arrested. The succession of decline, growth, fullness and emptiness go in a cycle, each and becoming a new beginning. This is the way to talk about the workings of the great principle and to discuss the principle of all things. The life of things passes by like a galloping horse. With no activity is it not changing, and at no time is it not moving. What shall we do? What shall we not do? The thing to do is to leave it to self-transformation... Do not let man destroy Nature. Do not let cleverness destroy destiny. And do not sacrifice your name for gain". Guard carefully your nature and do not let it go astray. This is called returning to one's true nature".

Chuang Tzu says that one has to follow one's given nature and react accordingly. "The eagles must not live according to the way of the insects. There is no point in imitating something good performed by others that is beyond one's ability. And yet on the other hand, one's mind should not be bound to this world of relative distinctions. In the great process of change, one thing tends to transform into its opposite. If one can see things through the eyes of Nature, he will no longer care to cling to these relative distinctions". In the statement, "Do not let man destroy Nature. Do not let cleverness destroy destiny..." we note Chuang Tzu's anticipation of Bergson's anti-rational attitude. Regarding order in the evolutionary process Chuang Tzu's views are reflected in Bergson's thinking: Bergson says, "Life presents itself to us as evolution in time and complexity in space. Regarded in time, it is the continuous evolution of a being ever growing older; it never goes backward and ever growing older, it never repeats anything. Considered in space, it exhibits certain co-existing elements so closely interdependent, so exclusively made for one another, that not one of them could, at the same time, belong to two different organisms; each living being is a closed system of phenomena, incapable of interfering with other systems"⁴.

Chuang Tzu further adds : "Having seen the one, he was then able to abolish the distinction of past and present. Having abolished the past and the present, he was then able to enter the realm of neither life nor death. Then, to him, the destruction of life did not mean life. In dealing with things, he would not lean forward or backward to accommodate them. To him everything was in the present of perfection. This is called tranquillity in disturbance.

2 Liu, *Time and Temporality: The Chinese Perspective*,
v East & West, April 1974, p. 147.

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4 Lougher (1921), p. 88-89.

Tranquillity in disturbance means that it is especially in the midst of disturbance the (tranquillity) becomes perfect"⁵.

Thus the emphasis on change is the emphasis on One. This is what Bergson also emphasises in his philosophy. The vital impulse which endures is the only Reality. Reality is movement. Movement is change. So, for Bergson, the One is change and God is nothing but unceasing action and freedom. All individual creatures and the existence of all living beings in the universe are the manifestations of this original principle which were implicitly found before manifestations in the vital impulse.

Bergson and Confucianism :

Like Taoism, Confucianism also taught a philosophy of change, we see in the "*Book of Changes*" Confucianism advocating the change in the following terms : "changes mean production and reproduction. *Ch'ien* means the completion of forms and *K'un* means to model after them. Divination means to go to the utmost of the natural course of events in order to know the future. Affairs mean to adapt and accommodate accordingly. And that which is unfathomable in the operation of *Yin* and *Yang* is called spirit"⁶. Although the Confucian philosophers maintain that the world is an ever creative process, new forms emerge and new orders come into being and become stabilised, the natural course of things is to create and further create without a moment of cessation and change follows a dialectical pattern which may swing back to its starting point, yet they are different from Taoists in one aspect. The Taoist says that in spite of the unceasing action in the evolutionary process one has to keep *oneself to the root or the starting point*. But the Confucian says that *one must look toward the future* and create new values. He believes that the "successive movement of *Yin* and *Yang* constitutes the way (Tao). What issues from the way is good, and that which realises it is the individual nature"⁷. So, for him, the creative process must not be obstructed. Since human affairs are the extension of the natural affairs just like we see order in nature, human affairs must also be without confusion and disorder. Bergson is almost telling us a similar thing in his view of creative evolution. The emergentist holds a similar view with the Confucian when he says that in the evolutionary process one must look toward the future. Bergson holds a similar view with the Taoist when he says that the One vital impulse which is at the back of all creative processes is the ultimate Reality. Again whereas emergent evolution places God at the end of the process, creative evolution puts God at the beginning identifying it with the original impulse that drives

5 Shu-hsien Liu, op cit., p. 148.

6 Ibid. p. 148.

7 Ibid. p. 149.

the world from behind. So the relation that exists between Bergson and the emergentist is similar to that between the Taoist and the Confucian.

Time, Duration and Space : Bergson's concept of Duration :

The concept of duration is important in Bergson's Philosophy. Since the evolutionary process is continuous, every moment is unique in the history of an individual and nothing repeats itself. So, if we confuse the nature of creative process with abstract time it is lifeless. The time we have to use here must be conscious and inseparable from the individual. Duration has history as far as the individual is concerned and not just like the mathematical time which is abstract and inextensive. The world is a flow, change and movement. "If our existence were composed of separate states with an impassive ego to write them, for as there would be no duration. For an ego which does not change does not *endure* and a psychic state which remains the same so long as it is not replaced by the following state does not endure either"⁸. Again, "Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances. And as the past grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its preservation. Memory, as we have tried to prove, is not a faculty of putting away recollections in a drawer or of inscribing them in a register. There is no register, no drawer; there is not even, properly speaking, a faculty when it can, whilst the piling up of the past upon the past goes on without realization"⁹. Since the past survives in the present, the consciousness does not pass through the same state twice because in spite of the circumstances being the same, it acts no longer of the same person, since it finds him at a new moment of his history. The individual personality is built up each instant with its accumulated experience and it changes without ceasing and such is the concept of duration of Bergson.

Chinese concept of 'flowing Time' and Yuchou :

The Chinese unlike the Westerners did not develop any abstract concept of time apart from the concrete happenings in the world; they also lacked the drive to go beyond the realm of change. Time, for the Chinese also just like for Bergson is for ever flowing without beginning or end. Space and time are not to be separated from the actual content or happenings of the world, material and spiritual. "The Universe or *Yuchou* is seen by the Chinese Philosophers to embrace within itself a physical world as well as a spiritual world, so interpenetrated with each other as to form an inseparable whole.

8 Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. by Arthur Mitchell, 1928, p. 4.

9 Ibid. p. 5.

It is not to be bifurcated, as it is done in Western thought, into two realms which are mutually exclusive or even diametrically opposed¹⁰. Regarding the fundamental idea of Bergson that the past continues itself into the present, Thome H. Fang States :

"The 'Universe' or 'Cosmos'. as expressed in Chinese is 'Yuchou' designating Space and Time. What we call 'Yu' is the collocation of three dimensional spaces; what we call 'Chou' is constituted by the one dimensional series of changes in succession-the past continuing itself into the present and the present, into the future.. Yu and Chou, taken together, represent the primordial unity of the system of Space with the system of Time Yuchou, without a hyphen, is an integral system by itself to be differentiated, only later on, into Space and Time"¹¹.

Bergson's interpretation of the unity of Space and Time :

The interpenetration of space and time is discussed elaborately by Bergson in his *Time and Free will*. He talks of two kinds of space and time : the homogeneous and the heterogeneous. The Mathematical time which is abstract, and is used in measuring the moments of succession, is a homogeneous time. Homogeneous time is extensive and does not have any meaning in the creative process.¹² Homogeneous space is without content and is a mere idea or Phantom constructed by the mind. Heterogeneous space has got sensible qualities since it is extensive. To illustrate the intermingling of space and time, Bergson gives us an example of the strokes of a pendulum; in using a pendulum as a clock we are not measuring duration but merely counting simultaneities: "Outside of me, in space, there is never more than a single position of the hand and the pendulum, for nothing is left of the past positions. Within myself a process of organisation or interpenetration of conscious states is going on, which constitutes true duration... Thus, within our ego, there is succession without mutual externality without succession : mutual externality, since the present oscillation is radically distinct from the previous oscillation, which no longer exists; but no succession, since succession exists solely for a conscious spectator who keeps the past in mind and sets the two oscillations or their symbols side by side in an auxiliary space... There is a real space, without duration, in which phenomena appear and disappear simultaneously with our states of consciousness. There is a real duration, the heterogeneous moments of which permeate one another; each moment, however, can be brought into relation with a state of external world

10 Yu hsien Liu, Op. cit. p. 146.

11 Ibid. p. 145.

12 Bergson draws a distinction between "pure space" and "extensivity" in his *Time and Free Will*.

which is contemporaneous with it and can be separated from the other moments in consequence of this very process. The comparison of these two realities gives rise to a symbolical representation of duration, derived from space"¹³.

So it is impossible for Bergson to conceive real duration without space¹⁴. When this is applied in the Cosmic level we have to think of the Universe itself undergoing evolution, its Duration being derived from Space which is similar to the Chinese conception of Yuchou. Both Bergson and the Chinese agree when they apply time and temporality in their philosophies to have *history consciousness*. As Shu-hsien Liu has correctly presented, "In Chinese history as well as Chinese Philosophy, time is regarded as a concrete reality not to be separable from the changing, growing, and developing processes of things, In other words, time is to experience concrete events of change. To observe time is to observe substantial happenings of the world... A general Chinese view would be: if one merely knows the dates of historical events at all. To know time in any important sense is to know historical events in time"¹⁵. This is in complete agreement with Bergson.

Conclusion :

There are ofcourse deficiencies too in the Chinese concept of time when compared with the Westerners. (1) "The Chinese lacked the concept of absolute time such as that held by Newton; (2) the Chinese also lacked a system to record the years in a liner progressive way; (3) The Chinese seem to have shown a lack of drive to go beyond the realm governed by time and temporality. These deficiencies, of course, tell us a great deal about the Chinese mentality and Chinese ways of thinking"¹⁶.

However, the Chinese by deemphasising the abstract concept of time, have been able to avoid what Whitehead called "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness". As finite beings they are conscious of their destinies and work hard in order to participate in the ever creative process of the universe. They are, by doing so, finding self-realization. They do not view time with a sense of anxiety and they do not worry about death which is a natural thing to them. As far as Bergson is concerned the Chinese are holding similar views regarding the primary concepts like change, time and temporality.

13 Henry Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, p. 108.

14 Bergson maintains a dualistic stand in his *Time and Free Will* by stating that space and time are separate; but he explains away the cartesian dualism in his *Matter and Memory* by following a non-dualistic principle.

15 Chung-ying Cheng, *Greek and Chinese views on time and the timeless*, *Philosophy East & West*, April 1974, p. 156.

16 Shu-hsien Liu, *Op. cit.*, p. 145.

Though Taoism agrees basically with Bergson's Philosophy, there are some problems as well. Taoism seems to involve a purely cyclical theory of time. While this might be consistent with some philosophies of creativity (e.g.) Nietzsche's which involves the concept of the Eternal Return), it is *not* consistent with Bergson's. Another problem lies in the way in which Bergson is interpreted as a monist. Life (or matter, for that matter) is not merely One for Bergson. There is an element of unity in it, to be sure; and this is derived from a basic original "push". But there is also an element of *real plurality*, which seems bound up *intrinsically* with the creativity of evolution in it struggles with "materiality". In the case of Taoism, it is doubtful whether the many gets *reduced* to the One and whether in the One change disappears.¹⁷

¹⁷ I am indebted to Pete A. Y. Gunter, Chairman, Department of Philosophy, North Texas State University, Denton, Texas for his critical comments on the similarities between the Chinese thinkers and Bergson's Philosophy.



The Direct and the Indirect Cognition

Valentin Kanavrov

The problems about the direct and indirect cognition are as old as philosophy itself. It is not exaggerated to maintain that philosophy emerges when the ideas about the differentiation of the indirect cognition and about its distinction from the direct one arise. Since then each philosophy (philosophema) more or less, openly or in a hidden form, utters its attitude towards the direct and indirect cognition and offers some settlement of the problem, even in cases where the first is totally discredited or openly rejected on account of the second one.

As a starting point of our analysis the traditional inter-relation of the direct cognition with the sensitive and the empiric (resp. the indirect with the discursive and the theoretical) can be admitted.

The idea of interrelation of the direct cognition with the sensitive and empiric cognition is admissible, but becomes intolerable when this interrelation grows into identification. The direct cognition represents *an idealised situation of a cognitive act, when the subject, [the object and the relation between them, are given, i.e. the subject, and the object, and their relation have each for itself a direct character.* Thus the direct relation does not exhaust the sensitive and the empiric cognition. This is obviously one of the elements of their structure in their quality of being cognitive processes, which is adequate to their essential specificity, defined both negatively and positively in respect to the rational forms and the theoretical level of cognition.

Is direct cognition however characteristic for these relatively "lower" forms and levels of cognition? Couldn't we find manifestations of a direct cognition also on "higher floors" of the cogni-

ive process? According to us the roots of the non reflexive cognition are hidden just in this direct cognition. The non reflexive cognition is equivalent to operating and using of ready, extreme abstractions in respect of the object, the subject and their relation between each other. The latter are presented as given in the cognitive act, i.e. the task of the subject is the direct cognition of some unknown how fixed object. Hegel calls this a direct intellectual thinking.¹ It does not go beyond the definiteness of immediacy and its difference from the direct forms of sensitivity is to be found in the form of universality, registered on the level of thinking. This universality is however immanent and expresses itself only as an unreflected strip of the cognitive process, which is not coherated with the single and the peculiar, taken as definers of cognition. So their non reflexive cognition is not externally (from the sensitive side) and internally (from the side of itself) indirectly perceived.

It follows that *elements of the direct cognition are contained both on the sensitive and the empiric level, and on the discursive level of cognition.* It represents a peculiar form of cognition, whose specificity may in the first place be revealed *in its functionary action as a form of cognition in the structure of the cognitive process and, in the second place, in its interrelation to the direct cognition.*

Behind the simpleness and the "gnosologic attractiveness" (D. Spassov) of the direct cognition, a number of problems are concealed. Each one of the shown three direct perceptions of the object, the subject and their interrelation—engenders a pile of questions.

The direct character of the object seems to be an obligatory condition on the line of its objective existence. The object is something fixed (in spite of the fact that it can move, develop, degrade, etc.), and the subject, whatever it might be, must examine it, grope it break it up, to see what is inside², or at the most, must think about it. It seems as if the object keeps its "unpiercedness" forever, simply because it exists as such what it is. Hyperbolising this "unpiercedness" any "intervention" against it ends either with the instructive "for the sake of the nature of things", or with the admiration towards the divine creation. If this conception is successive, the thinking of such an object also runs into collision with difficulties. This is most clearly seen in the apories of Zenon.

On the level of the direct object no objective contradictions are revealed, because that object incorporates the mere existence. Marx has splendidly synthesised this situation: "The main fault of

¹ Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *System der Philosophie. Erster Teil—Die Logik.* — In: *Samtl. Werke*, Stuttgart, 1904, B. 8, S. 185.

² In his actions man cannot do anything else but approach or set apart nature's bodies; the rest nature does within itself. Fr. Bacon, *Novum Organon*, "Nauka i Izkustvo", S., 1968, p. 56.

the whole up-to-now materialism — inclusively the one of Feuerbach — is included in that, that it realises the object, the reality, the sensitiveness only as *an object* or *a contemplation*, and not as a *human sensitive activity*, not as a *practice*, not *subjectively*.³

The understanding of a subjective in a subject-object relation as being direct, also engenders a number of questions and provokes not a few difficulties of gnosilogic nature. In the literature this situation has acquired general acceptance under the title "Gnosilogic Robinsoniade". The cognising subject is represented as isolated and independent. In the cognitive act it participates singly with its abilities appearing as only its, and wholly direct ones. The "It-ness" of its abilities is in some respect justified, but its contemplation in the sphere of cognition only as a direct one leads to insurmountable complications. So for example there is no guarantee that the cognitive results of the single subjects will coincide. Even when using the idea of photogenesis and some other physiological and psychological arguments, the rapid cognitive non-indirectiveness predetermines the elimination of whatsoever cognitive criterions for rightness. The object is not implicated too, as far as it is cognitively non relative towards the abilities of the object, thus representing themselves. The treatment of the subject as absolutely direct is a reflection of the according to us illegal psychologisation of the cognitive process.

Especially uncompromising in this direction is Fr. Bacon. He most strictly investigates the prejudices of the human sense (the mind), classifies them and offers some means for their cleansing. Although in compliance with it the mind must be directed from outside, and then not by something else, but by a ... "New Organon". Bacon does not see that this in its essence represents a New "Theatre" (the prejudices of the theatre deluding the mind, come from the theories, the logic, the philosophy), because it prescribes "from outside" the method of the mind's functioning. The latter, presented as a real cognitive subject, remains only as a desert abstraction. Bacon does not investigate the cognitive process. Once having fixed the empty subject as devoid of prejudices, i.e. of indirect preceivings, singly the possibility remains to him to instruct it.

Descarte, who apparently is on the other side of the barricade, crosses with analogical difficulties after he himself contemplates the cognitive subject as enclosed in its own directness. While Bacon does not succeed to thematise thinking in its own specificity, Descarte hypertrophs it in such a degree that in cognition every possibility to indirectly perceive the subject on account of the object blots itself

3 K. Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*. — In: K. Marx, Fr. Engels, *Works published by the Publishing House of B. C. P., S., 1957*, Vol. 3, p. 3; cf. also *Theses No. 4 and No. 9*.

out. The first thing which Descarts takes upon himself, is to free his thinking of any influences and of any objects of its, that could obscure its cleanness. So he remains alone with his thinking, or, more exactly, only it itself remains. Derived as a universal predicate, thinking is relevant to any object. In its absolute directness it loses its constructive functions towards subjectness and thus, after Descarte, the only criterion of truthfulness are clarity and distinctness, while the innate character of ideas is the foundation of its gnosiological conception.

Putting down the subject and the object as direct ones, predetermines the direct character of their relation. The latter is presented as "having", "giving", "owing" and the like. In facing such a formulation however, there always remains the problems of making the reference itself true, because of the closedness of the "referred" things in their directness, i.e. in such a case the relation is always problematic. In order to make it true the directness of the object or the subject must be "broken up". In the history of philosophy the two variants are met with, the breaking up of the shell of the direct nature of one of the elements being done by different means and elegance. Plato, Berkley, the immanents and others, discredit at the rudest the object, while Buchner, Vogt, Molleshot and others do the same with sensuality and thinking. Comparatively more frustratingly, i.e. more unsuccessfully, acts the classical rationalism, and, in reality, not by words, the classical empiricism and in the other camp—the French materialism, and, by deed, not by words, the classical empiricism. Howsoever shocking it may sound, in fact up to Kant the theory of cognition in general *did not go beyond* the frames of the described construction.

The direct character of the subject-object relation predetermines the non-constructivity of the cognitive process. The subject is met in still never objects and its activity is expressed singly in their untired description and classification. Cognition itself may grow only extensively by a certain form of "selfstripping" of the object. The subject is predestined to follow the object, and when it decides to do something more, this would mean to extort this something out of itself as an individuality. On this plan are included the methodical efforts of the direct subject. There cannot be word about methodology, because as being direct "the methods" are non-relative to the subjectiveness (of course if methodology is not interpreted as a method of description).

Thus the direct cognition realises itself in the form of an extreme objectivism or an extreme subjectivism. This alternative is inevitable, though its poles are not quite unacceptable for philosophy. The inevitability comes in the direction of the closedness of the object and the subject, in the immediacy and the compromising from the

point of view of making true the cognitive act of crashing the immediacy of the one of them. Because of the methodological impossibility of direct perceiving, and because of the necessity of two sides to be present for realising the cognitive act, the ruined directness of one member can be reconstructed only as an emanation of the directedness of the member which kept its sovereignty. In such a recourse the direct cognition does not go beyond the frames of the final modes of objectivism and subjectivism in cognition,

After having revealed the non-constructive nature of the direct cognition, it is easy to see a number of its features. Hegel pays attention to its *occasional character*. By putting down the object and the subject as direct ones, it becomes clear that their relation will be only occasional. The rationalists correctly interpret this fortuity as insufficiency on a cognitive plan, in the sense that the necessity of relation is not being explicated. The object is non relative towards the subject and its direct description may prove to be in contradiction with other occasions of its occurrence in the subject. That is why the classicists-rationalists resort to the services of God (a striking example is the occasionalism of Malbranche).

On the other hand the occasional character may be classified as a pejorative characteristic of the subject by investigating its essence. This occurs with the absolutisation of the situation, when the object (the fact) reveals itself to the subject "by its own will". Belief is ranking first here. The believer is humiliated to such a degree that he could singly except that the essence "shows itself alone" to him.

The occasional character of direct cognition also manifests itself by hypertrophication of the subject's assuredness in itself. In the history of philosophy it has attained different names—"remembrance", "internal sensitivity", "intellectual intention", "revelation", "contemplation", etc., but all its transformations express the non-indirectly perceived nature of the subject (resp. the thinking) of the material contents. Regularly as a pretext is used the non satisfaction with the inherent to cognition "impersuasiveness" and "occasionality", coming on line with its objective causality or "limitedness" and "closedness"—on line with its indirectly perceived character. A classical example in this respect is Henri Bergson's intuitionism.

In the case of hypertrophication of the subject's assuredness in itself the direct cognition represents itself as *absolute*. Here we come across with the following paradox in respect of the fullness of cognition—in its presumption for selfsufficiency and exhaustiveness the direct cognition pretends to actually fulfill up to exhaustiveness the object's contents. From its position this proves to be quite legal and realisable, for it *owns* the object as a given one, and it is natural that only the non given is not cognizable. It is important

for the subject to have an assiduous insight of the object. When looking at this from the position of the methodologist, we must say that in the described situation the subject acts externally in relation to the concrete contents of the object, because principally all objects are one and the same for it. Decarte's "Rules for mind management" and "Reasonings about the method of right mind management and of searching the truth of sciences" reflect these situations.

By the way the mentioned paradox does not exist on the level of direct cognition, because the problems reside there only up to the moment when the lack of the object "is felt". When it is given, the pretensions for an evident completeness are "irrefutable", because the direct cognition does not own another criterion of truthfulness and completeness except the single intuitive clearness. The paradox can exist for it rather as *impossibility the object to be accepted partially and not completely*. From its point of view however this situation is thinkable only in the case that the object is such a one—not complete, not sufficient, etc. On the other hand the direct cognition is not able to know this previously, but even if it knows it, this would reflect the partiality of the "necessary completeness".

We already mentioned the *non reflexive character* of the direct cognition. We must only add that such a fixedness as reflexivity is principally excluded for it. The direct cognition does not need it. It owns the whole complex process of reflexivity in the form of "simplicity and obviousness".

It is on such a plan that the difficulties standing before every gnosiology "confessing" *singly* the direct cognition and having as an aim the basing of its *sufficiency* and *absoluteness* are understood. According to us, when making the analysis successively, *the theory of cognition lying only upon the direct cognition, is impossible or is not a theory at all*.

After this critical analysis of the specificity of the direct cognition it is necessary to find the measure where it has validity, sense and necessity indeed. This does not mean, that in the proposed conception direct cognition is previously accepted as being present. Its explication as necessary within definitive limits will also prove the legality of its existence. This aim is realisable through interpretation of the direct cognition in agreement with the indirect one.

Generally it is admitted that the indirect cognition is the real surmounting of the limitedness and inadequacy of the direct one. They are controversial indeed and in this sense they are alternative. In the literature the advantages of the indirect over the direct cognition are broadly described. We cannot but agree with them. But there exists a "subtle" moment, which is brought to the limitedness of indirect cognition. It is often dropped out of view, so that in

practice the analyses end with pointing out the merits of indirect cognition over the direct one.

In respect of contents the indirect cognition represents one of the forms of constructivisation of the object. With the above we showed the principal non constructiveness in cognitive respect, expressing itself in absolutisation of the indirect cognition. The indirect cognition breaks down this limitedness and closedness by means of thematisation of a cognitive movement, reflecting the contentual conditionality of the object of the general abstract determinedness. In this way a possibility is offered for a principally new perceiving of the object. This one is not put down as absolutely different in respect of the subject, but as being meaningful in the forms of its activity. The object cannot be philosophically determined in another way, but through a mental dematerialisation of the subjects and a conceptualisation in the forms discursivity. On such a plan it already does not seem "unapproachable" and "apathetic" towards the subject, but occurs under the form of subjectivity, i.e. it is contentually indirectly perceived by the subject.

This does not mean that the object is wholly conditioned by the subject, that it has lost its character of an objective reality. On the contrary, each discrediting of the object, acquiring extreme forms, represents the expression of a conceptual weakness of the object or corresponds to a real loss of some of the object's sides. If nevertheless, in the sense of indirect perceiving, we can speak of a conditionality of the object (the objectness) from the subject, one must understand here singly its cognitive transformation into the forms of thinking.

It already becomes clear how even, let us call it, such a ripe form of cognition as the indirect cognition cannot function fully independently, i.e. giving on a fixed line a selfsufficient thinking form of the object. Looking at it from the viewpoint of history of philosophy, scepticism reflects at the brightest the limitedness and non-conformity of conceptions, according to which the direct cognition is wholly denied. This is a special kind of speculation, which practically is an adept of direct cognition and which principally does not go beyond its frames. Without being able to rise up to the idea of contentual indirectedness in cognition, scepticism cuts the branch on which it is sitting and its results quite exactly express the falling down and the next bit.

The mentioned "subtle" moment is incarnated in the fact that the indirect cognition, when cut off from the direct one, in reality represents an unending regressive cognitive line. But if only one link of its is examined, the indirect knowledge of the second member will be deduced to knowledge of the first, i.e. this cognition is limited. Thus arises the paradox of the unlimitedly limited character of the indirect cognition. Do come across with that; Kant has devoted enough place to it.

And so the indirectly perceived cognition must also be indirectly perceived, and in this case not by something else, but by the directly perceived cognition. By means of argumentating the bilaterally mutual necessity of the direct and the indirect cognition it is possible to found the idea of their uniting into a common cognitive relation, "the direct indirect cognition".

IV

The Concept of Man in Paul Tillich

Priti Sinha

The doctrine of man is the pivotal concept in Paul Tillich's theology. All the five parts of his system commence with an analysis of human existence. He himself points out that any interpretation of religion can be judged to be better or worthless in accordance with its treatment of the issues arising in man's life.

Man, according to Prof. Tillich, occupies an important place in ontology not as an object among other objects but as a being who puts the ontological question and is able to answer them. Other things too participate in being like, man, but 'man alone is immediately aware of this structure'.

A self is an original phenomenon which logically precedes all questions of existence. The question is not regarding its existence but regarding being aware of self relatedness. Denial of this awareness will itself imply its affirmation as self relatedness is experienced in the acts of negation as well as in affirmation. A neutral interpretation of man is not complete or excludes existential concern. Tillich's interpretation combines both neutral and existential factors. The neutral factors deal with the structure of being and existential factors deal with the meaning of being for us. In neutral analysis, reason is the final authority, in existential analysis, revelation is the final guide.

The term self is broader than the term ego. Being a self means it is separated from what it is not self. It looks upon not self. Each self has an environment in which he lives. 'Self and environment determine each other. Without the world, self consciousness would have no content. Prof. Tillich opines, "The self without a world is empty; the world without a self is dead". The relation of the subject and the object is not of identity but of polarity.

Man, according to Prof Tillich, is not only completely self-centred; he is also completely individualized. And he says that it is because individual participates in the universe through the rational structure of mind and reality that Leibnitz asserts that each individual is a miniature representative of the whole world. "There are microcosmic qualities in every being, but man alone is microcosmos". The universe is in man not only indirectly or unconsciously, but directly and consciously. Personality is the perfect form of individuality and communion of participation. Participation for him is essential for the individual, it is not accidental.

The fundamental concept of Tillich about man is that man is "homo religious i.e. a being for whom religion is the depth dimensions of all creative concerns". Joseph Haroutunian has expressed Tillich's view thus: "... man is a religious animal and his culture necessarily religious". The religionless man is an 'ill man'. As a spiritual being, potentialities of man are never exhausted. But as a finite person he is always threatened by not-being. Man has double characters—what he is essentially and what he is in his self estranged existence (and should not be). Man is aware of his finitude and at the same time he is aware of his belonging to Being itself. Nothing finite can allure him. To be involved in non-being means to be involved in time process and thus be subject to death. This finitude is the ontological basis of human anxiety. This anxiety is not fear, which is directed towards definite objects. This is not neurotic anxiety too, which can be removed by psycho-therapeutical treatment. "It is anxiety of not being what we essentially are. It is anxiety about disintegrating and falling into non-being through existential disruption".¹ This anxiety, though ineradicable, "can be accepted and used creatively as a part of what it means to be human".

Prof. Tillich analyses categories like space, time, causality and substance in terms of human finitude. The anxiety of death tolls on the mind of every man every moment and characterises the whole of human existence. It is true for Adam as well as Christ. The anxiety of sin is remediable but the anxiety for finitude is ineradicable. This anxiety is balanced by the courage which affirms temporality. Man is more courageous than any other creature. If man would not have possessed courage he would have succumbed to despair.

Striving for space is also an "ontological necessity". Every being is trying to have some space for himself. It includes not only a home, a city but viewed socially, it means vacation, a sphere of influence, a group, a position in one's epoch. "To be finite is to be insecure". This anxiety of man again is balanced by courage with which he asserts the present².

1 Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 199.

2 Ibid. p. 121.

The category of causality too has direct influence over theological interpretation and religious symbolism. Causality expresses 'inability of anything to rest on itself'. It expresses powerfully "the abyss of non-being in everything". Nothing is independent of cause. Anything finite can not escape non-being which appears in causality. The name of the possibility of losing one's ontological structure is finitude.

Prof. Tillich observes that the persistent problem involved in man's life is estrangement between man's existential situation and his essential situation. The root meaning of the term existence is 'to stand out'; to stand out of what? To stand out of non-being. It is a mixture of being and non being.

Essential being is different from existential being. "The really real is different from the seemingly real". Essence is the true nature of things from which being has fallen. The distinction between essence and existence means the distinction between created and the actual world. God is beyond essence and existence. There is no difference in the divine life between potentiality and actuality but man's existence is different from his essence. In estrangement man is outside the divine center to which he essentially belongs. Man has not only consciousness but self consciousness. Man is tempted to make himself the centre of himself and the world. Every individual desires reunion with the whole. The classical name for this desire given by Paul Tillich is 'Concupiscence'. He realises his freedom at the same time he is conscious of his limitation thus he is called mortal. He is immortal from the point of view of his potential infinity to God. He stands between 'the actual finitude' and 'the potential infinity'.

According to Paul Tillich, there is essential unity between man and God. Sin disrupts this unity. "It is the attempt to center life, power and meaning in one's own finite self". Prof. Tillich says that the picture of Jesus in the Bible does not serve as model for us to be initiated. Here the important thing is not the man Jesus but 'the power of being in the life of this man.' Unity with God, according to Tillich, does not mean that man is actually, in concrete existence, united with God or ever can be God. The vision of this unity does not mean that it will be achieved in history nor that vision will be achieved in Heaven. To quote Weisman, "Paul Tillich says, it is absurd to claim that being itself could ever assume the forms of a man although the man Jesus as pictured in the Bible has a transparency through which we can discern the power of being".³

'The fall', according to Paul Tillich, is not a story of once upon a time, rather it is symbol for the human situation universally.

3 Intellectual Foundation of Faith. P. 108.

The story transcends its mythical character and contains a deeper truth concerning human existence.

Man's freedom is finite freedom. Due to this finite freedom, the transition from essence to existence, is made possible. Human freedom is limited by destiny. God is his own destiny, but in man freedom and destiny limit each other. The transition from essence to existence is possible because finite freedom works within the frame of universal destiny. The doctrine of fall is the doctrine of the fall of man from his essential being. Only he who is the image of God has the power of separating himself from God. "His greatness and his weakness are identical". A man without such possibility would have been a thing among other things. His essential nature is present even in his existential distortion. Estrangement means that one belongs essentially to that from which one is estranged. He belongs to his true being, he is not stranger to it. Sin is "an expression of man's estrangement from God, from man, from himself".⁴ It is an act by which a creature rebels against God. God's image is not destroyed here as Sin always presupposes what it defaces. "Man could not be Godless without God". For Sankara and Sri Aurobindo, ignorance is the cause of estrangement but for Tillich, it is Sin. From the point of view of Vedanta, Avidya lies at the root of Sin.

Usually freedom is used in polarity with necessity but Prof. Tillich uses freedom in polarity with destiny. Freedom is not a quality of will rather it is an element in man's ontological structure. Freedom is experienced as deliberation, decision and responsibility. Such freedom goes in hand with destiny. Destiny is not a transcendental power determining our lot. Only he could have destiny who had freedom. Freedom and destiny constitute an ontological polarity. Everything participating in being must participate in this polarity. Tillich observes, "Man has used his destiny".

Being a self means being separated from other thing. He is able to look at it and act upon it. Every self has a world to live in. Self and environment determine each other; there is self-world correlation. There cannot be self consciousness without world consciousness. Being a self means man is both against the world as a subject and in the world as an object. He is so separate from the world that he can look upon it at the same time he is so much involved that he is an 'episode in the process'. Tillich claims, "The self without a world is empty, the world without self is dead". It avoids both Cartesian dualism as well as identity philosophy. For Sri Aurobindo too self is "equally real and truly individual. He says "To fulfil God in life is man's manhood". Paul Tillich resembles here with Indian Philosophers like Sankara and Sri Aurobindo.

4 Systematic Theology, Vol. II. p. 47.

V

Forward Steps in Sankara Research

Richard Desmet, S. J.

Fifty five years ago, when I was a 16-year-old schoolboy in Belgium, I happened on a French article on *advaita*. There was much question in it of *brahman* and *ātman* but I could find no clear explanation of these terms. For months I puzzled over them until light came from the titular or our terminal class of humanities, Fr. Rene Debauche. Such was my first introduction to Śāṅkara Vedānta. I pursued on my own the exploration of the various types of Vedānta until I came to India in 1946. The interpretations of Śāṅkara by S. Radhakrishnan and others, which had appeared since around 1920, did not seem to represent correctly the Ācārya's thought. I would have to study Sanskrit and ponder the very text of his authentic works. This I was doing in Calcutta when in 1950 I attended for the first time a session of the All India Philosophical Congress, its Silver Jubilee session presided by its chief founder, the prestigious Professor Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. After then graduating with a doctoral dissertation entitled "The Theological Method of Śrī Śāṅkarācārya," I began in 1954 my regular teaching in Poona. In that same year, I attended the Kandy session of our IPC of which soon after-wards I became a life-member. As such I have presented many a paper treating of some aspect of the doctrine of Śāṅkara.

Now you have asked me to deliver in this session the Pratāp Śeṭh Vedānta lecture. It is an honour for which I am deeply grateful. It is also a task which I undertake with joy despite my declining memory and weakened sight but with a consciousness of being little worthy of it.

Indeed, such a lecture ought to advance scholarship in the field of Vedānta whereas I can only present to your critical hearing the chief steps forward which I made in my unrelenting study of Śāṅkara and which I perhaps wrongly consider to be true advances.

1 Śaṅkara : strictly an interpreter of the Jñāna-kāṇḍa of the Śruti

I first considered it important to ascertain the intention of Śaṅkara and the specific nature of his teaching, i.e., the *pramāṇa* in the authority of which he had made his doctrinal assertions. Was he a *śrutivādin*, according to the long-favoured opinion, or was he a rational philosopher in the manner of most of the modern philosophers of the West, as asserted persuasively by Radhakrishnan and many who sided with him? There was no doubt that Śaṅkara was a master of reasoning but was he relying on independent reasoning or on reason aided by testimony?

Soon the evidence from his own writings concerning his purpose his *pramāṇa* of reliance, and the nature of his method became forceful:

"We begin the study of the Vedānta-texts in order to get free from the wrong notion which is the cause of all evil and to attain thereby the knowledge of the absolute unity of the [supreme] Self." (BSBh Introd.)

"The import of the Śruti is the demonstration that the Ātman is the supreme Brahman: in this only the aim of all the Upaniṣads is exhausted." (BAUBh 2 iii 6)

"It is only with the help of the śruti that this exceedingly deep Brahman can be fathomed, not of reasoning." (BSBh 2 i 31)

So much for his purpose and his reliance on the śruti. He further explains the latter (1) with regard to Ātman, (2) with regard to Brahman:

(1) As to the Ātman, "is it not the object of perception? No, because we observe an actual conflict of opinions regarding the very existence of any ātman connecting the body of this birth and the body of another birth, since this is denied by the Lokāyatikas and the Buddhists. In spite of the idea of 'I', the Vaināśika [Buddhists] really profess the inexistence of any ātman different from the body.

"Neither is the existence of an ātman provable by inference, because no relation to another birth is perceived. We do not deny that the Mīmāṃsakas [e.g., Śabara in MSBh I i 5] and the Vaiśeṣika-Naiyāyikas [e.g., VS 3 ii 4-21] have proposed such inferences. But it was while actually following in the footsteps of the Śruti and finding there the empirical grounds of their inferences. They fancy that the idea of 'I' and the other grounds of inference, which are Vedic only, do originate from their own thought, and so they declare that the ātman is knowable through perception and inference whereas in fact it is only so through the Vedic word." (BAUBh Introd.)

(2) As to the Brahman, it is clear from the Upaniṣads that it transcends the whole empirical realm and has no ontological relation

to its own effects. Hence, it cannot be grasped by perception or established by inference (since *anumāna* depends on *pratyakṣa*) and is not even expressible by words (since words primarily refer to substances which belong to a *jāti* and to their actions, qualities and relations while the Brahman stands beyond all categories; cf. BHG Bh. 13:13).

In modern times we often seek in Śāṅkara for an unlimited philosophy complete with ontology, cosmology, epistemology, psychology, ethics but Śāṅkara's teaching is limited to the transcendent Reality and the transcendental relations to it of the universe of things and selves.

"The Śruti is an authority in transcendental matters, in matters lying beyond the bonds of human knowledge, i.e., beyond perception and reasoning, but not in matters lying within the range of perception, etc.

"A hundred śrutis may declare that fire is cold or dark; still, they possess no authority in the matter. Thus we should in no way attach to Śruti a meaning which is opposed to other *pramāṇas* or to its own declarations." (BHG Bh. 18:66).

In particular, "it is not in Śruti that we should seek for the means of attaining the desirable and avoiding the undesirable in matters coming within the range of experience and ascertainable through perception and inference." (BAU Bh Introd.)

And "it is nowhere the purpose of Śruti to make statements regarding the *jīvātman*, since from ordinary experience the latter is known to everyone as the agent and experiencer.

"But the Lord, about whom ordinary experience tells us nothing, is to be considered as the special topic of all śrutis." (BSBh 1 iii 7)

"Neither is it the function of the Śruti to inform us about the manifestation [of the world], its formation and similar topics upon which the welfare of man depends in no way. The Śruti itself declares that passages setting them forth are but subservient to the purpose of teaching Brahman." (BSBH 1 iv 14)

Thus Śāṅkara Vedānta is a transcendental doctrine grounded strictly in the Śruti. It exists side by side but without compromise with the non-transcendental sciences. It asserts their limited validity. It completes them by the addition of its own dimension and perspective without substituting for them.

However, it corrects them eventually by opposing their pretended metaphysics and substituting for it its own *śruti*-founded metaphysics. For instance, Nyāya Vaiśeṣika operates within its proper bounds of perception and inference when it develops an analysis of the world of effects in terms of its categories (*padārtha*) but, due to

the insufficiency of its acceptance and grasp of the *śruti pramāṇa*, it has added to that an *Īśvaravāda* or theology which posits God as a mere correlative of his effects. Indeed, he is not subsistent Fullness but a *viśeṣa ātman*, a special *ātman* characterized by omniscience and freedom and the *partial* omnipotence of combining the eternal substances and other *padārthas* into an organized universe. Such a God pales when compared to the transcendent Existent (*Sat*) which is the cause not only of the structure but of the very reality of its effects.

As to the *method* of Śaṅkara's metaphysics, it is directly derived from Yājñavalkya's statement: "Verily, O Maitreyī, it is the *Ātman* that should be seen, heard about, reflected on and meditated upon." (BAU 2 iv 5) Of the three steps here clearly demarkated: hearing, reflecting and meditating (*śravaṇa*, *manana*, *nīdīdhyāsana*), the second one should retain our attention.

Manana signifies the whole endeavour of reason to penetrate the import of the *Śruti*. To borrow a phrase from St. Anselm, it is 'faith seeking understanding.' Its overall principle is harmony (*samanvaya*), the conviction held in faith by all Vedāntins that the meaning of the *Śruti* is homogeneous and excludes contradiction between any of its statements. The first task of the teacher is to study and eventually to correct the traditional analysis of the *Śruti* into meaning-units centred on a great saying (*mahāvākya*) which itself is subserved by ancillary sayings (*arthavāda*). Understanding each *mahāvākya* is properly the scriptural-rational task. One or more *prima facie* interpretations are brought forth, then the teacher ascertains the correct interpretation and establishes it into a firm conclusion (*siddhānta*). He does this through *samanvaya* *śruti*-passages, support from *smṛti*-passages, and extensive rational discussion. Ideally, *manana* should be continued as long as doubts remain and all other plausible opinions have not been debarred.

This critical enquiry constitutes the prior ascertaining (*pravṛtti*) which Śaṅkara requires before the third step be undertaken. (*Upadeśa sāhasrī* 18 125 and 126) It is the ascertaining of a *positive* content, namely the existence and nature of the Witness (*Sākṣin*), by *manana* on the great saying 'That thou art.' Without it, *nīdīdhyāsana* would result in mere void (*śūnya*):

"If you say, 'what is prescribed here by the authority of the scriptural word [*neti neti*]' is negative meditation (*nivṛtti*), [the answer is,] 'the Witness not having been positively established (*aprasiddharvāt*), a mere void (*śūnya*) would result.'" (*Ibid.* 125).

Śaṅkara is here countering Maṇḍana Miśra (*Brahma Siddhi* p. 157: "What then is taught by *Śruti*? [Only] the non-existence of the universe") who was driven to attribute final authority solely to

the *mahāvākya* "It is not so" and other negative śrutis because he did not believe that positive speech, being dualistic, could express the non-dual Absolute. For Śaṅkara, speech could be indicative (laks-) where it could no longer be expressive (vac-) and, therefore, he could hold that "That thou art" and other positive *mahāvākyas* did provide the positive ascertaining which, he thought, must precede and give substance to *nididhyāsana*.

This is confirmed by his definition of the state of enlightened faith (*śraddhā*) which the aspirant must have reached at the end of *manana*. Faith, he says, is "the awareness of positive existence held in the pacified mind" (*citta prasāde āstikya buddhi*). (Māṇḍ. U. Bh 2.17) The mind is now at peace, having cleared off all doubts, but it is focused upon the non dual Existent.

This focusing is *nididhyāsana*: it consists in "grasping the Knowledge which has been heard (*vidyā-śravaṇa grahaṇa*), holding it (*dhāraṇa*) and repeating it mentally (*abhyāsa*)." (TUBh 2 i) With its culmination, *saṁādhi*, it constitutes *dhyāna yoga* "which is the most immediate means to *Vidyā*" (BhGBh 5 27), "the highest form of yoga; it consists in abiding constantly in the Ātman, bearing in mind that the Ātman is All and nothing else is Existent." (*Ibid* 6 25) In this work at least, he defines it as *vijñāna* contrasted with *jñāna*: "*jñāna* means the enlightenment (*avabodha*) regarding Ātman, etc. as obtained from the śāstras and the ācāryas [thus this fruit of *manana* is still abstract and general]; *vijñāna* is the experiencing of that (*tad-anubhava*) in its specificity (*viśeṣataḥ*)." (*Ibid*. 3 41) It means "turning into personal experience (*sv'anubhava karaṇa*) the knowledge obtained from the science." (*Ibid* 6 8; 7 2; 9 1) Let us notice that, contrary to some modern presentations, Śaṅkara's teaching does not start from experience; he starts from the *Śruti*, which he thinks is authorless (*apauruṣeya*), and terminates hopefully into experience.

Hopefully, I say, because achievement here does not mean the automatic conclusion of a dialectical process. There hovers over it an uncertainty which situates the role of divine grace. In Śaṅkara's most authoritative work, he says: we must "assume that liberation is effected by a discerning (*vijñānena*) caused by His grace (*tad-anugraha-hetukena* because Scripture teaches it," (BSBh 2 iii 41) i.e., "by the attainment of knowledge caused by the grace of the Lord" (*Īśvara-oraśāda-nimitta-jñāna prāptiā eva* (BhGBh 2 39).

2. A Quest for supreme Values

Phenomenologically, the teaching of the Ācārya appears as a quest for supreme values rather than a systematic work of rational speculation. His very first requirement for the aspirant is "the capacity to discriminate between eternal and transient realities". (BSBh Introd.) And his very language is a language of discernment

and evaluation. His aim, however, is not to establish a hierarchy of all possible values but in every mixture to discern the most excellent and to set aside all the rest whatever be its relative value. He formulates this *key-distinction* as follows :

"As the wild goose [according to Indian folklore] sifts milk from water, so the wise man sifts the excellent from the mere pleasant, going mentally all around these two objects, examining them closely, weighing their respective importance or futility; and having distinguished them, he chooses the excellent alone on account of its superiority." (Kath. U. Bh 2 2).

It is possible to expose the whole teaching as a Value seeking spiral of successive siftings and choices. It would start naturally with a selection of the supreme end of man.

- 1- Of the four ends of man, liberation alone is to be selected.
- 2- Of the two ways, ritual action and knowledge, knowledge alone is to be chosen.
- 3- Of the six sources of knowledge, *śabda* (word) is primary.
- 4- Among all words, only the authorless word of *Śruti*.
- 5- And in *Śruti* the knowledge section alone must be our reliance.

6- Out of the manifold of these texts, we must pick up the sentences which convey knowledge, namely, the indicative assertions.

7- And from the sequences of assertions choose those which appear to be 'great sayings' around which ancillary sentences are organized.

8- Those 'great sayings' refer in various ways to the *Brahman-Ātman*. Out of all objects, be interested in this Brahman alone. It is conveyed by them as by diverse definitions (*lakṣaṇa*). We must take them all in combination because they complete one another by correcting in turn some aspect or trend of our innate ignorance.

9- The negative definitions of the *neti neti* type posit the Brahman as exempt of all finitude and exceeding the primary scope of all words and concepts. Thus they assert its absolute transcendence and exercise our mind from all temptations of pantheism. They root us in apophatism by excluding the Brahman from the expressive power of mind and speech. They are fundamentally normative and must remain subjacent to our correct understanding of the affirmative definitions.

10- The superlative definitions posit the Brahman not as a relative maximum (such as the *Īśvara* of Nyāya) but as the absolute Maximum beyond any commensuration with mundane entities. It *Pūrṇa*, the Fullness of all illimitable perfections, and thus the most desirable, the supreme Value. This definition must be grasped in

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coordination with the *neti lakṣaṇa*. Thus the Brahman is simple (*akhaṇḍa*) in its very *pūrṇatā*. It is intensive Fullness (not fullness by conglomeration). Hence, it is *nirguṇa*, qualityless, not by deprivation but by superessentiality. Neither the Sāṅkhya conception of *guṇas* as three internal tensors of Prakṛti nor the Nyāya distinction between substance and accidents finds any application in it. It is homogeneous (*ekarasa*) Goodness. The superlative mode of speech does not express this maximality (for there is no mundane instance of it) but it can *point* it out with vigour and precision.

11. The causal and other relational definitions (*upalakṣaṇa* or *taṣṭha-lakṣaṇa*) posit the Brahman as the Root (*mūla*) of the universe and all its entities, the total Cause of their being and moving. The risk of misinterpretation here is anthropomorphism. Indeed, causality is a feature of our world which we constantly experience. We risk therefore superimposing upon divine causality the modalities of the causal activity of nature and man. This is why we must approach these definitions with a mind imbued with the previous teaching of negativity and maximality. Brahman's causality is total. As the master-cause, Brahman produces out of nothing but its Fullness the whole reality as well as the structure and the dynamic development of the universe. It is its *upādāna*, i.e., its substantive or reality-giving cause, without being subject to such mutability (*pariṇāma*) as characterizes the *upādāna-kāraṇas* of our mundane experience. It is also the *nimitta-kāraṇa* or ordaining cause without having any need of preexisting materials, calculation, tools or wants to fulfil. In its universal causality, the Brahman is absolutely free and immutable.

Its causality is so pervasive and ontologically total that it is the innermost *Ātman* of every single entity. This is not any of the lower *ātmanas* or *puruṣas* which the *upaniṣads* enumerate but the *Paramātman* which presides causally over, and, for instance, illuminates every sentient being.

As relations from Brahman to the world, causality, immanence, *ātmahood* and the associated fact of being the Lord, the Illuminer, the Witness, the Goal, etc. appear to add something extrinsic to the absolute Essence. But we know that the Brahman is transcendent and unchangeable Fullness. Hence, these relations cannot be ontological but logical only. They are not intrinsic attributes (*viśeṣaṇa*) but extrinsic denominators (*upādhi*). Similarly, in regard to Brahman, all its effects are *upādhis*. The relational *lakṣaṇas* are true in what they affirm, not in the manner of affirming it. What they affirm is the communicativity of the changeless Absolute but they affirm it in terms of our experience of ontological relations. A mind steeped in the teaching of *neti neti* and *pūrṇa* can receive their message without being misled by its modality.

But if one fails to correct his first grasp of them, he is led to believe in the qualified Brahman (*saguṇa*). This notion points to the Brahman but inadequately and incorrectly still. It is propaedeutic and thus useful on the way, especially for meditations of what the upaniṣads call the *vidyā* type, but finally we must reach beyond them. Just as we must reach beyond the three sovereign forms of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva and beyond *a, u, m.* to the *turīya* solely intended by the syllable *auṃ*.

12- "That thou art" (*Tat-tvam asi*) and its equivalent "I am Brahman" (*aham Brahmi'āsmi*) are cardinal 'great sayings' expressing the *tādātmya* relation between the knower/agent and Brahman. In this case, *tādātmya* is not reciprocal identity, as in 'I am my parents' first son,' but the unreciprocal relation of 'having *Tat* as one's *Paramātman*.' In *Upadeśa sāhasrī* 18, Śaṅkara explains particularly well what is this 'I' which is the subject of that relation :

"The appropriator (*abhimāna kṛt*, that says 'I' and 'mine') is the ego sense (*aham kartṛ*) which always stands in proximity to this [*Ātman* which is pure Awareness, *upalabdhi*] and acquires a reflection of It (*tad ābha*). Hence, there arises the [undiscriminated] complex of the *Ātman* and what relates to it (*ātmiya*) which is the sphere of 'I' and 'mine'." (US 18 27).

"Only when there is a reflection (*ābhāsa*) can words [such as *aham, tvam*], referring to the internal Vision indicate (*lakṣayeyuḥ*) [the *Ātman*-Witness] but in no way designate Him directly." (29)

"It is because the ego sense bears a reflection of the *Ātman* that it is designated by words pertaining to the *Ātman*; just as words pertaining to fire are applied to torches, etc. but not directly (*na anjasā*) since their direct referent [fire] is other.

The reflection (*ābhāsa*) of a face is different from the face since it conforms to the mirror; and in turn the face is different from its reflection since it does not conform to the mirror.

The reflection of the *Ātman* in the ego-sense is comparable to the reflection of the face. As in the case of the face the *Ātman* is other (*anya*), says the tradition, and the two [*Ātman* and *ābhāsa*] are indeed likewise undiscriminated [by the ignorant]. (31-33)

Why this lack of discrimination? Because of the similarity, closeness and intimate dependence of the reflection-ego upon its Prototype. But it is also on account of this proximity of the *jivātman* to the *Paramātman* that *Tat-tvam asi* can be effective, the *ābhāsa* serving as the door (*dvāra*; *ibid.* 110) across which the mind can reach to the supreme *Tat*. This is why Śaṅkara can use the method of *anvaya vyatireka* (agreement and difference) to explain that sentence. If we wish to understand him we must remember the rule of Dinnāga that words placed "in opposition" restrict one another's meaning (e.g., in 'black horses,' 'black' excludes all non-blacks

including non-black horses, and 'horses' exclude all non-horses even if they are black).

"Because the words '*tvam*' and '*Sat*' (for '*Tat*') refer to one and the same entity, they function like the words 'black' and 'horses'. Through being brought into apposition with the word '*Sat*' which expresses absence of pain, the word '*tvam*' [loses its reference to anything connected with pain and] is left with the meaning '*Sat*'. And similarly through being set in apposition with a word signifying 'inmost self' (*pratyag-ātman*), the word '*Sat*' [is left with the meaning 'inmost Self']" (US 18: 170-171).

"Without giving up their own meaning (*svārtha*) the words *tvam* and *Tat/Sat* convey a specific (*viśiṣṭa*) meaning. And they lead to immediate awareness (*avagati*) of the inmost Ātman. Apart from this meaning, there can be no other one which would not result in a contradiction." (*Ibid.* 173)

Let us notice Śaṅkara's innovative application of the *anvaya-vyatireki* method. It is equivalent to the *jahad ajahal-lakṣaṇā* method employed explicitly by one of his direct disciples, Sureśvara. It is used to understand a great saying which is true (since Śruti is infallible) and yet cannot be true according to the primary meaning (*mukhyārtha*) of its terms. One must then seek for their secondary meaning as suggested by the context (*lakṣyārtha*) which, in this case, can only be their supreme meaning (*paramārtha*). This seeking progresses through *apavāda* or *vyatireka* which, in the light of *neti neti*, excludes all the finite objects denoted by the *mukhyārtha*: to that extent the *lakṣaṇā* is *jahat*, exclusive. But it preserves the proper notion (*svārtha*) of the terms: hence, it is *ajahat*, inclusive. It is then possible, in a final step, to elevate the two *svārthas* to their highest possible value and thus accede to their common *paramārtha* (*anvaya* in the light of *Pūrṇa*). The logical link between primary and supreme meaning is the *svārtha* but dynamically what sets the process into motion is the suggestion that the *jīvātman* is a reflection of the supreme Ātman and thus in *tādātmya* relation with it.

Tādātmya is not peculiar to the *jīvātman* but is the founding relation which imbues all effects of Brahman. It has the following characteristics.

(a) *unreciprocity*: "Names and forms in all their states have their Ātman in Brahman alone, but Brahman has not its Ātman in them." (TUBh 2 vi 1).

(b) *dependence*: "It is an accepted principle even in the world that an effect is intimately dependent (*anuvīdhāyin*) on its cause." (BAUBh 1 v 14).

(c) *indwelling*: "All the created beings abide within the Puruṣa; for every effect rests within its cause." (BhGBh 8 22).

It is also called *non-separation, non-division*: "An effect is non-separate (*avyatirikta*) from its cause." (BAUBh 1 vi 1) "The non-separation of the two is possible only if the whole aggregate of things originates from the one Brahman. And we understand from the Veda that this affirmation can be established only on the principle that between the substantive cause and its effect there is non-separation, ... non-division (*abheda*)." (BSBh 2 iii 6)

(d) *non-otherness*: To be 'other' the effect would have to be utterly foreign, heterogeneous and ontologically independent from its cause. But "there exists in the past, present or future not one thing simply other than the Ātman, simply non-Ātman, separated by space or time, utterly subtle, disconnected and remote." (1UBh 2 vi 1) "The effect is non-other than the Cause, i.e., it has no existence/essence apart from the Cause (*vyatirekeṇā 'bhāvāḥ*)" (BSBh 2 i 14)

Vice versa, "the Brahman is not other in such a fashion, [namely, as circumscribed by delimiters, as 'cowness' is delimited by 'horseness,' etc.] since it is not subject to limitation by exclusion on the part of other substances." (1UBh 2 i) Brahman is described through *neti neti* "by means of the elimination of any difference due to limiting adjuncts (*sarvopādhi-viśeṣā-'pohena*); the two words [*neti neti*] refer to a quid devoid of any such distinctive characteristics as name, form, action, alterity, species or quality." (BAUBh 2 iii 6)

(e) *distinction*: "If absolute equality were insisted on, the relation of cause and effect would be annihilated... This relation is based on the fact that there is present in the cause an excellence [which the effect is lacking. On the other hand, they are similar, since] one characteristic feature, namely existence (*sattā*) is found in ether, etc. as well as in Brahman" (BSBh 2 i 6)

(f) *extrinsic denominativity*: how the effects are not ontological adjuncts but *upādhis* of Brahman has been explained above. It does not mean that they are illusions for they have *sattā*.

But how can this assertion of the ontological reality of the effects be reconciled with the fact that his doctrine is said to be a form of *māyāvāda*?

I cannot take up here the whole question of *māyā* in Śaṅkara. I have done it elsewhere ("Māyā or Ajñāna," *Indian Philosophical Annual* (Madras), II (1966) 220-225). Suffice it to say that in the largest number of instances Śaṅkara uses *māyā* in the traditional sense of 'extraordinary power' and uses it in the sense of 'magic' or 'product of magic' in a quite limited number of cases only. These cases are to be understood in reference to his theory of *avidyā* (nescience), a term ubiquitous in his writings. *Avidyā* is superimposition (*adhyāsa*) either of the properties of the Absolute on the relative beings or vice versa. In *avidyā*, we mis-apprehend things

and persons as independent subsistents and the Brahman as changing and appearing in manifold forms. Now "the aim [of the Śāṅkara-śāstra] is to show that the only one highest Lord, ever unchanging, whose essence is knowledge, appears as manifold due to nescience (*avidyā*), just as the magician due to magic (*māyā*)." (BSBh I iii 19) As usual, magic is brought in only as a point of comparison. It makes us understand both the source of illusion (our ignorance) and the magician's free mastery and unchangingness. Historically, the mutation of Śāṅkarism into *māyāvāda* took place only with Vimuktātman.

The relational definitions have by now been sufficiently explained. It is time to pass on to the best, the essential definitions.

12. The essential definitions (*svārūpa-lakṣaṇa*) are of the type : "the Brahman is Reality, Knowledge, infinite" (*satyam jñānam anantam Brahm'eti*). (TU 2 i 1) Śāṅkara treats it according to the method we have already seen at work :

(a) The defining terms stand in coordination, not in subordination since Brahman is exempt from genus and difference; hence, "each term is independently connected with the term Brahman." But "by virtue of their mutual contiguity they are controlled by, and controlling, one another, and thus they exclude (*nivartaka*) from that [Brahman] the express meaning (*vācārtha*) of *satyam*, etc. and become the indicatives (*lakṣaṇārtha*) of Brahman." However, they "certainly do not lose their proper meaning (*svārtha*)." Thus the process of interpretation is *jahad ajahal-lakṣaṇā*.

(b) The *svārtha* of SATYAM is being, ontological truth, stable reality. "Its primary denotation (*mukhyārtha*) is existence as common to all external things." But its connection with JÑĀNAM excludes materiality, and its connection with ANANTAM excludes all finitude.

(c) The *svārtha* of "JÑĀNAM is knowing (*jñapti*), awareness (*avabodha*)... Its primary denotation consists of whatever is appropriated by the *buddhi* (organ of intellection) and expresses (*vācaka*) the reflections (*ābhāsa*) of that [Brahman]." But here, "because it determines Brahman along with SATYAM and ANANTAM," it must be understood in its supreme sense as unrestricted actuality of its root *jñā-*; for "it is *bhāva sādhana* [a Pāṇinian expression meaning the sole root without declensional endings such as nominative, etc.]" Any such ending would introduce the distinction of knower, knowing, knowable whereas "that which is ANANTAM is not divided from anything." Indeed, BAU 4 iii 30 says: "There is no discontinuity (*viparilopa*) between the Knower and his Knowledge on account of his indestructibility."

(d) Thus, by the *paramārtha* of SATYAM and JÑĀNAM, "the Brahman is indicated but not expressed (*tal-lakṣyate na tū 'cyate*)."

"So, in agreement with...TU 2 vii ["It is unexpressed (*anirukta*)], it is established that Brahman is inexpressible (*avācya*) and that, unlike the blue lotus [defined through *jāri* and *viśeṣa*], it is not the object of any expressive sentence." (all quotations from TUBh 2 i 1)

This is the way along which Śaṅkara led his pupil to the supreme Value, "the Goal of him who stands knowing It" (BAU 3 ix 28). Through the negative definitions he has raised his mind above all the empirical, through the superlative focused him on the transempirical Absolute Fullness, through the relative, especially *Tat-tvam asi*, and the essential definitions he has established within him the positive contents without whose ascertaining (*prasiddhi*) the pupil would have nothing to appropriate and experience in *nididhy-āsana*.

3. An Intercrossing of Three Levels of Language

The previous section has shown that we must distinguish in Śaṅkara's writings three levels of language rather than three degrees of reality for their distinction depends on man's approach of reality through the *pramāṇas* rather than on reality itself (*vastu*)

1. Ordinary (*vyavahāra*) language. It is circumscribed by the first two *pramāṇas*: sense-perception and inference. It embraces the *mukhyārthas* (primary meanings) of all terms and their classification and definitions. It provides the basis starting from which the other two levels of language are elaborated chiefly by absolutization, elevation and negation.

2. Upanishadic language. It is circumscribed in the *jñāna kāṇḍa* of the *Śruti*. It is focused on the metempirical and metaphysical. It absolutizes words whose denotation is such that they can be unlimited: words such as *sat*, *jñāna*, *ātman*, *brahman*, *satya*, *vidyā*, *asti*, etc. As absolutized, such terms are often, by convention, written with an initial capital: *Sat*, *Jñāna*, *Ātman*, etc. They are thus maximalized, which is also done by using them in the suprelative mode.

As maximalized, they lend themselves to a simple dialectic of Yes/No opposition in the form of *Sat/a-Sat*, *Asti/Nāsti*, *Vidyā/a-Vidyā*, etc. This gives rise to the paradoxes of the Upaniṣads. They arise from the ambivalence of the negation of a term which can result either in its contrary (*Sat/Asat*) or in its simple contradictory (*Sat/a-Sat*) and the two are not phonetically distinguished. Now, compared to *Sat*, any *sat* is *a-Sat* but it is not *Asat* (like 'the son of a barren woman'); yet, it sounds as if it was.

This manner of speech is not exclusive to the Upaniṣads. Jesus, for instance, employs it in the following episode: A young man ran to him and asked, 'Good master, what must I do to have eternal life?' Jesus replied, 'Why do you call me good? One alone is Good God.'

It will help to present this matter in the form of a diagram :

Positive ABSOLUTE	Negative OPPOSITES	
	Contradictories	Contrary
Sat	a-Sat	Asat

3 Śāṅkara's commentatorial language. It is the three-step ladder by which he makes us ascend from ordinary to upanishadic language: the three steps are (a) *adhyāsa* (superimposition) at which it is seen that so long as the terms of a 'great saying' are taken in their primary sense, it is stultified; (b) *apavāda* (negation) by which all the finite connotations or modalities of those terms are eliminated; (c) *paramārtha-lakṣaṇā* (indication by the supreme sense) by which the *svārtha* of each term is elevated to infinity and thus becomes a proper indicative of the maximal Value and Being, the *Brahman-Ātman*.

Once we realize that the threefold distinction is not ontological but linguistic (and conceptual), we become free from the difficulties which have plagued the interpretation of Śāṅkara in late-medieval and modern times.

4. The Intellectual Dynamism of Śrī Śāṅkarācārya

Let me finally draw your attention to one feature in Śāṅkara's profile by which he stands out among Indian thinkers. It is his pre-supposition that human intelligence is dynamic and interpretative rather than static and mirror-like. It is interpretative because "the intellect has the power of considering as a whole" (*samasta pratyavamarśinī buddhiḥ*: TUBh 2.3) the successive data of the senses which it synthesizes and judges. It is dynamic because it is driven by a constitutive desire to know (*jijñāsā*) which is not limited to finite realities but reaches beyond them to the supreme Reality.

The Śruti makes this desire explicit and directs it clearly to *Brahma jijñāsā*, the "quest to know Brahman," so as to reach the supreme goal of man (*parama puruṣā'rtha*).

Jaimini had defined *puruṣārtha* as "that object to which human desire is inherently attached because it cannot be disconnected from it." (MS 4 i 2) As inherent, it need not (though it may) be enjoined. (Ibid. 4 i 3) The desire for "the perfect good" (*niḥśreya*) is radically the desire for immortality (*amṛtatvam icchan*: KaUBh 4 i), for final release (*mumukṣutva*: BSBh 1 i 1), whose precise "object is the inmost Ātman" (*pratyag ātma-viṣayā'ijñāsā*: KeUBh 1 i). This

paramount desire of the intellect tends to know the supreme Reality in the best manner possible :

"The direct object of the said desire is a knowledge culminating in an intuitive penetration (*avagati paryantam jñānam*), desires having reference to fruits. Knowledge, indeed, constitutes the means (*pramāṇa*) by which Brahman is desired to be intuitively comprehended (*avagatum iṣṭam*). For this direct comprehension of Brahman is the end of man (*Brahmā-vagati hi puruṣārtha*) since it extirpates completely that which is bad, namely, Nescience, etc., the seed of the entire *samsāra*." (BSBh 1 i 1)

"The knowledge which discerns Brahman and discards Nescience terminates in experience (*anubhavā-vasānam*)." (Ibid 2 i 4)

It is because intelligence is focused by its inner dynamism upon the highest Object that it can pursue it along the *lakṣaṇā* indications of the 'great sayings' beyond any expressed meaning of words. Its intentionality breaks through the limits of effability to rush into the domain of the ineffable. It frees it from the dual structure of sentences to ascend through *lakṣaṇā* to the *Paramārtha*. Thus freed, it is full with faith (*śraddhā*) as *āstikya-buddhir-bhakti-sahitā*: "an assurance of its existence which devotion accompanies." (BAUBh 3 ix 21)

What is the relation of other human longings to this uppermost desire? On the one hand, they are subsumed by it since "it is for the love of the Ātman that husband, wife, sons, etc. are dearly loved." (BAU 2 iv) On the other hand, no one is qualified for *Brahmai-jjñāsā* unless "he renounces all desire to enjoy objects whether here or hereafter." (BSBh 1 i 1) Hence, negation (*apavāda*) is not only a step in the dialectic but affects, as *nivṛtti* or *saṁnyāsa* (renunciation), the whole quest of man for immortality.

Yet, here also, just as the *svārtha* was preserved, what is positively valuable in each desire is preserved to be exalted in the obtention of the uppermost Fruit :

"The knower of Brahman enjoys all desires, all delights procured by desirable objects, without exceptions. Does he enjoy sons, heavens, etc. alternately as we do? No, he enjoys all delectable things simultaneously, as amassed together in a single moment, through a single perception, which is eternal like the light of the sun, which is non-different from the essence of Brahman, and which we have described as Reality-Knowledge-infinite... He enjoys all things by that Brahman whose nature is omniscience." (TUBh 2 i 1)

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VI

Rig Vedic Concept of Rita

D. Nirmala Devi

Rg-Vedic seers used *Rta* as an appropriate term for the totality of the physical phenomena and of the spiritual phenomena. *Rta* could be treated as equivalent to the term *Prakṛti* or nature. What sense the term *Prakṛti* or Nature has for us, the same sense was expressed by *Rta* for the Vedic seers.

The term '*Rta*' has variously been interpreted by the scholars, ancient or modern. The *Nighaṇṭu* reads the words '*Rtam*'¹ and '*Rtasya yonih*'² as synonyms of water, and the former as also the synonym of *satya*³ i.e. truth. Yāska in his '*Nirukta*', takes it to mean 'water' and accordingly derives it from (ṛ 'to go'. Water is called *Rta*, because it goes to all lands.⁴ All of the Indian commentators such as Skandasvāmin, Udgītha, Veṅkaṭa Mādhava, Madhava Bhaṭṭa, Sāyaṇa etc. have taken *Rta* to mean sacrifice or water or truth.⁵ Skandasvamin says that though the term '*Rta*' has is not read as a synonym of sacrifice in the *Nighaṇṭu*, yet in the Vedic passages it has been frequently used in the sense of sacrifice (*Yajña*)⁶. From the alternative meanings which the Indian commentators offer for *Rta*, it appears that the true sense of the

1 Yāska — *Nighaṇṭu*, I. 12.68. Ed. Rajwade, BORI, Poona, 1940.

2 *Ibid*, I. 12.70.

3 *Ibid*, III. 10.6.

4 *Nirukta of Yāska* — with comm. Durgācāra, Rg-II. 25, Ed. Bhandarkar, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit series No. LXXXV, BORI, Poona, 1942.

5 Skandasvamin on RV. I. 2. 8. Ed. Kunhan Raja, C. Madras, 1931 and Madhava on RV. I. 1.8, Ed. Kunhan Raja, C. Adyar Library and Sayana on RV. I. 70. 4, Ed. Baladev Upadhyaya, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras, 1934.

6 Skandasvāmin on RV. I. 1. 8, Ed. Kunhan Raja, C. Madras, 1931.

term was not known to them. Had they got the true sense of *Rta* they would not have given alternative meanings of the term in the same passage. These various meanings ascribed to the word '*Rta*' by Indian commentators rather seem to be post-Vedic.

Among the modern scholars Roth defines '*Rta*' as 'order'—order in nature, order in ritual, order in human life; in short, order everywhere. Luders⁷ relying upon later Indian way of thinking invariably defines *Rta* as truth, nothing else but truth. According to him *Rta* as truth appears as wonderful power subduing the spirits as well as the material world. This belief or custom is something lying between oath or vow and magic or sorcery. It was believed that by speaking out some truth one could bring about what is wished. This custom, which he called '*satva-kriyā*', is common in the epic tales and in Buddhist stories. Max Muller's view⁸ is the same as that of Roth. He says that *Rta* is a straight, direct or right line and in a more general sense the Law of Nature. Oldenberg, Griffith, etc. invariably take *Rta* as to mean 'Cosmic Law, or Law eternal'. Wallis writes: "The word used to denote the conception of order of the world is *Rta*. Every thing in the universe which is conceived as showing regularity of action may be said to have the *Rta* for its principle. In its most general application the conception expressed by the word occupied to some extent the place of natural and moral law, fate or the will of supreme God".⁹ He further says: "The meaning of the word, as applied to the natural world, connects itself to the alternation of day and night, the regular passage of the sun through the heaven, or the unswerving motion of the rain in its fall from courses. This last application of the word may have determined its special sense of water in the later language"¹⁰. V. S. Ghate has given the history of the evolution of the meaning of the word '*Rta*'. He says: "This word '*Rta*' in the *Rg Veda* itself seems to denote three ideas, all allied to each other, or one idea under three aspects owing to the difference of dominions".¹¹ In his opinion, the word '*Rta*' represents the 'cosmic order' in the first stage of its being used in the *Rg Veda*. In this stage *Rta* regulates the recur-

7 Luders, H: *Varuna and die Wasser Gottingen*, 1951, pp. 13, 27. Quoted from *Treatment of Nature in the Rg Veda* by Dr. Braj Bihari Chaubey, Vedic Sahitya Sadan, Hoshiarpur 1970, Part I, Cha. 1, p. 4.

8 Max Muller, F: *India, What can it Teach us*. Longmans Green and Co., London, 1899, p. 243.

9 Wallis: *Cosmology of the Rg Veda*, p. 93, Quoted from *Treatment of Nature in the Rg Veda* by Dr. Braj Bihari Chaubey, Vedic Sahitya Sadan, Hoshiarpur, 1970, p. 5.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

11 Ghate V. S.: *Lectures on the Rg Veda*, Ed. Sukthankar, II Ed. Poona Oriental Book Agency, 1926, p. 114.

rences of the natural phenomena, the rising and setting of the sun, the coming of dawns and so on. In the second stage of development of its meaning *Rta* comes to denote the correctness and regularity of the cult of God-worship or sacrifice. It regulates the different aspects of sacrifice, the coming of gods, the offering of oblation and such other things. Sacrifices are described as conducted by *Rta* as opposed to the magic rites and acts of witchcrafts which may be, therefore, called *anṛta*. Lastly, according to Ghate, the moral law which every righteous man must observe is *Rta* which may be paraphrased by *satya* or truth, its opposite sense being conveyed by *anṛta*.

Viṣṇu Hari Vadekar has struck a different note as to the meaning of the word '*Rta*'. According to him the Vedic word '*Rta*' or *Rtasya pañihāḥ*' is synonymous with the Zodiacal belt, i.e. the sun's course north and south of the celestial equator.¹² He has explained some of the passages of the *Rg Veda* wherein the word *Rta* or its forms occur to prove his proposition. For example, he translates R. V. I. 136.2 thus: "The very wide path of *Rta* i.e. the Zodiacal belt has become united with the rays".¹³ He holds the view that whenever the word '*Rta*' and the compounds in which *Rta* is the chief component part, are used in connection with the heavenly luminaries like the sun, moon or constellations, etc., or the heavenly phenomena like *Uṣas* the *Aśvins* etc. the words do convey the meaning of the Zodiacal belt wherein the phenomena occur or the luminaries move. As to how the word '*Rta*', which originally meant Zodiacal belt, happened to be used in the sense of 'right path', he observes: "This path of *Rta* was so to speak the 'right way' of luminaries like the sun, moon, dawn etc, and hence called *Rta* which though derived from (ṛ 'to go' soon came to mean the 'right path' the circle of which exists for ever, or rather exists and exists in the Vault of heaven".¹⁴

According to D. P. Joshi *Rta* means immanent dynamic order, inner balance of the cosmic manifestations. He says *Rta* like later cosmic idea of *Karman* manifests itself through all periods, soon after this cosmic order becomes the settled will of supreme God — the law of morality and righteousness — just a development from the physical to the divine. What law is in the physical world that virtue is in the moral world.¹⁵ C Kunhan Raja says that "*Rta*

¹² Viṣṇu Hari Vadekar: '*Rta or the Zodiacal Belt*', The Poona Orientalist, Vol. X, Nos. 3-4 (July 1945), pp. 101-7.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

¹⁴ '*Rta or the Zodiacal Belt*', The Poona Orientalist, Vol. X, Nos. 3-4 (July 1945), p. 104.

¹⁵ '*The Rta*' Sp. AIOG 15th Session, Bombay 1949, Section I (Ved.) 8 p. 8.

cannot be identical with *satya*, the former is that part of universe that moves and changes while the latter is that part which is permanent, unmoving, immutable and unchanging."¹⁶ He also takes *Rta* as essentially the moral order. J. C. Tavadia defines *Rta* as divine law or justice, right or order.¹⁷ H. D. Valankar, distinguishing *Rta* and *satya*, has expressed the view that "*Rta*' as its derivation suggests, expresses something which is established as an existing fact from beginningless time, something which precedes all and stands supreme as their foundation". "*Satya* on other hand" says he, "refers to a thing which is yet to come into existence and which is expected to correspond to a will that is expressed, or a statement that is made".¹⁸ According to him *Rta* is not dependent upon the will of gods and men while *satya* is so dependent. *Rtavāda* is telling the truth by describing a thing as it is, while *satyavāda* is expressing a will or making a statement, or promise which is expected to agree with events, or things as they are going to happen, or exist. He also takes the view that *Rta* seems to have developed into the *Brahman* of the *Upaniṣads* and in the *Rg Veda* hymns the idea of *Brahman* is sometimes conveyed by the words '*Rtam brhat*'.

Different scholars have used the word '*Rta*' in different senses. According to Western scholars *Rta* means 'cosmic order' or 'eternal law'. It may be said that this meaning is not the original one. 'Cosmic order' or 'Eternal Law' is attribute of nature. Though the attribute and the attributed are closely related, yet at the first moment of its production, the latter is regarded as existing without the former.¹⁹ Nature's most essential attribute is 'cosmic order'. Nature should be taken as different from its attribute for a moment, without undergoing any change in designation. Thus *Rta* as nature is the attributed and *Rta* as 'Cosmic Order' is attribute.

According to Luders *Rta* has nothing to do with oath or vow and magic or sorcery, because the *Rg Veda* is not a book of magic or sorcery.

V. S. Ghate has tried to make a synthesis between Western and Indian views as to the meanings of *Rta*, but he could not go beyond the limit set up by Western scholars. In the first stage the word *Rta*, as he says, expresses 'cosmic order' but the truth is something beyond. In the first stage '*Rta*' did not actually represent cosmic order; it did so only in the second stage. His solution, as to the other meanings of the word *Rta* is, to some extent, convincing.

16 Kunhan Raja, C: '*Hindu Religion and Hindu Customs*' — The Adyar Library Bulletin, Vol. XIV, Part I, 1-4, 1950, p. 22.

17 '*The Meaning of Rta*', ABORI, Poona, 1954, p. 30.

18 '*Rta and Satya in Rg Veda* — Sp. AIOG — 20th Session Bhubaneswar, 1959, Section I (Vedic), p. 11.

19 '*Īsvara Kṛṣṇa — Tarkabhasa*, Ed. Vishweswar, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi, 1963, p. 33.

According to Rg Vedic seers 'Rta' as nature is the primeval cause of the universe. It produces and regulates the sky, the fire, the earth etc'. Rg Veda states that from *tapas* were born *Rta* and *ṣaṭya* and *Rātrī* and watery fluid.²⁰ *Rta* is the most subtle where from the gross or material world took its origin. Subtle regulates the material. because it is omnipresent and omniscient. Due to its pervasiveness all its different phenomena invariably observe its order. That state of things, when they do not observe its order, cannot be imagined. Ofcourse, it will be a great chaos when the phenomena do not obey the order of 'Rta' or nature. There is nothing in the universe which do not obey its order.

This conception of *Rta* is born out by the utterances of the Rg Vedic seers themselves. They frequently call that gods are the followers of *Rta*. Agni is born of *Rta*;²¹ Sun is born of *Rta*;²² *Brhaspati* is born of *Rta*;²³ Maruts are born of *Rta*;²⁴ *Uṣas* are born of *Rta*.²⁵ Thus gods are said to have been born from *Rta*. *Rta*, as nature, includes all the things of the universe — the sun, moon, heaven, earth, air, cloud, the course of the sun, year, month, days and nights and so on. Rising of sun has been depicted as the pure and lovely face of *Rta*.²⁶ Sun is also described as shining in the seat of *Rta*.²⁷ The dawn like other luminaries starts her journey from a fixed point in this *Rta*.²⁸ She perfectly follows the path of *Rta*. The vast earth and heaven belong to *Rta*.²⁹ The names of the Sun and Agni dwell in *Rta*.³⁰ Various phenomena of nature are seen in their changing form in different seasons. This is connected with *Rta*. Owing to this connection of seasons with *Rta* the former are called *Rtus*. The year is the wheel of *Rta* with twelve spokes.³¹ This wheel of nature, viz. *Samvatsarb*, never suffers from age. It goes on without any stop. In short, all things are the forms of *Rta*.

Rta has been expressed by Griffith to mean 'holy law'. He explains: "Its meaning varies slightly in this and the two following

20 Ralph T. H. Griffith: *The Hymns of the Rg. Veda*. X. 190.1., Ed. Shastri J. L., Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1973, p. 651.

21 *Ibid.*, I. 189. 1., p. 127.

22 *Ibid.*, IV. 40.5., p. 227.

23 Ralph T. H. Griffith: *The Hymns of the Rg. Veda*. II. 23.15., Ed. Shastri J. L., Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1973, p. 145.

24 *Ibid.*, III. 54.13., p. 192.

25 *Ibid.*, I. 113-12., p. 75.

26 *Ibid.*, VI. 51.1., p. 317.

27 *Ibid.*, IV. 5.9., p. 204.

28 *Ibid.*, IV. 51.8., p. 232.

29 *Ibid.*, IV. 23.10., p. 217.

30 *Ibid.*, V. 44.2, p. 259.

31 *Ibid.*, I. 164.2., p. 109.

starzas, but the original idea of regularity, conformity to, or establishment, by eternal order or law, is found throughout".³² The Verses may be translated thus: Many are the comforts of *Rta*, i.e. nature, "the thought of eternal law, removes transgressions; the praise-hymn of eternal law, arousing, glowing, hath opened the deaf ears of the living".³³ Work *Rta*, i.e. nature is firm footed. There are "many splendid beauties. By holy Law along lasting food they bring us".³⁴ "One controlling nature wins nature. The power of nature is very swift and given of desired things. The vast and deep earth and heaven belong to nature, these two supreme *Milch-kine* pour milk which belong to nature".³⁵

In the first stanza, it is said that many are the comforts of nature. It is nature that gives comforts to all. It gives water, heat, air and everything that a man requires for his existence.

In the second stanza, it is said that the work of nature is firm-footed. Everybody knows that each action or each phenomenon of nature is regularly governed by certain principles and the principles which once governed will ever be governing. All the beautiful things that attract our senses and fulfil their requirements, are forms of nature. It is nature which provides abundant food to every creature, animate or inanimate. The rays of the sun are said to have entered into nature by nature, that is to say they are produced by nature and move in nature.

In the third stanza, it is said that one who controls nature wins nature. This is the principle of modern science that nature can yield much, when it is controlled. For example, light which is a function of nature, when controlled, works in accordance with the will of man, but when uncontrolled, it follows the order of nature. The power of nature is very swift. It gives all things that are desired. It is said that earth and heaven belong to nature. Here earth and heaven are *upalakṣaṇa*. They indicate all things in the universe between earth and heaven. Whatever we receive from anything between earth and heaven we receive from nature. Here heaven and earth are called to *milch-kine*.

In the first stage *Rta* was used as a term conveying the sense of nature. It is derived from (ṛ 'to go'. Every phenomenon of nature is characterised as moving constantly. For example the sun, moon, stars, year, seasons, day and night etc. are moving constantly. They have been moving from times eternal and will be moving upto eternity. This constant movement without rest was the main reason

32 *Ibid*, IV. 23.8., p. 217 (Footnote)

33 *Ibid*, IV. 23.8., p. 217.

34 *Ibid*, IV. 23.9., p. 217.

35 *Ibid*, IV. 23.10., p. 217.

why the Rg Vedic seers called it 'Rta'. In the *Rg Veda* flowing waters and rivers are called *Rtāvarī*.³⁶ *Uṣas* is called *rtāvarī*.³⁷ *Rtāvarī* does not mean 'full of waters' or 'holy one' or 'truthful'. It only means one who moves constantly. This constant movement in the realm of nature yields a new sense to the word 'Rta'. The movement, which nature undergoes, is not irregular. Thus, in the second stage, *Rta* conveyed the sense of regularity or order. In this sense *Rta* is said to have ruled all the universe. All the gods are said to have followed this eternal law of nature. The regularity, found in the realm of nature, happened to be found in the worship of gods at the sacrifices. Gods were requested to attend the sacrifices regularly; oblations were offered to them in fire regularly and sacrificial fees were given to the priests. Many other regulations were observed in the sacrifices. That is why sacrifice is called as being conducted by *Rta* i.e. the eternal law; the name 'Rta' was given later to the sacrifice itself.

In the sacrifices some rules of morality, i.e. *Vrata* or Vow, were strictly and necessarily observed by the priests as well as by the sacrificer. Thus the word 'Rta' conveyed the sense of morality and righteousness and its opposite sense was being conveyed by the word 'anṛta'. The word 'anṛta' is used in the sense of lie or falsity or untruth. Thus *Rta* as being opposite of *anṛta* began to be used in the sense of truth (*satya*). Fundamentally there is difference between *Rta* as truth and *satya* as truth.

Varuṇa is closely related to *Rta* in the *Rgveda*. In the later post-Vedic literature *varuṇa* has been regarded as the presiding deity of the waters. This is the reason which led the authors of the *Nighaṇṭu* and the *Nirukta* to think that *Rta* is water.

The concept of *Rta* introduced elements of intelligence and will along with morality in the governance of the universe. It assured men that nature was not a chaos but a cosmos, that is to say, systematic, orderly, harmonious and purposeful. The place of *Rta* in the cosmos corresponds to that of *karma* in human life. *Rta* means the course of things. It shows order and intelligibility in the physical and moral realm. The principle underlying the cosmic order has been termed *Rta* by the Vedic Rṣis. The principle of *Rta* gave solace to the hearts of men tormented by uncertainty, insecurity and fear. There is a superior power in the universe which recognises the merit of individuals and rewards persons who sincerely follow the path of truth and justice. This is the implication of the principle of *Rta*.

In the Vedas there are no hymns addressed specifically to *Rta* but brief reference to the important concepts are found in the hymns

³⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 41.18. III, 33.5., pp. 158, 179.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, VIII, 73.16, p. 415.

to *Varuṇa*, *Agni*, *Viśvedevas* and other gods. The following hymns will illustrate the point—

“*Varuṇa*, true to holy law, sits down among his people; he. Most wise, sits there to govern all”.³⁸

Gradually the concept of *Rta* takes a new meaning from eternal physical order or uniformity of nature when it acquires the significance of a moral order. The whole world was thought to be governed by the some universal principles and these were included under *Rta*. Thus the whole world is controlled by *Varuṇa*. He is not only the upholder of the physical order but also the custodian of the moral order—“*Rtasya gopā*”—and who punishes the sinner. The following hymn is an example.

“The great lord of these sees as if he were near,
If a man thinks he is walking by stealth the gods know it all”.³⁹

“He who should flee far beyond the sky, even he—would not be rid of *Varuṇa*, the king.

His spies proceed from heaven towards this world, with thousands and eyes they look over this earth”.⁴⁰

The concept of *Rta* is at once a principle of causality and a principle of morality. It is the anticipation of the law of *Karma*, which is one of the distinctive characteristics of Indian thought and which is the counterpart in the moral realm of the physical law of causality. *Rta* also stands for ritualistic punctilio. The idea of sacrifice finds a prominent place in the vedas and the upaniṣads. The creation of the world itself was taken to be the fruit of sacrifice performed by the supreme being.

38 *Ibid*, I. 25., p. 15.

39 Bloomfield, M : *Hymns of the Atharva Veda* (Tr.) IV. 16.1. SBE, 1897.

40 *Ibid*, IV. 16.10.

VII

Marxist-Leninist Epistemology in the Context of Other Recent Theories of Knowledge

Willis H. Truitt

When Lenin wrote *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* in 1908, he was not setting out a definitive Marxist epistemology. His intentions in writing this work were primarily tactical. He was trying to purge Russian Marxism (and Marxist philosophy in general) of subjectivist elements that were represented in the Bogdanovite program—a program that borrowed heavily from degenerate Kantianism (Avenarius) and ultraempiricism (the sensationalism of Mach). The reason that “Marxist” philosophers had gotten sidetracked into subjectivist blind alleys can be attributed, at least in part, to the schematic and unfinished condition of Marx’s own epistemological views to which I shall turn later.

Lenin’s concern was to, once and for all, rid revolutionary Marxist thought of the degenerate Kantianism which argued that scientific laws were imposed by the mind, and the empirical conventionalism and phenomenalism of Mach and Poincaré which denied the continuity of perception and with it continuity of physical and social reality. *Materialism and Empirio Criticism* constitutes the initial Marxist attack on positivist empiricism. Let me briefly sketch the background of this attack.

Marxism and empiricism developed from different sources and represent different ways of thinking. Historical and dialectical materialism is rooted in studies of historical social development. Empiricism for the most part grew out of investigations of physical nature. But both Marxism and empiricism were and are empirical from a methodological standpoint; both reject supernaturalistic and

transcendental explanation and rely on observation and empirical generalization. Still Marxists attack empiricism as dangerous because it leads to solipsism, conventionalism, and phenomenalism. And phenomenalism—here I mean the view that sensations, not material objects or processes are the only legitimate objects of knowledge—is most characteristic of the positivist phase of empiricism stretching from Mach down to at least Ayer, who quite explicitly declares in favor of Berkeley's subjective idealism.¹ Appropriately, Marxists argue that phenomenalism precludes an empirical understanding of human affairs and social relations even while masquerading as an "advanced" form of empiricism.

Historical and dialectical materialism also differs from empiricism in that it gives an historical account of the origins, development, and social function of empiricism (as it does of itself; the only philosophy to do so). It locates and analyzes the reasons why empiricism and positivism have exhibited phenomenalist tendencies and how positivism distorts social theory by its rejection of historical knowledge for example. In his positivist phase, Russell even went so far as to suggest that the world as we know it might logically have come into being in the last five seconds.² Obviously, this kind of phenomenalist positivism cannot give a critique of social development nor can it comprehend the project of the sciences as that of advancing our knowledge of nature and society. Strict positivism based on confirmation of sensory facts and intersubjective unanimity cannot anticipate the potentiality inherent in the real, nor can it account for change and development—it is cognitively surd.

In the Nineteenth Century, Marxists, and especially Engels, were put on the defensive by certain developments in science which tended to undermine the materialist conception of science. The growth of thermodynamics turned attention to the phenomenon of heat and energy transformations. It was seen that mathematical equations could adequately account for energy transfer and transformation. No materialist hypothesis was required in the work. Inquiries into causality were suppressed in favor of numerical correlations. An idealist conception of science began to gain ground. These developments were appropriated in the works of the positivist tendencies of the time, in Mach and Avenarius and others. Now the characteristics of Marxist theory of knowledge then as now are: 1. Objective knowledge against subjectivism, 2. Knowledge is relative (the basis of our conception of class science) but also objectively based or objective relativism against skepticism and subjectivism 3. The active dialectical relation between the subject k

1 A. J. Ayer, *Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (Macmillan, London, 1940) Chapter V.

2 Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Matter* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1927).

and the object of knowledge against the artificial subject—object dichotomy and an idealized conception of passive observation. Therefore, and quite naturally, Marxists led the attack on the solipsistic direction of philosophical positivism.

In Lenin's time positivism was generally phenomenalist and growing in its influence. And Lenin's assessment was that if this incipient idealism infected Marxist philosophical thought, it would undermine the Bolshevik movement in addition to giving a false account of scientific knowledge in general. At this time Machean positivism was the most prevalent version of phenomenism and had been taken up by the Russian Marxist Bogdanov. Thus Lenin challenged Bogdanov arguing essentially that phenomenism led nowhere in social theory and practice (perhaps best exemplified in the later case of the Machean Friedrich Adler), a conclusion reached also by Hume himself. If phenomenism had any social function at all it might be that of serving reactionary social ends, which later it did indeed.³

In Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio Criticism* there appear to be five principle theses.⁴ First, empiricism, with Hume, concluded in solipsism, the outcome of which is either total skepticism or slavish obedience to custom and convention. Second, subjectivism as an interpretation of science makes verification by an empirical test irrelevant and can lead to an intersubjective agreement about unconfirmable entities and doctrines, as in the case of IQ testing. Third, scientific subjectivism confuses objective knowledge with absolute knowledge and leads to pseudo-philosophies in the style of Karl Popper. Knowledge can be both relative and objective. Fourth, the positivist program of reductive definition equates meaning with verification, i. e., meaning with measurement. This precludes an objective account of the semantic relation of idea and reference and leads to a subjectivist semantics, or a private language theory. Accordingly, the cognitive process becomes unintelligible and causality becomes, with Hume, only a convenient habit of thought. Fifth, and finally, positivism undermines the social sciences by emphasizing empirical data collection over the search for causal patterns. As I have pointed out elsewhere,

The collection of empirical data and the corollating of this data must be interpreted within the context of the general theory of total society. The acceptance of the fragmented results of existing [bourgeois] social science research betrays a value judgment which prefers existing society as it is. Not to

³ See my "On the Political Origins of Scientific Thought", *Dialectics and Humanism*, Poland, forthcoming.

⁴ Following R. S. Cohen, "Dialectical Materialism and Carnap's Logical Empiricism" in *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap* (Open Court, LaSalle, 1963) pp. 134-41.

question the ways in which society functions as a whole, but instead, to analyze those functions independently, is to abdicate the central task of any science, which is to understand the world.⁵

It is inescapable that there are some difficulties with *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*.⁶ This is especially so when Lenin treats perception as apart from and distinct from practice, as he does for example in Chapter 1 and section 6 of Chapter 2. I do not believe Marx would have separated the two in this manner. In this, the reflection theory, Lenin says we have an image inside of us that is a reflection of things outside of us and that we can find out whether this reflection is an accurate representation of what is outside of us. Now this means that our perceptions are not direct, but mediated by an image and in order to show how we confirm the truth or accuracy of our perceptions, Lenin might have better linked practice to observation, which he does not do adequately even in Chapter 2.

In his polemical and unyielding attack on subjectivism, Lenin left himself open to the accusation of uncritical realism. This accusation was best argued by Korsch. In *Marxism and Philosophy*⁷ Korsch argued that Lenin presented knowledge merely as an accurate and passive reflection of objective reality in subjective consciousness. This, Korsch regarded as a pre-critical, i.e., a pre-Kantian position. It is said to be undialectical in denying the historical and relational determination of consciousness and theories of knowledge. But Korsch facilely dismisses the issue, attributing the reflection theory to Lenin's need to provide a common-sense version of perception accessible to workers, and peasants. My opinion is that this criticism is thoroughly unjustified although my reading of the *Philosophical Notebooks*⁸ does not altogether do away with the problem.

How Marx would have responded to this internal controversy is not evident. Surely Lenin was right in effect. In attacking positivism he was attacking a doctrine that implicitly denied historical truth and undermined social theory. And at the same time he was defending Marxism, not as a dogma — Bernstein was the dogmatist — but as a scientific hypothesis. Yet Korsch was correct in identifying several pre-critical elements in the Leninist argument. At this

5 "Ethics, Ideology, and Moral Reconstruction". in *The Philosopher in The Community: Essays in Memory of Bertram Morris*, forthcoming.

6 I am using the International Publishers' edition, copyright, 1927.

7 Karl Korsch, *Marxism and Philosophy* (Monthly Review, Press, New York, 1970).

8 V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1961) volume 38.

place let me try to reconstruct the views of Marx that most readily apply.

First of all one must acknowledge that there is an affinity between empirical positivism and Marxism. Both share an anti-metaphysical stand. This means that Marx agreed with what was later to be called the verification criterion, that there must be an empirical test for truth and meaning. Statements that cannot be falsified under any circumstances are meaningless. We must be able to show evidence for the truth of a statement. There must always be a test we can perform that will serve as evidence for or against a statement or a theory. And if a statement is consistent with all possible experience then it is either tautologous or meaningless. In the vernacular, a difference, to be a difference, must make a difference. Superficially, the main difference between Marxism and positivism at this level of articulation is to be found in the positivistic emphasis on passive observation in the verification process as contrasted to the Marxist stress on intervention and practice. The passivity of the positivistic equation of meaning, observation, and measurement (the meaning of length is the operation of measurement) is simply not convincing. But what is involved here is not trivial. It is the conception of science itself. And for this reason Marxists attack positivism on two fundamental issues.

First, the passivity of the verificationist criterion, limiting itself to observation, conceives ideal observation as thoroughly free of investigator interference and is an idealist conception. Ideally, it removes the scientists from the world. It leads ultimately to the view popularized in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics that when we measure sub-atomic phenomena we are not measuring nature or matter, but only the results of our own interference in nature. This makes the study of physics hopeless and leads to metaphysical doctrines of surd indeterminacy. Marx argues that we learn by changing and transforming the world, not by passively observing it. And we learn how to transform the world by imitating or reproducing the processes of nature, from making fire to nuclear fusion. This is not at all metaphysical; it takes matter seriously.

Second, the idea, actually inherited by positivism from earlier empiricism, that we can know only what is immediately before the senses, strikes at the heart of historical knowledge and renders all historical truth subjective. It ignores the possibility of understanding the historical basis of the doctrine of immediacy itself, thus suppressing knowledge of the historical roots of positivism. And for Marxism, social practice is rooted in, and meaningless without, historical knowledge.

The Marxist emphasis on practice and manipulation naturally leads to the problem of its association with pragmatism. Both

Marxists and pragmatists opposed positivism because of its abstract one-sided conception of the relationship between man and nature. But again we will find fundamental differences. But even given these differences, I am uncomfortable with the fact that Lenin is much more an epistemological realist than Marx, even though Lenin's emphasis was quite right. The early epistemological notes of Marx barely touch upon the reflection theory as it is formulated in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*.

The second Thesis on Feuerbach states, "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, ... of his thinking in practice". Much later John Dewey advanced the idea that thought was instrumental: an idea is true *because* it works in practice. Two things need to be pointed out here. One is that Dewey is not making a truth claim. He is merely redefining truth (which at this time was generally acknowledged to be correspondence between a statement or idea and a fact, undefined) in terms of workability. Second, history teaches us (notably the history of science) that frequently false ideas (those which do not correspond with a matter of fact) work in practice. How is this different from what Marx wants to convey in the Second Thesis?

Marx is claiming that an idea works because it is true. He is making a truth claim beyond mere workability or experience. And, presumably, Marx would acknowledge that sometimes false expedients seem to work — as in bourgeois economic and social engineering or as in the fictitious constructs of scientific theories (Ptolemaic epicycles or phlogiston for example), but not over a long time when subjected to criticism. For Marx then, those ideas, theories, statements which accurately reflect natural and social process are true. It is nature and society that make them so, not merely their workability. And it is in the long term application of ideas and theories, in practice, that they are proven true or false. Marx is an epistemological realist. Yet this realism is assured only through testing, application and practice.

Nevertheless, certain things need to be said about practice. By itself, practice in general can have no epistemological status. We must have a theory about practice and only a theory of knowledge conceived in the form of scientific realism can both comprehend practice and provide it with truth criteria. This is why pragmatic theories of knowledge fail; they exhaust themselves in practice as it exists, as does, I am inclined to believe the Maoist version of pragmatism to be found in *On Practice*.⁹

9 Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice" in *Five Essays on Philosophy* (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1977) pp. 1-23.

The ideas that arise spontaneously from practice are quite obviously true of, and about, that practice. Yet, that practice might be leading nowhere, whether in science or in politics. So we require a scientific theory or what I have called elsewhere¹⁰ a regulative ideal that will insure that practice is in correspondence with the facts of the situation. Ultimately this is the role of Marxist theory of knowledge. Correspondence criteria of truth here come into play. And this is what allows us to say that historical and dialectical materialism is an empirical science. In other words, Marxists must be more than political activists, they must also be students of Marxism. Should we reject all ideas except those rising spontaneously out of practice, we necessarily suppress all criticism of existing practice. And we are surely aware that practice produces both true and false ideas.

Now the realistic standard that we require as a regulative ideal and guide to practice is a scientific standard — and this I would argue is what makes Marxism scientific. It is methodologically autonomous. This does not mean that science is free from ideological infection. But, it does mean that scientific realism discloses objective reality in an imminent sense and is therefore an independent procedure that can stand by itself and is characterized by a correspondence to the real world. In other words, there is a scientific epistemology. It has its roots in scientific empiricism and Marxism. And it has its bourgeois distortions in such movements as pragmatism and phenomenalism. It is just these distortions that Marxists reject. Even so, scientific realism is incomplete without the dialectical component supplied in human practice — a relational component that I will consider momentarily.

The way in which science reveals itself as ideology (in Marx's sense of *falsches Bewusstsein*) is not to be found in the activity itself, i.e., in the method of inquiry, but rather in the interpretation of results. For example, Heisenberg's notions about indeterminacy rest on the fundamentally subjectivist standpoint of the Copenhagen interpretation, promoted by Bohr, which claims that the uncertainty relations discovered by Heisenberg set limits to what can be known about atomic physics. As I noted earlier, "it was argued by Bohr and his followers that measurements of an elementary particle interfere with it in such a way that the observer cannot know its real disposition and behavior and that for this reason the observer is measuring only the results of his/her own disruptive activity. Accordingly, objective knowledge is impossible. What this situation shows in fact is not any inherent limitation to our potential knowledge of sub-atomic phenomena, nor a limit to the objectivity of

¹⁰ See my "Realism", *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 37/2, 1978, pp. 141-148, and "Ethics, Ideology, and Moral Reconstruction", op. cit.

science."¹¹ Rather, what it betrays are the limitations of a probabilistic logic and the phenomenalist ideology which favors it. This distortion could only come about for a conception of science in which the investigator was a passive, ideal observer, in which we do not actively intervene in nature in order to know it, but rather passively record what is happening from a detached standpoint. Marx did have something to say about all of this.

In the "Third Thesis on Feuerbach" Marx cryptically suggests the context within which theory of knowledge is to be conceived. Let me offer the following remarks as a gloss on that passage, although my conjectures surely go beyond its sense, and I acknowledge taking much liberty.

The environment, including nature and society, does not enclose and directly determine the consciousness and actions of human subjects. What is unique to the human species arises through the evolution of our mental capacities which in turn is a product of the social-historical development of the practical, productive activities of collective humanity.¹² The external environment confronts people as materials to be transformed through labor to meet human requirements. It is this transformative act that is the basis of all knowledge. Marx conceives the process of cognition as a dialectical, reciprocal, or relational encounter in which, by altering the world, we gradually come to know its substance and laws.¹³ It is not for Marx, as the classical empiricists supposed, that nature inscribes its secrets on a blank tablet. Rather, we learn through active intervention. The concept of the ideal observer is pre-scientific, a vestige of theology.

The genesis of knowledge is to be found in praxis, but is not bound by it. It is in the processes of labor, in production, that we find the sources of the scientific attitude. But it was not until the rise of science, as a highly sophisticated form of labor, that self-conscious, realistic canons of inquiry were formulated on an empirical foundation. It is these standards of correspondence with the real material world which determine the "scientificity" of the various disciplines. And it was in the appropriation of these standards that Marx was able to create the science of history and the science of society. Scientific realism arises out of practice as its culmination. It is a progressive epistemology which can lead, under conducive social conditions, to productive abundance. Marxist theory of knowledge is scientific because it adopts the most advanced

11 "On the Political Origins of Scientific Thought", op. cit.

12 Compare A. N. Leontiev, *Activity, Consciousness and Personality* (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1978).

13 See my "On the Question of Technological Determinism" in *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Marx and Science* (Reidel, Holland, forthcoming).

theoretical standpoint in the theory of knowledge. And historical and dialectical materialism completes and provides the general theoretical context for empirical realism, which when understood as a doctrine of private experience, as in classical empiricism, could lead only to solipsistic absurdity.

SUMMARY

Marxism and empiricism have a number of significant methodological affinities, but ultimately decisive differences. Lenin's important contribution to Marxist epistemology was in pointing out that positivist empiricism was incipient idealism which endangered both scientific and social practice. He argued more generally the empiricism is not necessarily the natural ally of historical and dialectical materialism and that the empiricist standpoint was incapable of grasping its own historical origins and foundations.

Marx's early epistemological theses border on pragmatism, but retain realistic truth criteria that, when more fully explicated, assure the objectivist standards required by science.

Practice alone cannot insure the scientific status of theories. The link between correspondence and practice is necessary to disclose and then castigate false or expedient ideas and measures.

The abandonment of correspondence criteria in philosophy, as for example in the critical theory movement, is a mockery of Marxism, and a similar abandonment in the interpretation of scientific results leads inevitably to subjectivist, or fully blown, idealist conceptions of science—for example Heisenberg's platonism.

Although labor is the root of knowledge and science, it cannot assure objectivity or "scientificity" except when it adopts the standpoint of scientific realism which is itself the hard won achievement of historical practice, as represented in the victory of the scientific, i.e., materialist world view. Historical and dialectical materialism represents the completion and culmination of this world view in nature and society alike.

VIII

Is Advaitic Mukti Non-analytical ?

Rashmirekha Pati & Bijayananda Kar

The concept of *Mukti* finds a prominent place in Advaita Philosophical discussion. Advaita philosophy centres around the concept of *Mukti* (*mokṣa*) in so far as it tries to establish self-realisation as the highest goal. Self (*ātman*) which is conceived as eternal (*nitya*). Non-dual (*advaita*) and unqualified (*nirguṇa*) is in bondage so long as it is not aware of it self. Hence, self-realisation (*ātmānubhūti*) is taken as the state of *Mukti* itself. This is said to have been possible by means of enlightenment (*śuddhajñāna*) alone and for this there is no necessity of either taking recourse to different rituals prescribed in tradition (*Karma*) or appealing for devotion (*bhakti*) to any theocentric Lord (*Īśvara*). Advaita philosophy is thoroughly monistic and here *Mukti* consists in realising the non dual reality or Brahman. itself.

So far as the attainment of *Mukti* is concerned the role of *Jñāna* is obviously very significant. But scholars express different opinions with regard to the exact status of *jñāna* in relation to *Mukti*. The most popular opinion in this regard is found to be emphasising on a sort of anti-intellectual rendering of the concept of *jñāna* and thus pleading for an intuitive or transintellectual account of knowledge.

In order to find justification for this rendering scholars have referred to such original textual expressions like *atarkyam* or beyond argumentation. It is suggested that self-realisation is neither possible through empirical means like perception, inference etc. nor through intellectual argumentation (*tarka*) but through immediacy (*sākṣātkāra*). Thus status of liberation (*mokṣatva*) is conceived as both transempirical and translogical. It is knowledge not in conceptual but rather in a non-conceptual sense. Here such expressions like *cittavṛttinirodha* has been cited.

But critical thinkers have found difficulty in accepting such an account of knowledge. How can there be knowledge of any form which is free from the involvement of concepts ? In order to meet the critic's point of view, it is said that knowledge in the ordinary sense (*vyavahāra*) is of course bound to be conceptual. It must involve the admittance of an agent (*pramātā*), an object of knowledge (*prameya*) and the means for attaining it (*pramāṇa*). But *Mukti* or self realisation is non conceptual in so far as it is beyond the tripartite distinction as stated here. The distinction between the knower and the object completely ceases and thus, the identity of *jīva* and *ātman* has been accepted. But such transcendental and anti-intellectual account is found to be most unconvincing to a critic who regards this as impossible not simply as a matter of fact but even in principle. He argues that such an account of knowledge (that is immediate non conceptual awareness) is logically untenable and thus the traditional rendering of Advaita conception of *Mukti* as totally mystical and obscure.

Attempt has been made to reinterpret advaita account of *Mokṣa* (primarily depending on Śaṅkara's works) in an altogether different manner so that the charge of mysticism and obscurantism can be avoided. In recent past late Prof. G. Mishra has written :

"We find that Śaṅkara has addressed himself to the task of clarification of human thought and human discourse, because he clearly believes that critical examination of the human conceptual system has the double purpose of releasing the human mind from the bondage of dogmas and allowing us to gain an insight about the workings of our language which is of supreme value for the philosopher ... Śaṅkara declares the logical analysis of linguistic and cognitive forms constitutes the proper method of philosophic knowledge (*śrutyādaya, Anubhavādayacha yathā sambhavaiha pramāṇa*) ... Śaṅkar's assertion that the Brahman is eternal but the world is not, simply signifies that the logical subject is eternal, incorrigible and saturated whereas the logical predicate is corrigible, non saturated and changeable... For him, liberation is attainable in this life (*Jīvan Mukti*). This liberation means freedom from the wrong pictures created and fostered by language. Critical examination of concepts destroys this false picture which holds the mind captive. This is what Śaṅkara means by liberation attainable by knowledge (*Jñāna-mārga*) in this, life and no where else (*Jīvan Mukti*)".¹

This interpretation obviously puts Advaita *Mukti* on a different basis and such an account instead of being anti-intellectual is found to be thoroughly intellectual. *Mukti* here is conceived not in the plane of translogical obscurantism; it is rather interpreted in

¹ G. Mishra : *The Advaita Conception of Philosophy: its methods scope and limits*, published by B. Mishra, Bhubaneswar, 1976, Preface, pp. II IV and 13-19

terms of logical and conceptual analysis. According to this interpretation, self-realisation is not however meant as something empirical or factual in nature. It is not held that attainment of liberation consists of the knowledge of either more sensible or supra-sensible facts. Advaitin's insistence that *Mukti* cannot be attained through perception etc. is interpreted here as establishing the point that philosophic knowledge attained through critical analysis of the conceptual system is not factual but logical in character. It is surely transempirical but not for that reason, trans-intellectual. Advaita philosopher, according to this point of view, withdraws himself from the empirical knowledge (*vyavahāra jñāna*) and puts the entire conceptual frame-work as the object of investigation. The knowledge obtained through this kind of investigation is not worldly or factual (*Jāgatika*) but logical and linguistic (*pāramārthika*). It is in this sense said to be *atijāgatika* or meta factual. A logical analysis of conceptual system helps in eliminating confusions and misleading suggestions (*avidyā*). The *mokṣa* sense of illumination is said to be nothing but getting one self away from falsity created out of misunderstanding of the structure of the entire conceptual system. Such an illumination is not subjective or psychological but is based on logical validity. It helps in removing dogmas and superstitions that are possible when the entire linguistic frame-work is misconceived. Advaita concept of *jīvanmukti* has been interpreted as a state where the individual keeps himself free from the dogmas of illogical things and which in turn helps him in being placed at proper situation. Clarification of conceptual confusion is not of subjective or individual interest rather it does contribute to proper human understanding at the social level and consequently it safeguards the principles of justice and morality. Emphasising on the role of unity in human understanding Advaita philosopher contributes towards universal enlightenment, peace and happiness.

However, such an interpretation of Advaita account of *Mukti* is inspite of its freshness, is not found to be convincing to some recent scholars. It is pointed out in this connection that though there are traces of logical and linguistic analysis in Śāṅkara Vedānta, it is too much to interpret Advaita account of *Mukti* as only linguistic and logical. Classical Indian philosophy in general and Advaita *darśana* in particular, it is held, emphasise in meeting a problem concerning life in its practicality. The Advaita philosopher, according to this point of view, finds the worldly life as full of sorrows and sufferings and move for philosophic discussion in order to attain complete cessation of sufferings and absolute happiness. Self realisation is taken to be a state of bliss and thus is regarded as a state of absolute freedom. To put in other words both the problem and its solution posed here are thoroughly practical as these concern life. The

emphasis on *jñāna* need not suggest that the move here is theoretical and thus is aimed at an investigation of knowledge for the sake of knowledge, itself.

Taking these points into account it is remarked that a logical or theoretical rendering of the concept of *Mukti* rather rests on a misunderstanding of the uniqueness of the very advaitic or Indian philosophical approach. Clarification about the workings of language, it is said, concerns only about grammar and language. *Mukti* if it is viewed as a state of freedom at the practical setting can not be consistently interpreted as only the eradication of linguistic and logical confusion.

In this connection, it is pointed out,

"Analysis, it should be admitted does play a very significant rather in certain context the central role in achieving illumination no doubt but everything in Śāṅkara Vedānta cannot I submit, be reduced to linguistic analysis, for the comprehension of unity or non duality of existence (*Brahmāvagati*) is the final goal (*Puruṣārtha*) to be realised through such analysis".

It appears from the reference quoted above that within Śāṅkara Vedānta there is scope for distinguishing between *Brahmāvagati* and linguistic analysis. It is conceded here that linguistic analysis (*Vākyārtha vicāraṇa*) is a means for the attainment of *Brahmāvagati* which is nothing other than the state of *puruṣārtha* or *Mukti*. To put differently, *Mukti* may be attained (so far as Śāṅkara Vedānta is concerned) through conceptual analysis. But it is some thing about reality itself (*Vastu svarūpa*) and can never be reduced to the level of language.

Further by referring to some expressions contained in Śāṅkara's *Viveka Cūdāmoṇi*, it is said that, the liberated person is calm (*śānta*) and thinks well of fellow beings (*Janahitākāṅkṣi*). Such a spiritually enlightened person cannot be consistently interpreted as a linguistic analyst who is simply engaged at the clarification of conceptual obscurities in the theoretical level.³ For, clarification at this level need not necessarily prompt him to be a humanitarian, peace-loving person. Hence, a trans intellectual spritualistic rendering of advaita concept of *Mukti* is not unfounded.

These critical remarks about the linguistic, interpretation of the advaitic concept of *Mukti* rest upon, according to us, on some misunderstanding both about the nature of analytical philosophy and of

2 G. C. Nayak : "Śāṅkara and Linguistic Analysis", *Abstract of Papers* (ed S. P. Dubey), The Indian Philosophical Congress, Diamond Jubilee Session, 1985, p. 21.

3 Vide the unpublished M. Phil dissertation entitled Śāṅkara's theory of liberation: a critical analysis, (submitted by Smt. Rasmirekha Pati) Utkal University, 1985.

Advaita account of *Mukti*. Analytical philosophy in the sense of investigating into the workings of our conceptual system by means of logical scrutiny need not be understood as an excursion to the field of grammar, concerning any particular language in actual use. It is on the other hand an excavation about the logical structure of any language whether actual or possible. In that way it is not concerned only with the language of either past or present or future. It is precisely aimed at clearly discriminating logically valid linguistic expressions from the invalid ones and for this, analysis of meaning is of course significant.

Advaita concept of *Mukti* is based on analytical study of concepts by means of which the philosopher attempts to demarcate the corrigible concepts (*anitya*) from the incorrigible ones (*nitya*). Such a distinction is not based on the study of grammar but on the principle of logical consistency. Such a study of language need not be construed as merely formal. Because so far as this approach is concerned there is no scope for conceiving a reality apart from the conceptual realm. So, the logical analysis of different concepts cannot be said as purely theoretical and has no practical significance. For, any account of reality at the practical setting is bound to involve the use of concepts and thus an analysis of concepts remains indispensable. Conceptual or linguistic analysis for that reason need not be viewed as completely away from the realm of practice. Analysis undertaken by a philosopher is surely to make an impact on his view about the practical framework concerning life as a whole.

The ontic view of life which is said to have been derived from the Advaita philosophy cannot be consistently interpreted as beyond the periphery of linguistic/conceptual analysis. The sense of absolute freedom is surely based upon the analytical study of the conceptual frame-work from the standpoint of logic.

There seems to be no valid point in making a distinction between attainment of *Mukti* and the means for attaining it at least within the context of Advaita. For the Advaitin, so far as this issue is concerned, there is no distinction between means and end (*Brahmabhāvasa mokṣah*). This clearly shows that the clarification attained through conceptual analysis so far as Advaita is taken into account, does have a practical import. The view basing on the oneness of reality (*sarva—bhūtān-tarātmā*) definitely prompts the Advaitin to be a human. It also gives him a boosting to adopt an attitude of calmness in the moral plane. He seeks to find out a harmony between the egoistic and altruistic needs and thus opts for a state of balanced living (*sthitaprajña*) that has full relevancy within the life here and now. There is no need to search for a logical justification about the mysterious transcendental life which is both impractical as well as illogical.

The critic's point of view seems to have been grounded upon a misconception that an analytical philosopher is thoroughly formalistic and has no concern with life as such. The conceptual subtleties that he explores in the field of language is of no relevance in the field of moral life. But such an impression is found to be baseless, for many prominent analytical philosophers are known to be great humanists, quite ethical and disciplined in their practical life. It may be recalled here that important empirically minded analytical philosophers like Hume, Russell and Ayer are all humanists both in theory and practice. It seems to be absolutely groundless in presupposing that analysis and morality in the human plane are antagonistic to each other. Particularly in the Advaita context, such a presupposition is found to be futile for the simple reason that on Advaita never proposes for dismantling the social moral order but is rather keen on sustaining it with full sincerity.

Brahmāvagati need not imply a non-intellectual state of immediate awareness but a state of comprehension and clarification. It helps in removing the intellectual muddles so that the person no longer remains victim to logically unfounded dogmas and superstitions.⁴ Rather interpreting *Brahmāvagati* in terms of non-intellectual immediacy would result on some form of obscurity which the analytic methodology (*vākyārtha vicāraṇā*) always aims at avoiding. The Advaitic *mukti* need not be viewed as mystical and non-analytical. It is based on a logical analysis of the conceptual system and prepares ground for a humanistic ontology free from transempirical mystical tendencies. Basing on Śaṅkara's statement⁵ it is held that *Brahmāvagati* is possible after the cessation (*nivṛtti*) of *vākyārtha vicāraṇā*. And from this it is perhaps argued that there is a significant form of difference between the two. But it can be said here that *Brahmāvagati* is possible in the context of Śaṅkara Vedānta only as an outcome or result of *vākyārtha vicāraṇā*. In this sense both are not to be construed as very much different from each other. Rather it is only on the basis of analysis, the clarificatory state of illumination or *mukti* is possible.

⁴ *Brahmāvagati*, from this point of view, can also be meant as serving the cause of man (*Puruṣa*). Vide, in this connection Vācaspati's interesting remark that being sought by human beings this (*Brahmāvagati*) is humanistic "*puruṣeṇārthyamānavāt puruṣārtha iti yukta*" in his *Bhāmati* on Śaṅkara Bhāṣya (I. I. I.).

⁵ "*Vākyārtha vicāraṇādhyasānanivṛtī hi Brahmāvagatih*" Śaṅkara on *Brahma Sūtra*.

IX

The "Transcendental Meditation" of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi

K. D. Kanev

These days, and especially outside of the *Yoga* circles, it is fully natural the phenomenon meditation to be considered as something entirely new, modern and even as a "neo-hobby", but in fact practitioners from as early as the most ancient times were significantly more numerous than now.

Some of the first informations about the meditation come from India, where the practical and theoretical interest in this phenomenon does not calm down for over 6000 years. About 5000 years ago meditation practices were also known to the Egyptian civilisation. Its application can be traced to the Eskimos and to many other places in the world, in spite of its being overwhelmingly in a peculiar religious frame.

But how could interest in meditation be explained — with geographic or climatic factors, with the conditions in which religious ideology governed, with racial factors, etc. ?

Of course, the one or the other of the above mentioned factors and conditions could favour the aspiration towards meditation practice, but some of these irreversible factors or incentives have been also the eternal life's aspiration of mankind towards a psychological equilibrium, towards physical and spiritual health, longevity, towards a deeper penetration and cognition of man's gist as a unique creation in universal variety.

But if in these early patriarchal and romantic times meditation was yet a looked-for practice, then it proves to be many foldly more necessary and useful today—in the age of scientifico-technical revolution, with the uncessantly growing and increasingly unbearable for man total dynamics, which conditions in the first place relevant psycho tensions.

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Parallely with the possibilities of modern medicine offered to man, and the various kinds of sports, a still larger number of people show a lively interest also in Yogist practices (as a health prophylaxis and therapeutics), resp. in the specifically Yogist meditation as an archetype of meditation altogether.

An extraordinarily big number of meditation forms and methods are known, among which there could be found both something equal and something different. Our task here is to make an attempt to outline the common and the different especially between the meditation method (methodics, techniques) of Patañjali and that one of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi.¹

In my quality as Indologist-Philosopher I am professionally obliged to have a direct attitude also towards Yogism, includingly meditation (viz. not only as practical phenomena, but also as theoretical problems, from which logically some ideologic conclusions are derived.

Yet before my visit to India (1977-1978) I had studied the publications of a number of foreign (incl. Indian) authors, at that, nearly all of them having scientific titles or degrees. In India itself I acquired also a visual idea of the specific in this practice and especially of the so called "Transcendental Meditation" (TM)², whose contemporary author is the Indian Mahesh Srivastava, who became world-known under the pen-name Maharishi Mahesh Yogi.

In India it is spoken about meditation since the deepest antiquity (yet in the so called Vedic period, in Yogism, Tantrism, Buddhism, etc.) With some or other modifications meditation is practised (resp. theoretically or ideologically interpreted) in almost all religions, in a series of philosophic schools or systems, in some cases also as a relatively independent psychophysiological teaching or method, etc.

What concerns especially the variant "Transcendental Meditation" (TM), by recognition of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi himself it is only another denomination of meditation, which is also mentioned in the so called "*Yoga Sūtras*"³, which — as it is conventionally

1 *Scientific Research on the Transcendental Meditation Program* (Collected papers, Volume I). Maharishi International University, 1977.

2 For a greater convenience and shortness we shall use everywhere in our exposition the abbreviation "TM" instead of "Transcendental Meditation".

3 On a Seminar in Delhi (in 1975) Maharishi Mahesh Yogi declared inter alia that "TM" is only a new denomination for Westerners, given to the century old method (of meditation — K.K.), *Dhyana*, already well-known in India", and at present in many other countries of the world too.

believed — were compiled by Patañjali (between the IVth and IIInd centuries B C.).⁴

Before going over to some moments of the TM-techniques, it is necessary to point at certain similarities and differences in comparison with the religious or with the classic Patañjali-Yoga meditation.

One of the essential differences in TM-techniques in respect to the classic Yoga meditation of Patañjali, or a certain resemblance of TM with the relevant religious practice refers to the specific TM-ritual. The TM practice supposes the obligation for the practicant (or the beginner student) to carry with him flowers, fruit and a piece of white cloth, which are presented to the teacher. By the respective practices a special significance was laid down into the "contact" between the student and his devotee (teacher or "Guru", which is tendenciously wrongly translated as "Saint").

It is characteristic of the ritual in question that fragrant grasses are used (similar to incense in churches), which in this case have no religious but chiefly prophylactic significance. It must however be stressed, that neither of the above-mentioned requirements in the TM ritual is obligatory for the classic Patañjali-Yoga meditation. Some authors perceive a certain similarity between TM and the classic Patañjali-Yoga meditation in respect of using the so called "*Mantras*" (literally: words or short sentences). In fact the specific Yogist full mental concentration (*Samādhi*) can also be achieved by means of utterance or singing of these or those *Mantras*. But still at the beginning of the IVth Section of his "*Yoga-Sutras*" Patañjali stresses that in man the "powers" (*Sidhi*) are acquired by birth, by means of drugs, *Mantras*, self-restraint or *Samādhi*". The consequence from this is that the use of *Mantras* is allowed, but it is not absolutely obligatory in classic Patañjali-Yoga, because in this case "the powers" — *Sidhis* are achieved fore-mostly by means of the specific Yogist mental concentration upon a certain object (resp. a thing, a phenomenon, an abstraction, etc.).

The application of *Mantras* gives factually reason to look for something common between TM and Tantrism or the church-religious practices, where a certain ideologic directedness is at hand (e.g. in the church-religious activity some peculiar *Mantras* are the prayers, the conclusive word "*Amen*", etc.). But parallelly some definite, if not strongly therapeutic, so at least some health-prophylactic effects are searched. In general irrespectively of the shown traditionally religious means and end-purposes, as a final result at least, the psychologic relaxation is a non-argued fact.

4 *Patañjalasūtrāṇi* — with the Scholium of Vyāsa and commentary of Vāchaspati (Bombay Sanskrit Series), Bombay, 1892.

But what about the question of the role of mental or mind concentration? While in the classic Patañjali-Yoga, meditation is unthinkable without the specific Yogist mind concentration, in TM-techniques the concentration of mind seems not to have been of essential significance. In fact however with TM it is practically impossible to eliminate fully the mind concentration because the application of *Mantras* itself supposes (at least in the initial stages) to do so. As a result of a peculiar concentration the modifications or the "synchronisation" of brain waves could also be examined. But these are already other problems of discussion.

Let us now put a glance at the specific TM-techniques. After the relevant ritual requirements with TM (e.g. the presentation of flowers, fruit, etc.) as well as after giving special theoretic explanations, incl. the receipt of a strongly individual-personal *Mantra*, one goes over to the essence of the easily accessible TM-techniques :

The practicant has to be in some of the traditional Yogist body positions (e.g. the outgoing position *Lotus* or *Padmasana*, and in the end the traditional Turkish sitting too). The next requirement is the practicant to strive to master the situation of a maximal physical and psychical relaxation, i.e. a fully calm flow of the emotional, sensual and mental activity. An eventually arisen association (a mental or sensual one) must not be put aside by force (i. e. by a conscious interference of mind), but its analysis must be carried out extremely calmly. But if this state continues too long (i.e. if the practicant cannot get rid of this intrusive thought or sense) then he must go over to the use of his previously given *Mantra* (that could even be of no whatsoever sense). This *Mantra* must be repeated several times (viz. only at the beginning in a loud voice, and then always in mind). And one of the important prescriptions or requirements in this case is to come to such a state when with the flow of time this *Mantra* begins to be reproduced only in mind and mechanically, i.e. without mental concentration. Under the pressure of the repeated slow utterance of the *Mantra* the suppression or fading must begin so, that at the end the arisen mind or sense association disappears.

According to the classic Patañjali-Yoga or TM-techniques the use of a *Mantra* conditions a fixed progressive increase of "synchronisation" in brain, i.e. leads to a state of the least excitement, which asserts the beginning of the meditation process. Always in this connection the TM-techniques supposes (as a requirement or a result) also the arising of defined phenomena, known in the classic Patañjali-Yoga under the common name *Siddhi*, i.e. "powers", which will again be mentioned in the following.

A resultative teaching of the student factually leads to special abilities or phenomena, considered in the past as a quite abnormal

repertoire of behaviour. On this occasion one of the TM publications reads: "These abilities include the revelation or cognition of objects hidden for the eye; a definite knowledge of the past and future; a maximally developed feeling of friendship and sympathy; strengthening of the sensual (for example the hearing — K. K.) apparatus; invisibility; overcoming the earth gravitation, etc.).

Only for information it must be cleared up that the reality of these phenomena is mentioned already in the deepest antiquity. Patañjali speaks (in his "*Yoga-Sutras*") comparatively in details about a multitude of comparative phenomena, but not as of a self purpose of the Yogis, but mainly as of real results. At that, not as of something divine or mystic, but as of completely "natural states". Something more, Patañjali even advises to avoid its practising, because these phenomena or states in fact slow down or divert the practising *Yoga* from his end-purpose — *Samādhi*.

Our view is that the TM-techniques include in their "repertoire" the respective phenomena in order to acknowledge also experimentally their reality and natural character, and so to repudiate their mystic or religious explanation. Of course the end-purpose of TM-techniques is to prove experimentally the necessity of meditation as an ancient and unique means for health prophylaxis and therapeutics.

Which are only some of the TM prophylaxis and therapeutics aspects? The TM adepts support the view that one of its most essential purposes is its relativeness in the first place to man's health, to his balance with the environment that he lives in, etc. And while in the classic Patañjali-Yoga the results of the corresponding prophylactic or therapeutic effects (incl. of the so called *Siddhis* — "powers" are merely postulated, the modern level of science consigns to TM adepts to offer also experimental proof of their reality.

But by the way, which or what are only some of the real achievements especially of TM, that are proved in an experimental way? One of the initial formulations of TM is that the state of plain health supposes a perfect coordination between "mind and environment" or between "body, mind and activity". And still more, health supposes that "the body is functioning in a way that is fully coordinated with the laws of nature, which control all aspects of physiology".

Another characteristic starting point is that the TM-techniques allows mind activity to settle up to a state of *minimal excitement*, because only in such a state the corresponding systems in man are able to be in a maximal order. (in this case only by analogy the II Law of Thermodynamics is pointed at, whose fully possible expression is achieved in a state of minimal excitement of the quantum field, i.e. the so called "basic state").

In TM it is maintained that just during the time of its techniques application these principles are reflected in a general integration, regularity or physiological harmony increase, etc. Hereby it is pointed — as an especially important thing in this case — just at the *high synchronisation* of brain waves. This synchronisation became the more expressive, the longer TM-techniques has been practised in life. Or, that TM-techniques enlarged this synchronisation development and gave it the possibility to be maintained together with the other activities. In general, in the sense of TM-techniques, the EEG-synchronisation is highly interrelated with a number of aspects of the neuro physiologic integration, where a state of the least conscience (mind or thought) excitement is felt. And still more, the EEG-synchronisation maintains the accompaniment of physiologic activity, resp. of the conscious activity stage on different levels.

One of the generalising conclusions (from TM investigations) is, that "when the state of the least excitement is reached without loss of consciousness or cognition, this is considered as a field of higher intellectual possibilities of the practican^t". In our opinion especially this conclusion is of extraordinarily high significance for the evaluation of TM techniques, from the point of view of the scientific-Marxist methodology.

During TM-techniques "caution" (resp. vigilance, activity, etc.) is maintained, but this exists together with the state of deep rest. This is in fact such a state of the nerve system, in which the entire physiology functions normally, i.e. according to nature.

And here are in a summarised form also some of the experimentally proved indices, realised by the TM-techniques of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi : in the first place an increased EEG-synchronisation; an increased automatic balance; a faster restauration of motor neurons after stimulation; a higher skin resistance; a decreased milk-acid contents in blood, etc.

Some experimental data (as a result of deep meditation practice) are also mentioned by the Soviet scholar V. Bakhur, Dr. of medicinal sciences, viz. : decrease of exchange processes; decrease of skin sensibility; electro-encephalogram data about the abundance of alpha-rhythms, especially in the fore—and central brain regions, where they are generally slightly expressed; still slower hesitation of the so called theta-rhythms. In conclusion Dr. V. Bakhur states : "The same picture has been observed also by American physicians, when they examined in 1972 in the USA. very thoroughly 36 patients dealing with their very widespread Yogist system—the so called "Transcendental Meditation".⁵

⁵ *Science and Life* (Magazine in USSR) No. 3, 1977, p. 74.

It is hardly necessary to stress what a significance even only these experimentally proved indices, especially health prophylaxis and therapeutics, acquire. Both in some capitalist countries so untried (by single sects or communities) the so called "Transcendental Meditation" is used as a peculiar substitute of narcomony with the aim to reach some peculiar psycho-experiences. Another question is, that it could be used also against narcomony itself. Here it is possible to use it again with stressed ideal motives, i.e. includingly for conclusions on behalf of spiritualism, mysticism and theology. But we shared already the view that such an access has nothing to do with the first predestination of meditation altogether. So similar ideal speculations even dialectics could be used, couldn't it ?

* * *

In conclusion it must still be also mentioned that man's health and the development of science compel at least the scholars to have a due attitude towards the experimentally proven results of meditation in general, and in this case referring also to "Transcendental Meditation". In such cases presumption, sectarianism and dogmatism, ideological insinuations etc. do harm on a positive investigation, on the strongly scientific and scientifico-popular information. It is another question that with the discovery or postulation of this or that even experimentally proved phenomenon may arise a number of discussionable problems or "white spots", which often give reason for inconsiderate conclusions and generalisations. In the given case a similar precedent is at hand in this country too, even in respect of health prophylaxis and therapeutic effects of "Transcendental Meditation". But such an insinuation or explicit rejection is in contradiction with the spirit of scientific thought. And in spite of the fact, that the "talk" about meditation in general (as a practical phenomenon or a scientific and ideologic problem) in this country starts with a significant delay, we are deeply convinced that it will continue on a scientific and scientifico-popular level in future too. And this is necessary not only for science but first of all for man's health, for his multisided and harmonic development, for his physical and spiritual self-perfection.



A Note on Ascription of Experience

N. Malla

In this short note, I wish to critically review certain points made by Suresh Chandra about the concepts of person and ascription of experiences. The author presents a comparative account of the concept of person advocated by Wittgenstein and Strawson but fails miserably in the task. Moreover, the author unnecessarily mystifies Wittgenstein's concept of person and imposes his pet ideas both on Wittgenstein and Strawson.

The author confuses between two different issues, i.e. (i) the issue of the concept of person and (ii) the issue of ascription of experience. The concept of person and the concept of ascription of experience are two different concepts. But the author treats these concepts as if they were co extensive. It is true, as a matter of fact, (and Wittgenstein rightly points out) that sensations, pains and feelings can be ascribed to other animals even to flies. Not only a human person can feel the pin-prick but also an animal. The Indian scientist J. C. Bose even went to the extent of advocating the thesis that sensations can be ascribed to plants. Wittgenstein makes a clear-cut distinction between the concept of person and ascription of sensation. He maintains (very correctly) that pain and sensation can even be ascribed to flies. According to Wittgenstein, pain and sensation can be ascribed not only to human persons but to creatures resembling human persons.

The basis of ascription of pain and sensation is *life* but not *personality*. Only some of the living beings (i.e. human beings) but not all can be treated as persons. The author, without assigning any reason, glorifies Wittgenstein's concept of person and takes Strawson to task. The author argues, without any justification that Wittgenstein extends the concept of person to a variety of entities where as Strawson restricts it to human beings only. Further, the

author points out that Wittgenstein applies the so called 'P-predicates' to a variety of things where as Strawson restricts it to human person only. I wish to point out that the author has misinterpreted the position of both Wittgenstein and Strawson. Self-knowledge, self-consciousness, reflection and exercise of intelligence are the criteria for the application of 'P-predicates'. Strawson is very correct while he argues that 'P—predicates' can be applied only to human persons. Strawson will not deny the obvious fact that animals do feel pain and sensation. Even if Strawson has not made this point explicit in his book *Individuals* yet this point will not be inconsistent with his general position. I wish to maintain that even if Strawson will not extend 'P—predicates' to a variety of beings, he will extend the concepts of feeling and sensation to a wide variety of living beings.

The author characterises Wittgenstein as a theological behaviourist. This sort of characterisation of Wittgenstein is not only baseless but cannot be supported by textual evidences at all. Even, Wittgenstein's concept of person does not warrant such an interpretation. The author unnecessarily imputes certain views to Wittgenstein and then characterises the latter as a theological behaviourist. It is just like the case of giving a bad name to a dog and then to hang it. The author, instead, gives a good name to Wittgenstein and then hangs him. He puts into the mouth of Wittgenstein, "Subjects to which sensations are ascribed are persons" (p. 294). Wherefrom does the author get the idea of *pan person-ism* in the works of Wittgenstein? This is just a brain child of the author. Wittgenstein simply maintains that sensations can be ascribed not only to human beings but to many other creatures. From the fact of ascribability of sensation to other creatures, the author derives the doctrine of *pan-person-ism* which is highly unwarranted. Moreover, there are textual evidences in the *Philosophical Investigations* to run counter to this sort of interpretation. Wittgenstein argues, "Human body is the best picture of human soul" (P.I.P.—178). This goes to prove that Wittgenstein tries to eliminate soul. The author rightly points out that both Wittgenstein and Strawson seek to eliminate the Cartesian ego. But he goes ahead and maintains that Wittgenstein is a theological behaviourist.

It is true that Wittgenstein makes a distinction between primary and secondary use of concepts. Secondary uses, for Wittgenstein, are the metaphorical or figurative uses. In this connection, Wittgenstein maintains that even dolls and pots can be said to feel pain and sensation in secondary sense. But the author seems to have taken this remark of Wittgenstein in the literal sense. He seems to interpret Wittgenstein as arguing for the case that pain and sensation can be ascribed to other material things, besides men and animals. But

to interpret Wittgenstein in this manner is to caricature him. Again, the author points out that even if Wittgenstein is interested in logical grammar yet sometimes he takes resort to observation. True, while trying to elucidate the meaning of words, Wittgenstein draws our attention to a variety of situations for the simple reason that the meaning of words is unseparably bound up with actual and possible situations in life. Wittgenstein cites the cases of 'pretending', 'hoping' and 'anticipating' in order to make his point explicit. His findings are that a child takes a very long time to be conversant in the act of pretending. Moreover, the concepts of 'hope' and 'anticipation' cannot be applied in the case of animals. If the author thinks that it is a sensational revelation on his part to have pointed out this then he is absolutely mistaken. Any explication of the logical grammar of concepts is bound to take note of the actual ways in which they are used. But this is not observation in the sense in which the author intends to mean it. The author perhaps intends to say that even if Wittgenstein is interested in elucidating the logic of concepts yet he is also conducting observation and experiment in the manner of a scientist.

Strawson has been accused of treating other animals as mere automata. I wish to suggest that this is a false charge against Strawson by the author. Strawson surely maintains that 'P—predicates' can be applied only to persons and in no case can they be applied to other animals. By applying 'P—predicates' we ascribe mental-qualities to persons. But non ascription of mental predicates does not turn out animals mere automata. To say that animals do not have higher mental abilities is not to say that they are lifeless and dead pieces of matter. It is true that Strawson has not specifically said what does he mean by a 'P—predicate: but it is clear from the context what he wants to say. We can defend the Strawsonian position in the following manner. To say that 'P—predicates' are not applicable to other animals, is not to say that they are lifeless. Both Wittgenstein and Strawson will agree that 'P—predicates' can be applied to human persons and not to other animals. The author unnecessarily argues that Strawson neglects animals. Does Strawson argue that animals are lifeless things? This is an invention of the author.

Further, the author argues that persons and bodies cannot be explained in terms of 'P—predicates' and 'M—predicates'. Rather, the distinction between 'P—predicates' and 'M—predicates' presupposes the distinction between person and body. I wish to point out that any conceptual explanation is bound to be circular. If one begins with 'P—predicates' and 'M—predicates' one is bound to end up with persons and bodies and vice-versa. If the author thinks that he has turned the table against Strawson he is under the wrong

impression. To add to the confusion, the author maintains (p. 282) that in actual life, 'P—predicates' are applied to material bodies. A human person is surely a tangible and visible entity. But from this it does not follow that he is nothing but a lump of matter. To be a person means to have a body but the concept of person cannot be exhaustively defined in terms of material body alone. The basis of the application of P—predicates' is not the material body of the person but something else; it is the presence of non-material principles.

The author again visualizes the objectification of pain. He even goes to the extent of talking in terms of pain-patches. His arguments are that most of the philosophical problems centring round mind and body will disappear if we adopt the language of 'pain-patches' in the manner of 'colour patches'. In this connection, the author refers to section 312, and 313 of *Philosophical Investigations*. In support of his thesis, he claims that even Wittgenstein has visualized the language of 'pain-patch'. I wish to point out that the mere fact of its being said by Wittgenstein does not make the thesis acceptable. The thesis must be acceptable on independent grounds. The logic of 'pain' is such that nobody can be said to feel pain in a place outside one's own body. Short stories and novels could be written depicting pain-patches moving here and there in space. But this will not solve our problem. We can very well imagine a world where there is no pain at all but we cannot possibly imagine a world where there is pain and everybody sees it but nobody feels it. In other words 'pain' and 'feeling' are internally connected. To have pain means to feel it and to feel it means to exhibit it. A pain which cannot be exhibited in behaviour is impossible in nature. Wittgenstein maintains that private exhibitions of pain is an illusion (see P. I Section 311). By 'exhibition', Wittgenstein does not mean exhibition in terms of behaviour which is publicly accessible. It is true that Wittgenstein uses the terms 'pain-patch' in the section 312 of the *Philosophical Investigations*. But by 'pain-patch' he means 'pain-producing patches'. It is not only true but quite conceivable for pain-producing patches to be there out in the world. Pain-producing patches are surely objective. Nobody will disagree with the author that the leaf of the scorpion-plant contains pain-producing patches. But from this it does not follow that pain as felt by a human person or an animal can be represented as pain patches. There is a difference between pain-producing patches and pain as felt by a human person or an animal. There is a difference between pain-producing patches and pain felt by a living being. The author unnecessarily confuses between the two. X. Pain producing patches may be objective but pain as felt by a person can never be objectified. The author again confuses pain with the cause of the pain.

Even section 313 of the *Philosophical Investigations* cannot come to the help of the author. Wittgenstein maintains "I can exhibit pain, as I exhibit red, and as I exhibit straight and crooked and trees and stones — that is what we call "exhibiting". The author of the article under reference misinterprets the above-said remarks of Wittgenstein and tries to impose his own views on the latter. Wittgenstein lays emphasis on the objective exhibition of pain but not on objectification of pain.

The author again maintains (see, for instance page-285) that animals are the proper subjects for ascription of experiences. But I wish to point out that the author fails to distinguish between experience and mere sensation or feeling. Animals cannot be said to have experiences. The application of 'experience' presupposes such mental abilities as self-knowledge and reflection. Living beings like animals can be said to have sensations but cannot be said to have experiences.

Suresh Chandra "Wittgenstein and Strawson on the Ascription of Experiences", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. Vol. XLI, March, 1961, No. 3.

Book-Reviews :

Shreenivas : *SHRINGINAD*, The Voice of Divine Trumpet, pp. 830. Publishers: Indian Institute of Business Management and Dr. Zakir Hussain Institute for non-formal and Continuing Education for Kavishpriyaangava, Patna—800 001. Distributors: Press Service of India, 6E, Rajendra Nagar, Patna 800 016. Price Rs. 135/- \$ 30/-

Shringinad—a voice although comes through an empty horn (converted into a musical instrument) but here it carries much more than this being a voice of deep thoughts and emotions from the core of Heart—of Dr. Shreenivas who fortunately happens to be an eminent Cardiologist of India.

An eminent physician can be so grand a language master, a pure mathematician, a great physicist, psychologist is hard to believe, unless one sees the tremendous task he had done in writing this book, which shows the jugglery of words, ornamentation, its mathematical calculations in relation to modern physics of Relativity of Einstein and Quantum theory Max Planck, psychological aspects of life in relation to time immemorial work on Yoga and its attainments, asirvada of many gurus and last not the least from his revered mother guru.

It is a bare fact that till today inspite of greatest achievements in all spheres of science, technology, arts and mathematics and with all volumes of experiences and religious books available, one is short of the justifying presence of God—whom he has very rightly defined as Omnipresent, Omnipotent and absolutely Absolute and whole of universe as a cosmic creation. All roads whether of religion or of science, mathematics, psychology—lead towards one goal—a goal of finding one who is running the whole show. I personally feel human being as MINI-universe. Dr. Shreenivas has very meaningfully defined

God=Space

And God as consciousness (Truth consciousness—Bliss Truth Compassions—Beauty

Sacchidananda (Satyam Shivam Sundaram)

The deep insight of Spiritometry was evoked in his heart from his mother's experience. Spiritometry is an attempt to scan and search the Mysterious Unmanifest Absolute for the Spirit. In the words of Dr. Shreenivas :

God is to Spiritometry what point is to Geometry. The first principle (or axiom) of Geometry is that ! 'A point has position but no magnitude. Likewise the first principle (or Axiom) of spiritometry is that "God is" (page 7).

God is an axiom of the first category for the theists and of the second category (of the pinnacle) for the converts. The absolute can be realised as the origin, the source and the substance, and the support and the cover, of the universe, the fulcrum of the Natural Laws (physical as well as psychical) and the unmanifest essence of manifest essentiality" (page 84).

Maya in his words is a handmaid of Relativity. The Absolute is beyond Maya. Relativity depends on Maya and Maya on relativity and since Relativity is infinitely relative, therefore Maya too is finite.

Maya=Infinity=limitless eternal=an aspect of God.

As regards Biological set up : Mind and Brain are two different entities. Mind is not just the physiology (function of the brain (Anatomy). Mind is to the brain as electricity is to the heart. Consciousness is the ultimate biological power behind Existence (and life)—of E.G.C. and electronics, (p. 136).

Mind and matter are correlated with consciousness and creation. The physical, the psychic and the spiritual are intertwined and alloyed.

When the mind gets rid of all relativity and conditioning the consciousness stands revealed as the absolutely absolute awareness and the Truth of the existence and Being is realised as the abiding reality. The Totipotency of the Zygote is equivalent to the Totipotency of the Cosmic Creatrix (Hiranyagarbha). The microcosm is the macrocosm in miniature.

Thus the possible implication in (of) Physics and the possible implication in (of) psyche points to the unification of Mind and Matter as the consciousness and space=God=consciousness (CHIT) =The absolutely absolute=The totality=The One=The 'O' (Sunya)=The changeless Truth, Reality, Existence and Being=Sachitanand (page 142).

Maya further he described has limitation of our bahikaran+Antahkarana (is the range and extent of our perceptibility, observability and comprehension). Maya is the mother janani (Prakriti) and Natural Laws, the father Janak (purush) of the Relativity and the Cosmic Creation is permutation and combination Conglomerate of the relativistic kaleidoscopic Nascent Novelty. (page 147)

His vast study on the Laws of Conservation, the study of Einstein regarding his theory of Relativity, the study of Quantum Theory of Max Planck, which in its simplest term in the theory of the submicroscopic world where some of the nature's variables, i.e. energy, man's angular momentum etc can take only discrete values (quantum units) and accordingly can change only in finite jumps and its application on the human kid he speak of the greatest interest on the untouchable topic.

The most modern physics and its application on the Cosmic creation, the unknown concept of gravity, Electricity and the electron and its application present term is worth appreciating.

The biologic configuration of both the cerebral hemispheres and its union through corpus Collosum and their physiologic functions on the basis of anatomy, the classification and position of mind in body which is still a mystery has been projected in a very refined way, acceptable to many.

His imagination and rationalism on the mystical presence of God, and very thought provoking ideas in which he has depicted God as the absolutely absolute, Abstract being, the omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, as the One without the second, Life consciousness Bliss entity, the truth Benevolence, Beauty, the suchness of existence" carries a definite weight.

He is absolutely correct when he says Nature divulges to mind only that much of the truth which is, at that stage of his mental development, intelligible and assimilable to him.

He further says,

'In all fairness it must be said that science does not yet know too much about its (nature's) working concepts and tools and that mathematics, logistics and equations are but the products of severely limited minds and an attempt to make sense of non sense. When common sense has to be discussed as it must need be in that domain of existence and being to where it does not belong.

This book emphasises the importance of truth in life since God is truth and truth is God. The Maya is a myth, a dream which appears and vanishes. The God of science exists as a supreme self, as the (super) space, the cosmic energy, the creative consciousness, but the God of Arts as known by the life long seeings, penance, contemplation and transcendental meditation of great Rishis and Yogis—"God is present everywhere everytime and pervades everything—go within and seek the self with love and confidence, and you will find God enshrined within-yourself".

This book is an excellent and sincere effort, although difficult to understand at a first stretch, but is very much descriptive, illustrative, mathematical and scientific in its approach toward the understanding of illusion of life and its understanding toward the Divine light, the divine truth, which will remain an experimental study till the life remains.

Since in words of Dr. Shreenivas also Creation is in His Expressed Existence, exposed and announced and manifest. The Cosmos is, His enfolding body, His lap. But He himself is beyond the Umanifest, Absolutely Absolute one. Nature is ineludible, the inevitable, inexorable, the intractable cosmic consitution.

Space is endless, unbreached (continuous) integral perspicuously pervading perspective of the phenomenal from microcosm to Macrocosm from the Centre to the circumference, from Relative to the Absolute from the physical to psychic from creation to the Creatrix, when man's mind dwell in the Relative, it gets away from the Absolute And the mind has to be dropped and left out and transcended before the Absolute can be contacted.

This is the step ladder for any human individual for the greatest achievement in one's life—to find out the truth—the Ultimate, the God—the Creator—for which any race from any source seems to be limited, bounded, but full of challenge—Discovery is open and the race is open.

This book is very interesting and scholarly contribution which covers various fields of study and is encyclopedic in nature. The study is scientific and covers almost all aspects of life based on experience and thinking of Dr. Shreenivas. Indeed a great contribution. The author deserves heartfelt Congratulations for bringing to light many facts for common man who wish to have knowledge of Man, universe and God.

Dr. M. C Sharma, M. S.,
Senior Medical Superintendent
Moradabad

S. K. Pandian:—*The Hidden Heritage*, pp. 125, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., L-10 Green Park Extension, New Delhi 110016, Price Rs. 80/- (1987).

Soorian K. Pandian, is a senior administrator scholar who has contributed several articles to newspapers and magazines. He is at present working as Education Secretary to the Government of the Andhra Pradesh. The present work traces the origin of Indian Religious Thought and Philosophy and the vicissitudes these underwent at different times, especially during the Vedic and Puranic periods. Similarly the origin and development of Indian languages is explained in the light of the latest discoveries of cave writings that have been made in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Extensive photographs of cave paintings and cave writings have been furnished and their relationship to the Indus script shown. The book has nicely dealt with the fundamental tenets of Hinduism and how these truths have been distorted in some religious classics is explained in a logical and coherent way, making a comparative study of various religious faiths. The relevance of ancient cultural heritage to our march towards modernity also forms the subject matter of the book.

The whole book is divided into six chapters: The Hidden Heritage—Introduction, The Lemurian Civilisation—The Three Deluges—The Siddha Tradition—The First Yogi—The Ancient Four—The Suppressed Heritage. Chapter II The Paisachi Language—The Antiquity of Telugu—Mahendragiri and Mahayogi—Tungabhadra Valley Script—Indus Valley Script—The Linguistic Illusion—The Intellectual invasion—Reshaping of History—The Sister Languages; Chapter III The Life-Giving Ethic: Godhead and God—Religion revealed through Science—God and Soul—Mummalam or the Three Impurities—The Three Yogas and the Three Gunas—Dharma Yoga, Bhakti Yoga—Jnana Yoga—Jainism—Buddhism;

Chapter IV The Man-Making Religion — Six schools of Thought — Revision of Bhagawat Gita — Siva or Manu — Supra-religious Humanism; Chapter V The Socialistic Society: Liberty — Secularism — Equality — Socialism Fraternity — Saivism; And in Chapter VI The Spiritual Evolution : The Goal of Life — Obstacles to the Goal — The Diksha Theory — The Maya Theory — The Karma Theory — Conclusion. In the end Plates, Annexures I and II have been provided. Bibliography of 35 important books is appended which will help the readers to get more and more material for further study in the subject.

Mr. Pandian has arrived at many conclusions in his study which do not find favour with old traditional views. But he has tried to put forth his views on the logical basis to press his findings. It is a good study based on the ancient Indian philosophy, religious, historical and cultural traditions of India. It is very interesting and thought provoking book. Most of the interpretations, contentions and conclusions do not have the support of the majority of leading authorities of Indian History, religion, culture, and philosophy.

Mr. S. K. Pandian, deserves congratulations on this thought provoking study in the field of philosophy, religion and history.

Priti Sinha : *The Philosophy of Advaita*, pp. 436, Published by Shri Ashok Kumar Varma, Sivaraja Publications, Pilikothi, Varanasi 221001, 1986 Price Rs. 150/—.

Dr. Miss Priti Sinha is a teacher of Philosophy of good standing in Vasanta College, Rajghat, Varanasi. The present work proposes to bring in clear focus the richness, depth and profundity of the Vedanta Philosophy which is considered the most significant philosophical tradition of India.

The whole book has been divided into the following chapters: Introduction, I Kevaladvaita of Sankara, II Sankara's Conception of Man and his bondage, III Sanakara's conception of Liberation, IV Visistadvaita, V Dvaita Vedanta of Madhvacharya, VI Dvaitadvaitavada of Nimbarka, VII Suddhadvaita of Vallabhacharya, VIII Sri Aurobindo's Conception of Saccidananda and Supermind, IX Sri Aurobindo's Conception of Man and his bondage and Chapter X The Destiny of Man. In the end Dr. Sinha has very well summarised the views expressed by different schools of Vedanta throughout in her book. A quite an exhaustive Bibliography of books and journals consulted in writing this book has been provided.

The Philosophy of Advaita : A transition from Sankara to Sri Aurobindo is a thorough study in the Advaita tradition in Indian Philosophy. Dr. Sinha has very ably shown her familiarity with the works of different exponents of Advaita Philosophy in India, such as Ramanuja, Madhva, Nimbarka, Vallabhacharya, Chaitanya and Sri Aurobindo. In Introduction Dr. Sinha has very ably discussed main concepts of Sankara's Advaitism, Main contributions of Theistic Vedanta's five Acharyas — Ramanuja, Madhva, Vallabha, Nimbaraka and Chaitanya Mahaprabhu, some notable features of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy, Impact of Bengal Vaishnavism on Sri Aurobindo. The role of Reason on Sri Aurobindo's philosophy. In chapter I Dr. Sinha examined the concept of

Brahman, Saguna and Nirguna Brahman, S.t, Brahman as consciousness, Brahman as Bliss, Isvara and the proofs for the existence of God; In chapter II Sankara's Conception of man and his bondage, she has discussed Jiva and Atman, Jiva and Saksin, Isvara and Jiva, Tat tvam Asi, the Three stages of Jiva, the doctrine of Maya, Maya and Avidya, Adhyasa, Is avidya one or many, World, Triple Reality, Some of Sankara's arguments for the unreality of the world; Chapter III Sankara's Conception of liberation discusses : The way of liberation, Karma and Jnana, Bhakti and Jnana, Jivan mukti and Videha Mukti; Chapter IV Visistadvaita discusses the concept of Reality, the nature of Ultimate Reality, The Human soul and its bondage, Destiny of Man and the ways to attain it, In chapters V, VI and VII The nature of Ultimate Reality, the nature of the world, The concept of Moksha and the ways of attaining it in Madhva-charya, Nimbarka and Vallabhacharya's philosophy Chapter VIII and IX and X have been devoted exclusively to Sri Aurobindo's Concept of Saccidananda and Supermind, Conception of Man and his bondage and the last chapter The Destiny of Man. In the end a very good summary 'A summing up' has been provided which gives clear understanding of the subject matter. A quite an exhaustive Bibliography of all the books and Journals consulted has been provided which will prove useful for the researchers who wish to study more about the philosophy of Advaita.

Dr. Sinha's study is an interesting and is very thoughtful study comprising of The Philosophy of Advaita : A transition from Sankara to Sri Aurobindo. It gives clear understanding of Sankara's and Aurobindo's understanding of the main concepts of their philosophy along with the views of other Vedantacharyas — Ramanuja, Madhva, Vallabh, Nimbarka and Chaitanya.

Indeed a very good book on the Philosophy of Advaita covering the main thoughts of several Vedantic thinkers including Sri Aurobindo. She has critically examined the views of Advaita in its various aspects and its contents are very rich and informative and makes a good reference book for the researchers in the field of Indian Philosophy.

Dr. Sinha deserves our congratulations for bringing out such a nice compendium on the Philosophy of Advaita.

R. C. Gupta : *The Wonder that is Hindu Dharma*, pp. 240, B. R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi-110052. (1987). Price Rs 125/-

The author of this book Shri Ram Chandra Gupta is Principal of Ravindra College Bhopal. He has a large number of books to his credit in English and Hindi on varied subjects such as Gandhian Philosophy, Socialism and Democracy in India and Shri Krishna.

Hindu Religion and Hindu Thought have governed the Hindu way of life for thousands of years. Dharma is an intrinsic concept of this way of life since it treats life as a whole. It guides the social life, serves as the basis of political life in India. According to Shri Gupta Dharma stands for the virtues of self-denial, compassion, fraternal love and purity—the fundamental and universal values that serve as the basis of Indian Society. His approach is unique and explains the concept of Dharma in its various forms and attempts to

establish that it is neither philosophy nor religion, neither morality nor law, yet it pervades all. Dharma is necessary for the development of a human being both as an individual and also as member of the society. Dharma paves the way for social, religious and political synthesis in human society as well as for the progress and welfare of all mankind.

The book has been divided into seven chapters : I. The Concept of Dharma : Its origin and meaning, Svadharma and Varnashramdharma, scope of Dharma, the sources of Dharma; II. Religious Thought and Hindu Dharma : — The Necessity of Religion, Hindu Religious Thought. Philosophy, Religion and Dharma interrelated in India, Hinduism and Other Related Religious Systems; III. State and Dharma : The Origin of State and Dharma, The Concept of Law and Dharma, Dharma in relation to king. His position and Authority. Sanctions of Dharma behind Kings's duties and Responsibilities, Rajadharma and the Ideals of State, Dharma as the Basis of Ancient Indian Polity; IV. Dharma, Law and Justice : Ancient Views on Law, Secular Law (Vyavahara as a Branch of Dharma, Dharma and Administration of Justice, Hindu Judicial System, Judicial Procedure, Criminal Law; Principle of equality; V. Secularism and Hindu Dharma: Western Secularism and Hinduism, Temper of Hindu Religious and Philosophic Thought, The Nature of Secularism in India, The Ideal of a Secular state in modern India, Secularism in Indian situation Modern Indian Secularism and Dharma; VI. Dharma and Indian Society: Basis of Indian Society, Sanskaras (Sacraments), Ancient Indian Education: Its System and object. Family Life: Position of Women. In the end quite an exhaustive Bibliography has been appended (A) Primary Sources and (B) Secondary sources, and (C) Miscellaneous and lastly Page Index has been provided.

The book is a scholarly contribution to Hindu Dharma giving in brief various aspects of Hinduism which has attracted the whole world and is creating an atmosphere on account of its greatness and secular character. Dharma is an important concept in India. Philosophy, Religion and Dharma are inter related in India. State and Dharma are closely related and the King has to perform his duties according to the prescribed rules for governing the state. Dharma, Law and Justice all are very well defined in Hindu Dharma. Ancient Views on Law have meaningful significance in Hinduism. In Hinduism was evolved the procedure for Administration of Justice, Hindu Judicial System, Judicial Procedure, Criminal Law. The author has discussed very nicely the Secularism and Hindu Dharma in its various aspects and in the last chapter a discussion Dharma and Indian Society in which he has pointed out and discussed Basis of Indian Society, Sanskaras, Ancient Indian Education and Family Life and Position of women.

It is very interesting book on Hindu Dharma wherein the author has discussed several aspects which has made Hindu Dharma a unique religion in many respects and serves as the basis for social and political life in India.

Mr. Gupta deserves congratulations for bringing to light many facts about Hinduism which were neglected by orthodox writers. This book depicts the realistic tendencies of Hinduism.

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Albert Einstein and Metaphysics

A Comparison to Eastern and Western Religious Beliefs

Eugene E Whitworth

Many religious leaders of the present day and the past, both in the Eastern and the Western worlds have held closely to certain Metaphysical Concepts which may be found in the Vedas, the Bhagavad Gita, and Western writings that led to modern Christianity. These leaders have influenced many lives. They have been respected by many, have developed religious teachings and moral codes founded upon these concepts that influence large parts of many nations, and are life-or death matters to large segments of the population in their sphere of influence. These religious leaders have imposed upon their devotees and upon themselves, codes of moral conduct, and tenets of religious belief that rivals the ancient Egyptian code of behavior, and are tenets held fast by many as a pathway to the Eternal. Some of these codes of behavior and tenets of belief are basic to the very cultures of today, and are used as touchstones in practical daily life.

But no matter how advanced a religious leader may be; no matter how popular his teachings may be as evidenced by the many who follow him; no matter how acceptable his behavioral codes or tenets may be—those who search for metaphysical truths must analyze these fundamental structures in terms of the new sciences of the present day. It is the intent of this paper to analyze some of the most popular metaphysical beliefs in light of Albert Einstein's scientific breakthroughs. Obviously we cannot delve into all the

ramifications of beliefs and tenets held by Metaphysicians, Eastern or Western. However, we may choose only a few; but that few considered to be the very basis of Metaphysics, Eastern Philosophy, or Western Metaphysical Religions. We shall then see if they will stand the spotlight of Einsteinian Concepts, and the New Age Sciences.

We are literally looking for logical, scientific support to Metaphysical and religious questions that have haunted man since the beginning of time. To be *True*, religious concepts must be the same for an individual at any age, for a race at any stage of development, and for a believer in any scientific milieu. If they cannot serve through any age, and meet any scientific test, they should be doubted and possibly discarded by the devotees

Some of the statements fundamental to Metaphysical Thought and religion are :

1. From Brahmanism — "Maya is the great deluder, the physical world is a delusion."
2. From the oldest recorded concept of Metaphysical man, the Emerald Tablet of Hermes — "That above is like that below, that below like that above."
3. From the Bhagavad Gita — "The Knower of the Field becomes the Field."
4. From the Egyptian Initiate Mysteries, quoted almost verbatim by Swaminarayan in his Sacred Discourses — "The Mind of Man may know in a flash of Divine Revelation the Laws of the Universe."
5. From the Egyptian, but found in Buddhist, Christian and Brahmanistic concepts :— "Thoughts are things. Every word spoken in Righteousness by a sanctified priest must be followed by an effect."
6. From the Egyptian, found in Brahmanism, the oldest concept known to mankind :— "All Universes, physical things, and man himself are formed from some Cosmic Essence".
7. From Brahmanistic thought, supported by Swaminarayan in his writings, and the basic thought upon which his religion and philosophy, as well as the religion and philosophy of almost all Brahmins is founded. Unless this concept can be squared with scientific knowledge, the world has a right to declare that Swaminarayan's religion is unsound, also the religions derived from all Brahministic thought. This basic thought is :
 "TAT is the final fundamental, the Eternal, what is left after all else is gone. TAT consists of three essentials, Infinite Essential Space, Absolute Essential Motion, and Absolute Abstract Law (sometimes called 'The Will of TAT')."

Our task is to use reason to prove or disprove these seven concepts in view of Einsteinian scientific theories. While it is an onerous labor, we attack it with love: for it is clear that if these ancient concepts can be supported on the newest scientific concepts, the non-scientific, non-orthodox, all mystics and all metaphysicians need no longer be uneasy about the charges of orthodox science or religion that there is no foundation to these beliefs.

To understand these proofs as they are developed, we need to know :

1. Einstein's Formula and its implication in modern life.
2. The concept of Relativity advanced by Einstein.
3. The meaning of "Electromagnetic", "Force Field", and "Photoelectric".

Let us learn something of the life of Albert Einstein, remarkable metaphysician and scientist, who wrote : "The loftiest passion of the human intellect, the greatest dream of the metaphysician, the driving mind of scientists have tried to use disciplines and also introspection to arrive at a knowledge of an ultimate, immutable essence that is the source of the mutable world, the illusory universe".

Albert Einstein was born in Ulm, Wurtenburg (Germany), March 14, 1879. He was not accepted in early life, seems to have broken the social rules and to have been quite unconventional. He was "so slow in learning" to talk, he did not utter his first word until the age of three; over this his worried parents consulted a doctor. In school he was an indifferent student, and said : "The teachers remind me of drill sergeants". He always detested rigid disciplinarians in education, science and politics, and, let no one doubt, he would never have submitted to the rules of conduct laid down by Swaminarayan.

At the age of five, the mystery of the compass stirred him. He spent his time and the patience of everyone, asking questions about life. He wanted logical, acceptable explanations of Why, WHY ? His teachers did not recognize his talents.

One teacher told him, "You'll never amount to anything, Einstein. Your very presence spoils the respect of the class for me."

Albert Einstein finally became a drop out in 1890. Later he crippled through college using the notes of a friend. The methodology of education was repulsive to him. Finally he got a job in the patent office. Here, this genius in physics, snatched precious moments for his own surreptitious calculations — which he guiltily hid in a drawer when he heard footsteps approaching. Working thus, he wrote four research papers which were published in 1905.

One was a dissertation on the photo-electric effect: the fact that when light falls upon a metal plate electrons are "kicked out",

likened to the force of a cue-ball knocking the other billiard balls about.

The second paper explored the nature of molecules.

The third and fourth papers introduce the Special Theory of Relativity, and for the first time expressed the world-changing formula: $E=MC^2$. In words it says:

Energy in ergs is equal to the Mass in grams times the speed of light in centimeters per second multiplied by itself. Einstein advanced it as a theory. It is, in fact, still a theory ... a theory that has changed the course of the modern world, and the lives of men everywhere. While it is important to sciences, it may even be more important to religious and metaphysical beliefs, to the concepts of the Initiates of Ancient Truths. For between the mystically inclined and the orthodox, work-a-day world of the old mechanical sciences, there has always been stress and rejection. The real cause of this problem seems to be THE AIM OF OLD SCIENCE IS NOT THE AIM OF THE METAPHYSICIAN.

The aim of old mechanical science is to describe the Universe and explain the world we live in.

The aim of the Metaphysician is to explore, describe and explain the cosmos by controlling the energies of the Universe through the use of the mind of man—and to teach others do so. (Certainly this was an aim, often stated, of Swaminarayan).

Einstein wrote: "My aim is to cover the greatest number of facts by logical deduction from the smallest possible number of theories".

Based on old Mechanical Science, nothing could be said to be self-evident; therefore religious truths that were said to be SELF-EVIDENT, (such as the concept of TAT, on which Brahmanism is founded and on which it exists) could not be accepted. Therefore, old science and religion were not compatible.

But science had readied for the use of Einstein certain important concepts, among these were: (1) "Matter is made up of atoms. Atoms are electrical particles." (2) "All forces are due to the interplay of powers in matter." (3) "Electromagnetic forces (light waves, radio waves, heat waves, etc) go through space in a complicated electromagnetic force-field, like the force-field that surrounds the ends of magnets." (4) "The earth is a great-big magnet. So are planets, suns, stars and galaxies. Force-fields inside the atom cause the electrons to whirl for the same reason that planets spin in the gravitational force-field of the stars."

Philosophy had also readied much for Einstein. Democritus, 23-centuries ago, Hindu Philosophers, Galileo, the German mathematician, Liebnits, and even the Irish Bishop of Colyn in 1743, all had

showed: "If it is not perceived, it does not exist in the mind. and either has no existence at all, or else exists in the mind of some eternal spirit."

Securely based on these backgrounds of science and philosophy, Einstein showed: "Both space and time are merely forms of intuition, which can no more be divorced from consciousness than can colors."

"Space has no objective reality; it is only an arrangement of objects as we see them and the mind perceives them."

"Time has no independent existence. It is only a measure of the orderlines of events, such as the movements of bodies in space, and what is seen in connection with this movement. TIME EXISTS IN MIND ONLY."

Based upon these concepts, one might reason that the objective universe of energy, matter (stars or atoms) cannot exist except as a thought in human consciousness; that the universe exists in mind only. Metaphysical thought seems to support these reasonings most thoroughly. But, here is a danger, for the old mechanical universe and old religious orthodoxy can be used by devotees to prove this reasoning is nonsense. They say, "Rap your head. It hurts. It is there, not in mind only."

Depending on physical senses to solve metaphysical problems may not be totally advisable. But we must now turn to our seven metaphysical principles on which metaphysical and religious thought has been founded and see if we can establish them in modern science.

"Maya is the Great Deluder, the physical world is a delusion." Science tells us that wavelengths of energy in the electromagnetic spectrum extends from one-trillionth of a centimeter up to lengths of over ten billion centimeters and can be measured by instruments. However, man's five senses (taste, touch, hearing, smelling and seeing) can detect only three ten thousandths of a centimeter difference in wavelengths of energy. So all that vast spectrum is lost on man except for a very small amount.

Albert Einstein said: "...our universe is a series of impressions clouded by imperfect senses." The Brahmins taught this, and that man develops himself most graciously who learns to dwell in that state in which the senses are most fully withdrawn.

Einstein postulated (this means he guessed, had revealed to him, or was impressed to say): "...there is a curious, natural order in what we conceive as activity. Nature mysteriously operates on mathematical principles." Hindus expressed it: "Divine Law provides for the manifestation of Parabrahman..." Are these not quite similar to the ancient Egyptian idea: "All Universes, physical things, and man himself are formed from some cosmic essence".

Metaphysicians, prophets, yogis, Brahmins, and religious leaders, claim to come up with laws that are solutions to the problems of understanding the universe by man. The Emerald Tablet of Hermes recorded: "That above is like that below. That below is like that above." Brahmanists taught that God is realized here on earth by man and in man through attaining the Brahmic Vision, or union with God. The realized man is like God.

What did Einstein establish that might support these concepts. He wrote:

"Man is a composite electromagnetic field. The Universe is a composite electromagnetic field."

Remember that Einstein put his thoughts into mathematical terms and formulas, thus indicating the truth of the ancient metaphysical concepts.

The ancient metaphysical thought from Egyptian Initiate Mysteries, supported by Hinduism is that: "The Mind of Man may know in a flash of Divine Revelation the laws of the Universe," What did Einstein do to advance the validity of this concept? The following will illustrate:

Near the turn of the century, the great concept of old science was: "Energy goes through space in an endless series of unbroken waves," These waves were thought to be much like those of the ocean.

This suited the orthodox, mechanical theory. It made for a tidy universe, tied up in a most acceptable package that explained all things from God to the atom in the way they wanted it explained.

Then along came a man named Max Planck who postulated (that is, he guessed, with some scientific background of course, but still he just guessed!) that instead of energy moving like unbroken waves, it travelled through space in short bursts, like water out of a squirt gun. Planck said that each of these squirts was "a given amount of energy". He called this amount QUANTA. Based on this he wrote a theory that is called Planck's Constant and for which he received the Nobel prize in 1918.

Planck guessed that each little squirt or QUANTUM carried an amount of energy given by his formula, which says in words: The Energy in each squirt is equal to the frequency (number of squirts per second) multiplied by Planck's Constant, indicated by the letter "H". This constant, this "H" is very important to modern science and religion. But where did Planck get this constant, this "H", and what does it mean to mystics and metaphysicians... and how does it prove that man "may know in a flash of Divine Revelation the Laws of the Universe"?

This all-important "H" is a small but unalterable number that remains the same anywhere in the universe. Science accepts it as a

fact, as one of the absolutely true things that mankind has ever known. Where did it come from? This is the important point for our discussion, for

Max Planck just suddenly knew that this number was correct.

He got it in a sudden flash, from some universal source, and it contains wisdom of the Universe. In other words, as a result of a revelation this scientist was given knowledge of the Laws of the Universe.

Max Planck, however, limited his energy to that coming from a radiant (or heated) body. Based on Planck's work, in about 1905, Einstein guessed (again on the basis of a mystic-like process) that all forms of radiant energy, not just heat, but light, X-rays, etc., travelled through space in separate quanta or squirts. He guessed, in other words, that energy gets from the sun to the earth in a series of these little squirts that Planck guessed at.

Einstein extended Planck's theory to apply to the whole universe. By direct deduction it can be made to apply to thought, for thought in the brain of man creates an electromagnetic effect all its own. With this concept well in place, we look carefully at the metaphysical statement, ancient and received as truth: "Thoughts are things. Every word spoken in Righteousness by a sanctified priest must be followed by an effect". The energy quanta of thought can most surely be detected by instruments; therefore one may assume with the words from "NINE FACES OF CHRIST"; that "every thought is an instrument for good or bad, and every breath brings in the Sacred Light by which one makes oneself either more or less Divine."

That the ancient religious and metaphysical concepts do have a basis in the scientific universe as explained by Einstein has been most adequately developed and may be considered proven. But we can no longer delay making the final, most difficult attempt to test the validity of the Brahmanistic concept of TAT against the mathematically established science of Einstein.

Just as Einstein arrived at his concepts by logic, so the ancient Brahmins derived the concept of TAT by logic. Their logic followed these steps of reasoning:

"From nothing, nothing can come".

"The real cannot dissolve into nothingness".

"What is evolved must have been involved, that is, the cause must contain the effect".

This thinking led them to TAT, which is the *fundamental essence that is left when all else is gone, and consists of (1) Infinite Essential Space, (2) Absolute Essential Motion, and (3) Absolute Abstract Law (the will of TAT).*

What can one take from Einsteinian Concepts that may either prove or disprove this great, fundamental basis of religious thought? Can Einstein's new ideas concerning astronomy be of help?

The old Mechanistic thought was that the Universe was static, formed and controlled by gravitational forces, and moving in patterns of slow-wheeling galaxies made of suns and their attendant planets. Einsteinian scientist found it to be an expanding universe. It was proven that galaxies some 500 million light-years away were getting farther from earth at a rate of 25,000 miles an hour, which is almost one-seventh of the speed of light. New scientists found that in space, material retains its shape, but space itself stretches out or expands. They found, too, that the further away the galaxies are, the faster they are going away from earth. Without exception, they are going AWAY from earth, never TOWARD earth. NEVER.

By calculation based on Planck, Einstein and others, this flight from earth is figured to be : (1) From some incredibly dense center of matter; (2) to have started about two billion years ago; and (3) to have been expanding ever since at this incredible rate. To give some idea of the incredible density and heat and density of the center of matter mentioned : Our earth's sun at the *surface* is some 5,500 degrees. At its *center* the sun is some 40 million degrees Celsius.

In this heat and pressure there can be No atoms, No molecules. No elements, and No matter of any kind. There can exist only free neutrons in a state of incredible movement. There was here nothing but PURE ENERGY.

But the center from which these galaxies seem to have exploded must have been larger than our sun by millions of times, much denser, and much hotter by millions of degrees.

After the explosion, this COSMIC MASS began to cool as it expanded. When it got "real cool", only about one million degrees Celsius, it is thought neutrons condensed, electrons were formed and attached themselves to each other. These formed atoms, molecules, finally elements, and then matter, itself.

Pure Energy had become matter.

Reasoning from this basis : Scientists thought that the world had been EVOLVED from an explosion. Ancient metaphysicians said "What is evolved must have been involved, that is, cause must contain the effect". Scientists now say that the Universe (in a short while, only ten to twenty billion years from now) will begin to contract. In other words, from its involved state (which Hindu Brahminists would call "the night of Brahma") the Universe evolved in a gigantic explosion ("the day of Brahma") and will again fall

back into its self, or become involved again. We have clear indication that *that which was involved must have been evolved, and further, that that which was evolved will again become involved.*

Scientists advance the theory of a pulsating universe. This is a modern construct of thought which was expressed ages ago by the Egyptian THE AGE OF THE GODS, and in the Brahmanistic DAY AND NIGHT OF BRAHMA.

We have established this, but we face a much more difficult task. Can we establish that there is *Infinite Essential Space, An Absolute Essential Motion, or an Absolute Abstract law*?

A first point of scientific logic may be this: If the REAL (let's call it "actual", since REAL can mean that it exists only in mind) cannot be dissolved into nothingness, we may have a chance of establishing these points.

But—according to Einstein's theory, the Universe as we know it is slowly running down... like an unwound clock. It is ticking slower and slower. Heat is disappearing, that is, energy is disappearing. So is matter.

Both energy and matter are disappearing into nothingness. We must admit that we are in trouble with our attempt to prove the validity of ancient thought based on modern scientific reasoning.

This is cause for alarm, and but for a fortunate circumstance, even deep concern among those who follow Swaminarayan or other metaphysical thinkers.

The fortunate circumstance is this: A scientist, one of the professors of Great Western University, San Francisco, California, was the first person to advance a new, revolutionary thesis. (Note: He, like others we've seen, got it in a flash by Intuitive Deduction.) His thesis is this:

"SOMEWHERE IN THE UNIVERSE, MATTER IS BEING FORMED. SOMEWHERE IN THE UNIVERSE, ANTI-MATTER IS BEING FORMED".

This thesis clearly sets out that THE UNIVERSE IS CHANGING FROM MATTER TO ANTI-MATTER, AND FROM ANTI-MATTER BACK INTO MATTER.

The reputation of Metaphysicians and other religious theorists may safely rest on this concept while we turn to another question, which is:

Can we scientifically establish *Absolute Essential Motion, and also Infinite Essential Space*?

If we approach from the cosmos, we are in deep trouble. Viewed from the cosmos, a careful analysis of the concept of the expanding universe does not seem to support the metaphysical postulation of

ABSOLUTE ESSENTIAL MOTION. For, by logic, if the Universe is expanding, and can, in a few billion years, again fall inward upon itself... the direction, or the amount of its motion is neither (1) Absolute, nor is it (2) Essential. On Motion we are blocked!

At this apparent block, let us ask : What about the INFINITE ESSENTIAL SPACE ?

Again we meet a problem. For Einstein established that there was a "CURVATURE OF SPACE"—that SPACE was in no way infinite. In fact, he showed mathematically that the CURVATURE of the Universe depended upon the amount of matter available in the entire system.

Subsequently Einsteinian scientists established that space is not empty, indeed not. There is one nine-million millionths (one noventillionth) of a gram of matter in each cubic centimeter of space. (For readers accustomed to English measurements, one gram is one-twenty-eighth of an ounce; one cubic centimeter is a scant teaspoon full.) Using Einstein's FIELD EQUATION, scientists figured out the exact curvature of the space of our Universe. They report it to be as follows :

"The radius of the Universe (that is, the distance from the center to the outside of any circle) is thirty-five billion light years."

Said another way : The radius of this ball-like universe in which man exists is thirty-five billion times the distance that a ray of light can travel in one solar year going at the speed of 286, 640 miles each second. That is about six million million miles, times thirty-five billion. This works out to a mere 210 noventillion miles !!

And that is BIG. Very BIG !! But Metaphysicians would not consider it big enough to be called "infinite". Therefore, we are at another block, for we cannot scientifically support the ancient religious concept of INFINITE SPACE.

If we cannot support the theory of Infinite Space, can we support the theory of the essentiality of space ? And do so with that disciplined logic and absolute truth to which all Metaphysicians would agree ?

To review our unfortunate position :

- (1) We have support for Essential Space — but not Infinite Space.
- (2) We have support for Absolute Motion — but not Essential Motion.
- (3) We have support for an Absolute, Abstract Law.

Where, then, did the ancient religious thinkers go wrong ? For surely if we cling to our approach from the viewpoint of the cosmos, there seems little likelihood we can prove on scientific basis that they were right in every aspect.

Certainly any true Metaphysical teacher — they who challenge the anthropomorphic concept of God held by certain thinkers because it does not include all variables of thought—would insist upon being right in every aspect, without fail !

It is clear that if we cling to the Cosmos, at our present state of scientific knowledge there seems little likelihood that we can prove the Ancient Metaphysical thinkers were right in every aspect. We know they would want to be right in every aspect and in their philosophies account for all new scientific findings.

Perhaps we may take some temporary comfort in what Einstein said and thought about the Metaphysical, Mystical and Religion. He wrote three important things :

"The most beautiful and most profound emotion we can experience is the sensation of the mystical. It is the sower of all true science. He to whom this emotion is a stranger, who can no longer wonder and stand rapt in awe, is as good as dead. To know that what is impenetrable to us really exists, manifesting itself as the higher wisdom and the most radiant beauty which our dull faculties can comprehend only in their most primitive forms—this knowledge, this feeling is at the center of true religiousness".

He also wrote : "The cosmic religious experience is the strongest and noblest mainspring of scientific research".

And he wrote this personal observation : "My religion consists of a humble admiration of the illimitable superior spirit who reveals himself in the slight details we are able to perceive with our frail and feeble minds. That deeply emotional conviction of the presence of a superior reasoning power, which is revealed in the incomprehensible universe, forms my idea of God".

Beautiful and important statements. But they, in themselves, do not supply the missing and needed support for the Theories of the Ancient Metaphysicians, and especially Brahmanism which founds its teachings and its faith on the concept of TAT.

Einstein held a concept : The interplay of primordial forces in a force-field is created by the relationships and proximity of matter in space.

The crucial question is this : What is the difference between a primordial force-field and matter ? If we knew this, we could resolve our problem concerning the Essentiality of Motion, a basic theory in the concept of TAT.

Einstein mathematically established that matter may become energy, and conversely, that energy (that in a force-field) may become matter.

This certainly supports the Ancient Egyptian concept of The Creation as expressed in this, the Creation Hymn of Osiris :

"I produced myself from primeval matter,
I created what came into being by Words of Power
(Hekau), I made all that was made".

Einstein seems to have proved that ancient concepts of Creation were right, whether creation is thought of as coming from God, or from the Word of God. Both have energy, primordial energy. The indications arising from this are astonishing. If this is true, anybody is part of the very universe he, himself, creates or destroys. Supporting this idea is a thought from the Christian Bible, and ancient Hindu writings: "Know you not that you are God?" Each of us then has the power to create by thought energy, to become—by the way we think, live and have our beings—the Eternal Son of the Living God. We can, these concepts seem to say, become like the Christic Self; like the Ancient of Ancients, Osiris. Each of us has the power to say in regard to his intimate life: "I am the creator of what came into being. I produced myself from primeval matter". By thought-force energy we can turn the clod of flesh into the Radiant and Divine Spirit.

Let us, then, review some of the concepts advanced by Einstein and see what we find. According to Einsteinian science, the features of the highly complex universe come down to a few basic qualities. These are:

Space, time, matter, energy, gravitation. Space and time are continuous, they are a continuum. Matter and energy are equivalent, that is, one may be changed into the other.

Further, Einstein's Unifield Theory established that *the entire Universe is one elemental field in which each star, each atom, each wandering comet, and each slow wheeling galaxy and flying electron is BUT A RIPPLE, a DISTURBANCE in the underlying UNITY OF SPACE-TIME*. Einstein established a profound simplicity out of the apparent complexities of nature.

Einstein simplified. What about the distinction between gravitational force (pull of gravity) and electromagnetic force? Between matter and energy? Between electric charge and force field? Between space and time?

Most important to our investigation, what is the distinction between the Cosmos and the Atom?

Einstein establishes that there is none. They are the same. And atoms establish the Universe. **THAT ABOVE IS LIKE THAT BELOW.** The Cosmos establishes *infinite space*. The atom establishes that *motion is essential* to its existence, Essential Motion is therefore established.

Therefore, Based on Einsteinian Science and his Theories, the Concept of TAT has been scientifically established.

Based on Einsteinian New Science, the ancient religious theories held by Brahminists and other mystics and metaphysicians through the ages have been logically justified. However, there are two additional ancient concepts that may be proved by scientific logic to those who have the mental discipline to analyze the facts and formulas. These two all important concepts came from the Egyptians at the earliest dawn of history, and were held by many a Hindu Guru as implied in his Satsang Discourses, and by every religion and in every metaphysical teaching. These are :

"By initiation and with God's Grace, man may create in his being while he lives a Radiant, Golden Body and Brahmanic Consciousness"

"Once established the Radiant, Golden Body and Brahmanic Consciousness may continue with God's Grace and enjoy Eternal Life long after the life of the human body in which the soul and God consciousness were established."

To establish a scientific basis for the concept of a Radiant Spirit and an Eternal Life, our search must reach beyond the concepts of Einstein.

Einstein said that nothing could go faster than the speed of light. But in the past ten years scientists have shown that it is possible to go at least at the square of the speed of light. THOUGHT, for instance, is able to travel faster than light.

Einstein established that the PHOTON was a particle of light. The ancients called something "THE ENERGY BEHIND THE ENERGY OF THE SUN". Mystery schools taught that man could TURN HIMSELF INTO A GOLDEN MAN, RISE FROM THE TOMB OF FLESH INTO SPIRITUAL ESSENCE. They taught that properly used, the light behind the light of the sun (let's call it cosmic energy) could bring enlightenment to the mind of man and turn him into a receptacle for Divinity. They taught that man could send his thoughts backward in time to see in the past, or forward into the future to see in the future. Remember that Einstein established that space and time are interchangeable. Therefore, the master who understands how to do it can translate himself (as the spiritual self) into the future or past, or to some different place in this moment in time. (Simply said, though it is not absolutely correct, this is astral projection and travel).

WE PROPHECY that a formula soon may be written that will show mathematically how this can be done, and that formula will be something like this :

$$D = (E_t - E_m) C^2 T^2$$

Or in words :

DIVINE MIND will be established when the Energy of Thought minus the Energy require to emotionalize about

that thought is multiplied by the speed of light (in CM/sec) squared and also multiplied by the speed of thought (in CM/sec) squared.

In more general terms : The Golden Soul will be built within the cell of man when the photons (energy of light) is at a speed high enough to act on the human tissue and stimulate a continuous flow of electrons. (This establishes the aura and corona of the Saints, and changes the power available to physical life.)

One thought must be added : The techniques are available for teaching one to prepare for the inflow of this Divine Mind. They were taught in the ancient mysteries and are still taught today BUT ONLY BEHIND A MOST BINDING OATH OF SECRECY. Man is taught to use the Cosmic Essence, from which the ancient God, Osiris and the modern scientist, Einstein, say the universe was wrought.

We may safely name it, as Vedic Hindus did, Brahmanic or God's power.

Shall we now turn to see if we can prove our last concept : SPIRIT MAY HAVE ETERNAL LIFE. Even the ancient Egyptians said that the spirit properly prepared could live forever with the Radiant Khus, the Gods of Eternity.

Let us reason thus : Albert Einstein showed by his formulas how it was possible for the mystery of the universe to be explained, which is, WHY DO STARS AND SUN BURN SO HOT FOR SO MANY BILLIONS OF YEARS ?

Einstein, through formulas, showed that it is because of energy coming from the nucleus of the atom when it is broken asunder.

Einstein also showed that there is a low-level light that exists throughout the universe, and that light consists of photons, which is the energy behind the energy of light.

Further, he showed that light falling upon matter sends out showers of electrons. In other words, light falling on matter, gives off endless amounts of energy.

Is it not possible that Spiritual Man, once free of the body as the Mystery Schools teach is possible, will continue through eternity using this low level light to create the energy required for existence as the Golden Spirit ? Especially if the energy from the force-fields created by matter is also added!

This is undoubtedly for Metaphysicians, the most wonderful concept ever developed and based upon Einstein's work.

Let us now speculate upon, and write a formula which may be proved in the future and establish the energy needed for this Golden, Radiant, Divine Self:

The formula may be like this :

$$ED = \frac{h M_b T^2 C^2}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{M_a}{\lambda} \times \frac{C^2}{T^2}}}$$

Or said in words : Energy of Divine (Eternal) man equals Planck's Constant, times the mass of the body in grams, times the velocity of Thought (squared), times the velocity of light (squared) (both in CM/Sec.)

ALL OF THIS DIVIDED BY the square root of 1 minus the mass of the atom divided by its own wavelength, times the square of velocity of light divided by the square of the velocity of thought.

Let us inspect the formula for meaning to metaphysicians. It says that the Energy of the Divine Man will be greater far than the binding energy that holds the atom together. Einstein established that the binding energy of atoms burst asunder made suns last for billions of years. The even greater energy available to Divine or Brahmanic Man in Radiant, Spirit form, may cause him to last for more billions of years—even if the sun dies to a cold cinder in the sky! Even if there are no stars in the sky! Even if all planets are as dust or non-existent !.

Surely the beliefs of the ancients, the metaphysicians, and Vedic Brahmins and all students on the pathway to Divinity has been scientifically validated.

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The Known and the Unknown : Jiddu Krishnamurti's Conception of Consciousness

G. Vedaparayan

The phenomenon of consciousness is the conundrum of all philosophical inquiry. It has been the central philosophical issue right from the ancient times. Thinkers of the Orient as well as of the Occident have given it a due importance in their understanding of human existence. Jiddu Krishnamurti (1895-1986) is regarded as one of the most eminent oriental thinkers who has offered us instructive insights into human consciousness. The discoveries he has made in the realm of consciousness are as prominent as the discoveries the modern physicist has made in the field of matter. Krishnamurti distinguishes between two levels of consciousness : (1) Consciousness as it appears and (2) consciousness as it really is. The former is consciousness as it 'is' and the latter as it 'should be'. He calls the one known and the other unknown. The known is consciousness infested with the burden of the past which includes time, choice, desire, motive, division, contradiction, conflict and sorrow. Whereas the unknown is consciousness which is completely transformed and therefore devoid of all the above qualities. It is of the nature of nothingness, integration, intelligence, eternity, harmony, peace and happiness. The known constitutes the life of bondage while the unknown embodies the life of absolute freedom.

This paper, therefore, is a detailed description of Krishnamurti's account of consciousness as it manifests in the realm of the known and the unknown. It consists of three parts. The first part is the description of consciousness in the realm of the known. The second deals with the transformation of the known into the unknown. The

third is the description of consciousness or life in the realm of the unknown.

I

Consciousness in the realm of the known, according to Krishnamurti, is its content. Krishnamurti says, "The content of consciousness is consciousness. Without the content there is no consciousness".¹ The content of consciousness is past which is thought, knowledge, memory, and experience. It includes all our possessions, attachments, beliefs, conclusions, ideas, ideals, idiosyncrasies, pains, fears, pleasures, motives, desires and ends. The emotions like jealousy, anger, hate, ambition and violence also come under the content of consciousness. Krishnamurti says, "consciousness is made up of all the things that have been collected by man as experience, as knowledge, as memory, confusion, destruction, violence — all that is consciousness".²

Consciousness in the realm of the known is always self-centred. It cannot exist without the "I" or the "me" as its centre. All its actions emanate from the centre called the "self." Hence, they are separative, self-enclosing, incomplete and inadequate. The known can never have an experience which is wholistic, since it is limited and bound by the centre which is "self." Since the known is self-centred, all its actions and experiences are of the nature of division which implies contradiction. Therefore the very structure of consciousness in the realm of the known is a contradiction between the opposites: 'what is' and 'what should be', the subject and the object, the thought and the thinker, the observer and the observed, the experiencer and the experienced, the past and the future, the mine and thine, and the knower and the known. It is this contradiction which brings about conflict which is the source of unhappiness. Hence, all its actions and experiences are of sorrow. Krishnamurti says, "The self is the centre of all that is known ... all the activities of the known can only bring sorrow."³

The state of consciousness in the known is always evanescent. That is, there is nothing in the known that sustains permanently. The content of the known is always temporal and fleeting. It perpetually changes from one impermanent state to another impermanent state. The basic nature of human existence in the realm of the known is transience. The known is a movement from the past to the future through the present. It exists on the background of the

1 J. Krishnamurti, *Tradition and Revolution*, Orient Longman, Madras, 1972, p. 116.

2 J. Krishnamurti, *The Awakening of Intelligence*, Discus Avon Books, New York, 1976, p. 94.

3 J. Krishnamurti, *Commentaries on Living, Second Series*, (Ed.) D. Rajagopal, B. I Publications Bombay, 1972, p. 241.

past and projects itself into the future in the form of its motivated goals or ideals or ends. It sustains itself as a constant flight from the past to future. It is conditioned by the verb 'to be' which includes the past, the present and the future. Hence sorrow and unhappiness.⁴

Consciousness as we know is of the 'nature' of choice. All the actions in the realm of the known are chosen and hence motivated and end-oriented. Choice is an action which is a motive for an end. It involves confusion, contradiction and conflict of choosing between the alternatives. Krishnamurti says, "choice in every form is conflict. Contradiction is inevitable in choice".⁵

Consciousness in the realm of the known is always incomplete. It is insecure within itself. Hence it constantly tries to fulfil its sense of lack through the acts of desire which are bound by the feelings of sensation and gratification. It indulges itself in various kinds of activities in order to fill its incompleteness. But the acts of desire can never be satisfied. Sensation knows no contentment. Each action of desire is the furthering of sensation and gratification. Therefore, the activities of the known are the futile and desperate attempts to fulfil itself through desire. All its efforts to attain happiness result in unhappiness.⁶

The known desires to fulfil itself through the accumulation of various kinds of possessions like things, people and ideas. It also intends to find happiness through the attainment of knowledge and fame. But it finds itself unhappy inspite of all its possessions. Hence it ultimately desires to experience God or Truth or Unknown. It strives after which gives a lasting happiness. But it can't find the unknown, since the known can never know that which it does not know already. Therefore the known in its effort to know the unknown merely strengthens itself and gives a continuity to itself without any break. The known, in its pursuit of the unknown, moves from the known to the known. It exists in the vicious circle of its own making. The monotony of the known is that, in running towards the unknown, it is running towards itself. The misery of the known is like that of an ignorant dog constantly chasing its tail. Krishnamurti says, "The known is ever trying to capture the unknown; but it can capture only that which is already known. The unknown can never be experienced by the known; the known, the experienced must cease for the unknown to be."⁷

4 J. Krishnamurti, *Beyond Violence*, B.I Publications. New Delhi, 1976, p. 42.

5 J. Krishnamurti, *Note Book*, Krishnamurti Foundation India, Madras, 1978, p. 192.

6 J. Krishnamurti, *Commentaries on Living*, (Ed.) D. Rajagopal, B. I. Publications, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 240-41.

7 Ibid., p. 89.

II

The distinctiveness of Krishnamurti is that he does not ascribe to the view that consciousness is limited to the known for ever. He does not hold that man is condemned to exist in realm of the known. Instead, he contends that there is consciousness of peace and happiness beyond the structure of the known and that it is possible to transform the known into the unknown.

The uniqueness of Krishnamurti is that he does not prescribe any method or system as a means to transform the known into the unknown. He holds that the adoption of a method implies a gradual change; gradual change implies time: time implies continuity of known. Moreover, method cannot work without a goal or an end in view. The goals achieved through a method can never be new, since they are the outcome of the past. They are always already foregone and made out of the content of the known. Therefore the transformation through a method results in the modified continuity of the known.

Therefore the only remedy to the predicament of human existence in the realm of the known, according to Krishnamurti, is the choiceless awareness of the vicious circle of the known. Consciousness has to be aware of the fact of its monotony without choice and deliberate effort. It has to observe all its movements without a means, a motive and an end in view. It has to feel out the fact that all its movements, either noble or ignoble, are confined to itself. It has to 'understand' the fact of its predicament without any ideas about it. It is the intense feeling or emotion of its plight that shatters the whole structure of the known. It is the timeless and the motiveless and therefore the choiceless awareness that can 'understand' the what 'is' of the known as it is. Krishnamurti says, "The understanding of what 'is' needs no motive; the motive and the means prevent understanding. Search, which is choiceless awareness, is not 'for something'; it is to be aware of the craving for an end and of the means to it. This choiceless awareness brings an understanding of what 'is'."⁸

Choiceless awareness is an 'insight' of Consciousness into itself which happens to be only when all the efforts of the known to transcend itself cease to be. It is the self awareness of consciousness without an observer. It is observation in which the observer 'is' the observed. It is in this awareness that the knower is 'still' and 'silent'. It is in this stillness that there is a total 'understanding' and transformation of the known. It is a sudden and spontaneous breakthrough of the known into the unknown. It is an act of purgation in which consciousness is rendered contentless. In it, consciousness

⁸ Ibid., p. 89.

becomes liberated from the prison of known and enters into the unknown.

III

Consciousness in the realm of the unknown, according to Krishnamurti, is freedom. It has none of the characteristics that belong to the known since it is liberated from the background of the past accumulated through time. It is no more conditioned by memory, experience and knowledge. It is completely free from all its possessions like things, people and ideas. Nothingness is its essence. Consciousness which is nothingness is autonomous and independent. It does not depend, for its existence, on something other than itself. The unknown is the timeless renewal of the nothingness which implies the experiencing of wisdom.⁹

Consciousness in freedom is life without a "centre". That is, it exists without the feeling of the "I" or the "me". Hence it is devoid of all the deteriorating factors like division, duality, contradiction and conflict. It is beyond all the evil qualities like hate, anger, envy, ambition, and violence. In it, there is no sense of separation as "mine" and "thine". It is integrated and wholistic within itself. It implies a mind which is "alone". "Alone" means all are one. Aloneness dispels the sense of separation and brings about a union which includes everything and everyone.¹⁰

As it is already said, all the states of consciousness in the known are transient. All its pleasures and achievements are passing. The contentment and satisfaction it gets out of its possessions are not lasting. The sensation and gratification it derives out of the acts of desire are ephemeral. But the experiencing of nothingness in the unknown is 'permanent'. The 'state' of nothingness is immutable, in the sense that it is irrevocable. There is no fear of losing the unknown. Nothing can disturb or contaminate the unknown. It is beyond the influence of circumstances. "Once it is there, though you may live in the world with all its noise, pleasure and brutality, they will not touch it."¹¹

Life in the unknown is a meditative life, since the unknown is absolutely free from thought. The unknown is the immensity where there is no becoming in time. It is a state of 'being' without self-improvement. In it, there is the complete absence of progress from 'what is' to 'what should be'. A meditative mind is that which constantly wipes away the past. It does not travel from past to future through the present. Instead, it exists in the 'present' which

9 Ibid., p. 209.

10 Ibid., p. 18.

11 J. Krishnamurti, *Meditations*, Krishnamurti Foundation India, Madras, 1980, p. 15.

is timeless. It lives in the 'now' which is eternal. It exists living and dying from moment to moment and in 'silence' which is infinite and without beginning and ending. It lives life without effort and a motive for an end. It exists in a state of non-being or emptiness in which there is peace and tranquility. Krishnamurti describes life in the unknown thus: "It is not 'progress', it has no direction, it is ever renewing itself, it is not static, it is a timeless becoming—not in the sense of growing into something. It is the tranquility of fullness, but not the tranquility of death. It is the peace of perfect emptiness, not the stagnation of hidden effort."¹²

The meditative life is an 'attentive' life. In it, the whole of one's 'being' becomes fully alive. It is a 'state' in which the psychosomatic organism becomes fully awake and all the senses function without being conditioned by the past. It is not controlled by the "centre" called the "self". Hence, life in freedom is ever new and fresh. "It is like the light of a candle which has been put out and re-lit. The new light is not the old, though the candle is the same".¹³

Krishnamurti calls consciousness without content 'intelligence'. Intelligence acts without choice, for alternatives do not exist for consciousness which is 'Intelligent'. Its action is so natural and spontaneous that it freely 'identifies' itself with that which is true. Intelligence is the capacity to see truth as truth and false as false. It is the clarity which instantly puts aside all the which is unessential. It is the energy which is devoid of the deteriorating factors like confusion, comparison and the friction of choosing between the alternatives. It is action out of the deep understanding of the what 'is' as it is. Krishnamurti says, "An intelligent mind acts and reacts naturally and to its fullest capacity. It identifies itself spontaneously with the right thing. It simply can not have choice. Only unintelligent mind has free will".¹⁴

The unique quality of consciousness in the realm of the unknown is that it is 'religious' in spirit. It is religious in the sense that it is the quintessence of love. Love is the governing principle of all its actions and experiences. Love is the flame which burns away the "self" which is the centre of all negative emotions. Love is never exclusive. It is not confined to somebody or to something. Instead, love is the fragrance which is for all. As Krishnamurti puts it, "The religious mind is the explosion of love. It is this love which

12 J. Krishnamurti, *Early Writings, Volume VI*, Off. Prints, Chetna, Bombay, 1971, p. 79.

13 J. Krishnamurti, *The Second Penguin Krishnamurti Reader*, (Ed.) Mary Lutyens, Penguin Books, England, 1976, p. 96.

14 Rom Landau, *God is my adventure*, Unwin Books, London, 1964, p. 220.

knows no separation. To it, far is near. It is not the one or the many, but rather that state of love in which all division ceases"¹⁵

To conclude, Krishnamurti holds that consciousness in the realm of the known is confined to the superficial layers of the whole mind. The known is consciousness as it appears to be. It is not the essential nature of consciousness. It is accessory in its character. Whereas the unknown is the true and necessary nature of consciousness. It is the real and inalienable essence of consciousness. It is the unknown that can bring significance to human existence. The unknown alone renders life meaningful since it is associated with goodness, love and happiness. It is only the experiencing of bliss or ecstasy of the unknown that can make life worth living. The creative happiness of the unknown is *sine qua non* for the peaceful co-existence of humanity. Krishnamurti maintains that individual as well as collective salvation consists in the experiencing of the unknown which is unconditioned, beyond space and time. The unknown, by its very nature, is nonverbal, ineffable and beyond the borders of ordinary experience. It is a state of 'being' but not of knowing. As he puts, its "All knowing is on the wrong side. If you know, you are already in the grave. The being is not knowing".¹⁶

15 J. Krishnamurti, *Meditations*, p. 1.

16 J. Krishnamurti, *The Second Penguin Krishnamurti Reader*, p. 125.

Intuition

Archie J. Bahm

SECTION A WHAT IS INTUITION ?

Intuition is immediacy of apprehension. Whenever awareness of appearance occurs and nothing intervenes between the awareness and what appears in awareness, that awareness intuits that appearance. Intuition is the name we give to the way awareness apprehends when awareness apprehends appearance directly. No intuiting exists apart from awareness. No awareness exists without intuiting.

Despite its simplicity, something more can be said about intuiting. Six characteristics of its nature may be distinguished: immediacy of apprehension, transparency, omnipresence, kinds, variability, and limits.

1. Immediacy of apprehension: Four factors in immediacy of apprehension may be differentiated: apprehension, immediacy, appearance, and intuer.

a. Apprehension: To apprehend is to grasp. Intuition apprehends, not as a hand grasps a glass, but in the sense that what is apprehended occurs in awareness all at once. When two or more objects are intuited, apprehending comprehends them together. When they are apprehended all at once, they exist together in that apprehension. When only one object appears, such as a sky cloudless from horizon to horizon, unity is present without togetherness unless the object is so extended that the extension implies plurality. Apprehending thus involves objective unity, whether the object itself appears unified or whether many objects are unified.

Intuition may apprehend more than one object, with or without pattern, more than one event, with or without pattern, more than one quality, with or without pattern, more than one dimension,

more than one feeling, more than one idea, more than one distinction, etc. Intuition may apprehend, and thus unite, not only formal, spatial, temporal, processual, sensory, emotional, paradoxical and frustrating kinds of pluralities but may also unify them in a single gestalt. As a unity, an intuition functions as a simple, non-relational, non-dimensional whole. As a unity of pluralities, an intuition may be not only relational and dimensional but also multirelational and multidimensional. Since all knowledge, no matter how complex and variegated, presupposes apprehension by intuition, intuition must be capable of apprehending all of the complexity that can be grasped in any single act of attention. If the mind can intuitively unify successive acts of attention, that the apprehensive capacity of intuition extends to include them.

b. Immediacy : Immediacy involves an additional kind of unity, namely, the unity of awareness and appearance, or the unity of apprehending and of what is being apprehended. Since nothing separates awareness and appearance, we must recognize a unity, if not identity. Immediacy is not mediacy, or the apprehension of appearance through or by means of something else. The fact that intuiting involves immediacy does not prevent it, including awareness, appearance and immediacy of apprehension, from being caused or mediated. Experience is caused, and consciousness is conditioned, and intuition occurs as a result of its causes and conditions. Such mediating factors in the production of intuition do not destroy its immediacy but contribute causally to it.

c. Appearance : What intuition apprehends is appearance. Without appearance there is no intuition. Without intuition there is no appearance. Appearance is a kind of being, even if very temporary. The being of the appearance is apprehended in intuition. Intuition exists both as an act of apprehending and as apprehending the being of the appearing which is intuited.

What appears has been called a "datum". A datum is something "given". But apprehending, in grasping, also "takes". So intuiting involves both something being given and something being taken. What appears is given; but if there is any incapacity of an intuiter to apprehend what is given, then less than what is given is taken, or if an intuiter always brings some contribution of his own to the way in which he apprehends, then he adds something to what is taken. When what is given is modified by the way in which it is taken, the appearance is a product of both factors causing what is given and what is taken.

d. Intuiter : Intuiting is not self-acting but is an action of an actor or intuiter. Although a fully adequate epistemology will involve also a fully adequate understanding of the nature of persons

Intuition

as agents, including as intuiters, no theory of the nature of an intuition will be developed in Chapter I. How a person functions as an agent, whether through his body, through his brain, through his mind, or through his self, calls for further explanation. But that intuiting involves an intuiting agency seems beyond doubt.

2. **Transparency :** Intuiting objects does not normally call attention to itself as intuition. Just as we see through glasses or through our eyes without seeing the glasses or our eyes, so we intuit objects without intuiting our intuiting of objects. Although intuitive self-reflection is possible, the intuiting of an intuition has its own transparency. Transparency, in this sense, seems to be a universal characteristic of intuiting.

3. **Omnipresence :** All knowing involves intuition. When any knowledge is mediated, it can be known actually only when such mediation terminates in some moment of immediacy. As long as potential knowledge fails to reach awareness in which its appearance is being intuited, it remains potential and not actual. When one infers, he does not escape intuiting but engages in a more complex intuition, usually in a series of intuitings.

4. **Kinds :** Although all intuitings are alike in consisting in the immediacy with which awareness apprehends appearance, the many kinds of appearances constitute many kinds of intuitings. Since intuition is an ingredient in all knowing, it exists in as many kinds as there are kinds of knowing. The Library of Congress system of classification or any most complete classification of kinds of knowledge that develops, is also a classification of the kinds of intuition in the sense that intuition is present in all such kinds. Kinds of intuition will be examined further below when kinds of inference are explored. (See Archie J. Bahm, *Types of Intuition*, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1961.)

5. **Variability :** Not only does intuition vary enough to participate as an essential condition of all kinds of actual knowing, but also relative to the four factors mentioned above, when immediacy of apprehension was examined.

a. **Apprehension :** Intuitions vary in complexity, in magnitude and in intensity depending on the simplicity or complexity of their contents, on the length or shortness of pulses of attention, and on the vitality or debility of the intuer while intuiting.

b. **Immediacy :** Although in one sense immediacy is immediacy and there are no degrees of it, in another sense intuiting apprehends appearances and appearance often embody apparent mediacies. Most of our waking, or at least working, life is occupied with beliefs about apparently real things. When one is aware that his knowledge is caused or mediated, his intuiting embodies both immediacy and

mediacy. An intuition does not cease to be constituted by its im. mediacy when it becomes constituted also by awareness of mediacy. Apparent mediacy itself is immediately apprehended.

Some intuitings are primarily contemplative and exist without awareness of mediacy. Some intuitings are primarily practical and fully occupied with mediacy. When a person is overwhelmed by fear or motivated by zeal, his intuitings are suffused with mediacy.

c. **Appearance :** In addition to seemingly endless varieties of appearance, appearances vary relative to how much of what is apprehended is "given" and how much is "taken". Some kinds of apprehendings are primarily receptive in the sense that they accept passively what is given to be grasped. Some kinds of apprehendings are primarily restrictive, or constructive, or constructive, in the sense that they accept only what the apprehender is willing, or able, to accept. Experiences differ regarding the differing amounts of contributions from memory, creative imagination, subconscious fears or manias, bodily health, disabilities or tensions, and conscious or unconscious purposes in influencing what is apprehended. A person cannot intuit what he lacks capacity to intuit, and his capacities are constant conditions of what and how he takes what is given. Variations in environmental and physiological causes of what is given in appearance also condition intuitions. A person cannot intuit as given what the causes of what is given do not supply.

d. **Intuiter :** The agency and power employed in acts of intuiting depends upon and varies with the health, vitality, tonicity, alertness, and interest of the intuiter; These vary from moment to moment, day to day, and during different stages in life, in each person, as well as varying in these ways in different persons. Past experiences, habits and skills, and development of differing degrees of facility (exemplified in speedy typewriting, auto racing, or mental calculating) all influence the ways intuiters intuit.

6. **Limits :** Acts of intuition have limits of many kinds, Not only are they limited by limits in what can be caused to appear and in capacities to apprehend but also by limits in the nature of acts of attending. Although persons awake from morning till night may seem to be conscious continuously, evidence from eyejerks, for example, indicate that awareness is interrupted repeatedly. One is not aware that he is not aware when he is not aware, so he is not aware of such interruptions. How long does awareness endure between interruptions? The length varies, but within limits. When one is alert, his present awareness tends to endure longer than when he is drowsy. Some indication of length may be observed by watching another person read. Although to the reader a line appears continuous and his awareness of it appears uninterrupted as he reads,

one can observe that his eyes stop, then move, etc., as long as he reads. Each stop suggests an act of apprehension. Each move, of which he is unaware, suggests an instant of unawareness. If intuiting occurs only during an act of attentive apprehending involving only a few seconds awareness, it does not last long. If so, and if there can be no knowledge without awareness and intuiting, then all knowledge itself exists actually only during instants lasting only a few seconds at a time.

The roles of brain and mind in maintaining thought processes over long periods of time and how they function relative to actualizing knowledge during acts of attention require more intensive study. Is one's ability to intuit limited to each such act of attending or can a mind retain a consciousness intuiting more than one act of attention? We know that more than one object or event can be intuited in a single act of attention. Normal acts include two or three, and when one tries he can attend to four or five lines or tones. Attentive geniuses attain seven distinct objects of attention in a single act. But our problem has to do not merely with limits within an act but how many acts, if more than one, can be apprehended in a single intuition? I do not know the answer. But knowledge appears to involve some continuity of consciousness provided by mind and brain over and above that occurring recurrently in moments of attentive awareness. Not all acts of thought are tied to eyejerks or to visual perception; but all acts of thought seem to occur in successive acts of attending nevertheless. What are the durational limits of intuitings, I am unable to say; but that intuitings have durational limits of variably short lengths seems probable.

SECTION B

PRESENCE

Each act of intuiting apprehends a moment of consciousness here called "presence." The term "presence" is chosen because it connotes (or is intended to connote) both what is present in awareness and the present being of what is in awareness. Presence consists of what is being apprehended as present, not of what is absent, and presence consists of what is being apprehended as temporally present, not of what is before or after the intuited present. All that is apprehended in an act of intuition, whether spatial or temporal, complex or simple, formed or formless, static or flowing, value or valueless, is intuited in presence, or in "a presence" when one act of intuiting is distinguished from another or others.

Efforts to understand the nature of presence encounter the question: "How long is the present?" The intuited present is not "a specious present," as claimed by those inferring that "the present", mathematically conceived, is an infinitesimal duration, or a temporal point without duration, somehow dividing past from

future. External guestimates of how long in clock time an act of intuition lasts suggest lengths equal to the pauses between eyejerks when one is reading. Such pauses can be observed to vary in length, especially when physiological conditions are conducive to alertness or drowsiness, although maximum observed lengths are measured in fractions of seconds. External evidences of gaps between moments of awareness exist, and these convince us that consciousness is actually discontinuousness in the sense that gaps of unawareness intervene between pulses of awareness. But, since we are not aware of what we are not aware, such awareness itself does not appear in presence. Yet, evidently each presence endures for a very short time and for only a very short time. The duration of each such presence is a genuinely present duration and is intuited as such. Whether a presence is occupied by apparently continuous duration or by apparently rapidly occurring events or by both is a matter of particular observation.

The present section is devoted to examining some additional characteristics of presence. I do not propose that each of these characteristics is self-evidently obvious in each presence, since the universal characteristics of consciousness normally tend to function transparently. I am proposing that, if and when a person stops to examine his own moments of awareness, he can observe that these characteristics are present. Each will appear as present to an observer only if and when he focuses his attention upon it. But each is presumed to exist as a characteristic (either an inherent condition or a normally recurring characteristic) constantly. Each proposed characteristic is presented as an hypothesis for further testing. The reader may test each hypothesis for himself.

1. **Universal conditions of presence:** In addition to the characteristics of intuition outlined in Section A, the following eight characteristics, or pairs of characteristics, are proposed as universal conditions of presence.

a. **Awareness-appearance:** Awareness and appearance interdepend. Awareness is awareness of appearance. Appearance is appearance in awareness. Without awareness there is no appearance. Without appearance there is no awareness. Awareness and appearance are equally essential ingredients in consciousness. In functioning as complementary opposites they constitute a polarity with a range of variations such that at times consciousness may be experienced as more fully constituted by awareness and at other times by appearance. When one is alert with expectation, he may experience awareness awaiting appearance; when one feels impressed by appearance, he may feel overwhelmed by it.

b. **Subject-object:** What appears is always an object of awareness. Appearance is always objective. All objects appear or

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are apparent. Awareness, i.e., awaring, involves an awarer (inruiter). An awarer, or agency that is aware, is called a "subject." Awareness is always subjective. All subjects are aware. [Persons, which are more than subjects, function as subjects whenever they are aware of objects actually.] Just as awareness and appearance involve each other, so subjects and objects involve each other. All objects are objects for subjects and all subjects are aware of objects. Like other polarities universally characterizing consciousness, this one also occurs in variations ranging from consciousness occupied primarily with objects to consciousness occupied primarily with a subject.

c. **Clarity and vagueness :** Appearance may be clear or vague, distinct or indistinct. When appearance is clear and distinct, awareness is clear and distinct. When appearance is vague or indistinct, awareness is vague or indistinct. The vagueness-clarity polarity omnipresently characterizes experience either transparently or by calling attention to itself during sudden shifts from more to less (as with zoom lenses) or when desire for more of one or the other has been aroused.

d. **Objectivity-objects :** What appears as object may be, and tends to be, both a field containing all of the objects and all of the objects contained therein. The field as a whole is continuous; the particular objects appear within the continuum, and two or more of them may appear to form a pattern. The whole of a moment of consciousness is continuous both spatially and temporally, so much so that there may be no explicit awareness of (attention to) the continuity as such. The objects are contents of consciousness, but so is the continuity, the wholeness, the unity. Failing to find a better word for such continuity, I choose the generalized word "objectivity". All that appears is objective, both the continuity and the objects contained therein, and any apparent relations or forms or patterns, etc., of objects, which are also objects.

There is a kind of polarity between objectivity and objects, for the parts (objects) are not the whole (objectivity), and vice versa, and yet each interdepends with the other, the parts (objects) participating in the objectivity (whole) and objectivity inclusive of all of its parts, even at times consisting entirely of parts apparently (i.e., at times may be filled with objects). At times consciousness may be occupied by a single object. The bothness of objects and objectivity is intuited (or at least intuitable). Again we may observe the complementary oppositeness of objectivity-objects as constituting a universal characteristic of conscious experience, and the principle of polarity basic to organic epistemology as observably present in the foundations of experience.

e. **Attention-intention :** What appears as object is attended to when we are aware of it. Awareness involves attention, either particularized, i.e., of some object or objects, or generalized, as when contemplating objectivity or the whole field of appearance. When attention is focused on a particular object, other objects, and objectivity, receive less attention or even no attention. Some speak of objects receiving less attention or little attention as constituting a "fringe" of consciousness. Since attention may shift from one object to another, or from an object to objectivity, what appears without being focused upon may then become focused upon. Sometimes attention is alert and rapidly shifting to many objects; sometimes it is relaxed and indifferently attentive. At times, especially when one is drowsy or sleepy, attention may diminish to barest awareness, to inattention, and cease altogether (terminating consciousness). Variations in attentiveness and inattentiveness range to extremes, and exist together as focus and fringe, interdependently as complementary opposites.

f. **Intention-unintended :** Attention involves intention. To attend is to intend. To attend is to intend to attend. To attend is to be aware of apparent objects. To attend is to be aware of apparent objects as they are, i.e., as they appear. To attend involves a willingness to be aware of apparent objects as they are, i.e., as they appear; this means a willingness to be objective. Attention involves an intention to apprehend objectively. "Objectivity", now meaning a willingness to be aware of things as they are, is itself a subjective attitude inherent in intention to attend. Objectivity, in this sense, is a natural universal characteristic of consciousness. Explanation of how such a natural universal becomes modified or substituted by prejudicial willfulness will be postponed here.

Just as some of many apparent objects remain unattended, so inattention is accompanied by unintention or absence of intention to attend to them. When both attended and unattended objects appear in awareness (consciousness), then both intentional attention and unintentional inattention occur together, and ranges of variations from intense intention to complete unintending exemplify their complementary oppositeness as constituting another polar category of consciousness. As one of the variations, one may intend to be inattentive, either to a particular object, to a fringe, or even to all objects when opting contemplative attention to objectivity. One may intend to be unattending when trying to fall asleep.

g. **Present-absent :** Appearance appears as present. Absence of appearance does not appear; appearance of absence does. Appearance of absence is not a universal characteristic of presence, but absence does appear at times, and one may focus attention on such apparent absence when he wishes. Appearance of absence is

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observed in processing when something not appearing appears and when something appearing ceases to appear. Appearance of absence involves awareness of absence, but absence of appearance does not.

When absence appears in any presence, what appears as absent and what appears as present appear together in an intuition. Although opposites, appearances of what is present and of what is absent complement each other in completing the appearances apprehended together in an act of intuition. Although presence is normally more fully occupied by awareness of what appears as present, variations range from awareness involving no appearance of absence to awareness involving appearance of complete absence. Visual awareness of sudden darkness when lights go out may be intuited as total absence. A yogin may achieve awareness of total absence momentarily, but he seems unlikely to achieve complete absence of appearance (his ultimate aim is awareness without appearance) until *mukri*, death.

h. Present-passing : All that appears as present. Awareness apprehends appearance intuitively, so all that awareness apprehends is apprehended present. Sometimes what appears appears as passing. Such apparent passing appears as present. Thus, such apparent passing appears as both passing and present. What is present remains the same from beginning to end of such present because, as intuited, it is intuited all at once, or all together, with any beginning and ending in that togetherness. The present, as present, does not appear as passing. But any awareness of passing, in any moment of awareness, is apprehended as all-at-once in that present. Passing involves a before, an occurrence, and an after. When passing is apprehended, such before, occurrence and after are intuited together in a present. The presence of apparent passing within an apparently unpassing present involves a unity of opposites complementing each other in constituting the appearances apprehended.

Contemplative attention to present appearance as present, without awareness of apparent passage, seems common enough (in my experience) so that I do not claim that awareness of apparent passing is a universal characteristic of presence, even though passing does seem present as a transparent universal characteristic. Consciousness conceived as awareness extending beyond single pulses of awareness tends to include, if not passing within a pulse, at least passing from pulse to pulse, although even awareness of this passing may be suspended for some time. But, sooner or later, awareness of passing occurs. Awareness of passing is a normal characteristic of consciousness. Maximums of duration of awareness without appearance of passing doubtless will be determined, although again, like athletes breaking world's records, such maximums may then be extended.

An additional reason why awareness of the presentness of what appears in a universal condition of presence and awareness of passing is less common is that the awarer, or subject of awareness, also remains the same during each intuition. The intuiter does not pass during an intuition, and functions in awareness of appearance, even if only vaguely, as present and not as passing. Hence there is a present subject-object polarity contributing stability to presence.

Sometimes presence is much more fully occupied with awareness of passing than at others. Doubtless some people experience awareness of passing more often (and more vividly) than others. I suspect that increased physiological activity (more common in youth than in the aged) with stronger or more rapid cardiac pulsation may produce increased awareness of rhythmic passage as a fringe appearance, although such increased activity is often accompanied also by increased alertness and longer attention span.

2. Recurrent contents of presence : Other contents of consciousness that appear in presence either universally (as some claim) or recurrently may be noted :

a. Feeling: some claim that feeling tone, positive (enjoyed), negative (suffered), or neutral, is omnipresent even when transparent.

b. Attitude: like-dislike, approve-disapprove, accept-reject.

c. Desire: and satisfaction-frustration, enthusiasm-apathy, contentment-disturbance.

d. Will: willfulness, willingness, will lessness.

e. Sensation: single, multiple, multisensory; pain and pleasure, hunger and thirst, etc.

f. Forms: patterns, relations (same-different, simple-complex, spaces, times).

g. Concepts: kinds, universals; pure, mixed with sensations, feelings, desires, etc.

h. Emotion: fear, hope, sorrow, elation, love, pride.

i. Inference: immediate and mediated of many kinds.

j. All other ingredients in experience and kinds of knowledge appear in presence, including questions, doubts, commitments, convictions. My view is that the ways in which these occur in presence are so interinvolved with physical, biological, physiological, psychological and social conditions of consciousness and with inferences about them that examination of their nature and contributions to knowledge should be postponed until the nature of their causal conditions have been examined.

3. Two dimensions of presence : Two dimensions, appearing as pairs of polar opposites, past-future and subject-object, constitute

four additional characteristics not only recurring constantly but almost universally present. They normally involve inferences also and are mentioned here in preparation for more detailed treatment later.

a. **Past :** Awareness of what appears as past, immediate or remote, is a normal constituent of presence. Such appearance participates in after-images, awareness of passing, memory, knowledge of what has passed and is past, and some generalizations about continuing beings and processes.

b. **Future :** Awareness of what appears as future is a normal ingredient in presence. Such appearance participates in anticipation, hope, expectation, planning, problem-solving efforts, and in some generalizations about continuing beings and processes.

c. **Subject :** Awareness of what appears as subject is a universal characteristic of presence, as previously indicated. Awareness of self, which not only functions as subject, intuiter, apprehender, but also as intender, willer, agent, as a presence-transcending continuant, as a rememberer, knower, anticipator, and as judge and enjoyer and suffer, is a recurringly common characteristic of presence, often including awareness of past and future as opposing directions of a past future dimension.

d. **Objects :** Awareness of what appears as objective, or objects, is a universal characteristic of presence, as previously noted. Awareness of objects, not merely as appearances, or as apparent objects, but as apparently real objects is a normally recurrent characteristic of presence. The apparently real existence of many objects, perhaps of most objects, involves appearing as having an existence and nature that is independent, either wholly or partly, of their being apprehended. Most of our beliefs and knowledge are about apparently real objects, including those constituting our environment, natural and artificial, momentary and enduring, near and far, and other persons, our bodies, and our minds when we seek to examine them. Although the subject-object dimension is essential to intuition and presence, apparent extensions of its directions to include self and the world constitute a self-world dimension as a normally recurring characteristic of presence.

The foregoing four directions are directions which inferences take in expanding and transcending presence. The four directions may be used in classifying kinds of knowledge. But when we learn how intricately interdependent and dialectically developing multidisciplinary kinds of knowledge are needed for adequate understanding of existence as experienced, such a classification must be considered elementary.

SECTION C
EXPANDING PRESENCE

Although each act of intuition apprehends a presence, absence of awareness of any gaps between such acts yields an appearance (awareness appearance) of continuity of two or more presences. Although attention to objects is inherent in the awareness constituting a presence, absence of awareness of gaps results in apparent continuity of attention during more than one presence. Such an extension of attention is included in what is called "attention span". This problem of apparent continuity of supposedly different intuitions raises the question of whether or not intuition itself somehow undergoes expansion and consequently whether or not presence itself, supposedly constituted of a single act of intuition, expands to include several acts of intuition which somehow appear as continuous and hence, in some sense, also as an enlarged single, or unified, act of intuiting.

How long may such apparent continuity extend as conscious continuity of awareness appearance? The question is important for epistemology because if the ultimate locus of certainty is the self-evidential apparent so-ness of what is apprehended in intuition, then any extension of such intuition results in an extension of the ultimate locus of certainty. In itself, a particular act of intuition need not be experienced in terms of a certainty-uncertainty problem, for what is involved in immediacy of apprehension is both a willingness to be objective (to apprehend objects which appear as they appear) and absence of doubt about what is apprehended. This does not constitute certainty after doubt, but merely the kind of ultimate locus of the immediacy of apprehension in terms of which any settlement of doubt may seem justified. Certainty involves intuition. How much claim to certainty is warranted depends in part upon how long a duration of presence, or how long a duration of attention span, can be included in either a single act of intuition or in a unified, or unbroken unity of, intuitive apprehension.

Since, at some times at least, we are unaware of gaps in awareness from waking to sleeping, the seeming certainty attributed to naive realistic attitudes may seem justified by this kind of reasoning about presence. Yet evidence for limitations of attention spans must also be recognized as casting doubt about the reliability of intuition when intuitive apprehension seems to extend beyond such limitations. As long as awareness of appearance continues apparently without gaps or discontinuity, no evidence, or reason for doubting such continuity, appears. Any claim, or theory claiming, that discontinuity occurs actually even though without appearing must itself be justified by appealing to some theory involving just the kind of intuition now being questioned. That is, a theory claiming that expanded conti-

nuity of presence is dubious even though no doubt arises within the intuited expansion (i.e., no evidence appears during the intuited expansion) seems to be claiming either that it is founded on a more reliable theory of intuition (and presence), or that we must infer that even the most intuitively certain apprehensions (apprehensions in which no doubt occurs) are unreliable, or that some other source of certainty (such as theoretical formal coherence) or of reliable probability (such as empirical or pragmatic persisting successes) is available.

The issue here is of utmost significance because, if intuited awareness of appearance cannot be trusted, there seems to be nothing else to trust. If temporal limitations of an act of intuition do exist, but do not appear within the act itself, then any temporally continuing intuitive action that does not detect such limits must be regarded either as actually expanding the temporal range of its intuitive (whole-grasping) power or as apprehending as if continuous what is not actually continuous in whatever sense gaps of any relevant kind exist.

In intuition apprehends as continuous what is, at least partly, temporally discontinuous, recognition of such a fact (?) properly raises doubt about its reliability. If such doubt is to be eliminated or reduced, then some relevant attempt must be made. If what is intuitively apprehended as continuous is, at least partly, discontinuous, then recognition (or theoretical speculation) that the complex of conditions within which an intuition occurs may provide conditions of stability and continuity in addition to, and over and above, those enabling the act of intuition to apprehend integratively to which the intuiting agency has, by nature, become accustomed, then the doubt-raising significance of the unapparent discontinuities may diminish or disappear. Such conclusion involves an acceptable theory of the complex of conditions.

If by apprehending as continuous what is known to be conditioned by gaps in the causes of appearance, an intuiter actually apprehends together in a temporally expanded appearance (expanded presence), then such act of intuiting may be regarded as integrative actualization—a creative act interpretable as part of a larger creative process. This interpretation again involves a theory of the conditions of intuiting. But it also can serve as a basis for a theory about still higher levels and larger wholes of temporal integration, mentally as well as physically, and of more complex kinds of conceptual unification that have their own kinds of intuitive obviousness for those who participate in them.

SECTION D

TRANSCENDING PRESENCE

Another way of expanding awareness is through inference. Some inferences about apparently real objects involve inferences about

the real nature of those apparently real objects. In whatever way an object appears as real, i.e., as independent of its being apprehended, something more (i.e., whatever, constitutes it as independent) than its appearing is intended. Such an inference, occurring within a presence, infers (postulates?) the being of something more than occurs within that presence. To the extent that this something more is more than what occurs within a presence, such presence is apparently projectively transcended.

Each such inference is intuited. The appearance of the apparently real object is intuited. The apparent realness of the apparently real object is intuited. So any apparent transcendence of presence inherent in inferring that the apparent realness of the apparently real object involves something more than occurs within presence may be interpreted as some transcendence of presence.

One may infer, and intuit his inferring, without being aware of his inference as inference. That is, inference may also be transparent in the sense that we infer without having our attention called to the fact that we are inferring. Naively realistic inferences seem to be a recurrently common characteristic of presence. Additional kinds of realistic inferences may be demonstrated as additional ways of expanding awareness. Chapter II, "Inference", and the remainder of this work, pertain to ways of expanding and transcending presence.

Religious Language : Towards A Theistic Re-interpretation

Mercy Helen & Mihirvikash Chakravarty

A theistic philosopher would claim that the language of religion comprises sentences which are cognitive in character and, at the same time, perfectly meaningful. However, in recent years there have been two very vigorous moves which have, in one way or another, shaken the theistic claim. One such move, as we know, was initiated by the logical positivists.¹ Going by what is called the *verifiability principle* of meaning, the positivists deny that these sentences of religion are meaningful; the cognitive character of these sentences however is not denied. The other is a move, towards denying, in one sense or another, that religious sentences have a cognitive character; the meaningfulness of these sentences is not however unconditionally denied. This move may be called the non-cognitivist² move. Anyway, in what follows, we have made a third counter move. This, in a sense, is a move backward though, not for that reason, a move in the wrong direction. The move is towards finding a way to uphold the claims of the theistic philosophers, that is to say, to restore for, the religious sentences, their traditionally accredited cognitive character along with their meaningfulness.

¹ A. J. Ayer and Moritz Schlick

Vide A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, (Dover Publications, New York, 1946).

Vide Moritz Schlick, "Meaning and Verification", reprinted in *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, (ed.) H. Feigl and Sellars; (Appleton-Century Crafts New York, 1949).

² It may be exemplified with reference to R. B. Braithwaite, J. H. Randall and Paul Tillich.

I

How, exactly, may we hope to accomplish this objective? In undertaking our search for a way, our attention is readily drawn to John Hick, we mean his well known idea of *eschatological verification*. He introduces this particular notion of verifiability in a bid to restore factual meaning to the sentences of religion. But what in our eyes is specially significant about this concept is that, unlike non-cognitivism, it does not abandon the underlying cognitive framework in which the sentences of religion are viewed in common both by theism and positivism. In other words, Hick's is an attempt to meet the verifiability theorists on their own terms. And this no doubt is an encouraging point about it.

Anyway, let us proceed to state in outline what the concept of eschatological verification means for Hick, and how he uses it.

Hick starts with an attempt at an elucidation of the notion of verification itself. What is verification for him? Verification, as he understands it, is a "family of inter-related notions".³ But, "the core of the concept..."⁴ says he, "is the removal of ignorance or uncertainty concerning the truth of the propositions".⁵ That is, "that *P* is verified means that something happens which makes it clear that *P* is true".⁶ The same idea is expressed in a different language thus :

...the general feature common to all cases of verification is the ascertaining of truth by the removal of the grounds for rational doubt. When such grounds are removed, we rightly speak of verification having taken place.⁷

In further elucidation Hick introduces, among other things, especially a phrase, viz. 'exclusion of doubt' in terms of which the notion of verification has been defined. 'Exclusion of doubt' he says is to be taken, *inter alia*, psychologically in the sense of "exclusion of doubt from particular minds",⁸ while, the experience

3 *Vide* R. B. Braithwaite, "An empiricist view of the nature of Religious Belief", *The Philosophy of Religion*, (ed.) Basil Mitchell (Oxford University Press : London, 1971).

Vide J. H. Randall *The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion*. Beacon Press, Boston, 1958.

Vide Paul Tillich *Systematic Theology*, (University of Chicago Press : Chicago, 1955).

4 *Vide Faith and Knowledge*, (Cornell University Press : New York, 1966), p. 169.

5 *Ibid.*

6 *Ibid.*

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 169-170 *Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion* (ed.) Basil Mitchell, (Oxford University Press, London) 1971.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 170.

which goes to expel such doubt, he says, is to depend "upon the specific subject matter"⁹

Now let us come to the qualifying epithet 'eschatological'. What does Hick want to suggest when a process of verification is called so by him? What is distinctive about eschatological verification *vis-a-vis* the verification of the ordinary kind? If we have understood Hick correctly, we may sum up his position thus.

The verification in any particular case is to involve reference to some *future* experience in terms of which the truth-claim of the sentence under verification may be confirmed (or disconfirmed). This is undeniable. For, it is a part of the meaning of the concept of verification and is entailed by the latter. But the future experience, according to Hick, is distinguishable into two types. One is confined to the *present worldly life* of a person, and the other extends beyond that, i.e., to his *life after death*. And it is in terms of this distinction that the difference between eschatological and ordinary verification is sought to be defined by Hick. Take the sentence, 'Arsenic is poisonous'. It is said to be amenable to ordinary verification, because its truth can be ascertained through our ordinary future experiences of the effect of the liquid on a living organism. But the eschatological verifiability, by virtue of which religious sentences, say, 'God is love' is to assume meaningfulness or factuality for Hick, is a different matter. The truth of a sentence, in this case, is confirmable only by the future experience of a person after his death.

But then isn't it the case that the knowledge of the truth of a religious sentence is available only to the particular person who has an after-life and lives through its experiences, that is, that it does not become a matter of public knowledge? Hick admits that it is so. But that, according to him, is not incompatible with the idea of verifiability. He says "... although 'verifiable' normally means publicly verifiable (i.e., capable in principle of being verifiable by everyone), it does not follow that a given verifiable proposition has in fact been or will in fact be verifiable by everyone."¹⁰

However, the more important point is, how it is possible at least logically for a person to obtain confirmatory experiences after his death. Obviously, this presupposes that it must be possible, at least logically, for one and the same person to enjoy a continued existence even after death. Hick accepts this presupposition quite unequivocally.

But the expression 'existence after death' sounds self-contradictory in ordinary language. What is more dangerous, it tends

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 176 (italics ours).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

apparently to commit itself to the liability of traditional mind body dualism. However, Hick has little difficulty in bypassing the liability. He does it by taking recourse to the christian belief in the "resurrection of the *flesh or body*"¹¹ in contrast to the notion of the "survival of the disembodied soul"¹². This he finds "in consonant with the conception of man as an indissoluble psycho-physical unity".¹³

Thus it is plain that the attempted vindication by Hick of the factuality and meaning claim of religious sentences rests ultimately on his assumption that a person say, Mr. X^1 survives after death as Mr. X^2 . Not only that, Mr. X^1 and Mr. X^2 have also to be self-identical. On the intelligibility of the two assumptions, depends the tenability of Hick's position.

May Mr. X^1 be supposed to have an after-death existence as Mr. X^2 ? The matter, of course, is purely hypothetical, though it is not perhaps logically impossible. Anyway, let us remain non-committal about its truth and falsity. What intrigues us is the other requirement, namely, that Mr. X^1 and Mr. X^2 should be self-identical that is one and the same person. The idea, if we may say so, appears far from intelligible. To explain ourselves.

What, really, may one mean by saying that Mr. X^1 is identical with Mr. X^2 ? Let us enquire.

Take the wordly person W . How may one formulate an identity question about him, if one chooses to do it? The usual formulation may be this: Is W today the same person as W yesterday?

The formulation is perhaps apt to be mis construed as a quality question. That is, one may, we fear, be tempted to read it as 'Is W today the same sort of person as W yesterday?' "and then proceed to approach it in a way different from that in which an identity-question is to be approached. But this we suppose, is a minor defect: it is unlikely to cause any serious damage to our identity-enquiry, if we are alert against it.

Anyway, taking the formulation as a model, one may formulate one's identity problem about Mr. X^1 and Mr. X^2 in this way: Is Mr. X^1 the same as Mr. X^2 ? Now consider this problem. What can a wordly man do about it? He can raise the problem. More, he is in a position perhaps to imagine a way in which someone not in the world can find an answer to it. Yet it is logically impossible that he can in actuality find an answer for himself. For, the way to the answer is in principle, shut out from him, which means, a man

11 *Vide Philosophy of Religion*, (Prentice Hall of India, Delhi, 1973) p. 19.

12 *Vide Faith and Knowledge*, (Cornell University Press: New York, 1966).

13 *Ibid.*

belonging to this world cannot, as long as he continues to be in this world, have any access whatever to the bodily features of Mr. X^2 nor can he check up Mr. X^2 's memory claim about his past life as Mr. X^1 . Thus the problem for him is a pseudo problem.

But can we make a sense of the problem by bringing in place of the worldly person, another person who does not belong to the world say, Mr. X^2 himself or some of his neighbour, an other-worldly man, say Mr. Y? Let us examine the possibility.

Take the two terms of the supposed identity relations *i. e.*, Mr. X^1 and Mr. X^2 . What do they stand for? Does Mr. X^2 stand for a dis-embodied self? Well, we don't have to suppose that. For, Mr. X^2 , as supposed by Hick has a resurrection body". So Mr. X^2 is an embodied self in a resurrection setting just as Mr. X^1 is another embodied self in a non resurrection *i. e.*, worldly setting, which means the problem whether Mr. X^1 is the same person as Mr. X^2 , amounts to whether one embodied self is the same as another embodied self, And this, if we may say so, makes no more sense than asking whether two things are one thing.

II

In attempting to make a case for the meaningfulness of religious statements, Hick does not, as we have seen, step outside the cognitive framework, in other words, does not deny, as the non-cognitivists do, that the religious statements do in fact purport to convey factual information to us. Thus far we agree with him. Yet, in our projected search for a way to confirm the meaningfulness of religious statements, we cannot perhaps go further with him. His doctrine of eschatological verification fails to attract us because of what it presupposes, namely, the idea of self-identity of a person before and after death. The hypothesis, as we have argued, is far from intelligible.

So, we have to resume our search along a new line. This line, we should acknowledge, is partly suggested to us by I.M. Crombie.¹⁴

What, precisely, are we to do if we are to vindicate religious statements' claim to meaning? As a first step, let us be clear about why it is that these statements appear unverifiable (and therefore meaningless) to the logical positivists. A first answer is: because the rule laid down by religion for understanding its statements are in conflict with each other. But, then, why is it such that while the rules in the case of religious statements contradict one another, those in the case of statements which are admittedly verifiable or meaningful do not? What is peculiar about religious statements *vis a-vis* the ordinary statements? The answer, possibly, is that, in the case of ordinary statements, we know what the statements are

14 *Ibid*

about, though in the case of religious statements, this does not appear to hold good. That is, here we cannot in any ordinary sense, specify the subjects referred to by the statements. So it is plain that in building up our case for religious statements, what we are required to do is to provide an account of the sense in which we may be said to know what the statements refer to.

For this purpose let us ask :

- (i) What is it that is to count as the subject (subjects) of religious statements ?
- (ii) What is extraordinary or wrong about the subject (subjects), because of which we are not in a position to identify it in any ordinary way? and
- (iii) How to remedy this wrong, in other words, to discover a sense in which the subject may be said to become amenable to identification ?

(i) doesn't detain us, 'God' is universally believed to be the common subject of all religious sentences. Sentences which are apparently otherwise, *i. e.*, those in which the word 'God' doesn't figure, it is said, are also finally analysable as having 'God' for their subject.

However, as is shown by Crombie, things become complex and anomalous when we approach (ii). Take any sentence with God its subject, *e.g.*, 'God' created the world'. How, exactly, to interpret the status of 'God' in this sentence? Can it be understood after Socrates in the sentence 'Socrates is wise'...? Well, Socrates is a proper name. But then, can 'God' be taken to stand for a proper name? There is one analogy. Socrates in the Socrates-sentence is directly referred to, and so is 'God' in the God sentence. But the dis-analogy tends to count as far weightier than the analogy, so that it is impossible to treat God as a proper name like Socrates. Take 'Socrates'. Suppose it is asked "Who is Socrates"? A contemporary of Socrates can answer 'this is Socrates' pointing to an individual.' Others can suggest a situation in which this demonstrating operation could be conducted. But all this cannot be said of 'God'. It would be silly if one actually says, "look here; 'this is God'". Nor can we imagine a situation in which it would make sense for one to say so. The word 'God' therefore, might be described using Crombie's phrase, only as an "improper proper name".¹⁵

Anyway, there of course are in language such words as are quite meaningful, even though their semantics cannot be demonstrated in the way, it is done in the case of an ordinary proper name.

15 *Vide* "The Possibility of Theological Statements", *The Philosophy of Religion*, (ed.) (Basil Mitchell, Oxford University Press, 1971).

E. g., the words 'point' or 'straight line' in geometry or say the name 'Alice' in *Alice in Wonderland*. Can the word 'God' be understood after the word 'point' in geometry or the fictional name 'Alice...'?

Well, between 'God' and 'point', there is a fundamental dis-analogy which is not hard to see. A statement about a point is reducible to statements about volumes. But 'God' being a unique individual, there are no set of statements into which statements about him can be reduced. On the other hand, likening 'God' to 'Alice' would amount to the position that 'God' is a fiction and discourse about him is a fictional discourse. But this is one thing the religious men are least prepared to concede.

So, our task in restricting for religious sentences meaning and factuality boils down ultimately to one thing mainly which is to find a suitable referrent to which the word 'God' may be tagged. Can we conceive of such a referrent? We suppose we can. The referrent, as we may so suggest, is a *divine being* outside space and time. In so defining the referrent of the word 'God', it becomes incumbent on us to do a number of things.

First, we are required to define the content of the notion, so that it may not stand the risk of being brushed aside as empty. We may do it this way.

Human life is replete with gaps or deficiencies. To make up the gaps or deficiencies, we have numerous devices, beginning from paper-pins to communism and so on and so forth. However, gaps and deficiencies of the ordinary kind belong merely to the surface of human life and can produce effects at best on a part of it. More, they add to the complexity of life which create further gaps. But alongside these peripheral gaps, there are gaps of a different kind. They belong to the heart of human life and involve the whole of it. we may call them fundamental gaps. For example, the gap between things a man knows and those which are just insinuated to him, the gap between what a man aspires for and what he can accomplish, the gap between his moral beliefs and the actual results of his moral actions, and so on. Now, the positive content of the notion of divine being consists in the idea of something which goes to fill in the gaps or make good the deficiencies.

Second, we have to find a way to guarantee facthood to the divine being in some sense, and thereby, factuality to sentences about 'God' with which the divine being is identified.

For, in placing the divine being beyond the range of space and time we might appear to some minds, to have placed it also beyond the range of facthood. But, actually, we have not done so. A thing which has its being in time, or in space and time, is no doubt a fact. But this does not entail that facthood is entirely a spatio-temporal

matter. Those who think so, do in fact look at the notion of fact through the eyes of a 'plough boy' as distinguished from those of a Plato of Meinong. Essence of the facthood of a thing lies in its having a being which means, whatever has a being, no matter whether it is spatio-temporal or otherwise, has a rightful claim to facthood. God, *qua* divine being, is a fact in this sense. So that factuality of a kind and therefore verifiability or meaningfulness are already built into the sentences about God.

The special kind of facthood which characterises God, tends to explain why rules that govern our sentence about ordinary facts do not apply to sentences about God, and how the so-called anomalies arise when we model the latter after the former. The so-called anomalies cannot in fact prove prejudicial to the meaning of religious sentences. How, really, can they? Consider the two sentences involving in common, the word 'healthy', e.g., 'He has a healthy body', and 'walking is a healthy habit'. The rules governing the use of the word 'healthy' differ in the two cases. But does that prejudice their meaning?

16 *Vide Ibid.*, p. 30.

The Role of Subjectivity in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Linguistic Communication

Akin Erguden

Merleau-Ponty's views on language appeared at about the same time as the emergence of Wittgenstein's later views on the nature of language as a rule-governed activity embedded in and expressive of "forms of life," and with the Austinian theory of speech acts. While the followers of Wittgenstein emphasize a communicative view of language within the broader concept of social action, they tend to overlook the subjective and creative aspects of authentic or original speech which Merleau-Ponty proposed to explore.¹ Put simply, the dilemma created by the post-Wittgensteinian views is as follows: if a necessary condition of a linguistic communication is its conformity to an already shared structure of rules and conventions which alone enable us to succeed, then, where does the subjective power to create wholly novel domains of meaning and understanding reside? That is, how do we account for (rather than dismiss) subjectivity which creates in man such infinitely multifarious sources for expression and meaning?

The present paper attempts to show that the subjective dimension of language as explored by Merleau-Ponty in his theories of "authentic speech" and "speech as gesture" constitutes an essential part of the process of linguistic communication. That is, contrary to what the above dilemma suggests, subjectivity is not incompatible

¹ M. Coyne: "Merleau-Ponty on Language: An Interrupted Journey Toward a Phenomenology of Speaking", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 1980, 20 (1) pp. 308-326.

with the social character of language. More specifically, it will be argued that what Merleau-Ponty has accomplished in opening the question of language within the context of the study of man's being-in-the-world, is to make evident the full import of the following point: language is a way in which man exists-in-the-world and that the subject-object dichotomy is no more adequate in accounting for the domain of language than it is for other modes of being-in-the-world. If this claim can be sustained, that is, if Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of speaking can establish the necessity of subjectivity in language, then the authentic or originary speaking which Merleau-Ponty proposed to explore need not be rendered mysterious as suggested in the above mentioned dilemma. The subjective approach to language can then be said to be both compatible with and necessary for the objectivity in language.

I will then, first discuss the ideas of authentic speech and speech as gesture within the context of and as a result of Merleau-Ponty's employment of the method of the phenomenological reduction. Secondly, the insights gained from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of speaking will be discussed in relation to some major views on language which tend to exclude the subjective dimension from linguistic communication. Merleau-Ponty's analysis of *la parole originnaire*, i. e., the first words of an infant, the first words of primitive man, the original understanding conveyed by authors who surpass traditions, etc., leads to numerous insights: we recognize, for example, that thought and language coincide in these simple forms. This leads to better understanding of the relation between a word and what it refers to. In authentic speech what is primary is the act of referring, since reference does not follow recognition, it is the recognition. It also leads to an understanding of the communicative act of speaking where the thought verbalized by a speaker can no longer be considered a representation of prior relations: his thought is his speech (*la pensee dans la parole*). Language, that is, accomplishes thinking.

In addition to the main idea of thought-speech equation, the genesis of authentic speech leads us to two other cardinal ideas which have been lacking in many modern views of language including those of Saussure, Chomsky, and Piaget. They are: the crucial role the intentionality of the body-subject plays in speech, and the idea that language has its origins in social action and life-world.

Before elaborating our first task of explaining Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of speech, it is necessary to introduce a distinction that is accepted by him in his writings on linguistic expression. It is the distinction between authentic speech (*la parole originnaire*) as opposed to "second order" or "empirical" speech (*la parole*

secondaire)². The latter makes up the general run of daily language in the sense of pre-established signs. The all important former category, alternatively referred to as "authentic," "productive," "creative" speech, is the "primary process of signification" and constitutes the ground or the original possibility of the second-order, conventionally determined language use.

In the preface to *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty defines phenomenology as the study of essences.³ It tries to give a "direct description of our experience as it is, without taking account of the causal explanations which the scientists... may be able to provide."⁴ The primary task of phenomenology is to describe the phenomenology is to describe the phenomena of perception as "a return to things themselves".⁵ This, according to Merleau-Ponty also reveals the true meaning of the method of phenomenological reduction. The phenomenological reduction does not mean for Merleau-Ponty, Husserl's return to "essences" as they are perceived by a "pure" or "transcendental" consciousness which is removed from the world. Nor does it mean a return to the objective, conscious world of ours, and our experience of it. It means rather a return to things as they are in our "original" experience of them. Original experience is defined as primary perception which is a "non-positing, pre-objective and pre-conscious experience."⁶ Merleau-Ponty describes "pre-objective" world as "the natural setting of, and field for all my thoughts and all my explicit perceptions," which "is there before any possible analysis of mind."⁷ The pre-reflective I or the "knowing organism" is nothing but our body as meaning giving force of specifying objects. To perceive, then, becomes a function which belongs to the body; it is "to render oneself present to something through the body".⁸

In the case of the specific problem of speech perception, phenomenological reduction must enable us to give a description of speech within the outline given above: first, one must show that like any other human activity, speech too is an essential part of our primary experience. Secondly, we must show that speech is constituted on

2 M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, (tr. Colin Smith), New York: Humanities Press, 1962, p. 178, n. 1 and p. 179, n. 1.

3 Ibid. p. VII.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 242.

7 Ibid., pp. X-XI.

8 M. Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays*, (tr. M. Edie), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964, p. 242.

the level of "pre objective," original body-subject. Only if this can be shown to be the case, then a true (i.e., undistorted) description of speech perception is possible, and this description shows itself to be an employment — and a legitimate one — of the method of phenomenological reduction. Merleau-Ponty employs this method for speech perception in the chapter six of his *Phenomenology of Perception*, entitled "The Body as Expression, and Speech."

In his usual way of arguing, Merleau-Ponty starts by exposing the common mistakes of the two great and mutually hostile camps of "empiricist" and the "intellectualist" theories. For the empiricist, according to Merleau-Ponty, speech is not a genuine action, for there is no speaking subject in any meaningful sense. Instead, there is some depersonalized phenomenon called "speech" which consists of traces left in the nervous system by words heard or seen. The word, for the empiricist becomes just one more item in the causal network; "meaning" is reduced to some psycho-physical verbal image or to an "appropriate" response to some stimulus and/or associations.⁹

The other extreme approach to language is what Merleau-Ponty calls "intellectualism." According to such a theory, meaning is decided by an internal thought process and imparted to the components of language, words and grammatical forms, through as-yet-unclearified process. Again, in the case of intellectualism, meaning lies not in and with the word but, as it were, "behind" the word, in the thought. The word becomes a merely external sign for an intellectual operation that proceeds independently for the elements of language. Intellectualism suggests an activity on the part of the speaker, but ultimately can offer no account of precisely how it is that thought process it portrays produces a word that is meaningful.¹⁰

Merleau-Ponty now applies his critique to the fundamental assumption shared by the seemingly irreconcilable positions of empiricism and intellectualism: that the word has no meaning :

As far as speech itself is concerned, intellectualism is hardly any different from empiricism, and is no better able than the latter to dispense with an explanation in terms of involuntary action. Once the categorial operation is performed, the appearance of the word which completes the process still has to be explained, and this will be done by recourse to a physiological or psychic mechanism, since the word is a passive shell. Thus we refute both intellectualism and empiricism by simply saying that *the word has a meaning*.¹¹

9 M Merleau Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp. 144 175.

10 Ibid., pp. 175 176.

11 Ibid., p. 177.

In the above summarized critique of empiricist and intellectualist theories of speech, Merleau-Ponty emphasized that both of these theories conceive the speaking subject as a disembodied consciousness. The act of speech in these theories is understood either as a purely physical process or as a "verbal image" that would be present to a pure consciousness prior to act of speaking. In either case, the word has no meaning. Merleau-Ponty's response to empiricism and intellectualism is centered now upon the explication of the formula: the word has a meaning. He does this not in the form of a philosophical argument, but by asking us to pay attention (without any prejudices) to something very familiar—what is it to express ourselves verbally. He reminds us that one must affirm that the word has a meaning once one recognizes the fact that the appearance of a word qualitatively changes a person's situation in relation to other people and things. Both a speaker's and a hearer's situation is modified with the appearance of a word. In the speech act of naming a thing (in Wittgenstein, a "language game") the person's relation with that thing becomes "fixed" in a manner in which it had not previously been fixed. Here Merleau-Ponty draws on an experiment by Piaget, who demonstrates that "for the child the thing is not known until it is named, the name is the essence of the thing and resides in it on the same footing as its color and its form."¹² If meaning were imparted to words by a thought process intended to device representations of what is found in the world, argues Merleau-Ponty, then the child would already know the things that he names. Furthermore, the child would be aware of the source of the meaning, namely, the internal thought process, and therefore could not regard the name of the thing as a quality of the thing.¹³

The listener's situation is also modified with the appearance of a word. There are instances in which words heard (or read) alter the meaning of a person's world. Here, one cannot say that the process of communication is one of coding and decoding and that the words are linguistic devices designed by our consciousness to call up the same thought in another consciousness by way of association. In such instances the words have thoroughly altered the thoughts of the hearer (or reader). The appearance of the word itself alters the hearer's (or reader's) situation in relation to things and other people. Merleau-Ponty offers the child uttering a first word, the lover revealing his feelings, and the writer who "reawaken primordial experience anterior to all traditions" as illustrations of such an event.¹⁴

¹² Ibid., pp. 177-178.

¹³ Ibid., p. 178.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 179.

The word has a meaning. How does the word with its meaning come into being? In order to answer this question Merleau-Ponty locates speech as a spontaneous use of the body. Just as the actual motion of the body follows from a prior dynamic situation or orientation of the body, so the speech follows from a prior dynamic orientation of the body in the speaker's world of meanings. In the case of speech the phenomena toward which and away from which the body is already oriented are words, and these words are inhabited by meaning :

[Words] are behind me, like things behind my back, or like the city's horizon round my house. I reckon with them or rely on them, but without having any 'verbal image'... I do not need to visualize the word in order to know and pronounce it. It is enough that I possess its articulatory and acoustic style as one of the modulations, one of the possible uses of my body. I reach back for the word as my hand reaches towards the part of my body which is being pricked: the word has a certain location in my linguistic world and is part of my equipment. I have only one means of representing it, just as the artist has only one means of representing the work on which he is engaged: by doing it.¹⁵

The process involved in comprehending "a word as a gesture"¹⁶ as described in the above quote provides Merleau-Ponty with an opportunity to precise the sense in which an act (a gesture or a word) brings the thing that is pointed to from the periphery of the world to the center. A gesture finalizes the situation in the sense that previously the person may have been thinking about various qualities of the thing and now replaces in his attention such abstract qualities with the thing itself as present. Translated into words, this gesture could say: "There, that is what I have been thinking about." Similarly, the spoken word is not the mere transference of a thought into an audible vehicle, but that "the linguistic gesture, like all the rest, delineates its own meaning."¹⁷ It marks a qualitative change in the world, which includes the speaker's body and things. The spoken word itself acts.

Although it may not be very obvious, the two steps of the phenomenological reduction as Merleau-Ponty understands them, are employed in the above discussion. Merleau-Ponty first attempted to show that like any activity, speech too is an essential feature of our primary experience within the original content of perception. Secondly, more specifically, he described language as "constituted" on the level of pre-objective original body-subject. Language, the phenomenological reduction shows, is one of the currents of man's being-in-the-world, and as such, finds its source in man's original

15 Ibid., p. 180.

16 Ibid., p. 184.

17 Ibid., p. 186.

bodily intentionality directed toward words. Words are phenomena. They have meaning, and this meaning is not static, but radically dynamic

In what follows, I will discuss some of the insights gained from the preceding explanation of the subjective dimension of language. The implicit assumption on the part of the present author is that Merleau-Ponty's views will enable us to gain a better and corrective perspective over the notions of the linguistic sign and communication as they are traditionally held by linguists and philosophers. First, a comparison between Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the "pre-reflective and Piaget's notion of the "pre-linguistic" thinking is in order. Such a comparison will provide us a critical and corrective account of Piaget's mistaken notion of the trivial role attributed to subjectivity in language and in the development of thinking. Further comparison of Merleau-Ponty's ideas with those of Saussure, Vygotsky and Wittgenstein will put the former's ideas into clearer perspective.

A first resemblance between Merleau-Ponty's and Piaget's views should be noted in the latter's implicit recognition of the pre-reflective during the very first stage (the sensori-motor, 0-2 years of age) the child goes through in his development.¹⁸ The original relation between the child and the environment, according to Piaget, is one of lack of differentiation, and the development takes the form of progressive differentiation between the two.¹⁹ The description by Piaget, of the development of sensorimotor period could thus be regarded as an explication of Merleau-Ponty's pre-reflective experience. The notion of the pre-reflective, as was discussed earlier, refers to a direct experience of the world prior to reflection and the appearance of subject-object dichotomy. The intentionality, as that directedness of consciousness, produces the natural and pre-predicative unity of the world.

Similarly, Piaget would claim that all sensorimotor actions and assimilatory schemes (kernel forms of concepts) have an intentional character.²⁰ That is, he demonstrates that even before language begins, the young child reacts to objects not by mechanical set of stimulus-response situations but by an integral assimilation to schemes of action which impress a direction on his activities and include the satisfaction of a "need" or "interest." To assimilate a newly

18 J. Piaget, *The Psychology of the Child*, (tr. H. Weaver), New York : Basic Books, 1969.

19 Ibid., pp. 94-95.

20 W. Mays, "Piaget : Formal and Non-Formal Elements in the Child's Conception of Causality," in B. Curtis, W. Mays (eds) *Phenomenology and Education : Self Consciousness and Its Development*, p. 66 ff.

encountered object into such a scheme is to confer a meaning on it which at this stage shows itself in the form of perceptual signals, indices and early practical directed activities²¹

The similarities between Piaget's and Merleau Ponty's thinking, however, end at this point. For Piaget, the achievements of sensorimotor period are considered as a transitory stage on the way towards the objective, formal-deductive thought, whereas for Merleau-Ponty, the pre-reflective subjectivity is the ever existing source of the mind's creativity, and remains so throughout life. Merleau-Ponty argues that there is no reason to suppose that our childhood thinking is obliterated when we reach adulthood. This early experience which we carry with us throughout life cannot be ignored if we are to understand how we perceive, think, communicate, etc.²²

Merleau-Ponty's possible objection to Piaget's above point that the pre-reflective consciousness can be dispensed with can be summarized as follows: the formal-logical thinking which Piaget emphasizes is inevitably a second-order schematization, a structure which originates in and refers to a contact with the world which precedes attempts at formalization. It is, in Merleau Ponty's opinion, the great error of the empiricist and intellectualist theories (Piaget is an intellectualist) to fail to recognize this fundamental fact revealed by phenomenological reduction. Recognizing the role of the pre-reflective subjectivity as the background against which all interpretations stand out, will enable us to place reflective thought within its proper context.

The above objection which is stated in general terms also applies to Piaget's notion of the role language plays in thinking. According to Piaget, language is an expression of the more generalized symbolic functioning, and the development of language is determined by the extent of the child's progress in the development of formal-logical operations. It is, however, the development of these formal operations through the internalization of actions which constitutes the basic aspect of the development of thinking; and, here, language plays a very minor, if any, role.²³ From the standpoint of Merleau-Ponty's theory, this view is nothing other than a reformulation of the intellectualist theory that was criticized above. In opposition to Piaget's notion of the relation between language and thinking, Merleau-Ponty maintains that language accomplishes

21 J. Piaget, *The Psychology of the Child*, pp. 14-15.

22 N. Bolton, "Piaget and Pre-Reflective Experience," in B. Curtis, W. Mays (eds.) *Phenomenology and Education*, pp. 32-33.

23 J. Piaget, "Schemes of Action and Language Learning", in M. Piatrelli Palmarini (ed). *Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

thinking.²⁴ In order to clarify Merleau-Ponty's position here, it is necessary to consider the previously mentioned distinction between authentic and empirical speech. This distinction, for our purposes here, can be reformulated as a distinction between the "spoken word" (*la parole parlée*), that is, language which is the depository of constituted meanings, and the "speaking word" (*la parole parlante*), which is the origin of the spoken word.²⁵ The latter, according to Merleau-Ponty, is the active and creative power which goes beyond already constituted meanings. Thus when Merleau-Ponty asserts that language accomplishes thinking he is referring to the speaking word (Heidegger's *Rede*),²⁶ by which the speaking person organizes his words in the light of "meaning" in order to actualize this meaning. Meaning both precedes the utterance, since it guides it, and follows it, since it is its culmination. When we speak the "speaking word" we constitute language itself, thus translating the silent world of the pre-reflective into the world of speech. It is through the mediation of the speaking word that we gain contact with the pre-reflective world.

This thesis is opposed to Piaget's contention that language is a mere accompaniment of thought. Merleau-Ponty reveals that language is the medium by which thought articulates itself. The relation between thought and word is a living process; thought is born through words in that the speaking word does not merely "stand for" a ready made thought, but articulates the process of thought.

The above conclusion resulting from the reflection upon Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the pre-reflective basis of experience has important implications in terms of a re-examination of the traditional (i.e., Saussurean) meaning of the sign. Merleau-Ponty points out that at first glance, it may appear that words are arbitrary signs agreed upon by man in order to communicate about the world. The existence of a number of languages may be offered as evidence. This view of language, according to Merleau-Ponty derives from a consideration of only the "conceptual and delimiting" meanings of words, the dictionary meanings that, although based upon spoken language, also represent an effort to fix usage and thus play a role of arbitrary authority. But if the "emotional" content of words is taken into consideration, that content which is evident in poetry, one recognizes that words are not merely arbitrary signs agreed upon by man in order to represent things in the world, but rather

24 R. L. Lanigan, *Speaking and Semiology: Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenological Theory of Existential Communication*. The Hague: Mouton, 1972. p. 176 ff.

25 P. E. Lewis, "Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Language", in J. Ehrmann (ed.) *Structuralism*, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1970, pp. 22-23.

26 R. L. Lanigan, *Speaking and Semiology*, p. 175.

present emotional essences extracted from the world. When speaking of the emotional content of words, Merleau Ponty indicates that the reference is not to a stock of adopted conventional responses to the world. Emotion must be taken in its literal sense as a motion carrying man beyond himself, beyond the world as man has organized it and has taken control of it. Just as emotional gesturer do not "stand for" a hidden meaning behind the facade, just as there is an inter-mingling of appearance and essence in the expressions of fear, anger and joy, so there is an interpenetration of mutual implication of the signifier and signified in the incipient moments of expression. In the phenomenological study of language, Merleau-Ponty states,

we must recognize a primordial process of signification in which what is expressed does not exist apart from the expression and the signs themselves execute their sense... This incarnate sense is the central phenomenon of which body and mind, sign and significance are abstract moments.²⁷

Merleau-Ponty's above suggestion, as I understand it, is not to deny that signs may operate as a conventional agency, but rather to emphasize that they operate without the perfect one to-one correspondence. The sign has a primordial one to many relationship to its meaning which cannot be reduced to a correspondence between a specific signifier and a certain state of mind.²⁸ In this sense, the act of speaking becomes not a designating or pointing process but the perception proper of that which is existentially present to the perceiving subject :

The word and speaking must somehow cease to be a way of designating things or thoughts and become the presence of thought in the phenomenal world, and, moreover, not its clothing but its token or its body. There must be, as psychologists say, a 'linguistic concept' (*Sprachbegriff*) or a verbal concept (*Wortbegriff*), a central inner experience, specifically verbal, thanks to which the sound, heard, uttered, real or written, becomes a linguistic fact.

We find here, beneath the conceptual signification of the words, an existential meaning which is not only rendered by them, but which inhabits them, and is inseparable from them.²⁹

The notion of the "verbal concept" evoked in the above quote, brings Merleau Ponty's view of thought-language relation very close to that of speech and thought identity as explored by Vygotsky in his notion of "inner speech."³⁰ The elaboration of this point will

27 M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 166.

28 Ibid., p. 188.

29 Ibid., p. 182.

30 L. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language* (tr. E. Haufman & G. Vakar). Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962, p. 148. See also: A. Leontev, "Inner Speech and the Process of Grammatical Utterances", in *Soviet Psychology*, 1969, VIII, No. 3, p. 12.

further highlight Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the subjective dimension of language.

In the above quote and elsewhere,³¹ Merleau-Ponty identifies inner speech with verbal concept. Here, the point to be emphasized is the intentional dimension of inner speech. As Vygotsky develops the idea, the process of inner speech organizes thought adopting it to varying contexts and modes of communication in order to meet a variety of demands to make oneself understood both to others and to oneself. Vygotsky's formulations thus clearly indicate that inner speech is fundamentally outer directed and is an intentional act toward the world that can only be assessed against the background of whatever constitutes the intersubjectively established social-cultural reality at the moment of the occurrence of the communication situation.³²

Insofar as its inner form is a reflection in language of the unique world view and life style of a culture, Vygotsky's inner speech is comparable to authentic speech as bodily gesture as described by Merleau-Ponty. Inner speech too manifests a surface structure of nuanced variations which can be as individual as bodily styles. At its creative, authentic level, language operates, according to Merleau-Ponty, with the same transparent fluency as my body precisely through its inner form, whereby words and expressions recommend themselves to me as I bring my intentions to an expression appropriate to the situation.³³ This "gestural sense which is immanent in speech"³⁴ is the verbal concept both Vygotsky and Merleau-Ponty emphasize in their writings. Just as the expressive gesture does not simply "stand for" a hidden sense behind its front, so the word, both for Merleau-Ponty and Vygotsky, does not simply stand for its concept. Word and concept are experienced together, as word-concept (word-meaning) or gestural meaning.

Merleau-Ponty's concept of "thought within speech" (*la pensee dans la parole*) when referred back to its "corporeal projection" as discussed above, renders communication not as an act of transmitting fixed meanings, but the act of meaning itself—to speak is to "signify". This is, the speaker's thought in his speech. The listener then hears a thought-speech, and if the speech replies adequately to his expectations, he does not conceive of the spoken words as signs, his mind is fully occupied by the flow of thought. That is, neither the speaker nor the listener conceive the meaning of what was said as

31 M. Merleau-Ponty, *Signs* (tr. R. C. McCleary), Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1964, p. 88.

32 See footnote (30) above.

33 M. Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, p. 88.

34 M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 179.

meaning until after the speech — the meaning was there at every instant yet was no more posited as such than the words uttered were represented as words. Communication, in this sense, cannot be explained as a re-creation of mental representations by the listener; understanding of the speaker's message takes place in the same way that we understand his gestures, i. e., there is a renewal of the speaker's expressive intention in that the listener does not give the message its meaning, he does apprehend new and original thoughts — all are not known ahead of time by the listener.

Merleau-Ponty also shares Vygotsky's and Wittgenstein's rejection of an ideal language and private language as the following quotes express :

I begin to understand the meaning of words through their place in a context of action, and by taking in a communal life.³⁵

Language leads us to a thought which is no longer ours alone, to a thought which is presumptively universal, though this is never the universality of a pure concept which would be identical for every mind.³⁶

This means that there is no such a thing as private language, for, "even solitary thought does not cease using the [intersubjective] language which supports it."³⁷

Perhaps the most striking similarity between Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein lies in their shared idea that language has its origins in social action and life-world. The intersubjectivity of language, according to Merleau Ponty, requires a "taking up a position in the world" so that linguistic meaning transcends the private intention to speak: "The spoken word is a gesture, and its meaning a world."³⁸ This "world" or *Lebenswelt*, is the "universal styles shared by all perceptual beings."³⁹ Merleau Ponty's idea of the life-world is similar to Wittgenstein's conception of language as a "form of life".⁴⁰ For both of them words are like gestures: they come to possess their meaning because of the situation of the "world" in which they are expressed. Without this world there would be no significance. A word, like a smile, is a kind of natural expression but with a "conventional" meaning. A smile, for instance, in some oriental countries may indicate anger or malice whereas in western culture its

35 Ibid.

36 M. Merleau-Ponty, *Primacy of Perception*, p. 8.

37 Ibid.

38 M. Merleau Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 184.

39 M. Merleau Ponty, *Primacy of Perception*, p. 6.

40 L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, (tr. G. E. M. Anscombe), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978, paragraphs 19, 23, 241; pp 174, 226.

meaning is more joyful. Words too, are dependent upon context and purpose within the horizon of the life-world, and like gestures, derive their significance only in the context of this background. Similarly, Wittgenstein believed that to imagine a language presupposes a cultural style (like a caste system) which is expressed as the form of life. Therefore, one can say that Merleau-Ponty's "life-world" and "style of life" have in common with Wittgenstein's concept of "form of life" in that they both refer to the necessary conditions of man's existence upon which all linguistic meaning is constituted.

In positing such a functional, relative and material a priori, Merleau Ponty, with Vygotsky and Wittgenstein, affirms that there are no pre-existent meaning prior to men—no universal or ideal language—public or private. Meaning is "autochthonous",⁴¹ i.e., it is neither merely subjective nor solely objective, idealistic or realistic, not a function of simply the subject's mind nor of external physical object, but it is a product of both.

In summary, I have discussed the insights gained from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of speech in relation to the subjective and creative aspects of language. Conclusions drawn from Merleau-Ponty's ideas on the pre-reflective basis of experience, thought and speech identity and the authentic speech as gesture are compared to some other views on language. Through these comparisons, it has been shown that the subjective dimension of language as defended by Merleau-Ponty is not necessarily in conflict with the view that the essential nature of language is a social activity embedded in forms of life. On the contrary, the subjectivity as revealed in the phenomenology of speaking is an indispensable part of a coherent theory of linguistic communication. Merleau-Ponty shows us that the boundaries of the world require first that *man as a subject*, the I of speaking and listening, exists. The subject, the I, constructs the reality of the world and that the world cannot be known independently of the I that constructs it. In this sense, every act of consciousness is a consciousness of something. And language is among the most important intentional threads that attach us to the world. Once this is realized, that is, once it is known that language is a way in which man exists-in-the-world, then speech will appear by definition, as a unitary phenomenon devoid of subject-object dichotomy, of "symbolic" activity and of "natural" sign.

41 M Merleau Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, (French Edition, pp. 18, 26).

VI

The Impact of Religious Faith and The Attitudes of Self Transcendence on Death Anxiety in the Orthodox Muslims

Abu Sufiyan Zilli & Hari Mukund Sharma

The ideas leading into this investigation stem forth from certain major points of Islamic Philosophy contained in the Holy Quran. The subjects of this study were therefore avowed Muslims i.e., those who were regular in praying five times and observing throughout the month of Ramazan. Death and dying are not abhorred by Muslims especially because the prophet of Islam had encourage remembering death as a check on engrossment in wordly pleasures.

The authentic faith, according to Islam, leads into seeking the will of God, and sets in as the ultimate goal of life. The mundane life, as it is explicitly given in the verses of the Holy Quran, is only a preparatory stage for the abiding existence where the true believers would attain eternal bliss in consequence the actions commended by Allah. These ideas are not necessarily restricted to Islam; they are also found in the Jewish, Christian, Hindu and Jainist religions (Smart, 1968).

The Muslim mystics held love of God as the most advanced stage of spiritual development and self-transcendence. The most illustrious Muslim mystic philosopher Al-Ghazzali has given a systematic exposition of this developed state of human consciousness which involves a kind of psychic transmutation (Al-Ghazzal, 1962). The renowned mystic poet Rumi, who seems to strike a synthesis between the positions of Plato and Spinoza, anticipated Maslow through his concept of self-transcendence. Transcending beyond involvements

in life and death enables an individual to attain the most developed stage of spiritual sublimation. The basic concept of self transcendence orientation has been derived from Quaranic thought, which means investigation is derived, however exhibited in the love of God. P. I. L. Test was being used as a measure to aforementioned concept. It was taken for granted that those who strive for higher ends of life generally tend to transcend fear of death and disengage themselves from blind involvements in life.

Another assumption underlying the study pertains to the observation that the older generation of Muslim takes to religious practices very seriously. Through an intensive involvement in these practices they make preparations for the after-life or the AKHIRAT (as it is described in the Holy Quran). The variable carrying the age differentials could not therefore be neglected in the light of these considerations.

The significance of this investigation is derived from the fact that death anxiety has been studied in a cultural background where attitudes toward death drastically differ from those that have their roots in the modern western civilization which is governed by the scientific outlook. People in the west are, by and large, allergic to the ideas surrounding the fact of death. Death brings their mind into confrontation with a frightening meaningless void because to them the end of life means the end of existence as well. On the contrary death has a deep meaning and significance for the Indian mind to which the Muslims are no exception. Professor Toynbee (p. 130) has aptly remarked "A present day Christian monk's stalwart Christian faith makes death, for him a comparatively unimportant incident as it is for a Buddhist who believes the possibility of obtaining Nirvana, or for a Hindu who believes that the "dweller in the innermost" of a human being's spirit is identical with the Ultimate Spiritual Reality that lies behind a universe that is "illusory". So it is with a Muslim who firmly believes that death is a gateway to the life which is real and abiding; *WAL AKHIRATO KHAIR UM WA ABQA* (Holy Quran). In the light of these assumptions a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ factorial design was used to study the effects of age, religious faith and self transcendence on death anxiety. All the three independent variables were split up as 1. (a) Older subjects, (b) Younger subjects; 2. (a) High and (b) Low religious faith; and 3. (a) High degree of self transcendence and (b) Low degree of self transcendence. This design yielded either groups of subjects. A. Younger having high religious faith and high degree of purposiveness in life; B. Younger having high religious faith and low degree of purposiveness in life; C. Younger having low religious faith and high degree of purposiveness in life; D. Younger having low religious faith and low degree of purposiveness in life. The same scheme repeated with the older subjects and denoted E, F, G, H, respectively.

A sample of three hundred drawn from the educated population of Muslims consisted a graduate and post-graduate students, research scholars, teachers and persons from the non teaching or the administrative staff of the Aligarh Muslim University. The range of the younger group ran from 18 to about 30 years, and that of the older group from 40 to about 60 years. The original form* of Putney and Middleton's (1961) Religious Ideology Scale and Crumbaugh and Maholick's (1969) Purpose In Life Test were given to both younger and older groups of subjects in order to sort out individuals having high and low religious faith and having high and low purposiveness in life from each group. The eight groups of subjects thus obtained consisted of 15 subjects each. Templer's (1970) Death Anxiety Scale (DAS) was administered on each group, and the scores were subjected to t-test and the analysis of variance with the view to obtaining the significance of differences in the means and for locating the interaction among the three independent variables. The F ratio for the age variation turned out 4.71 (insignificant) suggesting an absence of difference with regard to death anxiety. The F-ratio for variation in PIL was 29.67 (significant at .01). These values tend to suggest that subjects having high degree of purposiveness in life are more afraid of death than their counterparts, with their mean of means at 9.03 and 5.24 respectively. F-ratio for religious faith variation was found to be 1.73 (insignificant) marking a clear absence of difference with respect to death anxiety. F-ratio for interaction between age and purpose in life was 77.19 (significant at .01), indicating an interactional effect of age and purpose in life on death anxiety. The insignificant values of F-ratios for 1. interaction between age and religious faith, 2. between purpose in life and religious faith, and 3. among age, purpose in life and religious faith were 3.44, 3.83 and .005 respectively. Hence no interaction exists among these variables so far as death anxiety is concerned. The t-tests yielded a very stranger finding. Older and younger persons with high purposiveness in life tend to have a higher means on the DAS. These findings run contrary to certain assumptions, and lead into very intriguing questions. Death anxiety is fairly prominent among those who may be said to have an orientation towards self-transcendence. Whereas it is true that the PIL measure of self-transcendence does not include, the Islamic religious and mystic notions it does not at the same time fall inconsistent with the main thrust of Islamic religious and mystic philosophy which encourage self-transcendence. Nevertheless, the questions which pose themselves for an answer seem to be concerned more with the death perspective itself. What is more specific about death

*English language is the medium of instruction in the Aligarh Muslim University.

from the point of view of the religion of Islam are its consequences, both remote and immediate. The immediate consequence of death arise out of one's fate in the grave about which definite beliefs are common among the Muslims. These beliefs generally surround the notion of punishment in the grave or *AZAB E QABR*. The remote consequences are believed to follow when one's destiny is unveiled—whether heaven or hell—at the day of judgement. These beliefs are part of the faith and any skeptic who dares to question them ceases to be a Muslim. This investigation however leaves these aspects of death perspective unexplored but they doubtlessly stimulate for a deeper probing.

It appears from a thoughtful handling of these findings that death being the antithesis of life confined goals and purposeful strivings of a self-transcendent nature poses a threat to meaningfulness with which these goals and strivings are identified. This might be an underlying reason for the elusive fear of death in the minds of the respondents. This idea draw a some reinforcement from the fact that the scores of the respondents who are not deeply involved in any purposeful orientation in life were low on the DAS.

These speculations on the part of investigators have led to the conclusion that death perspectives are to be reexamined in terms of their specific aspects and dimensions within the context of a particular philosophy, and death anxiety remains a diffused concept unless it is tied up with a specific dimension around which it really becomes effective. There may be an other-worldly dimension of death anxiety related to the firm faith of an individual that his fate in the other world lies entirely and exclusively in the hands of a Supreme Power who is absolutely just but who, at the same time is doubtlessly Merciful and Compassionate.

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VII

Cognitive Science as A New Synthesis

B. Chendov & T. Mikhailova

In the struggle of man to acquaint himself with nature and to conquer it, man's knowledge of man also acquires a vast popularity and practical value, along with the classical comprehension of cognition. Many a time the knowledge of man, inclusively man's investigation of the man himself have been based on the zealous competition among the private scientific approaches or on their practical peaceful coexistence.

Owing to the force of circumstances that the objects of cognition are complicatedly determined for one and the same object, a lot and different objects of cognition could be individualised. Thus cognition proves to be multisubjected and inter alia this determines the possibilities to investigate it with then methods of different sciences, which at best complete themselves and help by solving the unit cognitive task. For a very long time the monopoly in the study of problems connected with the optimisation of managing the human activity, belonged to psychology. Recently however it is seen that for the solution of such global questions, as well as of human cognition as a whole, the organisation of a complex study was necessary, leaning against the interaction between the different approaches in the canonical sciences. An optimal method in this case becomes neither the psychological, nor the logical, gnosiological, axiological, semiotical or theoretico-informational method, etc., but the complex interdisciplinary investigation. Of course here it is no question of solving sciences one into the other, but of their integration on the basis of their methodologic touch in respect of the object of cognition. In this case we could not say, that the cognitive science stands above psychology and logic, or that psychology and logic become groundless in presence of the cognitive science. Similar attempts have been made not for once, but they always proved to be groundless. As for example we could state the unsuccessful attempt of the

German psychologist G. Fechner, who in the XIXth century rose in revolt against the philosophical method of an esthetic cognition counterposing the psychological one.

Let us not forget that any canonical theory — the philosophical, biological, social one, etc., independently tears out only a separate "little bit" of cognition from the body of the studied object. Up to then, when any separate science does not pay attention to the neighbouring sciences or pretends for individual government of the object of study, there will still exist a danger man's cognition to turn easily from a welfare into a danger, from a weapon in the struggle to conquer nature into a weapon of man himself and the human civilisation.

It is a question of necessity to build up complex sciences of the scientific cognition integration. Naturally the investigation of all components of the culture of society, of the whole being and of the function of cognition requires the usage of specific scientific means and methods, adapted for an entire scientific study without ignoring the philosophical level of cognition. We think, that in the conditions of the scientifico-technical revolution (STR) the building up of complex sciences is a necessary and essential moment in man's cognition.

Lastly the cognitive science is being outlined as such a one. As a complex science the cognitive science cognitivists helps, by means of elaboration of a general theoretical model of cognition and recreation of the world and of man as a unit system, better develop the specific cognitive abilities of any concrete scientific approach and along with this it presents us a general program for a further knowledge and recreation of the world by man, in which the complex interdisciplinary study proves to be not an occasional neighbourhood of different scientific approaches and still less their rivalry, but a systematically organised cognitive process.

Such investigations require a new methodology and new conditions for the solution of methodological problems of this kind. Along with this the succession of the different types of knowledge bulges against the background of the complex science when we examine this science in the aspect of its historical formation, i.e. not in the type in which it is being found now, but how it has prepared historically, how it has formed within the development of the social cognition.

Historical prerequisites and scientific search

At the dawn of human civilisation knowledge was formed on the level of the passive human contemplation. The contemplative-descriptive type of knowledge does not mix up with the train of events. The scientist only marks down and describes

the cognitive objects. Very often the building up and the interpretation of such a type of knowledge takes place by analogy, borrowing from another more developed field of knowledge. Not rarely it proves that reality does not coincide with the results of such a sort of investigations.

The enrichment of the contemplative-descriptive type of knowledge invokes a still larger differentiation of sciences, simultaneously producing a knowledge of experimental type, the experimental analysis of the phenomena. The explorer is able to influence the explored phenomenon and to determine the results of its influence. Receiving such a sort of knowledge man can describe the ways of influence having the desired effect upon the studied object and allowing manifold repetitions. But he cannot account the inner changes happening within the very object of cognition (as for example we can take the behaviour direction in psychology, when the behaviour of man is contemplated without taking into consideration the object's motivation and its value system). The experimental types of cognition is more objective than the just contemplative one, but it also remains subjective in respect of the criterions and the grounds into which the different sides of cognition are divided and investigated. The attractiveness of the experimental studies remain preserved thanks to their relative concreteness, although the generalisation of the results is quite onesided and is suited foremostly for relatively simple practical tasks. In the process of formation and affirmation of this type of cognition emerges also the notion multispectness, giving birth on the one hand to the boundary sciences, and on the other hand to the inter-disciplinary way of studying the phenomena. Thus in the process of strengthening the differentiation of sciences the way towards their integration is being marked.

The still higher type of scientific cognition is connected with the building up of the idealised theoretical systems. With it the dismembering and the study of phenomena comes to a further development, using the structural levels of their organisation. On the basis of these criterions the arrangement of the acquired multiaspect knowledge is made by way of the above described modes, coming thus to the abstract division of the structural levels of natural organisation of the objects of cognition. This is briefly the way how the process of the scientific cognition differentiation takes place, in which the basic canonic sciences as mathematics, physics, biology, psychology, etc., and their subdivisions have formed. This general regularity shows itself also in the case, when cognition as a subjective method of the scientific-examinational process turns itself into an object of study.

The differentiation of the basic aspects of cognition as an object of scientific study

The cognitive problem arises as far back as in the dawn of human culture. At the very beginning it has been connected with the problem of relation between the soul and the body. At that time the soul was postulated as an ideal, and the psychic as a spiritual substance. At such a state of things it was not possible to come to another point except to the idealistic parallelism. The scientific solution of the problem was deprived of logic and lost in the labyrinths of cognition, where the question of the essence and the nature of the physical did not assume the necessary significance. The psychology, logic and other studies developed quite independently, detached one from another, hiding at given moments from each other and representing at the end a conglomerate of knowledges.

In spite of this, still with Aristotle (in the IVth century B. C.) quite clearly emanated three aspects of cognition, becoming a subject of study of three independent scientific disciplines logic, psychology and gnosiology. We must immediately remark that if for the "Prior Analytics" where the logical theory of Aristotle about thinking (his ascertoric sylogistics) is displayed — such claims are characteristic as the following: "If A is predicated of every B, and B of every C, A must be predicated of every C"¹, then in his treatise "About the Soul" such clauses are characteristic as: "If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that."²

In his logical theory of the processes of thinking Aristotle deals with the forms of thinking in connection with the establishment of the logical conclusion laws, but these laws are examined in a state of full detachment from the inner nature of realisation in the human's soul. In the treatise "On the Soul", with which Aristotle lays in a determinative sense the foundations of psychology as an independent science discipline, he examines the thinking processes as forms adherent to man, along and equally with sensation, perception, imagination, etc. In "Metaphysics", where the theory of cognition—the gnosiology of Aristotle—is systematically outlined as a philosophical discipline, thinking is already treated mainly in connection with the question of its functions as a reflection of reality, and in this connection, of essential significance become such questions like the ones about the source of cognition and the possibility for an entire enclosure of the object (the object of cognition)

1 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, in: "The complete works of Aristotle", edited by Jonathan Barnes, Vol I, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1984, p. 41.

2 Aristotle, On the soul, ibid., p. 682.

Even when analysing some states that are included in its logical teaching, e. g. the law of contradiction in thinking in "Metaphysics", this question (the question of thinking) is examined as far as it is relevant to the gnosilogic aspects of cognition, viz. to attain in the thinking process the principal possibility for a clear and exact knowledge of reality (of the examined object).

In the process of the development of science the differentiation of the various aspects of cognition as objects of independent scientific disciplines acquires a further growth. The methodological problems of scientific cognition become the object of a special attention and single examination also in the treatise of Descartes "On the Method". Thus in the processes of this differentiation a fourth aspect of cognition—the methodological one—is outlined.

We must immediately stress that this process of differentiation of the various cognitive aspects into independent sciences does not run smoothly and equally. Also trends of mixing up or replacing of the one aspect with the others (psychologism in logic) are at hand. In other cases, contrary to the outlined trend, a quick affirmation of the boundary sciences is achieved. In the field of logic the essential use of mathematical methods by G. Boole and G. Frege from the XIXth century up to now, leads to the emergence of the mathematical logic, as a result of which the logical aspects of cognition acquire a still stronger differentiation in respect to the psychologo-gnosilogical, etc., aspects. By that time springs up the experimental psychology, and with the investigations made by Helmholtz, Wundt, I. P. Pavlov and others, a new aspect of cognition study—the fifth in the order of the survey—affirms itself: the psychologic fundamentals of the cognitive processes.

In the teaching of K. Marx about the relation between the social being and the social consciousness, as an essential element of the historical materialism, an essential stride in the differentiation of a sixth aspect of cognition is made—the sociological one, where consciousness is examined in connection with its role and mode of functioning in social life.

Without pretending to have brought forward all aspects of cognition that have differentiated themselves in a sufficient degree so as to become the object of independent scientific disciplines, we shall stress that in the epoch of the scientific technical revolution, with the emergence of the cybernetical theory and the computer technique from the middle of the XXth century, a new aspect of scientific cognition is being formed—the seventh aspect—which is connected with the mathematical modelling and application of mathematical methods and models in the psychology of cognitive processes and modelling the latter by computers. We can, with a certain conditionality, call this aspect *the cybernetic one*. Here we

include also the investigations that were lately named "artificial intelligence".

Leaning against the so described strategy of reasoning we can in their depth realise the grounds that have conditioned the evolutionary ideas connected with the problem of cognition of the physical phenomena and the contemporary trends in the elaborations of this question.

Conclusion

In conclusion we shall underline that in the epoch of the scientifico-technical revolution the integrative trend imposes itself as dominating, i.e. to span bridges between the different scientific disciplines, seeming to the scientist, who is educated in the traditional style of private scientific thinking, to be quite far away and abstract.

Recently the trend outlined itself towards establishing of contacts between specialists, working in different fields of science and having as an object the examination of different fields of cognition—psychologists, logicians, sociologists, linguists, psycholinguists, neurophysiologists, philosophers and others. The integrational trends in scientific cognition are characterised with a variety of forms. One of the higher forms of integrative trends in the formation of intermediate and complex sciences, without losing the sense of independent development of sciences like mathematics, physics, etc., or by the us so called canonical sciences³.

The building up of complex sciences is not the result of a whim of a single person, but has objective foundations with the fact that cognition represents an essentially complex multiaspectuous object (phenomenon), such a one that the application of exact scientific methods supposes the essential use of idealisation methods. Just this leads towards these interdisciplinary relations and imposes the application of the systematic approach.

In this connection before the methodologic cognition the task springs up to fulfill the architectural function in this process, to offer on the basis of the methodologic analysis of these processes an "architectural plan" for building up a complex science of cognition—the cognitive science.

This imposes on its side a larger and more active organisation of interdisciplinary forms of the scientific investigation and in interchange of knowledges. Except the holding of symposia and seminars the necessity has already ripened up to establish interdisciplinary scientific collectives, magazines and attempts for monographic elaborations of the problem about the cognitive science.

3 B Chendov, *Definiteness, indefiniteness, modalities and probability as categories of the modern scientific knowledge*, Sofia, 1974, p. 19-20.

VIII

Sociology of Religion

(With Special Reference to Karl Marx and Max Weber)

Bimal Chand Jain

In established societies 'religion' is one of the important institutional structures making up the total system. We can say that religion is concerned with a 'Beyond' with man's relation to and attitude towards that 'Beyond' and with that man consider to be the practical implications of the 'Beyond' for human life. So by this analysis religion has been characterised as embodying the most sublime of human aspirations, as being a bulwork of morality, a source of public order and inner individual peace, as ennobling and civilizing in its effect upon mankind.

The term religion has been developed, sharpened and explained in sacred scriptures and theology. A rationale is attempted to establish a union of man with the Beyond through the mechanism of religion. Yet it dwelled in mystery and exposed as revelation to man and society. Scientific quest urges a causal explanation of religion to society and its multiple institution on a plane of secular and material conditions of life. Here are two major approaches developed by the giant economic-sociologists viz. Karl Marx and Max Weber. They have unrevell'd the mystery of religion and sought to relate religion with socio-economic system in its empirical material condition.

Max Weber feels that religion plays an important role in social structure. It is also responsible for the existence of spirit of capitalism. Karl Marx, on the other hand, says that religion is a opiate for society and it hinders and deters social changes.

KARL MARX—(1818 1883)

According to Karl Marx religion is an opium for the people. Karl Marx presents religion simply as a derivative of more fundamental of social variables, an epiphenomenon with no casual significance. Marx thinks that in every society there are two classes having antagonistic nature in themselves. The majority of society belongs to working class i. e. Proletariat. By those he meant to designate a class which has to stake in the present and on going social set up. The worker worked and lived in a society of which he was in no genuine sense a part. Marxism became a secular salvation of gospel for a large number of the working class between the middle of XIX Century. Marx saw dysfunctional aspect of religion. Society involves a division of labour, relation of super ordination and subordination, differential access to facilities and differential distribution of both material and non material rewards. Society evolves in concrete setting in response to the demand made for human survival and satisfaction of wants by a given environment. What evolves is a division of labour and of reward patterned allocation. Thus allocation is a process which creates 'Haves' and 'Have nots', there is deprivation involved both absolute and relative. This deprivation can elicit active opposition or passive acceptance. According to Marx religion was the essence of man himself projected outside himself and refined or personified. The powers and capacities attributed to Gods were in fact man's own powers and capacities. The divine law was nothing but the law of man's own nature. After this thinking in the terms of Feurbach Marx again asked in what circumstances do men project their own powers, their own values upon hypothetical super human beings. What are the special causes of this phenomenon? It was only in this context and background that Marx further elaborated the role and real significance of religion in society.

Again in the opinion of Marx man makes religion. Religion does not make man. Religion is indeed man's self consciousness and self awareness as long as he has not found his feet in the universe. But man is not an abstract being, squatting outside the world. This state, this society produces religion which is an inverted world consciousness. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its general basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human being in as much as the human being possess no true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly a struggle against the world whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is at the same time an expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sign of the oppressed creature,

the sentiment of heartless world and the soulless condition. It is the opium for the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of men is a demand for their real happiness. The call to abandon their illusion about their conditions is to call to abandon a condition which requires illusions. The immediate task is to unmask human alienation in its secular form. Thus the criticism of heaven transforms itself into the criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law and criticism of theology into the criticism of politics. So in this sense Karl Marx criticises religion and saw religious institutions as dysfunctional for society. Religion is created by the 'haves' because this class can divert the attention of 'have nots' from the real world. By religion the oppressed class becomes unconscious for their rights and duties in society and by this 'the haves' class can oppress the class of 'have nots'. Thus according to Karl Marx religion is the opium for the working class given by the capitalists for fulfilling their self-interests and perpetuate inequalities.

MAX WEBER—(1864 1920)

The three volumes devoted by Max Weber to the sociology of religion represents possibly one of the most valuable contribution made in the field in XIX Century.

The fundamental problem of this study is to ascertain just what relationship is between economic and religious phenomena. His answer to the problem is that religious and economic phenomena are mutually inter-dependent and each of them is influenced by a series of other conditions also. But methodologically it is possible to take one of these factors as a variable and to find its specific effects in the field of economic phenomena. Max Weber takes religious factor as a methodological variable and tries to disclose its influence on the economic as well as on the other social phenomena. Thus it will not be incorrect to say that Weber is a pluralist and a functionalist. Max Weber takes 'economic ethics of a religion' to find the influence of religion on economic life. By the 'ethics of religion' he means not so much the various theological dogmas of religion as the totality of the practical forms of conduct required and urged by a religion from its members. He acknowledges that economic ethics of every religion is the result of various factors but among them the factor of religion is very important. All the factors of 'economic ethics' taken together would lead to infinity but factually it is impossible. One must take economic ethics as an essentially religious product and find the effects of religious conceptions of human situation for the development and demonstration of human society.

Max Weber saw religion as concerned with what he called the problem of meaning i.e. the fact that men not only need emotional

adjustment but also cognitive assurance when facing the problem of suffering and death. He also had in mind the human need to understand the discrepancy between expectation and actual happenings in society. Every cultural setting or man require answers to questions concerning human destiny i.e. the demands of morality and discipline and the evils of injustice, suffering and death. On the basis of comparative study he shows that there are several directions in which men may go to seek and work out answers to these problems. The world religions presented the working out different rationally integrated solutions to these problems. The problems which concerned Weber are those deriving from the basic facts of human conditions contingency, powerlessness and scarcity. Weber shows that religions by working out answers to these problems which become part of the established culture and institutional structures of a society effect in the most intimate way the practical attitude of men towards various activities of daily life. In this way religious conceptions affect the function of goals, the rules which regulate means and the general value structure affecting choice and decision. Max Weber considered that for its adherence religion provided an ultimate answer to the problem of meaning but it is an answer which through its institutionalization enters as a casual factor in the determination of human actions in various spheres of human activity. According to Max Weber in secular society the role of religion is like religion 'Surrogates'.

For Max Weber 'Charisma' played a very significant role in human society. It was a source of instability and innovation. Hence it created strategic element in social change.

Max Weber's interest in religion, comprehensive as it was, may be characterised by two strands running through out his work. In 'The Protestant Ethics And The Spirit of Modern Capitalism' and in his studies of non-Christian World religions he demonstrated the role of religion as an independent casual elements influencing action throughout history. In this demonstration he sought to counter-act the thin current one sided interpretation of Karl Marx which presented religion simply as a derivative of more fundamental social variables, an epiphenomenon with no casual significance. Weber argued that the ethics of Protestantism is antecedent to modern capitalism and that it was an important factor in its development. Max Weber takes the 'Economic ethics of religion' of six religions of the world i.e. Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and Judaism — and studies the character of 'Economic ethics of religion' of each of them with its effects on the economic organisation and life of the people who belong to one of these religions. In this way he tries to correlate religion with Economics.

Though various elements of what is styled a "Capitalistic Economy" has been found in the past and in many non-European society. Modern Western Capitalism is a recent and specific phenomena i.e. the spirit of modern Capitalism are a rationally organised and managed economic enterprises based on exact scientific principles, private property, the production for a market, the production for masses and through masses the production for money and maximum of enthusiasm. In such society work is not regarded as something incidental but as something for which man exists, his principal life vocation imposing on him the most important obligations to serve his vocation or calling earnestly, devotedly and religiously. In such societies men are estimated and paid according to the efficiency of their work. Those who are inefficient in their vocation go down and those who are efficient go up.

According to Max Weber spirit of modern Capitalism is not an image of the average business organisation or business or working man but an image of an ideal business organisation or an ideal captain of industry or business man. Thus it is one type of ideal type. In such organisations Max Weber again uses Ideal type as Time is money, Credit is money, Money grows money, Honesty is the best policy and through knowledge of Accountancy is necessary for any business.

Max Weber is of opinion that this modern western Capitalism has been originated by the Protestant religion. The spirit of modern capitalism is that of Protestantism and is nothing but rules of conduct and practical ethics. This is an example of Economic Organisations proceeded by the ideological factors. Economic social structure or Socio-economic structure and modern capitalism had a great cultural significance in Western Europe, being the centre of Christianity.

According to Max Weber it is not possible to investigate social phenomena without value judgment. He himself is no exception to it. He considered that social phenomenon is a complex thing. There are multiple causes for a single phenomenon. Which cause is more important in the phenomena is the choice of social scientist? It is his own value judgment. Max Weber found Protestant ethics more significant than others. Value judgment does not find any place in Marxian theory. Karl Marx used model. Karl Marx saw economic aspect i.e. Economic structure and its related effect on various aspects of society. He did not think that religion gives rise to economic order.

Max Weber's sociology of religion is interpretative or Weber's study is the subjective interpretative analysis of a subjective phenomenon. Karl Marx used it as an objective interpretation of objective phenomenon. Karl Marx considered social phenomenon as a natural

one but Max Weber distinguished both phenomena with each other. Religion is the alienated form according to Karl Marx but according to Max Weber religion is a form of institution. According to Max Weber religion plays a positive role in the spirit of capitalism. Hence it is a force. Max Weber's analysis of the teachings of Luther, Calvin and many other Protestant teachers show that the spirit of modern capitalism is based on the spirit of Protestantism and practical ethics of every day. Protestantism gives immense ethical values to the worldly vocation. It consecrates labour and propagates honest and enthusiastic performance of man's vocational work as his second duty. Protestantism also inspired honest money making as a sinless activity. Max Weber argued that since reformation economically leading countries have been the Protestant countries (Holland, England, America etc.) while the Roman Catholics or non-Protestant countries have been far behind. Max Weber tries to prove this by statistical data which shows that in Germany Protestant population is economically better off and their children attend practical and business schools in greater percentage than the Non-Protestants.

AUTHOR'S VIEW

Marxian study is based on Historical Materialism. In his study religion is the form of alienation. For Karl Marx religion is an illusion. It is a form of alienation to the society by which man bases his consciousness and is oppressed by another class. Hence religion is an opium for the people by which they become fatalist and think that their fate is responsible for their difficulties.

How the religion determines the Socio-Economic structure? It is very well demonstrated by Max Weber through Heuristic method of Ideal Types and a comparative study of world religions in relationship to socio economic system (capitalism). After a careful scrutiny and study of the Protestant ethics Weber developed a Rationale of Relationship of Religion—ethics and capitalism. Every religion prescribes ethics (code of conduct) which regulates and controls the social behaviour of Individual in particular and society in general. The social behaviour includes economic activity in its compass. The organisation of economic activities of plurality of individuals goes a long way to create the Economic system. The rationality involved in the capitalist system too derives its genesis from the ethics. Hence the Protestant ethics through the social behaviour (Economic Activities) determines the capitalistic economic system.

The theories of Karl Marx and Max Weber are opposite to each other. The fundamental differences are that Max Weber used Ideal Type in his study. In sociology of religion he constructs Ideal Type

and investigate them through Historical Methods. Max Weber considers spirit of capitalism a socio-phenomenon where as he uses Protestant Ethics and the spirit of Capitalism as an Ideal Type and improving his hypothesis he uses comparative Method.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of above mentioned analysis we can say that Max Weber saw religion as a functional phenomenon while Karl Marx saw religion as a dysfunctional phenomenon. But it is a fact, that is to be recognised that economic conditions of society and religion are some how related to each other. In nut-shell we can say that both are inter-related, interactive and inter dependent.

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Graphology and the Mystic State

Tore Høisaether

European psychiatrists, doctors and psychologists have for the last 75 years worked with graphology, and have laid the foundations of a method by which handwriting can be used to determine the mental state of the writer. A theory and method have been evolved through the collection and comparison of a large material of handwriting samples (Garde 1972, page 20). In addition, various experiments have been carried out (Garde 1971, page 166) to show the importance of graphology.

Handwriting is a sensitive instrument for the registration of personality changes. Not only phases of general development, but also changes in mood at the moment of writing, are revealed in handwriting (Teltscher 1969, page 199 and Garde 1972, page 16). The character of handwriting can also be modified experimentally, for instance by hypnosis, suggestion and medication (including tranquillizers and stimulants) and by physical influence (Garde 1971, page 164). The principle of graphology is based on the kinetic laws incorporated in man, each nerve and muscle movement arising in the brain which directs the movement of the hand.

One of the more recent developments in the practical application of handwriting analysis is its use as a diagnostic aid in mental disturbances. Wormser describes graphology as one of the best methods of personality diagnosis, and considers that in most cases it is superior to any other diagnostic method (Lundgren 1975, p. 189). In this connection I have carried out a handwriting experiment in ordinary (normal) state and during a "genuine" mystical experience (with factors such as harmony and deep peace, sense of ceremonial occasion, a deep consciousness of the reality of existence, a synthesis of two worlds, an increased perception of depth, greater concentration and a sense of harmony between outer and 'inner' perception).

The state occurred spontaneously during a walk, and was not accompanied by disorientation or amnesia.

Experimental method

In two parts of the experiment I wrote the same disconnected lines completely *spontaneously* (with no thought for 'penmanship'), the words being fairly neutral and chosen at random. I used writing materials to which I was accustomed (not ink), the paper used being of ordinary type on both occasions.

I had no expectation of any special results, and a check-up was made of my condition before and after the part of the experiment dealing with the mystical experience.

Result

A comparison between the handwriting (which is normal) in the parts of the experiment shows that the samples of writing (a small material), which were on both occasions written quickly, are almost identical in every way (e.g. with regard to size, regularity, slope, width, direction of lines, distance between words, shape of letters, connection between letters, difference in length, direction of movement, connective style, ornamentation, special character, level of form, elasticity, rhythm, thickness and strength of line; see Lundgren 1975). It is *not* possible to prove, on this basis, that I was in a "genuine" mystical state. In this connection I must mention that graphology as a method has its limitations (Lundgren 1975, pp. 242-243). It is based on knowledge and experience, but its individual elements are not all statistically supported (Garde 1972, page 21).

There is nothing to indicate that this "genuine" mystical state has been accompanied by psychic disturbances, the basic principle being that mental disturbances show almost dynamic modifications in the handwriting (e.g. peculiarly shaped letters, meaningless word formation, frequent overornamentation, constant repetitions and underlinings, many corrections, omissions, illegible and inharmonious writing, lines running in all directions, irregular pressure and breaks in rhythm; (see Teltscher 1969, pp. 129-133).

Apart from the above I have studied my handwriting (which is normal and with differing content) and the placing of the writing on the paper at several different times (a number of different lines being written on each occasion) both before, between and at short or long intervals after all the "genuine" mystical states (approx. 10) which I have experienced. On all occasions the material was written *spontaneously* and about equally quickly. Only pencil was used (clear writing) and the paper to which I am accustomed. The handwriting samples were all made without examination in mind.

It proves that the handwriting was very similar on all occasions, in every respect, which may indicate that such states did *not* lead to

major modifications (sub sequent modifications) in the personality which is also my personal experience), but that they instead give a changed outlook on life, new values, and more meaning.

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LOGICAL STRUCTURES IN MYSTICISM

It is the propositions of logical import and the combinations of these which it is the purpose of logic to investigate. The linguistic proposition should express, be the expression of, or refer to, the logical proposition.

Each logical proposition or combination of propositions has a certain structure, its elements are interconnected in a definite, characteristic manner. We call this structure of propositions or combinations of propositions their logical form. The problem of finding an expression of the logical form of a proposition or combination of propositions is of prime importance in the science of logic. Formal logic abstracts from the content of the proposition, and interests itself only in their logical form.

Logic attempts to set up rules which can be applied in deciding whether or not we are dealing with a logical conclusion. The logical validity of an argument is unaffected by whether the premises or conclusion are actually true. If there is a logical consequence between the premises and the conclusion, the conclusion is logical and valid.

Let us now look at a number of syllogisms in ordinary condition or state, and then in "true" mystical states (using value expressions), in which the point of departure is as follows: value nihilism or the emotive theory denies that combinations of words using value designations are meaningful statements about anything ("good" and "beautiful" for instance are grammatically meaningful but not logical designations). Value statements should according to this theory not be compared with descriptive statements, but should be considered rather as exclamations (e. g. "Ah!"), which give expression to an emotional attitude but make no statements about anything.

In a "true" mystical state (in which the subject is clear-headed and concentrated and with the presence of factors such as a sensation of solemnity, silence, "inner" unity, unity with the surroundings, alterations of sensory data and the experience of true reality) there is however perfect harmony and deep peace, so that it is impossible to react emotionally to value expressions. The emotional charge of 'affective meaning' of a word disappears completely.

From the standpoint of value nihilism a number of (simple) statements (premises and conclusions) are thus altered to completely different statements in "true" mystical states, a fact which should be of special interest to logical thought, and which is demonstrated, inter alia, by the following :

In normal state

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>All flowers are beautiful</p> <p>(1) <i>All roses are flowers</i></p> <p>All roses are beautiful</p> | <p>All flowers are not ugly</p> <p>(2) <i>All roses are flowers</i></p> <p>All roses are not ugly</p> |
|---|---|
- No flowers are ugly
- (3) *All roses are flowers*
- No roses are ugly,

which takes on the following logical form in "true" mystical states (with one transcendental premise and one transcendental conclusion in each, T standing for the transcendental), the value expressions being eliminated from the statements, and thus showing what the statements mean, where "are" must mean exist.

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>T-all flowers are</p> <p>(1) <i>All roses are flowers</i></p> <p>T-all roses are</p> | <p>T-all flowers are not</p> <p>(2) <i>All roses are flowers</i></p> <p>T-all roses are not</p> |
|---|---|
- T-no flowers are
- (3) *All roses are flowers*
- T-no roses are

We see that premises and conclusions, which can express something about reality, are transformed into completely different statements, which are meaningless or absurd in "true" mystical states. (where there are many other syllogisms with other kinds of premises and conclusions). This shows something of the strange relationship between these two realities. In a "true" mystical state only the second premise is retained in all three cases. This does not, however, mean that it is not possible to draw a valid conclusion from the two premises.

The words we use must have meaning if they are to form meaningful statements, but in a "true" mystical state value expressions have no value. Here the words must be completely empty of content, as one of the criteria of such a state is complete harmony.

In connection with value expressions the following may be mentioned: although emotive words cannot be understood in a "true" mystical state, all other words can be (in this connection both value expressions and ordinary words have been studied).

Although no experiments have been carried out with the above statements (premises and conclusions), the result must be as indicated, where the value expression becomes neutral or consists only of a few neutral letters, words or sounds without meaning, whereas other words are retained.

Among the things language communicates are feelings, but this is not so in a "true" mystical state. This is of prime importance in language and thought in changed states of consciousness.

Let us look more closely at what characterizes language in such experiences (what certain sentences mean), where statements in the singular with a single individual as subject (i.e. "Per..."). These sentences must not be considered as being special, but only as part of the logical form in which they are expressed. The value expressions will be underlined.

The result will be a number of (simple) sentences, where for instance an expression which states a relationship is transformed into other sentences with another relation in "true" mystical states (where a) means in ordinary state and (b) means in a "true" mystical state). For example :

- (1) (a) Tor is *good* at school, if the class is P. T.
 (b) Tor is at school, if the class is P. T.
- (2) (a) Ola is *poor* at school, if it is exam time.
 (b) Ola is at school, if it is exam time.

In logic, statements A and B are called contradictory, as they cannot both be true and not both be false. E.g. : (A) It is raining,

(B) It is not raining; therefore :

- (3) (a) Either Per is *good* at school or Per is not *good* at school.
 (b) Either Per is at school or Per is not at school.
- (4) (a) If Per is *good* at school, then Per is not *poor* at school.
 (b) If Per is at school, then Per is not at school
 (which is meaningless)

A contradictory sentence is self contradictory, e.g. : "A wise man is not wise", therefore :

- (5) (a) If Per is *good*, then Per is not *good*
 (b) If Per is (exists), then Per is not (which is also meaningless)
- (6) (a) A *beautiful* flower is not *beautiful*
 (b) A flower is not (does not exist)

For that matter similarity and totality, for instance, acquire to some degree a different meaning in "true" mystical states, according

to that we have seen above, for instance, in connection with a number connected with a value expression. For example :

- (7) (a) 6 *good* boys = 6 *good* boys
 (b) 6 boys = 6 boys (but no good boys)
- (8) (a) 6 *good* boys + 3 *good* boys = 9 *good* boys
 (b) 6 boys + 3 boys = 9 boys (but no good boys)

We see how the content of the above sentences becomes completely changed in a "true" mystical state, and this can thus be seen as a changed relationship to reality, as the subject of such experiences is tied to two different worlds (one ordinary and one transcendental).

On the basis of what is mentioned in this article the following must be pointed out: in a "true" mystical state all sentences with any kind of value expression must be altered to create a language adapted to a transcendental picture of the world (as there is here a religious dimension; there is a unity of thought, feeling and action, the whole is overwhelming, the emotional life is expanded in the transcendental meaning of the term, the world seems "new" and there is an experience of the broadening of life and an access of power). There must therefore be a transcendental language and logic. This form of thinking is in accord with a reality encountered in another dimension.

When reality changes, so does language. When language changes, so does reality. The understanding of reality depends on language and language depends on reality. This indicates the central importance of language for our conception of the world.

This article is an independent paper (based on the author's own spontaneous "true" mystical experiences). I have not seen such an investigation mentioned in the literature.

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We shall now take a glance at the different aspects of "true" mystical states (on the basis of my own experience), aspects which have a certain connection with the other articles. It may be interesting and of importance to throw light on these aspects, of which only little mention has been made in the literature.

MYSTICISM AND PSYCHIATRY

The most important distinguishing line between healthy and diseased where the mind is concerned is found when we hear of the circumstances of the origin of the symptoms. Often it is not what actually has been experienced that is decisive. The cause of symptoms in disease is often said to be inner conflict. However, "true" mystical states are not experienced as being forced, and they have no appearance of escape. There is no feeling of doubt, and no confusion of ideas. In such states there is no longing towards God or the absolute, towards unity or peace and rest. There are no fantasies about divinity or self glorification; one tends rather to feel "small". On this basis we can ask the question: How many elements are there? How does the personality actually function? What is the synthesis-function?

The free will becomes a question of the degree of psychopathology, where mental illness is conceived as being a disease of freedom. The sicker one is, the less capacity for free choice. An illness is evaluated as something negative. In "true" mystical states, however, a goal is achieved, something desirable which is brought about by a choice.

In connection with such states it may be mentioned that experiments have been carried out which show the following:

(a) It is possible to have an abstract experience on the basis of an experiment with the Rubin's vase, respectively double-profile figures.

(b) There is probably more "intoxication" (more lack of clarity) and a longer intoxicating effect (after intake of alcohol) in "true" mystical states than in ordinary states.

(c) Pulse, respiration and body temperature are as in ordinary states, but it is possible that the pain threshold is higher and that smell and taste are more pronounced in changed consciousness, although hearing and sight appear to be the same.

As to the cause of such states, the following can be stated: Certain people can probably get into "true" mystical states (transcendental personality splitting) e.g. spontaneously, by harmony and calm, and passive attention, permitting integration in the limbic system (so that e.g. "inner" unity and "the light" bring about outer unity) and achieve improved contact with the right-hand half of the brain, which has connections to the unconscious. This may be due to an aptitude for special brain processes or certain biochemical processes, in which a newly-discovered hormone (a substance resembling morphine), which is a neuropeptide, may be of great importance.

In "true" mystical states a new connection is established in existence; a religious unity and integration (is there a transcendental

art ?) This is a unity of thought, feeling and action. The whole soul is engaged in the religious attitude to life. This religious state gives contact with a spiritual reality (a transcendental "power"). A greater, more important, deeper and higher reality which bursts the boundaries of the world of experience (is there a transcendental universe?) Religion is the attitude of the total spiritual life to a trans-subjective reality. The state is alive, and we look at it as something of importance, engaged and with wonder. If we wish to speak of religious truth we can thus think of the living and forceful way in which inner experiences can make themselves felt. The experiences and thought lines of "true" mystical experiences can unite to form a pattern which makes a religious interpretation convincing.

"True" mystical states show a definite regularity and belong together in a certain context; there is a special structural regularity in this context. There is order in the way the parts form a whole, a whole of which the individual parts are interdependent. These states form part of the nature of religion and show a comprehensive system with an inner structure showing no disunity. In such states religious conceptions are of great importance and in this connection it must be mentioned that I have never doubted (not since the first experience of a "true" mystical state many years ago) that there has been contact with a transcendental world. Here we must look at the way in which the experience of another reality is founded and the psychological development of the concepts. In "true" mystical states one has advance knowledge of 'the documents of the case'—all of them premises. Irrelevant details which happen to crop up are not made into premises. It must be added that many "normal" people have had special religious or transcendental experiences which have a certain relation to the above-mentioned states. It can also be pointed out that many students of religion are of the opinion that there is a transcendental "force" outside man; with which contact can be made. On the basis of all this it must be possible to establish that such religious concepts have nothing to do with delusions.

Mysticism and Language

In "true" mystical states there is a kind of transcendental overlying, underlying and juxtaposed concepts which show the structures in the transcendental world.

These concepts can be set up as follows :

Overlying and underlying concepts

Juxtaposed concepts (similarity)

"the all-one" "nothingness" revelation (stamp of ceremony)
(inner) unity (outer) unity (inner and outer) unity wholeness (Psychic) harmony integration calm (inner and outer relations).

This applies to "abstract" transcendental concepts arranged in a "hierarchy" of lower and higher concepts or lower and higher steps of unity. The higher the concepts, the more transcendental and abstract they are. Each single underlying concept has in a way the same overlying concepts (what is common to the underlying concepts). Each concept reflects the transcendental world: Harmony, unity, transcendental "force" and thus "contains" all the other concepts. The different concepts give the relative strength of these fundamental concepts in the transcendental world.

A transcendental "force" has the effect that all these concepts are "spiritual" and are thus given a content of "life" and unity. They express a comprehensive unity and interdependence, which again gives greater insight into another reality.

We can for that matter look at some of the conclusions which affect judgement logic. In disjunctive conclusions a premise is a disjunctive statement; the second premise is a categorical statement. It is possible, for instance, to draw a conclusion from "p or q" and "not -q" to "p". A dilemma is a hypothetical disjunctive conclusion, where two premises are hypothetical and one premise disjunctive, e.g. "If p, then q; if r then s; either p or r; thus either q or s".

If on the basis of the above the value expression e.g. "pretty" or beautiful") is used attached to a noun in a number of sentences in various combinations (one or more value expressions) in ordinary states, we can arrive at other sentences (premises and conclusions) which on the other hand follow the rules of judgement logic, in a "true" mystical state, as the value expression has no value in such states and is thus eliminated from the sentences.

In connection with that mentioned above it is natural to mention hypothetical conclusions. In such conclusions at least one of the premises is a hypothetical statement, for instance, "if p, then q" and "p" to "q". On this basis it can be stated that if various value expressions are used in different combinations (one or more) in ordinary states, one may arrive at a number of statements with a different content in "true" mystical states.

Finally it must be mentioned that there may be a kind of polyvalent system in "true" mystical states, in that value concepts such as "pretty", "clever" and "good" may be divided up (e.g. association and emotional content), so that these value concepts and sentences with such expressions can be given different values on the basis of understanding and truth in relation to different references, e.g. association and value expressions (meaning). Such a polyvalent system fits in with a transcendental world, but this is something very different from a polyvalent system in general. The language of another reality may correspond with a polyvalent world structure. This means that the language reproduces (represents, symbolizes) reality, so that one obtains a different and more comprehensive view of the reality of a transcendental world.

All these aspects and the other articles can be studied more closely by comparative studies (in relation to other literature). All this can also be checked or tested by other researchers and their experimental subjects.

Book-Reviews :

H G. Singh, (Editor) *The Vedic Path*, Quarterly Journal of Research, Special Number, *Psychological Traditions in India*, June 1986; Price Rs. 15/-, Publisher Gurukul Kangri University, Harwar.

'Psychological Traditions of India' are deep and strong and they lie interwoven with philosophy and religion except the yogic systems which are Indian equivalents to contemporary psychological systems. The psychological insights are clear and effective but not so elaborately stated as western psychological knowledge.

Prof. Allport is an eminent American psychologist. In his well-known book, "Pattern and Growth in Personality", he is apologetic about his lack of knowledge of Indian psychology and writes :

"Curiosity concerning the nature of man is not confined to the West. It is inexcusable provincialism for scholars in the West to neglect the wisdom of the East. Although I cannot hope in this volume to redress the balance, I can, as a bare token of adequacy, call attention to one pertinent formulation in Hindu psychology.

"Most men, the theory holds, have four central desires. To some extent, though only roughly, they correspond to earlier and later periods of life. Pleasure is the first desire. It is predominant in infancy, but remains throughout later ages. The desire for pleasure is soon supplemented by the need for success. Youth and the middle years are spent in the pursuit of occupational and social achievement. Some people never go beyond these two stages of desire. But as maturity sets in there is normally a strong orientation toward duty. One must provide for one's offspring and aging parents, and the ethics of social living take hold upon one's values. Finally, and especially toward the end of one's life, comes a desire for understanding — for philosophical or religious meaning — and with it a longing for liberation from the pleasure-success duty stages of life." (H. Smith, *The Religions of Man*, (N. Y. :Harper, 1958).

"It is interesting to note that no major Western school of psychology includes this whole sequence of four stages within its view of human nature. Positivist psychology gives full and lavish attention to the first two stages — to pleasure, in its theories of tension-reduction, reinforcement, libido, and needs; and to success, in its studies of power, status, leadership, achievement, masculinity. But positivist psychology has little to say about the duty motive (except that it is a reaction to the internalized parent image) and still less to say about the desire for philosophical and religious meaning, except to hint that such desire is a defense mechanism, an escape device no different in kind from suicide, alcoholism, and neurosis. Existentialism, by contrast, gives full recognition to duty (responsibility) and to the will-to-meaning. Yet oddly, existentialism says little about pleasure and success as motives.

"Therefore it seems that this Hindu formulation of the essential nature of man is more synoptic and complete than any one school of Western thought".

Besides Allport many other Western students of psychology recognise the truths of Indian insights into personality. But these

ghts need to be recognised by us and organised into a separate body of knowledge. That knowledge will prevail and nobody, will have to seek recognition for Indian psychology. We only need to work together and work out psychological insights living in different branches of Knowledge.

Indian Traditions in psychology are writ large on the entire face of Indian culture. They have to be seen as they were traditionally in India and then rendered into modern form.

The first psychological writing, "Indian Psychologist in Search of His Soul" purports to say that Indian psychologists have, in reality, a strong soul i.e., a strong body of psychological knowledge but, because of its form being so different from that of modern psychological knowledge, feel as though they had no psychological knowledge at all. We surely had a true hold over personality and we could seek and achieve perfection in life. That Indian history demonstrates well enough.

The same author has another article in the Special Number under consideration, viz. 'The Vivid Reality of Indian Psychology' where a contemporary development of Indian psychology, the Integral Yoga of Sri Aurobindo, is considered along with other yogic systems. There is also another article on the same subject i.e., the integral Yoga of Sri Aurobindo by Prof. Sharma of Firozabad. He has discussed integral yoga more widely, explaining in particular its concept of transformation.

Ayurveda abounds in psychological knowledge and this special number contain 3 papers on the subject, of which 'Abnormal Psychology in Ayurveda' is a comprehensive study. It deals with, in particular, personality in Ayurveda. It also discusses Ideal personality. It says, "According to Ayurveda for a healthy person it is necessary that the sense organs should be clear, the activity of mind should be normal and thirdly the most important of all is the spiritual health". It is interesting that spiritual health is not excluded from Ayurveda. The other two papers too are good, though brief.

"Land marks in Indian Psychology", possible areas and Topics of Research in Indian Psychology', Indian Psychology, New Vistas etc. and 'Literature on Indian Psychology' can be said to be particularly useful studies.

The article on 'Tirukural, the great Tamil writing, which has determined the cultural tone of Tamil Nadu is a good representation of the moral and spiritual virtues listed as 33 in number are proposed as traits of personality. But the personality of Tirukural is a thing to be worked out.

Jain Psychology is a vast subject, our paper on the subject is a brief study. Such studies have to be carried on. Jain discipline is a rich field of experience. The paper on Parapsychology is a good introduction.

Western Psychology has passed through many phases in its brief history. The present phase is a phase of emphasis on behaviour and practical applications to life, in health, education, industry, business and even in social or political life. And all this has evident utility. However, scientifically considered it has limitation. It is based on average life and average circumstances, where the inner dynamics are changed and the outer correlation automatically chan-

ges. Attitude and interest are functions yet least known and when a new interest is aroused in a personality, that changes its reactions.

The essential standpoint of Indian psychology was different. It aimed at knowing personality as it is by itself. The inner consciousness is the man. Behaviour is the outer consequence. And it was a normative study i.e., it aimed at changing it into the right form. It therefore sought to mobilise the deeper psycho-dynamics. It had its applications all round, but its form was different not like our present scales, tests, and others.

This was the character of Indian psychology. And it has an essential strength, which, however, has to be discovered and duly mistranslated in modern language.

In the West it was Jung who wanted to find out the true secret of personality and he discovered that behind all the polarity of life there is a centre, or self commenting integrative capacity over the diversity of life, which also accounts for creativity and uniqueness of personality. The same is now sought to be mobilised by Jungian Analysts. Their experience, when it becomes powerful, will bring about a change in what personality, essentially is and how it is to be changed.

Jungian Analysts through clinical experience are well on the way to change the course of psychology in the West.

This is of a special interest to Indian psychology.

Prof. H. G. Singh has found a mine of Psychological knowledge in Atharvaveda, also called the Brahma Jnana Veda. It indeed contains the basic insights of human nature, which can be elaborated into a complete system of Psychology.

His efforts for the recovery of Indian Psychology and duly supported by knowledge of it and he is bound to succeed in achieving his object, which inspires us all,

—Indra Sen, Pondicherry

Keith Dowman: *Masters of Mahamudra*, Songs and Histories of the Eighty Four Buddhist Siddhas, pp. 454, Published by the State University of New York Press, Albany, N. Y. 12246 (U.S.A.) 1985.

Mahamudra is name of the highest tantric path to Buddhahood, and it is the ultimate goal itself. The eighty-four masters of Mahamudra were the original founding fathers of the Mahamudra tradition who formulated its techniques of meditation, and also the founders' lineal successors who practiced those techniques. They all attained the realization of Buddhahood. These masters were called Mahasiddhas — Great attainers — and they lived in India between the eighth and twelfth centuries.

This great work on the masters of Mahamudra is an adaptation of the Tibetan text called Legends of the Eighty four Mahasiddhas. Here we have eighty-four authentic tantric legends, eighty four paradigms of tantric meditation technique, and eighty four personalities, some historical, some archetypal, who lived in India between the eighth and twelfth centuries.

The eighty four chapter headings are the names of the siddhas of the legends. The first component of the material under each title

is "song of realization" translated from the Tibetan text called Vajra Songs, : The Heart Realization of the eighty four Mahasiddhas compiled by a scholar named Vira Prakash. These song reveal the nature of the siddhas' realization and the path they traversed to reach it. Beneath this verse is the legend itself. The introduction of this work is also an introduction to the Buddhist Tantra, which reaches its climax in Mahamudra. This background gives the insight into the context and techniques of Mahamudra meditation and also into the concepts and terminology of the meditation instruction in the legends.

Under the Heading Historiography, all the material relevant to the task of establishing the historical identity of the siddha, his place in a lineage, and the period of his existence, has been gathered together. The Glossary of Sanskrit terms have been provided. Line drawings of twenty of the siddhas have been provided in the book by Hugh R. Downs.

A very illustrative chapter on Introduction has been provided in which details about Tantra, Siddhas, history, meditation, great powers (Siddhis), extra sensory powers, the transformative modes of action — purification, enrichment, control and destruction, Gurus, Lamas etc. have been provided and along with this chapter 'Notes to the Introduction' is explanatory.

Songs and legends of the Eighty-four Mahasiddhas which have been discussed are as follows: 1. Luipa, The Fish-Gut Eater; 2. Lilapa, the Royal Hedonist, 3. Virupa, Dakini Master, Dombipa, The Tiger Rider, 4. Savaripa, the Hunter. Saraha the Great Brahmin, 5. Savaripa, the Hunter, 6. Saraha — the Great Brahmin, 7. Kankaripa, The Lovelorn Widower, 8. Minapa, the Hindu Jonah, 9. The Nath Siddha Goraksa, The Immortal Cowherd 10. The Nath Siddha Caurangipa, The Dismembered Stepson, 11. The Siddha Vinapa, The Musician, 12. The Mahasiddha Santipa (Ratnakarasanti), The Complacent Missionary, 13. The Mahasiddha Tanipa, the Senile Weaver, 14. The Siddha Camaripa, the Cobbler, 15. The Siddha Khadgapa, The Fearless Thief, 16. The Mahasiddha Nagarjuna, Philosopher and Alchemist, 17. The Mahasiddha Kanhapa (Krsnacharya), the Dark Siddha, 18. The Mahasiddha Aryadeva (Karnaripa), the One-Eyed, 19. The Siddha Thaganapa, The Compulsive Liar, 20. The Mahasiddha Naropa, The Dauntless, 21. The Siddha Syalipa, The Jackal Yogin, 22. The Mahasiddha Tilopa, the Great Renunciate, 23. The Siddha Catrapa, The Lucky Beggar, 24. The Siddha Bhadrappa, The Executive Brahman, 25. The Siddha Dukhandhi, the Scavenger, 26. The Siddha Ajogi, the Rejected Wastrel, 27. The Siddha Kalapa, the Handsome Madman, 28. The Siddha Dhobipa, the Wise Washerman. 29. The Siddha Kankana, the Sidnha King. 30. The Mahasiddha Kambala (Lwa wa pa). The Black-Blanket-Clad Yogin, 31. The Mahasiddha Dengipa, The Courtesan's Brahmin Slave, 32. The Siddha Bhandepa, The Envious God, 33. The Siddha Tantepa, The Gambler, 34. The Mahasiddha Kukkuripa, the Dog Lover, 35. The Siddha Kucipa, The Goitre-Necked Yogin, 36. The Siddha Dharmapa, The Eternal Student, 37. The Siddha Mahipa, "The Greatest", 38. The Siddha Achinta, The Avaricious Hermit, 39. The Siddha Babhaha, the Free Lover, 40. The Siddha Nalinapa, The Self Reliant Prince, 41. The

Mahasiddha Bhusuku (Santideva) The Idle Monk, 42. The Mahasiddha Indrabhuti, The Enlightened Siddha-king, 43. The Siddha Mekopa, Guru Dread — Stare, 44. The Siddha Kotalipa (Tog tse pa), The Peasant Guru, 45. The Siddha Kamparipa, The Blacksmith, 46. The Mahasiddha Rahula, Jalandhara, The Dakini's Chosen One, 47. The Mahasiddha The Rejuvenated Dotard, 48. The Siddha Dharmapa (Gharbari), The Contrite Pandita, 49. The Siddha Dhakaripa, The Bowl-Bearer, 50. The Siddha Medhini, The Tired Farmer, 51. The Siddha Pankajapa, The Lotus-Born Brahmin, 52. The Mahasiddha Ghantapa, The Celebrate Bell-Ringer, 53. The Siddha Jogipa, The Siddha-Pilgrim, 54. The Mahasiddha Celukapa, The Revitalized Drone, 55. The Siddha Godhuripa, The Bird Catcher, 56. The Siddha Lucikapa, The Escapist, 57. The Siddha Nirgunappa, The Enlightened Moon, 58. The Siddha Jayananda, Crow Master, 59. The Siddha Pacaripa, The Pastrycook, 60. The Siddha Compaka, The Flower-King, 61. The Siddha Bhiksanapa the Potter, 64. The Nath Siddha Carbaripa (Carpata), The Petrifier, 65. The Yogini Siddha Manibhadra, The Happy Housewife, 66. The Yogi Siddha Mekhala, The Elder Severed Headed Sister, 67. The Yogini Siddha Kanakhala, The Younger Severed-Headed Sister, 68. The Siddha Kilakilapa, The Exiled Loud-Mouth, 69. The Siddha Kantalipa, The Ragman-Tailor, 70. The Siddha Dhahulipa, The Blistered Rope-Maker, 71. The Siddha Udhilipa, The Bird Man, 72. The Kapali Siddha Kapalapa, The Skull-Bearer, 73. The Siddha Kirapalapa (Kilapa), The Repentant Conqueror, 74. The Mahasiddha Sakara (Saroruba), The Lotus-Born, 75. The Siddha Sarvabhaksha, The Glutton, 76. Mahasiddha Nagabodhi, The Red-Horned Thief, 77. The Mahasiddha Darikapa, Slave King of the Temple Whorer, 78. The Siddha Putalpa, The Mendicant Icon Bearer, 79. The Siddha Upanaha, The Bootmaker, 80. The Siddha Kokilipa, The Complacent Esthete, 81. The Mahasiddha Anangapa, The Handsome Fool, 82. The Yogini Mahasiddha Laksminkara, The Crazy Princess, 83. The Siddha Samudra, The pearl Diver and 84. The Siddha Vyalipa: The Courtesan's Alchemist.

After describing Songs and Histories of the Eighty Four Buddhist Siddhas, Appendix I: Text and Sources, and Appendix II: The Siddhas' Genealogical and Genealogical Tree and have been provided. Besides are: Notes on the Commentary, Glossary of Sanskrit Terms and Glossary of Numeral Terms, Abbreviations and Bibliography and Indexes.

It is really a very exhaustive great and explanatory book on Masters of Mahamudra in which songs and histories of the eighty-four Buddhist Siddhas have been described and in the end two Appendix have added to the scholarly contribution of this great volume. Two glossaries one of Sanskrit Terms and another of Numeral Terms have very well explained and addition by the author which has made the whole book a very great contribution to the Buddhist literature of the great Masters of Mahamudra. The author Keith Dowman has done a great service in bringing out such a nice comprehensive and exhaustive volume on Buddhist Siddhas and deserves our most hearty congratulations. The Publisher, State University of New York Press, Albany, N. Y. (U.S.A.) also deserve praise for publishing such a nice volume.

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